Finally, on the extreme west of the Argonne is the chain of hills running north and south, crowned by the Argonne Forest which separates the Argonne district from the rolling plains of the Champagne. It is part of the next of the circular crests which have Paris as a center.

From earliest history the Argonne Forest hill chain has played an important part as a military obstacle. The difficulties the Royal Prussian Army had in getting over it contributed largely to the defeat of that army by the Republican French one at Valmy in 1792.

From the end of the First Battle of the Marne in 1914, the Germans had held to it firmly.

Now from its western slopes they could fire into the eastern, or left, flank of the Fourth French Army in the Champagne, and from its eastern slopes into the left, or western, flank of the American troops fighting their way north through the Argonne.

It took the advance of the French in the Champagne and the Battle of Chene-Tondu-Chatel-Chehery on our side in the Argonne to drive the Germans from this hill chain and deprive them of the tremendous benefits of flank attack, of which they took the fullest advantage.

Our 77th New York, 28th Pennsylvania and 82d Divisions, the latter from Georgia, Alabama and Tennessee, have vivid recollections of this prolonged combat. In this battle occurred the new famous heroic incidents of Major Whittlesey's Lost Battalion of the 77th Division and the then Corporal Alvin C. York's extraordinary leadership of his squad of seven men, which brought him the unusual distinction of the award of our Medal of Honor.

The Battle of Exermont-Gesnes and the Battle of Landres St. George were the first and second acts of the same drama.

In the first the ground in front of and including all the advanced natural strong points were captured and the Germans driven back into the prepared position of the Kriemhilde Stellung.

This battle was part of the second phase of the Argonne Campaign.

In the second that Stellung with its deep trenches in some parts, in shallower ones elsewhere and its many bands of barbed wire everywhere was broken through.

This battle was in the third phase of the Argonne.

Thus when the final general attack of the American Army came on November first, the troops which made it had the tremendous advantages given them as the result of the second act in which the 42nd (Rainbow) had broken the Stellung by capturing Hill 288 and the Cote de Chatillon while the 32nd had broken it by capturing the Cote Dame Marie.

The first and greatest of these advantages was that they were inside and not outside the Stellung.

The second was that they occupied the dominating ground and were looking down on the Germans instead of the reverse being the case as was true throughout the second act.

The third was that the German morale which had been high while occupying the dominant positions and shooting down the attacking Americans until in many cases their dead almost carpeted the slopes up which they advanced again and again was as far depressed when such slaughter had failed to stop the American attack.

The battle of Exermont-Gesnes is important to the 42nd for a number of other reasons. Before the infantry came in to relieve the infantry of the first division the night of Oct. 11-12, the 67th Artillery Brigade of the 42d was in support of the 32d Division from Oct. 7 to 12 inclusive during their attacks on the right of the 1st Division.

Where the First Division was when the battle of Exermont-Gesnes came town end determined the jump off position of the d when they began the battle of Landres-St.-George.

This jump off position which was a salient dominated from the front and on the right center and right flanked by the Germans on the hills and crests of the Kriemhilde Stellung determined the course of the battle.

Then the men of the Rainbow have been long interested in the bodies of their gallant comrades of the 35th, 1st and 91st Divisions with which the ground everywhere in front of the captured German positions was strewn and which were also mixed with the German dead in these positions.

The Rainbow buried most of these men. They did so under enemy shell fire which exacted a toll of dead and wounded.

In the battle of Exermont-Gesnes approximately 125,000 American troops were engaged.

This is a twenty-five per cent larger force engaged than the total of the Union Army at Gettysburg, one of the decisive battles in the history of the world. We had approximately 125,000 in the Battle of Exermont-Gesnes. The Union Army at Gettysburg was not quite 100,000.

It was their first hard battle for at least half our men.

It was a rough introduction to real combat because even the veterans of such bloody fights as Soissons and the Ourcq considered this battle fiercer.

The late afternoon and night of September 27, 1918, tired Kansans and Missourians of the 35th Infantry Division, and men from our Rocky Mountains, Pacific Coast states and far away Alaska, who belonged to the "Wild West" of 91st Infantry Division wearily finished their fox holes. They dug them along a line about two and a half miles south of the Exermont-Gesnes Ravine, where a few days later their dead were to outline the highwater mark of their advance.

They had driven forward nearly five miles since the attack began early the previous morning. The fox holes would give them some shelter for the night from the enemy's fire, but none from the weather. That is, for those who finished them without being killed or wounded by the enemy's fire. The number whose digging was thus ended was numerous.

What was ahead of them the next day?

Except more fighting, and probably heavier fighting, because the enemy's resistance was markedly stiffening, they did not know.

The Treaty of Verdun in 1843, divided the Empire of Charlemagne into three parts, two of which became modern France and Germany. Since Verdun has played a prominent part in the history of these two nations. Besieged in the Revolution, again in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, it was, with its surrounding territories of the Argonne, the Heights of the Meuse, and the Plains of the Woevre, in 1916, the center of the most stubborn defense in history.

The St. Mihiel Battle cleared its rear, or southern side, of the German threat. Our subsequent advance in the Argonne cleared

its western side. The American battles—by which our troops fought their way from the Argonne eastward across the Meuse, driving the Germans from the hills just north of Verdun—removed the last menace.

Shortly after the close of the St. Mihiel Battle, our line stretched from just southeast of Verdun's outer forts southeast across the Plain of the Woevre to just across the Moselle River at Pont-a-Mousson.

From the right of our line at Port-sur-Sielle to the City of Metz itself, was a scant ten miles; to the outer defenses of the fortress, of which the City of Metz is the center, but five miles. From the center of our line to the outer defenses facing Verdun was about ten miles.

Thus, the St. Mihiel Battle finished with our line in an excellent position for the jump-off in an attack on the historic Metz.

Metz, like Verdun, but thirty-five miles away across the Plain of the Woevre, has a long and dramatic history. Nearly 2,000 years ago at the time of the conquest of Gaul by the Romans under Julius Caesar, Metz was a city of the Gauls. During the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussians, by the Battles of Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte St.-Privat, the middle of August, 1870, prevented General Bazaine, commanding the French, from retreating from Metz to Verdun. Instead they shut him up and beseiged him in Metz. Six weeks later, he surrendered with his whole army. In the peace treaty, Metz passed to Germany.

The bloody field of Mars-la-Tour could be seen from our lines where our St. Mihiel attack stopped.

The Germans expected the next American attack to be made in the direction of Metz, probably both on the eastern and western banks of the Moselle River. The steps taken by General Pershing and his staff to encourage them to believe this are an interesting story. Such an attack, on a large scale made by both French and American Armies, to begin November 14th, was the one the Rainbow was on its way to when the Armistice begun at eleven the morning of November 11th put an end to the fighting.

In the meantime, while holding the line across the Woevre Plain, our army was to make the surprise attack through the Ar-

gonne General Pershing had finally agreed to. General Gouraud's Fourth French Army was to make a simultaneous attack in the Champagne to the immediate west of the Argonne.

The Germans being suspicious made trench raids in the Argonne to get prisoners. However they only found older French men of the divisions used to garrison quiet sectors.

American officers on their preliminary reconnaissance in the Argonne wore French helmets and overcoats.

More than 200,000 French and Italian troops were relieved by American troops along the Argonne front. Our 600,000, with their thousands of guns, replaced them, marching by night, and hiding by day in the largest forests which abounded here as in nearly every other part of France in which our troops marched and fought.

To insure the maximum secrecy a thin line of French troops held the front line of trenches up to the beginning of the Artillery preparatory fire.

There was no more successful surprise during the war than that of the simultaneous attack of our First, Fifth and Third Army Corps, 5:30 A. M., September 26, 1918, along the more than twenty miles of front, from the depths of the Argonne Forest on the west to where the Forges Brook—the scene of so much bloody fighting during the 1916 attack on Verdun—runs into the Meuse River.

The successful movement of this large number of men and their use in an attack which surprised the enemy is the best proof that French and British criticisms of our Staff work are unfounded.

At first, the attack swept everything before it. But by the end of the first day, and more particularly during the second day, the Germans commenced to slow it up, and break up what had been a general advance into a series of bloody battles. These battles were obstinate struggles for the strong positions which the Germans had created by taking fullest defensive advantage of the hills and woods and forests so liberally provided by nature.

Nature has been kind to France in furnishing her a succession of six ridges between Paris and her German and Swiss frontiers. These ridges are roughly semicircular, as if nature

taking a compass and using Paris as a center, had drawn them one after another.

The fifth ridge is a famous one. Part of it is just to the east of Verdun and played a decisive part in its defense against the German attacks in 1916. On this part are the famous forts of Veaux and Douamont. Along its top, and down its western side, are the trenches and battery positions in which the devoted Infantry and Artillery sacrificed themselves by the tens of thousands. Further south, this same ridge, known as the Heights of the Meuse, is the one which all Americans who made the main attack at St. Mihiel, across the Plain of the Woevre, will remember towered over them to their left.

One of the peculiarities of these successive crests concentric about Paris, is that while the French rivers in many places run along parallel to them—as the Meuse-River does west of the fifth crest, or Heights of the Meuse, from Neuf Chateau to Verdun—in other localities they break through to the farther side.

This is what the Meuse does at Dun-sur-Meuse about twenty miles down that river from, or north of, Verdun. Our 5th Infantry Division knows this locality well from its experience in fighting its way across the river there.

From the region of Dun-sur-Meuse, the fifth crest curves from east to west, completely across the Argonne. Thus, it makes a fine natural line of defense against troops advancing north through that region.

However, Nature has done more than this. From the fifth crest between Verdun and Dun-sur-Meuse she has projected into the Argonne to the west, and slightly south, three long, irregular spurs. Each is cut by the Meuse.

Each of the three is cut near its base, where it joins the famous fifth crest, by the Meuse River.

The southernmost one has for its highest point the famous Dead Man’s Hill, for the possession of which so many French and Germans gave their lives in the German 1916 attack on Verdun. Our 33d Illinois Division and 80th Division from the Virginias and Pennsylvania jumped off from its front face at the beginning of the Argonne attack.

Major Generals Traub and William H. Johnson, commanding the 35th and 91st Divisions, respectively, and their staffs did know. The higher eschelons of command at the post of command of the Third and Fifth Army Corps knew. Above all, General Pershing commanding the First American Army, and his staff, knew.

They knew that as hard as had been the previous two days' fighting, a harder test was ahead.

The day before, the 26th, at 5:30 A. M., that part of the First American Army along the more than twenty miles of front between the Meuse River, near Verdun on the East and the middle of the Argonne Forest on the west, had jumped off.

The attack had been planned as a surprise attack.

The Germans did not know that the First American Army had extended its front from Verdun twenty miles across the Argonne west to the right of General Gouraud's Fourth French Army in the Champagne.

They had expected the Americans to continue the attack begun where they smashed the St. Mihiel salient. All the more so because the great historic fortress of Metz, blocking the Moselle Valley, one of the historic routes of invasion of Germany, lay directly to their front.

They had prepared for such an attack and were not prepared for one in the Argonne.

Therefore, they had but few troops in the first position in the Argonne, that network of trenches which had seen so much French and German blood shed since 1914, and in particular during the famous German attack on Verdun in 1916. Thus, not only was our attack a complete surprise, but also it swept over the first German position without great difficulty.

However, the farther our troops penetrated, the greater the number of German defenders. Thus, the second day our troops found steadily increasing resistance.

Also, once the German Superior Command was certain where the attack really was, they commenced to pour in reserves to stop it.

In addition, the natural features of the ground, which the Germans with their usual skill were taking fullest advantage of, commenced to exercise their deceive influence.

The German resistance on these different features, broke up our attack from a united advance across the whole of the Argonne, into the different battles already mentioned.

The villages of Exermont and Gesnes, about two and a half miles apart, nestle in a little ravine, generally running east and west, through which meanders a little stream. To their south is a scattered group of hills, mostly with gently rolling crests, some of which are covered with trees. To their north, the country is much rougher, the rolling crests being replaced by hills rising to sharp crests, with ravines and deep gullies running in every direction, and largely thickly wooded. In most cases, where one of these hills had a bare slope it was on the south side, the side over which the Americans must attack, offering splendid targets to the German defenders.

The 77th (N. Y.) and 28th (Penn.). Divisions to the left of the 35th were having their line of advance pulled to the left, or west. This because the Germans were taking the fullest advantage of the Argonne Forest and the heights of Chene-Tondu and Chatel-Chehery to start a separate battle for their possession.

The 37th (Ohio) and 79th (Maryland, Va., N. J.) Division to the right of the 91st similarly had their line of advance diverted to the right or east by the struggle for Montfaucon.

This pinnacle-shaped hill, crowned by the ruins of a village, was adding one more chapter to its long bloody history. For centuries the way in which it dominates the surrounding country has made its possession something to be fought for. The view from its top of not only a large part of the Argonne, but also the hills to the immediate north of Verdun caused it to be used as an observatory by the Crown Prince of Germany during the 1916 attack on Verdun. On it is located our monument for the Argonne Campaign.

Thus, the night of Friday, September 27th, the 35th and 91st Divisions stuck out in a salient. A salient is always dangerous because of the opportunity it offers an active enemy to attack it on both sides, forcing the troops at its point to take their choice of being cut off or of retreating before caught.

This situation was to become much more dangerous during the next two days. This because the two divisions, though greatly reduced in strength by casualties, not only stubbornly pushed forward, but also became separated. Thus, two long pointed salients were shoved into the German position.

We shall see how effectively the enemy took advantage of this situation.

While the divisions to the left of the 35th engaged in the Battle of Chens-Tondu—Chatel-Chehery, were doing their full duty, the fact remains that their line of advance swinging to the left tended to pull the 35th Division to the left. Also, the Aire River valley, which was the left-hand boundary of that division, also inclined to the left. It being a geographical feature easily followed, the division naturally guided on it.

The first thing the morning of Saturday, the 28th, the 35th Division repulsed a vicious daylight German attack from Montrebeau Wood. It then renewed its advance. It soon began to diverge from the 91st because that division continued in its original direction.

By nightfall the Kansans and Missourians had wrested Montrebeau Wood from the enemy. The 165th New York and 166th Ohio remembers this wood. It was done by stubborn infantry fighting, as the artillery, like Grant's in the Wilderness, not knowing where the infantry was, could render little or no aid.

It was one of those confusing, blind combats in the midst of the thick foliage of a closely planted wood of which the American troops saw so much due to the greater part of their fighting taking place in country hitherto untouched by war and thus free from the devastation which marked the scene of one or more years of trench warfare.

Throughout the day, the German fire from the Chatel-Chehery hills across the Aire Valley plunged into the left flank of the division. This, with the fire from the front, made the advance of that flank short and costly in casualties.

Stubbornly advancing, the Californians of the 363rd and 364th Infantries, on the left of the 91st Division, drove the Germans out of the village of Eclisfontaine, and, after stubborn and bloody fighting, captured Exmorieux Farm, Baulny Wood and

Tronsol Farm. The 167th Alabama and 168th Iowa will remember these names.

On the right of the 91st Division was the 181st Infantry Brigade consisting of the 361st Infantry, 362d Infantry, and the 347th Machine Gun Battalion. These units were made up of men from the states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming and far away Alaska. Washington predominated in the 91st Infantry and Montanans in the 362d Infantry. Their war cry, heard on their battlefields in France and Belgium, was "Powder River. Let 'er buck!"

This had come from an incident the day the first Montana contingent arrived in Camp Lewis, Washington, where the division was organized and trained ten months before sailing for overseas. An officer had asked a crowd of men in civilian clothes who had just arrived where they were from. Full of enthusiasm, they let out a yell in response, "Powder River. Let 'er buck!"

This answer immediately became a favorite of the men of the brigade.

Sunday, September 29th, was fated to be one of the most heroic, dramatic and unhappy days in the history of both divisions.

Ahead of them laid bare, rolling slopes leading to the Exermont-Gesnes Ravine, with its steep sides. On the far side, looking down upon them, they could see the numerous, scattered, mostly wooded peaks of the ideal defensive German position, which was to cost so many American lives before its conquest was complete.

This highly irregular territory of something over twelve square miles, lay as a barrier between the Aire Valley on the west and the valley of the Andau, in which is the town of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon, on the east. Back of its eastern half, or to the north, lay the trenches and barb wire of the Kriemhilde Stellung in front of the villages of St. Georges and Landres et St. George. From in front of the latter this position swept southeast by way of the Cote de Chatillon and Hill 288 to Hills 289 and 287, where it turned east, running in front of, through and back of the town of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon.

All these are names which will long be remembered by our troops who struggled so desperately for their possession, leaving so many of their comrades on the ground.

The Kriemhilde Stellung was the main second line of German defense. It ran along the greater part of the Western Front, but had different names in different localities.

A glance at the accompanying sketch entitled "*Attack and Capture of Exermont Massif*", will show how the nature of the ground favored the German defense. It gave them a tremendously strong natural position, which had to be conquered before any attempt could be made to break the Kriemhilde Stellung.

In the first place, the Exermont-Gesnes ravine was like a ditch in front of an old-fashioned fortress.

The eastern half, in which is the village of Gesnes, curved gently northeast just in front of the main hill group. Starting at the western end, Hill 240, or Montrefagne; Hill 212, Hill 200, the Morine Wood and Hills 255 and 252, furnished a first line of defense. Like the bastions of an old-fashioned fortress, their defenders could not only fire to their immediate front, but also to the right and left into the flanks of the troops assaulting the neighboring bastions.

Back of them were Hills 272, 263 and 269, numbers which originally were nothing but figures designating the heights in meters of these peaks above sea level, but which today carry the same significance to the men who fought so bitterly for their possession as do the numbers of regiments. To a stranger such numbers as 165, 166, 167 and 168 mean so little. To the men who have served in the regiments so numbered their mention stirs their blood with recollections of the friendships, the loyalty, the courage and the self-sacrifice of their comrades.

These hills are scattered in checkerboard fashion in rear of the line of hills of the first line of defense. Thus, their defenders could not only fire to the front and flanks, but also, in many cases, into the gaps between the hills of the front line.

The problem which faced the 35th and 91st Divisions on that fateful Sunday, September 29th, was to fight their way across the rolling, open country, cut up by a few ravines, to and across the Exermont-Gesnes ravine to a foothold in the natural fortress just beyond.

The natural strong points of the ground they had to cross were held by the enemy. All of this ground could be swept by



All Data from Official Sources.

infantry and machine gun fire from the enemy looking down on it from their strong positions north of the ravine. The exact observation which the German Artillery observers had, made accurate Artillery fire a simple problem for the German batteries.

Across the Aire Valley to the east, the Germans on the heights of Chatel Chehery could sweep the ground in front of the 35th Division with an enfilading fire from the left. The storming and capture of Montfaucon having acted as a drag on the advance of the divisions to the right of the 91st thus opening a gap the ground to their front over which they were to advance was swept by an enfilading fire from the enemy, holding the gently rolling crests to their right front.

In addition to the difficulties of assaulting such a position, the 35th and 91st Divisions had already suffered considerable losses from the three days' fighting they had already passed through, the last two being stiff.

It was their first real battle. The 35th had previously had some experience in trench fighting in a quiet sector, and had been in reserve at the Battle of St. Mihiel. The 91st had never been under fire before.

There had been quite a little mixing of units and of individuals of different units in the 35th Division.

The first day's fighting through and cleaning up of part of the town of Varenne, the village of Sheppy, and the elaborate German trenches of the four-year-old Argonne line, was responsible for some of this.

One amusing incident of this first day was that of an American private who found a German eating sausage, surrounded by other food and unopened bottles of beer, in a deep dugout. Having been warned before the attack to look out for German traps of all kinds, the American while holding the point of his bayonet at the German's stomach, with his finger on the trigger of his rifle, was suspicious, despite the peaceful surroundings and the appeal both to his hunger and thirst. He wanted some of that beer. From the terrible tales he had heard he was afraid it might be poisoned.

Having been brought up on a Kansas farm by German immigrant parents, he knew some German. Still maintaining his

menacing attitude, he ordered the German to open and drink a bottle of beer, carefully watching for symptoms of poisoning. The only expression which spread over the German's face was first astonishment and then one of profound satisfaction.

Ordering the German to open all the bottles, he then made him get into a corner, while telling him that he was a prisoner and had better not try to escape. Seated comfortably, with his rifle in his right hand, he proceeded to gulp the rest of the sausages and wash them down with copious draughts of beer. Undoubtedly, he was one of those reported missing at the end of the first day.

Some of the confusion was also due to the steadily expanding front of the sector occupied by the division. A great deal of it was due to fire from across the Aire Valley into the flank of the division.

It is human nature to face in the direction from which fire comes. This operated more and more to deflect units towards the left. A large proportion of officers had been killed and wounded. In their eagerness to insure the continuation of the advance at all costs, Colonels and Brigade Commanders had moved up with the front waves of their commands. This tended not only to disjoint the smooth handling of support and reserves during combat, but also of supply and reorganization for the next day's attack during the night.

Colonel Dwight Davis, President Coolidge's Secretary of War, was then a Major of Infantry and Adjutant of the 70th Infantry Brigade, commanded temporarily by Colonel Kirby Walker. When he was Secretary of War the Rainbow Historian talked to him about this battle in his office—the historical one of the Secretary of War in the State, War and Navy Building in Washington, D. C.

The Secretary said, "I was with Colonel Walker early Sunday morning, when he personally gave the orders for the attack on Exermont. I particularly remember Lieutenant Colonel Delaplane, who commanded the 140th Missouri Infantry. He was seated in a shell hole and quite cheerful. There was some confusion, due to the mixing of units, but this was no more than could be expected under the circumstances. The fire into our left

flank from the heights to the west of the Aire Valley was largely responsible for this. The preceding day, I had been back and forth over the ground from Baulny to the front line a number of times. I have a most vivid recollection of this fire and particularly that of a German battery using direct fire. I could plainly see the flashes of the guns at each discharge."

Sunday morning, the Kansans and Missourians of the leading elements of the 137th, 140th and 139th Infantries made an assault. Despite heavy losses, they advanced across the three-quarters of a mile of open country, swept by the German fire from the front and flanks, to the Vermont ravine, captured Exermont and Beaureguard and Neuvilly-le-Compte Farms, the stone buildings of which enabled the Germans to put up a stout resistance.

How the Americans wished that French villages and farms were built of wood like their own Kansas and Missouri ones. Then inevitably early in the fight shells would have set them on fire and burned them to the ground, thus leaving no strong points from which skilled German veterans could use their rifles, machine gulls and grenades to the greatest advantage.

Some of our men secured a precarious foothold just across the ravine at the foot of Montrefagne and Hill 212. A few of the accompanying tanks which had survived, penetrated a short distance up the ravine leading to Arietal Farm, then they were destroyed.

Numerous acts of bravery were performed by valiant men and officers of the survivors of this gallant and successful attack on the Exermont ravine.

Let us leave them, for the moment, clinging desperately to the ground they have gained, with their numbers steadily diminished by fire from the front and both flanks, to see what has been going on in the 91st Division.

On the right was the 181st Infantry Brigade. Three times the leading elements of this brigade started their assault from Cierges Wood. Twice, with heavy losses not only from fire from the front but also on their exposed right flank, the survivors were driven back. The third time, despite heavy losses they pushed steadily forward, entered the village of Gesnes, drove the enemy from it after a vicious hand to hand combat, and forged steadily up the front slope of Hill 255, where they suc-

ceeded in capturing a number of German machine gun nests, with those of their garrisons who were not killed in the assault.

Hill 255 was somewhat to the left of the original line of advance o fthe brigade. Therefore a support battalion continued the line of the original advance and captured the Farm of St. Pie. This advance of more than a mile had been made despite heavy fire directly into its right flank from the Germans in la-Grange-aux-Bois Farm, and along the crest running north from it.

With a precision and determination that spoke well for the skill of its Colonel and battalion commanders and the discipline and courage of the men, two battalions of the 361st Infantry, which this day had started in reserve, swung to the right, and, disregarding the enemy's fire from the original front now striking them in their left flank, gallantly assaulted and took this farm and ridge.

On the left, the Californians of the 182d Infantry Brigade, reinforced by three companies of the divisional Engineers, were having a difficult time. Due to the gap between the 91st and 35th Divisions, which the Germans had taken advantage of, not only was their left flank fired into, but their left rear was in imminent danger of being turned. The enemy to their immediate front in the bastion-like Morine Wood just north of the Exermont-Gesnes ravine not only could fire into the Californians facing them, but also into the right flank and rear of those which had been facing west to meet the German menace on the left flank and rear.

Despite this difficulty, this brigade did succeed during the day in getting its right forward over the Gesnes ravine and up the slope close to the Morine Wood.

Thus, the 91st Division occupied a long, thin salient; the point on the front slope of Hill 255 and in front of Gesnes at St. Pie Farm. The right side of the salient ran from St. Pie Farm to la-Grange-aux-Bois Farm. The left side ran from the front slope of Hill 255, thence just east of the Morine Wood across the Gesnes ravine to Tronsol Farm, and then almost due south.

However, the 91st Division had only succeeded in reaching this position late in the afternoon. In the meanwhile, the Ger-

mans had taken advantage of the critical position of the troops of the 35th Division, who had captured Exermont and vicinity in the morning.

At 2:00 P. M. they attacked them with troops of a fresh division just arrived in the Argonne. Fierce attacks on their front and both flanks of the American group caused them many casualties and threatened to cut them off and capture them entirely.

There is a dispute as to whether they came back under orders, which undoubtedly had been issued for retirement from this dangerous position, or whether they were driven back by the German counter-attack. In any case, those who got back, came slowly and stubbornly resisting. Those who were captured were cut off still fighting. The numerous accounts of bravery which are a matter of record, and for which a number of Distinguished Services Crosses were awarded, testify to this.

The then Major Dwight Davis was almost captured by the Germans. As a matter of fact, for some time it was thought that he had been. He had gone to the edge of Montrebeau Wood to see how the counter-attack was progressing. In the talk with him when he was Secretary of War, he said, "The Germans advancing to the east of the wood progressed the fastest. Seeing them my people thought I had been caught. However, fortunately for me, I had started back on the western side of the wood, with the result that I got through without being captured."

As usual, the further back the news got of the successful German counter-attack, the worse the tale was. As a result, some alarming stories were current in the rear echelons of the division.

However, the situation was serious enough. The field batteries furthest forward prepared for pointblank fire in order to carry out the orders they received to stand fast and fire to the last.

While this was going on the divisional reserves had taken position along the Baulny Ridge. The enemy was finally stopped in front of this line.

In the meanwhile, in the gap between the 35th and 91st Divisions, the German eastern flank attacked the left rear of the 91st Division, apparently with the intention of turning its

left flank and getting in its rear. Though Tronsol Farm was lost, this attack was stopped by a reserve battalion, which was faced practically due west and occupied and held a line from near Tronsol Farm to Serioux Farm, about a mile due south.

The position of the 91st was highly dangerous. This, because the long, thin salient its front line occupied so invited successful counter-attack that it was certain the enemy would not resist the temptation long. Also, such a large proportion of the original support and reserve battalions were in the front line that the Division Commander had nothing left in his hands with which to meet such a counter-attack.

Therefore, the division was ordered to abandon during the night the gains which it had made at such great cost, and retire to a line between and along the northern edges of the Cierges and Baulny Woods, while still holding the line from near Tronsol Farm south to Serioux Farm. This they regretfully did.

The division had approximately 5,000 casualties. Of these, but ten were known to have been captured by the enemy, and but 101 missing.

Five thousand was the number of replacements which our G. H. Q. believed could be quickly absorbed by a division without such loss to its fighting value as to necessitate a period of training. With no greater loss than this a division could be held in immediate reserve.

The 35th Division had suffered approximately 7,500 casualties, of whom but 68 were known to be prisoners of the enemy and 448 of whom were missing.

The dead left on the lost and abandoned ground accounted for most of the missing in both divisions.

The distance these two divisions drove into the enemy position, the number of their casualties, and the small number of prisoners lost, all entitle them to be proud of what, for the 91st, was its first experience under fire, and, for the 35th, its first major combat.

The 1st Infantry Division was ordered from its position in reserve to relieve the 35th, and the 32d Infantry Division to relieve the 91st.

The 32d Division, commanded by Major General W. G. Haan, was made up of troops from Michigan and Wisconsin. Their forefathers, and in various causes their actual grandfathers, had distinguished themselves in the Iron Brigade of the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg during our Civil War. These Wolverines and Badgers had already made a reputation for themselves in the Battles of the Ourcq and Juvigny.

The 1st Division was made up of Regular Army units. It was then commanded by Major General Chas. P. Summerall who had commanded the Artillery Brigade of the Rainbow until December, 1917.

However with their expansion to war strength and above all with the many replacements which had come to it as the result of its heavy losses in each of its battles, its ranks now included large numbers of men who had never seen the army until the outbreak of the Great War. In the same way, amongst its officers' particularly in the junior grades, were a large number of splendid men from civil life, who had rushed to the Officers' Training Camps established prior to our entry into the war and immediately thereafter.

These men and officers from all over the Union grafted on to the frame work of Regular Officers and enlisted men, also coming from all over the Union, made a truly National Division.

All its regiments, except the 7th Field Artillery which was only organized in 1916, had battle honors on their Colors from previous wars.

Battery D of the 5th Field Artillery was organized in 1776 under command of Alexander Hamilton. Battery D of the 6th Field Artillery was organized in 1798. Both have missed but little fighting since.

September 30th to October 3d, inclusive, were devoted to executing the relief and preparing for the attack. The 1st Division had completed the relief of the 35th, under heavy enemy fire, by the morning of October 1st.

The night of September 29th, the Michigan Infantry Brigade of the 32d Division had relieved the 37th Ohio Infantry Division, which had been worn down by the Battle of Montfaucon.

The enemy welcomed them, as they did the 1st, with a heavy fire. The morning of the 30th, they drove forward until abreast of the 91st, capturing the village of Cierges.

The fact that they took and held it without heavy loss was considered a happy omen, because a village of the same name on the heights of the Ourcq, in July, had changed hands several times, each time with bloody losses, before the division finally got it for good. The night of October 3d, the 32d Division relieved the 91st.

The troops will never forget these days of waiting before the October 4th attack. They were out in the open with only such protection as each man could dig for himself. During the day, they were under constant observation by the largely hidden enemy occupying the wooded hills to their front. Day and night they were under Artillery fire and prolonged bursts of Machine Gun fire. The 1st Division alone averaged a loss of 500 men killed and wounded each day.

The Fourth French Army in the Champagne, on the other side of the Argonne Forest, reported October 1st that the enemy was retiring on its front.

To see if this was true also in the Exermont region, patrols were sent to the front from each of the four Infantry regiments of the 1st Division. As it turned out, unfortunately for the gallant men who composed them, the enemy far from retiring had every intention of holding. As was to be the case throughout the Argonne Campaign, the Argonne, being the pivot of the enemy's withdrawal from French territory, he had to hold here to allow his troops farther west to withdraw without danger of being cut off.

Taking advantage of the fog and the mist, these four patrols managed to get through the enemy's outposts and well into their lines, only to be cut off and mostly killed.

October 4th, the 1st and 32nd Divisions jumped off to the attack early in the morning. They both gained ground to their front. When they started the attack, the 32nd Division was facing almost due north, while the 1st Division faced northwest its right adjoining the left of the 32nd Division, which was bent to the left rear. By the end of the day the left flank of the

1st Division had advanced far enough so that the 1st and 32nd Divisions finished the day roughly on an east-west line along the Exermont-Gesnes ravine.

The next day, that of October 5th, the 32nd Division succeeded in advancing but little, except on the left, where it joined the 1st Division, which by gallant fighting had conquered some of the territory soon to become so well known to the Rainbow.

The advance on this day of the 1st Division was the second occasion on which Major General Charles P. Summerall, then in command of the 1st Division, used his method of artillery concentrations, which became the basis for the afterwards famous Summerall barrage of the November 1st attack, by the Fifth U. S. Army Corps, of which he was then in command. As this method of using concentrated artillery fire in the spots where it is most needed to help the infantry forward, instead of dispersing it over the whole front with equal strength everywhere, wherever used has meant victory let General Summerall explain it. The hills and other places he mentions all became well known to the Rainbow.

When he was Chief-of-Staff of the Army, one day while seated at his desk in the War Department, with a large scale map of the Exermont region before him he said,* in that calm but determined manner, which characterizes him on or off the battlefield, when he is in deadly earnest: "The one purpose of the artillery is to break down the resistance in front of its infantry so that it may advance. Artillery fire power concentrated in the right place, at the right time, always does this. Dispersed, it loses its strength and thus allows the enemy to stop the advance of the infantry, the artillery is supposed to be supporting.

"Of course, if you have not enough artillery to bring down such a concentration in front of all your infantry, then you must concentrate it in front of that part which it is important to go forward immediately, and leave the rest of your infantry with little or no artillery support, while at the same time not expecting them to advance.

"To those who say that this means that the infantry without the artillery support will be smothered by the enemy's fire, I say no. This for the simple reason that the soldier, and I use the term to include the officer, is not going to fire off to the right

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* To the Rainbow Historian.

or left, he is going to fire to his front on those who are firing on him and pay no attention to those who are not. I have seen it again and again in battle.

"When I was a lieutenant in Captain Reilly's battery in the Philippine Campaign and later in the Boxer Campaign in China, he always emphasized this, based on his Civil War experience.

"You can theorize as much as you please, and issue as many orders as you please; the soldier is not going to fire off to the right or left particularly if he is not being fired on from that direction."

He paused for a moment, as his Aide came in to deliver a message. He went on: "My first fight as a division commander was in command of the First Division during the Battle of Soissons, which began July 18th. It was part of the larger battle in which the Rainbow subsequently fought so well on the Ourcq River. After we had driven well forward into the German line, suffering many casualties and reaching the point where the men and officers still present were almost exhausted from physical fatigue and lack of sufficient food, the advance became very difficult. I decided the only way to continue it was to move one infantry brigade forward at a time, concentrating practically all the artillery supporting my division in front of that brigade.

"When I explained this plan to my infantry brigade and regimental commanders, they opposed it, saying that if only one brigade moved forward at one time the fire of all the Germans along the whole division front would be concentrated on that brigade.

"I told them that it would not; that the Germans in front of the brigade which was not moving, instead of firing obliquely at the brigade which was, would fire to their own front at the brigade in place. In other words, while theoretically my brigade and regimental commanders were correct, I was sure that human nature would dominate, as it practically always does in times of great danger.

"Of course the brigade that is without artillery protection for the time being suffers more from the enemy's fire than it otherwise would, but on the other hand the concentrated fire of practically all of the artillery in front of one brigade enables it to move forward where generally with only half that amount

both brigades are pinned to the ground and unable to advance."

He paused, looked over the map in front of him carefully, for at least five minutes, and then went on:

"The first heavy fighting for the 1st Division came when the line had crossed the Exermont Ravine. The advance of the 16th Infantry on the left, was helped by the fog. That regiment went ahead regardless of the regiment on its right, in accordance with the order that each regiment would advance regardless of what happened to the people on the right and left. This advance helped the 18th Infantry on the right of the 16th. The 18th assaulted Montrefagne. It was viciously counterattacked. The assault battalion was forced back and became amalgamated with the support battalion, which was still advancing. They remained merged from then on to the end of the fight. The assault on Montrefagne was made a number of times. The Germans counter attacked a number of times. When the day was over, the 18th was holding on just at the south edge of the woods which cover that hill.

"On the right the assault and support battalions of the 26th, having become merged in an effort to carry the woods just north of Hill 212, the Brigade commander asked me to let him have the reserve battalion of the 26th, which constituted part of the Division reserves.

"I refused, saying, 'no, if I give it to you it will only advance and get mixed in with the other two. I will put an artillery concentration in front of you, move it forward and you have the men of the assault battalion follow it, leaving the men of the support battalion where they are. This will disentangle the two battalions.' This was done. Then when they were straightened out, I said, 'now, you may have the reserve battalion to leapfrog the leading battalion.' Thus a considerable advance was made; the existing confusion straightened out and further confusion prevented.

"I then brought the Artillery fire back and put it in front of the 28th Infantry, which moved up attacking the Arietal Farm in that vicinity. I didn't move the 1st Brigade at all on this date.

"This advance, of course, extended the Divisional front. Not only was it extended, but in the attack of October 9th, the 26th and 28th Infantry, my right brigade, instead of attacking

in a generally northerly direction as it had been doing, had its axis of attack turned to northeast.

"On this occasion, I concentrated all the Artillery in front of this brigade until it had advanced, capturing Hill 263 and driving the Germans from that region. I then moved it back in front of Rider's battalion of the 16th Infantry, which I had kept in reserve, and which I had assigned to make the assault on Hill 272. I pounded that hill and everything on it, using all the guns of the Artillery Brigade, for half an hour. I then used all the guns in a barrage in front of Rider's battalion, which attacking in three waves, swept over everything, capturing amongst other booty, fifty machine guns."

It was in this way that the 1st Division determinedly, gallantly and despite heavy losses, fought its way forward to the evening of October 9th, by which time it held a line from Hill 289 on the right around 263, which stuck out as a salient, and thence to the south of the Cote de Maldah, along the ridge the left or western end of which is just north of Fleville, in the Valley of the Aire River.

Major Barnwell R. Legge, then an officer of the 28th Infantry tells the following amusing incident:

"A rolling kitchen full of cooked food came down an unimproved road on the eastern slope of the Cote de Maldah, looking for its company which no longer existed. It was gratefully received by the leading elements of the 28th Infantry."

Let Major Legge tell the story from then on:

"On the night of October 9th, the 1st Division was ordered to exploit its successes to the line Sommerance-Tuilerie Farm. Each regiment was to push out patrols in its zone of action at 7 A. M. Infiltrating forward they were to seize and hold favorable ground. The assault battalions would maintain liaison, immediately advance and occupy the best defensive position. The 181st Brigade was relieved and attached to the 32nd Division.

"The 2d Battalion of the 26th Infantry infiltrated forward fighting its way through woods so dense that contact was almost impossible. The 3d Battalion, in close support, threw two companies on the right flank to protect a gap between the 1st Division and the unit on its right. Nightfall found it on the northern edge of the Bois de Romagne.

"The 2d Battalion 28th and remnants of the 1st Battalion 28th similarly filtered forward, using the same methods, to the line as indicated.

"The 1st Battalion, 16th moved forward down the Cote de Maldah, against slight resistance. During its progress a German colonel was captured. He stated that he had been cut off by the barrage of October 9th and unable to move from his dug out.

"The 1st Battalion 18th pushed forward, patrolling into Sommerance. The 18th moved up. This operation was a slow process and lasted throughout the day.

"On the night of October 10th the 1st Division was ordered to continue its attack in the same manner.

"At 7:00 A. M., patrols were pushed out. These immediately came under heavy fire from the wired positions of the Kriemhilde Stellung line. It became evident that a specially prepared assault was necessary to take the position. Front line troops were ordered to hold their lines."

The First Division after one of the most determined advances in the history of warfare due to a combination of infantry courage and a handling of its artillery support with a skill far beyond that customary in any of the Armies of the belligerents had captured all the strong enemy positions in front of the Kriemhilde Stellung.

It was now face to face with that Stellung in the salient caused by that position turning sharply southeast at the Cote de Chatillon to run via Hills 288 and the Cote Dame Marie to 258 where it again turned east running in front that is south of Romagne sons Montfaucon.

It was in this salient that the 166th Ohio, 165th New York and 167th Alabama from left to right relieved the First Division the night of October 11th and 12th.

The 168th Iowa took over ground to the right of the sector of the First Division.

This was because the Rainbow fell heir to a situation which was to seriously increase the difficulty of the coming attack on the Kriemhilde Stellung. It was the cause of the 168th Iowa being moved to the right and opening a gap between its left and the right of the 167th Alabama.

Probably the best name for it is the Tuilerie Farm—Hill 289, Hill 255 Triangle Situation.

This situation originated with the gap which opened up between the 35th Division and the 91st Division on the night of September 28th-29th.

When the 1st Division relieved the 35th on the Baulny Ridge October 1st, their line faced northwest. At this time the line of the 91st faced north. It was on this same line that the 32nd Division relieved the 91st on October 4th. By this time the 1st Division which had started its attack towards the northwest had pivoted on its right until it occupied a line facing north. This had resulted in an extension of its front.

In the series of attacks of the 1st Division beginning October 4th, Hills 240, 263 and above all 272 in between them were centers of stubborn German resistance. It was the capture of Hill 272 on which later the 166th Ohio Infantry and the 83rd Infantry Brigade established their P. C's which caused the German colonel commanding its defenses when captured to say he had not believed any troops could do it.

To go back to the main thread of our narrative, the capture of these hills caused the 1st Division to occupy the salient in which the Rainbow relieved them.

Its western face ran from Hill 253 southeast to Hill 289 on one of whose peaks the engineers of the 1st Division had after gallant and stubborn fighting established themselves. A north and south line through the center of this salient ran through Baulny, thus showing that the axis of attack of the First Division had been shifted well to the left or west as Baulny was the original left of the 1st Division.

During this same period from October 4th to October 9th the 32nd Division after advancing north for a short distance, thus preserving the gap between it and the 1st Division, found its left flank held up by stubborn resistance of the Germans in the Bois de la Morine. This German strong point with Hill 255 and the southeastern end of the Cote Dame Marie gave the Germans a line of defense which faced southeast. As attacking troops are always pulled towards the fire of their enemy, the 32nd Division gradually pivoted on its western flank until by the time they had

captured the Bois de la Morine their line faced west of north but not quite northwest.

Thus between the right of the 1st Division occupying part of Hill 289 and the left of the 32nd Division held up on the forward slopes of Hill 255 there was more or less of a gap between the two divisions. It is not meant by this that no troops of either division were in this gap because at different times troops from one or the other or both were in it. However, neither really held it.

The consequence was that the 181st Infantry Brigade of the 91st Division though out of the line but a few days was put back in to fill this gap.

Here is what the history of that division says :* "It developed that while a portion of the line turned over to the 181st brigade by relieving elements of the 32nd Division was supposed to be the line from Hill 269 to Hill 255, the elements of the 32nd Division relieved were actually on a line one and one half kilometers south of the line joining these two crests, both of which were highly organized and attended by machine gun nests." October 8th and 9th the 91st Division captured parts of these two hills and finally the crest of 269 and most of that of 255.

Col. James B. Woolnough,** who commanded the 362nd Infantry of the 181st Infantry Brigade of the 91st Division during this operation, which was supposed to be simply a mopping up one but turned out to be an attack on the unbroken Kriemhilde Stellung, tells the following story:

He says: "The 181st Infantry Brigade, when put in on the base of the triangle Hills 269, 255, and the Tuilerie Farm, had not yet recovered from the exhaustion and losses of the first attack in the Argonne, begun September 26th.

"To really understand the situation, it is necessary to go back to the last part of that initial attack in the Argonne. This is true for two reasons. The first is in order realize the relatively small number of effectives left in the Brigade. The second is to grasp the fact that if our Brigade had been allowed to hold onto all the ground it gained in the first attack, it is quite possible there would have been no need for the attempt to occupy the Tuilerie Farm triangle, which failed because Hill 288, one of

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* Page 43, The Story of the 91st Division, San Francisco, 91st Division Publication Committee, San Mateo, California.

** A Regular Infantry Officer U. S. M. A., 1904.

the strongpoints of the Kriemhilde Stellung, was then strongly occupied by the Germans.

"By the 29th, the third day of the first assault in the Argonne, the leading units of the 91st Division were on the northern edge of the Bois Communal de Cierges. Here we received an order to assault and take the town of Gesnes without regard to loss, not only because it was to our own front, but also because the 37th Ohio Division to our right complained that fire from it into their left front and flank was holding up their advance.

"Col. John Henry Parker, of the Regular Army, was in command of the 362nd Infantry of which I was the Lieutenant Colonel and executive officer. As the result of this order, he decided to make an assault with two battalions of the regiment in the front wave and one in reserve.

"He put himself in front of the center of the two front battalions, saying that he would personally lead the assault. As he was a large man, with a large black moustache, he was a conspicuous target. As he was smoking a large pipe, and carried a large stick, he was just that much more conspicuous. When the time came, he gave the signal and off went the two battalions to the only old-fashioned bayonet assault I saw in the War.

"In less than forty minutes the enemy's fire had reduced the regiment to about half of the 1900 men they still had after the three days of previous fighting. However, they swept forward over the ridge between them and Gesnes, down into the valley, in which is Gesnes, everywhere driving the Germans before them, capturing them, and killing them, and finally in groups of different sizes which had lost all the formation with which they originally started, they swept up the slope of Hill 255, beyond Gesnes. The fire from the Germans on this Hill, 243 to its left rear and 256 further northeast, which was one of the strongpoints of the Kriemhilde Stellung, finally brought them to a halt. Nevertheless, they held on.

"Shortly after the assault started, Colonel Parker was shot through the arm. However, he kept on going until a fragment of shell badly wounded him in the leg when he was descending the hillside toward Gesnes. He lay on the ground, refusing to be evacuated, and telling every man and officer who came near him to never mind him but go on.

"Shortly before he was wounded the second time I was knocked unconscious by the concussion of a shell. When I came to, it was already dusk. I managed to get up, and go to where Colonel Parker was lying on the ground. He told me to straighten out the regiment as best I could and hang on to what we had gained.

"I found that while the organizations were mixed up that the men were in good spirits and determined, so that it made little difference if one group was commanded by a corporal of one company and the next one by a sergeant of another with part of the corporal's company beyond him, on the line to the right or left. I divided them up into combat groups and then started to see what I could do about getting supplies and ammunition.

"Just as I had about completed this an order came from the Division Commander to withdraw. I sent back the Adjutant, McClatchey, to protest, on the grounds that the men were in good spirits and we could hold on to what we had, as I could see no evidences of a counter-attack at that time. However, about midnight, a positive order came for us to retire. I have always believed that if Colonel Parker had not fainted from loss of blood he would have refused to retire. I learned later that the order was given because we were sticking out in a long pointed salient, which could easily be nipped off by a German counter-attack on either or both flanks.

"However, none was made, nor as far as I could see contemplated. The result was that after a very gallant assault and heavy losses we retired from being well up the slope of Hill 255 only to find ourselves on October 8th coming back to this same position to start an attack.

"Suppose we had been allowed to stay where we were and had been reinforced how much trouble would have been saved the 32nd Division when it later had to conquer this same ground at heavy loss because the Germans had by that time strongly reinforced their troops.

"As a consequence of our withdrawal on October 8th, when we went into line to fill in the gap between the 1st Division and the 32nd Division, we found our right well to the rear of the position

we had held on the forward slopes of Hill 255, this because we had to connect with the left of the 32nd Division which was then in the town of Gesnes. The 1st Division, on our left, had captured most of Hill 269 but its right was bent to the rear. Thus we faced a strong German line, the left of which was well down the forward slope of 255 toward Gesnes, and the right of which was on what was left in German hands of Hill 269.

"However, when the assault was made, we drove forward along with the 32nd Division on our right and the 1st on our left, until by the night of the 10th-11th we were face to face with the Kriemhilde Stellung, Hill 288 being directly to our front. Instead of making an assault with what was left of the Regiment and thereby suffering heavy losses without any compensating gain I sent forward combat patrols to feel out the German position which I was sure was a very strong one. These patrols bumped into a real resistance which stopped them. I, therefore, reported to the 1st Division that prior to the assault on 288 there should be a very heavy artillery concentration. They promised the concentration and ordered another assault, as it was lifted. However, the concentration was only of 75's, the shells of which did not destroy the German trenches and in particular a number of concrete pillboxes containing machine guns.

"I, therefore, again only sent forward combat patrols. They soon bumped into resistance as strong as that they had met before. I therefore repeated my report on the necessity for a strong artillery concentration, and this time insisted that it should contain larger calibres than 75's.

"The night of October 11th-12th the infantry of the 1st Division was relieved by the infantry of the Rainbow Division. I remember very distinctly and pleasantly a talk I had with Col. Tinley, commanding the 168th Iowa, which was the right regiment of the Rainbow. That same night our Brigade was relieved by the 127th Infantry of the 32nd Division. This relief, which was completed about daybreak, put the right of the Rainbow in liaison with the left of the 32nd Division."

Between October 4th when it jumped off at the same time as the First Division and October 8th the 32d Red Arrow Division had fought its way forward from the Exermont-Gesnes

Ravine to the Kriemhilde Stellung. The first few days its progress was slow despite heavy fighting.

The night of October 6-7th the Rainbow Artillery after one day spent in supporting the 3d Regular Division, the next division to the right of the 32d was ordered to the support of the 32d.

It was with it when that Division bumped hard against the Kriemhilde Stellung October 9th. It remained with it until midnight October 12th.

The order for the night march which the Division, except the Artillery Brigade, absent with the 32nd Division, will never forget, was Field Order No. 34, 10th October, 1918, 15.30 hours.

The officers and men of the Division who made it will never forget it, because of the long delays due to heavy traffic of the 3rd and 32nd Divisions, the darkness, the rain, and the losses from enemy shell fire.* It terminated in dark, damp woods, littered with the wreckage of war, including dead Germans and dead Americans, many of whom had laid there long enough to make their presence distinctly noticeable even in the dark, to say nothing of remnants of gas, and occasional enemy shells. This however, was by this time nothing unusual for the Division.

The commanding officers and staff of the Division will remember it, because the march instead of being made first to the rear of the 1st Division, the Division which the Rainbow was to relieve and then to the front, was made to the front in rear of the 3rd Division then to the left across some of its lines of communications and supply, and directly across all the lines of communications and supply of the 32nd Division, which was in line between the 3rd and 1st Divisions.

Colonel W. N. Hughes, Jr., then Chief of Staff of the Divisions says: "In addition to these difficulties we found our troubles were not over when we had reached the First Division Sector.

"I greatly feared our communications within the division would fail us as so many of the telephone lines turned over to us by the 1st Division were of old German field wire which had had hard service, been run over again and again by artillery car-

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* A and B companies of the 168th Iowa lost 6 killed and 48 wounded from one German salvo fired on the road near Eclisfontaine.

riages and other wheeled transportation. We found that the 1st Division had been suffering a good deal from various parts of the telephone communication system being out of commission.

"However, being an experienced signal officer myself I knew that Garrett would keep things going if any signal officer in the army could. To help him I turned over to him all the mounted orderlies of the Louisiana Troop. We arranged to have two go forward with each infantry headquarters down to include battalions.

"About two o'clock in the morning orders were received from the 5th Corps Headquarters changing details of the relief. Most of the telephone lines were inoperative, but the mounted orderlies made good the deficiencies with the result that our comunications within the division were adequate though slow and the change in orders was carried out.

"That night the headquarters of the 1st Division had great difficulty maintaining its communications. During the day General Summerall had been made Corps Commander and General Frank Parker who had commanded one of the infantry brigades of the 1st Division succeeded Summerall to its command.

"Under orders of the Corps Commander our Division Headquarters and our two infantry brigade headquarters were to establish themselves in the same locality as the corresponding headquarters of the 1st Division. This put the Division Headquarters at Cheppy. We established an advanced division headquarters in the abandoned elephant shelters of the German ammunition dump at Camp Drachen in the ravine next south of the Exermont one.

"Thanks to the energetic and skillful Major Garrett we soon had new field wire laid for our telephones everywhere. Of course, we asked him no questions as to where he had gotten the wire.

"Everywhere there was evidence of the heavy losses suffered by first the 35th Kansas-Missouri, and then the 1st Division in the shape of their still unburied dead. We buried them as quickly and as well as we could, getting a regiment of engineers from Corps Headquarters to assist us. Nevertheless, they were so numerous that we were continually finding them as well as Ger-

man dead in gullies and woods. Their dead proved that some of the 35th Division had crossed the Exermont ravine.

"Am only mentioning this subject because after all the Division had been through a good deal with no chance to rest or clean up since it entered the Bois de la Reine just before the St. Mihiel attack and this at the end of its long march to that wood. The numerous dead therefore did not add to its morale."

"I do not mean there was any weakening in determination or courage. I do mean that instead of entering this fight, well rested and in the best possible physical condition the powers of resistance of officers and men to fatigue, hunger, wet, cold and wounds had been considerably worn down.

"The First Division which we relieved had had a rest from the night of September 13th when it was through with the Saint Mihiel attack until the night of September 19th when it began its movement to the Argonne.

"The Second Division which relieved us the night of October 30th had been relieved after its magnificent fight at Mont Blanc in the Champagne the night of October 9th except its Artillery and Engineers who stayed on a while longer with the 36th Division.

"Both these divisions had magnificent records of which as a Regular I am personally proud. Therefore I am only bringing out these facts to emphasize how seldom the Rainbow had a rest period.

"One of the reasons which made a rest period more important in this war than previous ones was that no fires could be lit at night. In previous wars troops could get rid of marrow piercing cold and wet by lighting camp fires. In this one, such fires being too dangerous because they would inevitably bring heavy shelling and bombing, there was no way to even partially dry out."

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE ARTILLERY BRIGADE, THE FIRST TO ENTER THE ARGONNE BATTLE.

The honor of being the first units of the Rainbow to enter the long and hard Argonne combat fell to the Artillery Brigade of the Division.

While the infantry settled down to such comfort and rest as could be gotten in the so-called Bois de Montfaucon, so called because four years of trench warfare had wrecked it as a wood and filled it with muddy broken down bomb proofs and shell holes, the Artillery Brigade was ordered to report to the Commanding General of the 3rd Division. This Division was then fighting its way forward just to the North and Northeast of Montfaucon.

While the Brigade had served with another Division once before when it went on to the Vesle with the 4th Division, that time it was in support of a Division relieving its own infantry. This time was its first experience in going ahead of the infantry and to a Division which the infantry was not to see.

The Artillery Brigade was also to experience for the first time the difficulties which come from being changed from Division to Division under fire. They had hardly settled down with the 3rd Division before they were taken from it to go to the support of the 32nd Division. It was with this Division during the days it, with the 1st Division on its left, was capturing the German strong points in front of the Kriemhilde Stellung and during its first and unsuccessful assaults on the Cote Dame Marie. The Rainbow Artillery was then switched over to support its own infantry which two days before had relieved the infantry of the 1st Division.

This meant that the 67th Field Artillery Brigade was to have the distinction but at what cost of hardship, great fatigue, cold and danger, of being continuously in combat or marching at night from one combat to the next from September 1st to November 11th, the day of the Armistice. As artillery is never in support or reserve during a battle but is always in position their periods

under fire are far longer than those of the infantry though much less dangerous for any given length of time.

The first problem of the Brigade then was the support of the 3rd Regular Division. This Division had relieved the 79th Blue and Gray Division after the latter had captured Montfaucon. This mountain was for four years the principal German observatory in the Argonne. During the tremendous German attack on Verdun in 1916 it was the observatory of the German Crown Prince. Today it is crowned with the largest of the three battle monuments to the A. E. F., put up by the American Battle Monument Commission of which General Pershing is the Chairman.

From the Northern base of this isolated mountain which because of its natural strength was a fortified village in the days of Caesar and a feudal fortress throughout the middle ages, the 3rd Division had steadily driven forward until it struck the Bois de Cunel. Here the German resistance was so strong that for the time being it was held up.

The evening of October 6th found the Division including the Artillery Brigade in the Bois de Montfaucon the northern edge of which is about two kilometers south of the top of Montfaucon.

The next morning the Rainbow Artillery received its orders to report to the 3rd Division. The Colonels and Field Officers and Captains immediately left for the front, the first to get their orders from the 3rd Division and then with their subordinates to reconnoitre for the best positions to occupy to carry out their missions.

By the morning of the 8th Redden's Battalion of the 149th was in position ready to fire just south of Nantillois, Hammond's Battalion of the same regiment was echeloned to its rear, while Handy and MacDonald's battalions of the 151st were echeloned to the left rear of Redden. Thus all the Rainbow 75's were in the area between Nantillois and Montfaucon. Miller's, Spence's and Cureton's battalions of the 150th had their howitzers on and near the rear slopes of Montfaucon thus taking full advantage of their high angle fire.

At this time the 3d Division was preparing for the attack they subsequently made on October 9th along with the 32d and 1st Divisions on their right.

During the 8th orders were received relieving the Rainbow Artillery from the 3d Division and assigning it to the support of the 32d Division.

The 149th being on the right was immediately moved west, Hammond's Battalion taking position just east of Cierges and Redden's to a position about three-quarters of a kilometer to the east of Hammond.

The 151st being on the left could fire its mission without moving so for the time being was left in place. Later MacDonald's Battalion moved to just north of Cierges and Handy's to just west of that town.

The 150th could fire its missions so was left in place.

The problem which confronted the 32d Division was at that time confronting the First (Regular) Division which had relieved the 35th (Kansas-Missouri) Division at the same time that the 3rd Division had taken over the front of the 79th and the eastern half of the 37th Ohio Division while the 32d Division had taken over the western half of the 37th Ohio Division and the front of the 91st Division.

In other words, the 3rd, 32d and 1st Divisions had taken over from the 79th, 37th, 91st and 35th Divisions four of the Divisions which had started the first attack in the Argonne on September 26th.

With this relief the second phase of the Argonne began in this region. It was the fight forward to drive the Germans out of all their advanced positions in front of the Kriemhilde Stellung.

When the Rainbow artillery went to the support of the 32d Division this Division had already fought its way forward capturing about half of the German advanced positions. The 1st Division was steadily doing the same to the left of the 32d. This despite the fire into their left flank from across the Aire River where due to the difficulties of advancing through the Argonne forests the 77th New York Division had progressed more slowly than the divisions to its right. The result was that the 28th Pennsylvania Division which first had the 35th and then the 1st on its right and the 77th on its left was forced to face first northeast, and then almost due east, as it gallantly fought its way

forward up the valley of the Aire and the hills on the western bank of that river.

The Rainbow artillery stayed with the 32nd Division until it bumped hard against the strongly prepared defensive position of the Kriemhilde Stellung from Hill 288, later to become so well known to the 168th Iowa, along the front of the Cote Dames Marie and that part of the position to the east of that Cote.

Though the 1st Division had conquered all the advanced positions of the Germans in front of the Kriemhilde Stellung in a battle so gallantly carried forward as to excite the admiration of the beaten Germans and a special commendatory order from the Commander-in-Chief General Pershing, it had not attacked the Kriemhilde Stellung at the time of its relief.

The reason it had not is one which was to be a dominant factor in the subsequent attack on the Rainbow Division on that Stellung, or position.

The reason was that this Stellung is not along an east and west line for the whole of its course. South of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon and to the east it is on such a line. South of St. George Landres St. George and to the west it is on such a line. However, in front of Landres St. George, St. George it is three kilometers further north than it is just south of-Romagne-sous-Montfaucon. As a consequence from in front of Landres St. George to Hill 258 not far from Romagne-sous-Montfaucon for a distance of four and a half kilometers it faces southwest. This stretch includes the unusually strong, strongpoints Cote-de-Chatillon, Hill 288, Hill 283 and the Cote Dames Marie the southeastern end of which is Hill 258.

Thus while they had started on approximately the same line the 32d Division had inevitably bumped against the Kriemhilde Stellung while the 1st was still fighting its way forward capturing the advance positions which lay in the salient of which the Cote de Chattilon was the apex.

As was true of their service with the 4th Division on the Vesle the Rainbow Artillery was again to find the difference between serving with their own division and a strange one.

The main difference which they had to accustom themselves to was the totally different formations for attack of the 32nd

Division. In the 42nd Division the attack was always made with the four infantry regiments abreast of each other, with one battalion for the assault, one in support and one in reserve. The light field artillery regiments were assigned each to the direct support of one regiment of infantry. In its service with the 32nd Division the attacks were made with the two regiments of one brigade side by side each with two battalions in the assault position and one in support while the other brigade was held in reserve. Just before the Rainbow Artillery left to join their own division the 32nd Division had three regiments in line, each with two battalions in the assault position and one in support. At first the two brigade commanders were in different posts of command as was always the case in the Rainbow Division. Almost immediately, however, they were put in the same post of command.

In the attack of October 9th the 63rd Infantry Brigade was in front with the 126th Michigan Infantry on the right and 125th Michigan Infantry on the left, each with two Battalions in the front line and one in support. The 64th Infantry Brigade was in reserve. The P. C.'s of the two Infantry Brigades were placed together so as to insure liaison.

The Rainbow Artillery supported the 126th Infantry on the right, its two light regiments the 149th and 151st, were grouped under the command of Colonel Reilly, who had direct liaison with General Frank McCoy commanding the 63rd Infantry Brigade to which he had been assigned when promoted from being Colonel of the 165th New York to Brig. General, as well as with General Gatley commanding the 67th F. A. Brigade. Colonel Tyndall commanding the Indiana howitzers reported directly to General Gatley. For this attack the 32d Division had besides the Rainbow Brigade its own 57th F. A. Brigade to which was attached the 147th F. A., ten Batteries of the 58th F. A. Brigade, six light and four howitzers, three batteries of French 105's, two batteries of French howitzers and one battery of French 155 longs.

The 149th Illinois supported the right front line Battalion of the 126th Infantry, the 151st Minnesota supported the left front line Battalion of the 126th Infantry. Each Regiment furnished a liaison detachment under command of an Officer to the Battalion it supported.

On the 9th the 126th Infantry succeeded in reaching the southern outskirts of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon. This same day the 1st Division took Hill 263 later to become well known to the 167th Alabama and the 165th New York and Hill 232 on which the P. C.'s of the 166th Ohio and 83rd Infantry Brigade were later placed.

On the 10th the attack was continued, the right Battalion of the 126th Infantry penetrated the trench de la Mamelle. This trench was a continuation of the Kriemhilde Stellung after it descended from the Cote Dame Marie, crossed the road from Cheppy to Romagne-sous-Montfaucon south of that town and ascended the hill to the east and thence ran in front of the 3rd Regular Division which was on the right of the 32nd. However, the Red Arrows could not break through. They were held here until the day that the 84th Infantry Brigade and the right of the 32nd Division finally broke the Kriemhilde Stellung by capturing the Cote Dame Marie, though the left of the 32nd bumped hard against the center part of the Cote Dame Marie.

October 10th was the day the First Division reached the positions on which the Rainbow Infantry relieved them the night of October 11th.

October 11th the 32nd attempted no advance. Such ground as had been gained was consolidated in preparation for the next attack which was made simultaneously with the Rainbow's first attack on the Kriemhilde Stellung.

October 10th orders were issued for the relief of the Rainbow Artillery at midnight that night; however, they were later cancelled by telephone, and verbal instructions given to prepare fires for an attack of the 126th Infantry that afternoon. This attack was not made but was postponed until the next day. The reason for this postponement was that the order directing the attack had also directed changes of position for one Battalion each of the 149th and 151st Field Artilleries. The time was insufficient from the receipt of these orders to make the changes of position, prepare and then execute the fires, and also get the ammunition necessary up to the batteries. It was also found that the Infantry was not ready and were even some distance from the line from which they were supposed to jump off.

The 67th F. A. Brigade was finally ordered relieved the night of October 11th but was ordered not to move a piece from any position until after midnight.

The rendezvous position of the Brigade was the northwestern edge of the Bois de Very about 3 kilometers east of Cheppy where the P. C. of the Rainbow Division had just relieved the P. C. of the 1st Division.

When the Battery and Battalion Commanders, worn from being up all night and struggling through the heavy traffic on shelled roads, reached this position the morning of the 12th they were given orders to immediately make their reconnaissances, to put their batteries in position that night in support of the Rainbow Infantry which had already relieved the Infantry of the 1st Division.

Thus, as so often happens in war, while the enlisted men, after taking care of the horses and having a hot meal, were able to sleep and rest, the Colonels, Majors and Captains were up at the front under shell fire picking the battery positions, making the plans and getting out the orders to enter the line after dark.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE RAINBOW BREAKS THROUGH THE KRIEMHILDE STELLUNG.

The Rainbow was now to meet its hardest test.

First, because of the unusual strength of the enemy's position which it had to attack and through which it finally broke. Secondly, because to do this it had to pass through the hardest moral test it is possible for soldiers to be subjected to in battle; that is, to see defeat face to face but instead of yielding to grimly, hang on even though ultimate success seems impossible.

General Arthur MacArthur *, who enlisted in 1861 as a boy private in a Wisconsin Infantry Regiment and four years later was a Brigadier General and the holder of the Medal of Honor, was asked** during the Russo-Japanese War what he thought of the Japanese Army based on the numerous battles which they had fought.

He replied, "As up to the present the Japanese Army has only won victories I am unable to form any opinion as to their value as soldiers. Until they taste the bitterness of defeat and I see how they come out of this real test of whether or not troops are first class soldiers, I will remain uncertain as to their value."

"The older I grow and the more I see and learn about war, the more I am convinced that the greatest achievement of both the Union and Confederate Armies in our Civil War, was the fact that again and again each was defeated but undismayed right afterwards would fight as hard as if they had been victorious."

The Division was now to meet such a test.

Previously it had seen hard fighting, it is true, but always had had certain advantages.

In the early months of the Division's service at the front in Lorraine it faced an entrenched enemy but it was equally well entrenched itself.

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* Father of General Douglass MacArthur of the Rainbow.

** By the then Second Lieutenant Henry J. Reilly.

In the Champagne in July it faced the last of the three great German attacks of 1918. It was the first one to be stopped dead by the defender. The proceeding German attacks only halted as does an incoming wave which rushes far inland submerging everything it meets until it comes to a stop from its own exhaustion. In this, the first great battle of the Rainbow, they were in a maze of trenches resulting from four years warfare back and forth across a strip of French soil from the Argonne Forest to Rheims. The enemy attacked in tremendous force and with the support of the most brutal type of artillery fire. However, their plan of attack was upset by Gouraud's withdrawal from the old First Line to the Intermediate Position which became the main line of defense.

The Ourcq, the second great battle of the Rainbow, was their first in the open. However, their training had been primarily for such fighting. Also the enemy was in the open so that contest was an even one.

The St. Mihiel Battle was an assault from trenches against a strongly entrenched position. This though a salient sticking way out from the German line had successfully resisted all attacks upon it since September, 1914, when it was first made by the rush of the Crown Prince of Wurtemburg's Army. The Americans had the advantage because they caught the Germans by surprise just as they were beginning a withdrawal.

The situation which now confronted the Rainbow was very different. The Germans occupied an entrenched and well wired natural position running along ridges and the crests of hills. The Rainbow was in the open on ground everywhere dominated by this German position. On some large sectors the German positions flanked the ground the Rainbow was to advance over. At points giving a wide field of fire to the front the Germans had concrete machine gun pill boxes in the front bands of their barbed wire.

Too much emphasis cannot be put on the fact that the Germans were ready for peace, realizing the failure of their attempt to win victory with the tremendous reinforcement which Russia's dropping out of the war had enabled them to bring to the Western Front. They knew that the arrival in time of the American reinforcement to the Allies had turned the tide against them and

that this reinforcement was so rapidly increasing that the initiative now lost to the Allies could not be easily recaptured by them, if ever.

Therefore, all their efforts were devoted to withdrawing from the huge salient which they had held in France and Belgium since 1914 before any or all of it could be cut off and the troops within it thereby faced with surrender.

As a consequence they simply had to hold the Argonne pivot of their salient until their troops within it could safely withdraw to a line across its base.

Shortening their line would strengthen it everywhere as the same number of troops could be much more densely distributed to each kilometer.

Then should the peace negotiations fail they might be able to prepare another offensive just as their withdrawal in 1917 to the shorter Hindenburg line had given them a better preparation for the spring offensive in 1918. Similarly it would serve in the meanwhile as a much stronger line of defense.

The first attack order in the battle, which was to prove the hardest test of the Rainbow, was Field Order No. 36, 13th of October, 5 o'clock.

The first paragraph of this order is one of the outstanding proofs of the fact that the Argonne in which the Americans were fighting was the pivot about which the whole retirement of the Germans from France swung backward towards the Meuse River, just as in August and September, 1914, it had swung forward on the pivot of Verdun-Metz.

The first section of the first paragraph was: "The enemy is withdrawing on the entire western front".

The enemy was undoubtedly withdrawing on the rest of the western front, because in many cases he went back considerable distances without fighting, though in other cases resisting.

From the beginning of the Argonne battle, September 26th, until after the break-through of November 1st, he never retired voluntarily in the Argonne!

He always fought stubbornly! At no time did he fight more stubbornly than in the Battle now just ahead of the Rainbow, with the 32nd Division on its right, and the 82nd Division on its left.

The 5th Army Corps, whose front was occupied by the 42nd and 32nd Divisions, was given as its objective La Bergerie Ferme-Cote 253—Ridge running southwest from Hill 300 in Bois d'Andevanne—La Bergerie Ferme—Bois L'Epasse—Cote 253—Ridge 1 kilometer northwest of St. Georges.

These positions, however, were not to fall into American hands until the break-through of November 1st, more than two weeks after the date of the order.

The rest of the German line in France had retired, partially as the result of allied attacks, but also partially without fighting. At the same time the Germans not only stubbornly resisted in the Argonne, but also sent Divisions from other parts of their line to reinforce their pivot in the Argonne. (See map, end of Chapter 28.)

An extremely important point in this order is the fact that while the four infantry regiments of the Division were given parallel areas in which to advance, they were not assigned the same jumping off line running at right angles to these four lanes.

In other words, it was not the standard type of assault such as the Division made in the St. Mihiel attack.

Instead the jumping off line was escheloned in three steps for the Rainbow and in four when the 32nd Division to its right is included.

The 83rd Infantry Brigade on the left was farthest forward with the 82nd Division on its left, on approximately the same jump off line. Slightly in advance of the line of the 83rd Brigade was the jump off position of the 167th Alabama Infantry. To the right rear of the Alabama Regiment and separated from it by a gap was the jump off position of the 168th Iowa. To its right rear was the jump off position of the 32nd Wolverine Division.

The attack order prescribed that "At 'H' hour, the right of the 84th Brigade will attack in liaison with the left of the 32nd Division." It designated a point of separation between the right of the 84h Brigade and its left, which, as it worked out, meant that the 168th Iowa would attack simultaneously with the 32nd Division, while the 167th Alabama stood fast.

At H plus 3 hours, at which time it was planned the 32nd Division and Iowa regiment would be abreast of the Alabama regiment, the whole of the 84th Brigade was to attack to the front. At H plus 5 hours, the 83rd Division was to attack.

This order prescribed that the divisional reserve would consist of the 117th Engineers last two companies and the 149th Machine Gun Battalion. The two companies of engineers not included in the reserves were sent one each to each of the infantry brigades to perform their usual duties of helping the infantry to cut and get through the enemy's wire and to help them keep open their lines of communication over which ammunition and food had to be brought forward and the wounded sent to the rear.

It ordered one artillery platoon of two guns to be attached to each of the assault battalions, for direct fire on any obstacles holding up the infantry.

The four objectives for the attack were as follows:

1st. (for 84th Brigade and 32nd Division only) a line on northern edge of Bois de Romagne about 400 meters south of la Musarde Farm, and extending northeast across the clearing to a point about 500 meters south of la Tuilerie Farm, thence generally east through Bois de Romagne.

2nd. a general east and west line through Hill 206 and Ferme de la Cavaniere.

3rd. a general east and west line through the mill just north of St. Georges and running about 200 meters north of Landres et-St. Georges.

4th. a general east and west line running through Cote 253 and along the north edge of Bois Hazois.

This order was modified by an Army Order at 9:30 P. M., and by a Fifth Corps order in accordance with the Army Order, so that both brigades were to advance on the second objective at H plus 3 hours. The plan for the attack on the third objective was not altered, but the times for the jump offs were. The 83rd Brigade was ordered to advance at H plus 4 ½ hours, and the 84th Brigade at H plus 6 hours. The times for the artillery barrage were changed to agree.

At noon, October 13th, a memorandum from Fifth Corps headquarters set H hour for 8 A. M., October 14th. During the

day several changes were made in the parts of this order affecting the 83rd Brigade, while the plan of employment for the artillery was entirely changed. The first change was unimportant, as it turned out, with the exception that the 83rd Brigade between H and H plus 3 hours was to give all possible assistance to the advance of the 84h Brigade by fire on enemy positions threatening the left of the 84h Brigade.

This is important because it shows recognition of the fact that an advance by the 83rd Brigade before the 84h was abreast of it would subject it to fire into its right flank. In the battle such an advance was made with the result that this flank fire contributed materially to prevent its success.

The change in the artillery plan of employment undoubtedly was the primary cause for the failure of the 83rd Brigade to break through and the delay in capturing the Cote de Chatillon.

Insofar as the artillery was concerned, the main point in Divisional Field Order No. 36 issued at 17 hours, October 13th, was the statement "nearly all the artillery of the Division will support the attack." This was for the advance to the first objective in which the right of the 84th Brigade and the 32nd Division attacked together. It included the taking of Hills 288 and 242 by the 84th Brigade. This would have brought the 32nd Division and the 168th Iowa abreast of the 167th Alabama.

Similarly, for the second phase of the attack, which was divided into two sub-phases, the first by the 84th Brigade, the second by the 83rd Brigade, it was provided "In each phase almost the entire divisional artillery will support the attacking brigade."

The first sub-phase of the second phase, that in which the 84h Brigade attacked alone, was to begin three hours after the first phase. The second sub-phase of the second phase, in which the 83rd Brigade was to advance, was to begin at five hours after the first phase of the attack began.

The sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph (3) of this order provided: "Especial attention will be devoted by the divisional artillery to: "Cote de Chatillon—Hill 262—Northern part of Bois de Romagne—Hill 288 and Enemy Trenches."

The Plan for the Employment of Artillery, which was Annex I of this Order, provided for these concentrations.

However, this Order had hardly reached the artillery Colonels before a memorandum was published by the 67th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters which, after stating that the organization of the command as announced in Field Order No. 36 remained the same, stated: "All other parts of Annex I are revoked."

For the artillery concentrations of practically all of the guns in front of that part of the infantry which most needed it in accordance with Major General Summerall's practice in the attacks of the 1st Division, there was substituted the customary system of artillery fire, which meant a more or less uniform distribution of it over the whole front.

Brigadier General George Grant Gatley, commanding the 67th Field Artillery Brigade, and his Adjutant, Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Nance, were both regular Field Artillery officers, with reputations above the average. General Gatley as a captain in command of a mountain battery in the Southern Philippines had made a reputation for himself as an artilleryman, and life-long friends amongst infantrymen and cavalrymen by the artillery support which he gave them in their combats with the Moros.

Major General Charles P. Summerall, who commanded the Fifth Corps, had won his promotion largely as a result of using his system of artillery concentration to help the infantry of the 1st Division forward. His chief-of-staff, Colonel "Andy" Burt, was a regular artilleryman with a reputation above the average.

As no record has come to light yet, explaining exactly why this change in the artillery Annex was made, the presumption is that it was due to the lack of artillery ammunition in the same way that the preliminary fire at St. Mihiel had to be limited because the available ammunition was not sufficient for a greater period of fire with the large number of guns used.

The second paragraph of the 67th Field Artillery Brigade memorandum would indicate this. It says:

"From H hour minus 2 hours to H hour minus 15 minutes all guns will be concentrated on sensitive points in the enemy terrain with maximum rate of fire. Ammunition must, however, be conserved so as to allow on the battery positions at the H hour, 400 rounds for the 75's and 200 rounds for the 155's."

The night before the attack, Brigadier General Lenihan had Colonel Hough, Colonel Mitchell, and Colonel Reilly report to him at his P. C. in a wooden shack on the hillside above Exermont, to go over the details of the assault to begin the next morning.

The shack was on the bare hillside not far from the edge of a wood out of which some of the 35th Division, who reached farthest forward in their advance, had come first and later out of which the leading elements of the 1st Division had also rushed forward.

The edge of the wood and the open ground all around the hut were covered with the dead of both divisions.

Though the three Colonels did not have far to go they will long remember the trip through the dusk, stumbling in shell holes and only avoiding stumbling on the dead because of their great care not to do so and the fact that in some cases comrades had stuck the dead man's bayonet in the ground, thus leaving his rifle upright to mark where their friend had fallen.

Similarly the trip back through a mist which was steadily getting thicker and rapidly obliterating such few landmarks as there were, would have made a fit subject for one of the British painter Orpen's pictures.

The two infantry Colonels, when asked their opinion by General Lenihan, said that they thought the attack was a difficult one because it had to be made into a salient, the front and right face of which were held by Germans occupying a naturally strong position which had been well fortified.

They pointed out that the Cote de Chatillon, flanked from the right all the country over which the 83rd Brigade would advance; that all this country was open and therefore in full view of the Germans. They expressed doubts as to the 84th Infantry Brigade being able to break through the German position and capture the various strongpoints to the front of the 168th Iowa and to the right front of the 167th Alabama in the time allotted by the attack order.

Colonel Reilly, when asked his opinion from the artillery point of view, stated that he considered greater artillery concentration should be brought down on the Cote de Chatillon during the advance of the Brigade and also upon the German positions directly to its front.

One of the Colonels suggested to General Lenihan that he report to the Division Commander, General Menoher, and ask for a greater allowance of artillery ammunition, following the example set before St. Mihiel, when as a result of such requests, the preliminary artillery fire had been considerably increased.

Another suggested that at the same time he request that more time be allowed the units of the 84th Brigade to accomplish their missions, thus giving them a better chance to be abreast or almost abreast of the 83rd Infantry Brigade before that Brigade started its attack.

The conference broke up without any decision having been announced as to these two suggestions.

To understand what actually happened it is best to outline the tactical moves first and then give the human interest side.

Here are the tactical moves.

From right to left the assault battalions were the First of the 168th Iowa, the Third of the 167th Alabama, the Third of the 165th and the Second of the 166th.

To the right of the Iowa regiment was the 1st Battalion of the 127th Wisconsin—to the left of the 166th Ohio was the 327th Infantry almost immediately relieved by the 328th Infantry, which was in line in time to jump off with the attack.

Due to some delay in the Corps memorandum which fixed "H" hour as 8 A. M. in reaching the front line battalions the attack was not entirely synchronized as ordered.

By 13 hours the Iowans had reached a position on the reverse slope of Hill 288 and near its summit.

Thus they had broken into and captured one of the most important strong points of the Kriemhilde Stellung!

In the meanwhile on their right the battalion of the 127th Wisconsin, was unable to overcome the resistance to its immediate front. Next to it on the right was the Second Battalion of the 126th Michigan.

The history of the 32nd division says :*

"The battalion of the 126th, in the center of our front, had the best luck, springing forward from its position on Hill 258, surging through the wire and closely following the barrage as it

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* Page 105, the 32nd Division in the World War, Issued by the Joint War Histories Commissions of Michigan and Wisconsin.

advanced to the first objective of the attack. On the. right, the 128th Infantry, by some vigorous and heady work, succeeded in getting through the trenches south of Romagne, and by skillful maneuvering virtually surrounded the town and established a line on the northern outskirts. The 128th had been forced to avoid the town in its rush ahead, and, accordingly, mopping-up parties were sent into the village from the 125th Infantry, which had been following in support, ready to take advantage of just such a situation. The 125th had its hands full, but the Germans at length gave up the fight and some 200 prisoners were taken. Captured Officers said they quit as soon as they discovered they were surrounded. In the meantime, the 128th was stretching its left flank north of Romagne, and the 126th was reaching out with its right, liaison finally being established and the position consolidated.

"While the 126th and 128th were thus breaking through the Kriemhilde Stellung, the 127th on the left was flinging itself in vain against the impregnable defenses of the hills which flank La Cote Dame Marie. Colonel Langdon's men found that the artillery preparation had not cut up the wire to any appreciable extent, and the first wave which dashed over the top as the barrage lifted found itself caught in the impassable tangle. Into this wire strong enemy groups poured a withering machine gun fire, and effectually halted all efforts of the 127th to advance.

"But, while La Cote Dame Marie was successfully resisting every effort at a frontal conquest, her doom was being sealed by the valiant battalion of the 126th which had been the first to break through the line in the morning. This battalion drove straight forward, concealed and protected from view of the Cote, and passed the hill on the right. Its objective was north of La Cote Dame Marie, and this objective the battalion reached, there establishing the position which it had extended to the right to meet the 128th.

The summary of the Battle Monuments Commission says "Late in the afternoon of October 14, the second and third battalions of the 127th Infantry passing around the right of Cote Dame Marie through the gap made by the 126th Infantry, took up a position along the Sommerance-Romagne Road where

contact was gained with the right of the 168th Infantry about 6p. m."

This means that while the 168th Iowa broke the Kriemhilde-Stellung by the capture of all of Hill 288 with the exception of an isolated German post on its front slope, thus flanking out the left of the German position on the Cote Dame Marie the center and right of the 32nd Red Arrow Division by breaking thru the Kriemhilde-Stellung in the lower country running down to and in the valley of the Andon River flanked it on the southeast or on its left flank.

The gap between the 168th Iowa and 167th Alabama still remained.

In the meanwhile, the 167th Alabama attacked about 8:30 A. M. from the northern edge of the Bois de Romagne. The summary of the Battle Monuments Commission says "K Company on the right was stopped after an advance of about 200 meters by barbed wire, but L Company on the left was able to advance about 300 meters farther. About 9:30 A. M., portions of K Company had reached the narrow woods west of Musarde Farm and had patrols in the two small patches to the north.

"During this time fire was received from Bois de Romagne to the right rear. Company I was put in between Companies K and L and advanced to the line before nightfall. Company "H" was placed in line on the left to gain contact with the 165th New York Infantry and did so. The line for the night ran along the northern edge of the Bois de Romagne and paralleled the German trenches on the Cote de Chatillon at about 500 meters. Running up the draw just north of two small patches of woods in front of the Cote de Chatillon and then running generally west to its junction with the 165th New York."

What had happened was simply what always happens when troops advancing in one direction find themselves under heavy fire from another. It was that the Alabamians attacking to the North, came under heavy fire from the Germans to their right on the Cote de Chatillon with the result that they swung to the right facing this fire. H Company then had to be put in at right angles to this line facing north, that is, in the original direction of the attack in order to connect with the 165th New York which was facing north.

This was the night that the order for the attack on the Cote de Chatillon with the bayonet was given which was subsequently withdrawn.

The 165th New York attacked at 8:30 A. M. An hour later some of the assault battalion had reached the second objective. About 11:20 A. M., the attack was received from the second objective.

However, the heavy fire into the right flank from the Cote de Chatillon brought this attack to a halt. At five p. m., after an hour and a half artillery preparation the battalion attacked again. A short advance was made when the battalion was again brought to a halt by the heavy fire into its right flank from the Cote de Chatillon added to the frontal fire from the German position south of Landres St. Georges and German artillery fire from the Bois Hazois.

The First Battalion relieved the third occupying the line of farthest advance. It had liaison with the Alabama regiment on the right and after 10 p. m., with the Ohio regiment on the left.

The Second Battalion of the 166th Ohio attacked at 8 :30 A. M., from a line about 200 meters north of Sommerance. It flanked the woods about 700 meters north of the town and advancing in company with the right of the 82nd Division forced the enemy to evacuate these woods. It made a frontal attack on Hill 230 about ten A. M. However, the battalion was held up for the time being while the Hill was flanked on the left by the right of the 82d Division. Elements of the Battalion reached the woods on the second objective about 10:50 A. M. About noon patrols were sent forward from these woods and succeeded in reaching the hostile wire south of St. Georges, but could not hold the position. The enemy's artillery fire and infantry fire had considerably increased since the attack was started.

At five P. M., a new attack was made at the same time as the 165th New York Infantry. The attack was stopped by heavy enemy fire. A line was organized for the night, abreast of the 156th Infantry on the right, and of the 82d Division on the left which had not succeeded in advancing any further than the 166th Ohio.

Summing up the situation at nightfall the 14th it can be seen that considerable progress had been made though the attack was far from the objectives assigned it.

On the right the Iowa regiment and the 32d Division had broken into the Kriemhilde Stellung. On the left the 83rd Infantry Brigade and the 82d Division had driven the Germans from their advance positions into the main position of that Stellung.

However, the line occupied by the 83rd Infantry Brigade was more than a kilometer north of the east and west line running thru the position occupied by the 168th Iowa and the 32d Division on its right. Facing this band of territory south of the front line of the 83rd Infantry Brigade and north of the front line of the Iowa Regiment, was the key to the Kriemhilde Stellung, the Cote de Chatillon. It was still in German hands as were its outpost strongpoints Musarde Farm and Tuillerie Farm. Hill 242 also was still in German hands.

Also there remained the small posts of the Germans on the front face of Hill 288 not yet captured by the Iowans but whose fate was certain because that regiment occupied the crest of the hill between them and their own lines.

In the gap between the 83d Brigade and the Iowa regiment facing the Cote de Chatillon was the Alabama regiment.

Thus the position of the 83rd Infantry Brigade and particularly the 165th Infantry on its right and of that part of the Alabama regiments in the open in front of the west face of the Cote de Chatillon, was a precarious one.

As long as the Germans held the Cote de Chatillon they had nothing to worry about in so far as that part of the Kriemhilde Stellung which ran from in front of Landres et St. Georges west was concerned.

Thus it was obvious that the key to the situation was the Cote de Chatillon, and that only by its capture could the Germans be compelled to abandon the rest of the Kriemhilde Stellung.

This ended the first of the three days of the Division's hardest fight. The 83rd Infantry Brigade had made two assaults on the well-wired, fortified Kriemhilde Stellung which the American army had now assaulted for the first time in this part of the front,

though the 32nd Division and the 181st Brigade of the 91st Division had bumped up against the more southerly part of it more than a week before.

The night of October 14th, at 23.30 hours, or a half hour before midnight, the Division issued Field Order No. 37.

The first paragraph was cheering, but not convincing, particularly in so far as the 83rd Infantry Brigade and the Alabama Regiment on its right flank, which faced both north and east, were concerned.

This paragraph said "The enemy's resistance on the front of our army is breaking."

The order called for the continuation of the attack on the 15th and gave the same zones of action as for the 14th.

The Divisional artillery was ordered to fire on the enemy wire from 7:15 to 7:30, after which it was to lift 300 meters and stabilize for ten minutes to permit the passage of hostile wire by the Infantry. At 7:40 it was to begin forward movement. The 83rd Brigade was to begin its advance at 7:40. It was to be supported by tanks "in accordance with verbal instructions."

During the advance of the 83rd Brigade, the 84th Brigade was ordered to exploit the Cote de Chatillon and the woods near La Tuillerie Farm.

This is what happened on October 15th, the second day. On the right the 1st Battalion of the 168th Iowa began the attack. The simplest description of the bare facts is that given by the Battle Monuments Commission in its pamphlet. It says: "On the left Companies B and D advanced towards the left of Hill 242. As the attack progressed, "A" on the right advanced around the east and west of Hill 242. Parts of its 1st platoon got to Tuillerie Farm, capturing machine guns, but had to return under heavy fire before noon to the north edge of the Bois de Romagne, where a line was reformed with Companies "H", "A", "B", and "C" from right to left.

"After a three-quarter hour artillery preparation, these companies attacked again at three p. m. This time Company 'H' attacked on the right of Hill 242 (going well into the sector of the 32nd Division), the balance to the left. 'H' got to Tuillerie Farm and captured all of it but the barn, holding on until after dark, when it withdrew. On the left in this attack 'B' hit the

hostile wire with ‘C’ and ‘A’ on its right, advancing down the slope from Hill 288.

“By dark forward movement had stopped, and the line was consolidated with all four companies of the 1st Battalion in line, plus ‘H’ with ‘F’ as local support.

“The line for the night ran from its junction with the 32nd Division on the right near the Divisional boundary about 400 meters southeast of Tuillerie Farm, thence around the forward slope of Hill 242, and generally following the north edge of the Bois de Romagne, and running southwest along the hedge across the clearing before Musarde Farm to a point 400 meters southwest of Musarde Farm, where it joined the line of the 167th Alabama.”

The 32nd Division on the right also attacked at 7:30 a. m. About 3:45 p. m. the flanks of the 168th Iowa and the 127th Wisconsin were in contact on the eastern slope of Hill 242. From there by nightfall the line of the 32nd Division ran in general due east in continuation of the line of the Iowa regiment for a kilometer and a half and then ran southeast to just north of Romagne-Sous-Montfaucon.

The 167th Alabama was still confronted with the same difficult situation as it had found itself in by nightfall of the day before. Except for the small part of its line still in the Bois-de-Romagne it was out in the open facing the Cote de Chatillon to the east and that part of the Kriemhilde Stellung in front of Landres-St. Georges.

During the day patrols from Companies “F”, “K” and “M” explored the hostile wire on the western slopes at Cote de Chatillon but found it undamaged by artillery. No changes in line were made in this regiment this date.

The 83rd Brigade attacked at 7:30.

This attack was to be supported by tanks but because of mechanical troubles and casualties, the tanks got scarcely any farther north than Sommerance and were withdrawn by nine hours.

The 1st Battalion, 165th New York, while attacking received fire from the left from some Germans who had worked up the draw running from St. George towards woods 199. They were

not only working around the left flank of "A" Company in the front line, but also of "B", the supporting company, back of "A". Artillery fire on this group and on the front was asked for at 10:15 and was continued until noon, when the New York attack was resumed. By 12:45 the attack had reached the enemy's wire about 500 meters north of the morning position. An hour later the 1st Battalion was relieved by the Second Battalion and an east and west line consolidated about 400 meters north of Woods 199. Contact with the Alabamans on the right had been maintained. On the left it was not gained with the Ohioans until after dark.

About 7 or half an hour before the time for the attack, the Germans made a counter-attack against the 166th Ohio and the troops of the 82nd Division on its immediate left. This counter attack reached the groups of woods just south of Point 206. This counter-attack was repulsed.

However, when the Third Battalion of the 166th Ohio attacked, it had been held up twenty minutes and suffered from the enemy groups in these woods. "L" Company on the left was held up about 150 meters south of the enemy wire by machine gun fire and "M" on the right by the enemy in these woods. This, coupled with the enemy groups taking advantage of the draw from St. George to infiltrate between the Ohio and New York regiments, was met by establishing a strong point of automatic riflemen and riflemen from "I" Company on the slopes about 300 meters west of Woods 199.

Advantage was taken of the same barrage as that put down in front of the New York regiment, which also had been asked for by the Ohio one, to relieve "L" and "M" with "I" and "K", the two support companies of the Third Battalion.

In the afternoon four attempts to advance were made. "I" Company on the right reached the creek running from Woods 199 to St. George where it held. It was after dark in this vicinity that contact was made with the New York regiment. On the left contact was maintained with the 82nd Division.

The 328th Infantry on the left of the Ohio regiment repulsed the 7 hour counter-attack with considerable loss to the enemy, but with rather heavy losses in killed and captured to itself. This regiment did not attack. The center of the 82nd Division attacked, made some gains, but to quote the Battle Monuments

Commission "were unable to hold their ground and subsequently withdrew to approximately the same line held during the night of October 14th."

Thus ended October 15, the second day of the bitter struggle of the Americans to break entirely through the Kriemhilde Stellung.

The 168th Iowa by its capture of Hill 242 had advanced the center of the Fifth Corps one step further towards its objective, because now face to face with the southeastern slopes of the Cote de Chatillon. The 32nd Division on its right had carried its left and center forward to a position abreast of Iowa. On its right its line ran slightly southeast to the line of the Third American Army Corps, on the right of the Fifth Corps.

The center of the Fifth Corps from right to left, the 167th Alabama, 165th New York, and 166th Ohio, were face to face with the enemy's wire in the salient made by his strong position just south of St. George and Landres-St. Georges and the western face of the Cote de Chatillon. They were out in the open, exposed to fire from the front and from the Cote de Chatillon on their right flank.

They held grimly on to the ground they had gained!

Some of the leading elements of the 165th New York had left their dead in the enemy wire. Some of their bodies were still there at the time of the attack on November 1st. The others had been buried at night by the Germans.

On the left, the right and center of the 82nd Division, like three Rainbow regiments, was up against the wire of the Kriemhilde Stellung.

The left of the 82nd Division was somewhat to the left rear on Hill 182 just north of St. Juvin.

The more the map of this situation is examined the more what strikes the eye at the first glance is apparent: That the Cote de Chatillon was the key to the whole situation because as long as it remained in German hands their line over the greater part of the Argonne was safely anchored. As long as this part of the line in the Argonne was safely anchored, the pivot of the retirement of the greater part of their line in France was safe.

Here is what Colonel Hughes, the Chief of Staff of the Division, says:

"A careful study of the situation showed that the Cote de Chatillon was the key to the whole situation, not only because of its physical characteristics and the position which it occupied, but also because very strongly held by the Germans, who apparently after our first attacks had increased its garrison.

"The heavy flanking fire from it held up the Alabama regiment and was the main reason why the 83rd Brigade could not successfully break through the German position to its immediate front. It caused the heavy losses, particularly in the New York regiment. Nevertheless they held on to the position to which they had advanced and from which each of their unsuccessful attacks was made, leaving behind as evidence the bodies of their dead in the German wire.

"When there could no longer be any doubt that only by the capture of the Cote de Chatillon, the apex of the German position paralleling the salient which the Rainbow had taken over from the 1st Division, MacArthur asked permission to concentrate on the Cote de Chatillon and that the 151st Minnesota Field Artillery be placed directly under his command for the attack.

"General Menoher held a conference at the Division P. C., after which he, MacArthur and I went to see General Summerall, the Corps Commander.

"From his P. C. we went on to General Drum, the Chief of Staff of the 1st Army.

"Both General Summerall and General Drum said that MacArthur could not capture the Cote de Chatillon with his Brigade alone, that the only thing to do was to make another general attack, particularly as the advance of the whole army had been held up by the Germans on this key position.

"However, they finally yielded to our arguments, and MacArthur was given permission to go ahead.

"In the meanwhile, I had discovered that a very large proportion of the dead of the 35th Kansas-Missouri Division around our headquarters were shot through the ankles and shins and through the top of the head in the case of those within a short distance of former German machine gun nests. I also noticed that these machine gun nests were not placed on the 'Military Crest', but were pushed well forward in front of it. This enabled the Germans to deliver a surprise fire at close quarters from

machine gun nests, which because of their unusual location, had not been discovered and destroyed by the artillery fire. This low fire had mowed down the men of the 35th Division by shooting them through the legs and ankles and then as they fell forward through the top of their heads.

"This observation of mine confirmed reports from both our infantry and artillery of German machine guns in front of the German wire, as well as in it and back of it in the usual positions in the trenches.

"Aeroplane photographs, which I had made at this time, confirmed this. One of them also showed an opening through the German wire, near the southwest corner of the Cote de Chatillon."

General MacArthur tells the following concerning the orders to capture Cote-de-Chatillon. He says:

"When the orders first came for the attack of the Division and I looked at the map and saw the ground in front of the 84th Infantry Brigade and then followed this with a personal reconnaissance, I had many misgivings. The 32nd Division on our right had after most gallantly capturing strongpoint after strongpoint, finally been held up by the Cote Dame Marie despite malting the most determined attacks. Hill 288, even if held by the 32nd Division as indicated by the orders for relief, was a considerable distance south of Hill 242 which had to be captured by the 168th Infantry before it would be abreast of the 167th. The minute that Regiment left the shelter of the woods where it had taken over from the First Division it would have to cross open country absolutely dominated by the German fire from around the base of and on the Cote de Chatillon.

"Then when the 168th Iowa found as it did by some very gallant patrol work that Hill 288 had not been captured but was still in the hands of the Germans, I had even more misgivings about the outcome.

"This was so much the case that when General Menoher, the Division Commander, asked me whether or not I could take the Cote de Chatillon I told him as long as we were speaking in the strictest confidence that I was not certain. I gave him the reasons why.

"When General Summerall, the Corps Commander, came around the night before the attack and asked the same question,

I replied: 'General Summerall, this brigade assures you that it will capture Cote de Chatillon. If this Brigade does not capture Chatillon you can publish a casualty list of the entire Brigade with the Brigade Commander's name at the top.'

"Tears sprang into General Summerall's eyes. He was evidently so moved he could say nothing. He looked at me for a few seconds and then left without a word."

On this same night of the 15th of October General Summerall visited also the P. C.'s of the 83rd Infantry Brigade, the 165th New York, the 166th Ohio and the 149th Illinois Field Artillery.

It was quite evident after these two days of attacks that the artillery as it was being used could not lend sufficient support to an infantry attack which because of the German position was necessarily a disjointed one.

An accompanying fire with a number of guns and at a rate sufficient for the normal attack of four regiments of infantry abreast, each with one battalion in the assault position, was entirely insufficient for an attack in which these regiments were headed in different directions.

The 83rd Brigade on the left covering a front of more thank two kilometers faced north towards the Germans, on their immediate front. Its right regiment, the 165th New York Infantry, besides the fire from its front inevitable in any normal attack, received fully as heavy a fire into its right flank from the Cote de Chatillon squarely on that flank and only a kilometer away. The jump off position of the 167th Alabama Infantry was nearly a kilometer further north than that of the 168th Iowa on its right, also there was a gap of at least half a kilometer between these two regiments and this exactly in the center of the 84th Brigade. The German position from the Cote de Chatillon to Hill 288, the first objective of the attack of the 168th Iowa was parallel to the right flank of the position of the assault battalion of the Alabama regiment in the Bois de Romagne.

As soon as the assault Battalion of the 167th moved north out of the Bois de Romagne, it was fired into on the right flank by the Germans around the Musarde Farm at the southwestern base of the Cote de Chatillon. The further this battalion progressed north in the original direction of the attack assigned it,

the more it suffered from this fire in its flank with the inevitable result as troops always face towards the maximum fire they are receiving that it swung to the right until most of it faced the Cote de Chatillon. This exposed its left flank which was now turned towards the north to fire from the German position in front and directly south of Landres St. George.

All this meant that instead of the supporting artillery having to cover at most a front of four kilometers, it had a front of approximately five and a half to six kilometers. This front, due to the irregularity of its natural features and the skill with which the Germans had taken advantage of them, particularly in placing their machine guns, needed to be effectively covered with more than the normal amount of artillery fire. This either by using a greater total number of guns than were available at the time or else concentrating the fire of all available artillery first in front of one part of the infantry until it had succeeded in moving forward and then in front of another; in other words, the artillery tactics successfully used by General Summerall to help the infantry of the First Division forward south of Soissons and again north from the Exermont valley.

The Rainbow artillery as always in combat had carefully accumulated every piece of information regarding the enemy's position which both their own observers and their liaison officers with the infantry reported.

Some hours after dark, October 15, the Corps Commander, General Summerall, suddenly appeared at the small wooden shack above Exermont in which was the P. C., of the 149th Illinois Field Artillery, near which were the P. C's of the 166th Ohio and the 83rd Infantry Brigade. As he came in Captain Dwight L. Smith, the Captain of the Headquarters Company called "attention"!

The General spoke to Smith and several other officers and sergeants of the Headquarters Company whom he recognized from the time he had been in command of the Rainbow Artillery Brigade. He then asked the Colonel of the Regiment who was working over a map on the drawing board, "What are you doing there?" The Colonel showed to him and explained a tracing on which he was marking all the latest information with respect to the enemy's position and indicating the need for greater artillery

fire. He also showed him a letter he had just dictated to accompany the tracing. It follows:

HEADQUARTERS
149TH FIELD ARTILLERY
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

October 15, 1918.

From: Commanding Officer, Light Field Artillery supporting the 83rd Infantry Brigade.
To: Commanding General 67th F. A. Brigade.
Subject: Conditions which it is desired to better in future attacks.

1. Attached is a tracing showing the fires delivered prior to and during the attack which was launched at noon today, or the attack which was delivered after the one planned for the morning failed; also information since received from the infantry and from observatories as to suspected or located enemy artillery and machine gun positions. It will be noted that in the preparatory fire no 75's fired below the X coordinate 286.9 except in the case of the woods marked "A," and that therefore the southern-most enemy trench element was not entirely covered. This part of the trench system was thoroughly covered by fire in the second attack attempted yesterday, October 14, 1918. There was no fire south of this line, with the one exception indicated, because the infantry considered it to be too dangerous. It would seem that in such a case it would be better to withdraw the infantry somewhat and permit the fire to cover all parts of the enemy's position. It is certain that there will be no difficulties in arranging such a partial temporary withdrawal with the infantry commanders. Attention is called to this matter merely to bring out the point that any such action will necessitate more time in the preparation of such attacks in future.

2. From the report received, while it is evident that machine gun and artillery fire from the front had something to do with stopping the attack, it is believed that the primary cause of *its failure was machine gun and artillery* fire from the right flank and some artillery

fire from the left flank. Due to the four infantry regiments of the division and apparently also the infantry of the division on the right being echelonned in depth from left to right, the elements of the 83rd Brigade which, being on the left were most advanced, were peculiarly open to such fire. It is considered that in future attacks if sufficient time can be taken to ask through the Commanding General 67th F. A. Brig. for fire from the neighboring artillery on suspected localities within its sector; or that authority be granted to use some of the batteries supporting the 83rd Brigade for this purpose, that the attack will be materially aided.

* * * * * * * * * * *

HENRY J. REILLY,
Colonel, U. S. A., 149th F. A.
Commanding.

General Summerall read the memorandum, followed the explanation on the map carefully, and then after saying good night, walked out.

Late the night of October 15th (hour not stated in order) the Division issued Field Order No. 38 for an attack the next morning.

The 83rd Brigade, supported by the attack from the tanks, was ordered to capture the road running between St. George and Landres-St. George, and to mop up both towns. It was then to advance and occupy the third objective as laid down in the original order for the first attack of the Division in this area. Reorganized on the third objective, it was then to go on to the fourth and dig in, pushing out strong exploiting patrols well to the front.

The 84th Brigade was ordered to continue the exploitation of the Cote de Chatillon and the woods about La Tuillerie Farm, but not to advance its elements beyond the line of the original second objective.

The artillery fire was distributed over the whole front of the Division.

The Divisional reserve, the 117th Engineers, was ordered to report to General Lenihan commanding the 83rd Brigade, for such use as he might see fit to make of it in the coming attack.

This order put the emphasis on the attack of the 83rd Brigade which was to make a simultaneous advance with the 82nd Division on its left. The 32nd Division on the right of the 84th Brigade was not to attack, but to merely exploit to its front as was true of the 84th Brigade.

This same night, fifteen minutes before midnight, the Fifth Corps ordered the 42nd Division to prepare to protect the right of the First Corps in its advance. This order provided that in case of any possible counter-attack, the line of resistance of the 42nd Division would be the Cote de Maldah, south of Musarde Farm and along the northern edge of the Bois de Romagne.

In other words, the Cote de Maldah was to become the key position of the salient held by the Americans (re-entrant) the left or western face of which would be the right flank of any ground gained by the 82nd Division protected by 166th Ohio facing northeast.

Upon receipt of this order, the Rainbow headquarters issued a memorandum suspending Field Order No. 38 and calling attention to the provisions of this Fifth Corps order.

This sudden change of plans was due to the capture of a German prisoner who, when questioned, stated the Germans were planning a heavy counter attack on the American Fifth Army Corps front.

When the attack did not materialize early the morning of the sixteenth the decision to allow General MacArthur to attack the Cote de Chatillon with the 84th Infantry Brigade having been made, he attacked as planned.

Here is what happened October 16th, the last day of this three day hard combat.

The First Battalion, 168th, with Companies “F” and “H” attached, attacked at 5:30 hours, “F” replacing “B” and “A”, the remnants of which were put in support. Twice during the morning “C” succeeded in passing Tuilerie Farm but each time was forced back again.

At 10:30 “F”, “H”, “C” and “B” from right to left, attacked again. “C” succeeded in making a hole in the hostile machine gun defense, with the result that the rest of the Battalion was able to advance and to reach the crest of the Cote de Chatillon. However, the enemy fire from several directions was so

strong that these companies were forced back to the foot of the hill.

While this was going on, the 167th Alabama repulsed a local German counter-attack, then with a provisional Battalion made up of "E" and "M" Companies and portions of "K" and "I", it moved to the right through the gap in the German wire which had been found from an airplane photograph,* and formed at its left opposite Musarde Farm. In this position they had the leading companies of the 168th Iowa on their right. From this position these companies advanced in one skirmish line.

About the time the companies of the 167th Alabama formed their line from which they attacked, "C" Company of the 168th Iowa broke up a local counter-attack.

At about 14 hours the whole line of the 168th Iowa and 167th Alabama advanced. "H" of the 168th was held up on the edge of the woods to the left of Tuilerie Farm and dug in. About 15 hours "E" and "G" Companies of the 168th under the threat of a hostile counter-attack, were put in on the right and the left, as the attack was slowly forcing withdrawal of the line. The whole line then advanced, "E", "C", and "B" of the 168th taking the crest of the Cote de Chatillon, where they dug in in contact with the 167th on the crest to its left.

In other words, the key position of the enemy, the Cote de Chatillon, fell into American hands as the result of a combined attack of the Alabama and Iowa regiments, to whom the division of the honors must be evenly made.

On the right the 32nd Division spent the day mopping up the Bois de Chavignon and the woods immediately west, south of the Bantheville-de la Candaniere Farm road.

There was no organized attack made by the 165th New York this date. The same line was held but reorganization in depth was carried out.

The 166th Ohio spent the day reorganizing and strengthening its line, particularly in the small strip of woods to the southwest of Point 206, and on the right of the sector.

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* A search through the files of the photographic section of the Signal Corps and also those of the Air Corps for this photograph has been unsuccessful.

On the left the 82nd Division made no material advance.

In a commendatory order dated October 26, 1918, General Charles B. Summerall, commanding the Fifth Army Corps, commended the 84th Infantry Brigade as follows:

"This Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Douglass MacArthur, has manifested the highest soldierly qualities and has rendered service of the greatest value during the present operations. With a dash, courage, and a fighting spirit worthy of the best traditions of the American Army, this Brigade carried by assault the strongly fortified Hill 288 on the Kriemhilde Stellung and unceasingly pressed its advance until it had captured the Tuilerie Ferme and the Cote de Chatillon, *thus placing itself at least a kilometer beyond the enemy's strong line of resistance*. During this advance the enemy fought with unusual determination with a first class division and in many cases resorted to hand-to-hand fighting when our troops approached his rear. The conduct of this Brigade has reflected honor upon the Division, the Army and the States from which the Regiments came."

This ends the recital of the tactical moves as established by military records, of the three days' hard fighting by which the Rainbow with the 32nd Wolverine Division on its right broke through the Kriemhilde Stellung.

What follows is the human interest side told by officers and men from their personal experiences and from the histories of units published since the war.

As most military orders and discussions start with the right and as the 168th Iowa Infantry on the right started the attack the first stories are those told by members of that regiment.

Here is the personal account of Colonel Matthew A. Tinley:

About 8 p. m. October 11, the 1st Battalion of the 168th Infantry took over the position occupied by the 26th Infantry. On October 12th men of the 1st Battalion, reconnoitering the hills in the vicinity of the Arrietal Farm came upon a hut in the woods with five dead Germans in the interior and one American soldier of the 26th Infantry lying dead in the doorway with a bullet hole in his back, giving evidence of a tragic event that took place the day preceding. In advancing our line across the Exermont Gesnes Valley and up to Hills 263 and 288 dead of the 32nd Division were encountered. One Second Lieutenant of the

same division, name unknown, was discovered severely wounded. On the right of that position, that is, down the slope from hills 263 and 288 the Germans had carried a portion of their Kriemhilde Stellung around the front face of Hill 288 some thirty or forty feet below the crest of the hill and along the military crest. They had machine gun positions in this locality and made it very difficult going for our troops at first. There was no evidence of the 32nd Division on our right aside from the dead found as we advanced. One regiment of a brigade of the 91st Division had been pinched out between the First Division and the 32nd Division on the night of October 10th.

"Colonel J. B. Woolnough was in command of the regiment of the 91st Division, relieved during the night of October 10th. I met him in the Bois de Baulny on the morning of October 10th. We were in position Sunday night, October 13th. On October 14th, we received an order to 'side slip to the right' to fill the gap between the right of the Rainbow and the left of the 32nd Division.

"On the night of October 13th, a patrol of six men from our regiment were surrounded and two were taken prisoners. Several were wounded and died later on. Two or three returned after the Armistice. During the evening of October 15th General Summerall visited General MacArthur at his C. P. and gave the Corps order that MacArthur's brigade would take the Army second objective at all cost. Regimental commanders of the 167th and 168th Infantry were given this order about 10 p. m., October 15th. Returning to my command post and consulting with my operations and intelligence officers I prepared my order for the following day in which I asked for a half hour preparation of artillery on machine gun positions known to us to exist on the advance slopes of Cote de Chatillon. Major Ross of the 1st Battalion was in command of the assault battalions. The attack was launched at 10:30 in the morning. It was necessary to give him some assistance from the 2nd Battalion with two companies under command of Captain Haynes. The position was taken by 4:30 p. m. Following this Ross' battalion was relieved by the 3rd Battalion, in command of Major Yates.

"The four following days were days of intense discomfort on account of the chill of the air and rainy weather. On Mon-

day, October 21st, the 84th Brigade was relieved by the 83rd Brigade, taking over the entire front. A portion of the right front of the 168th Infantry was taken over by the 364h Infantry, 89th Division, commanded by Colonel Babcock. It is interesting to note, and this from memory, the wonderful cooperation we received from the auxiliary arms. The much discussed 'accompanying gun' of the artillery was present and did most excellent work, giving direct fire on machine gun positions when called for. This liaison officer assisted materially in reducing serious positions both by directing the fire of the accompanying gun and procuring for us the assistance of the balance of the regiment. The overhead fire of our machine guns during this action, which was personally directed by Major Winn, was of the utmost assistance in enabling our men to advance successfully."

The then Major Lloyd D. Ross, who commanded the assault battalion (the first) of the Iowa Regiment, tells the-following:

"At about 7:00 A. M. on the morning of October 11th the officers of the 1st and 2nd Battalions made a reconnaissance of the routes to the front and of the positions held by the 26th Infantry of the 1st Division which we were to relieve. It was a tedious and tiresome trip for the mud was terrible. Returning to the troops still at Exmorieux Fme arrangements were made to give them an early supper and at 4:30 P. M. the 1st Battalion set out for the forward positions to relieve the 26th Infantry. We marched down the Rau de Mayache to the draw east of Neuva Forge Fme then turned north, passing la Neuville le Comte Fme and keeping to the high ground to avoid gas pockets arrived at Fme de Arietal just at dark where guides from the organizations of the 26th Infantry which we were to relieve met us. They however were new to the sector, having only occupied some of it that day, so they even got lost, and as a result it was midnight before the relief was completed. In coming into the forward positions we met Boche artillery fire and the low lands were filled with gas but the different platoons reached their positions with but few casualties.

"The positions assigned to the 1st Battalion were in the north edge of Bois de Romagne facing la Musarde Fme. Two companies were holding the front line and two companies were in support in the bend of the road north-east of Cote 263. The

and was placed on the south slope of Cote 263. We maintained these positions during October 12 receiving bursts of machine gun fire from la Musarde Fme against the front line companies and from Hill 288 on our right against Battalion Headquarters and the support companies. It was also discovered that there was a gap in our line from our right flank near la Musarde Fme to the troops of the 32nd Division facing Cote Dame Marie. A brigade of the 91st Division had been in the sector but had been withdrawn. We found American dead on our reconnaissance of the area and later found dead from the same organizations north of Hill 288 after we had taken that territory.

"Early the morning of October 13th we received orders to reconnoiter the ground one kilometer to our right and as soon as the reconnaissance had been completed to move the 1st Battalion into that area. Acting on these orders the Battalion Commander with his staff and the company commanders with the battalion scouts made a reconnaissance of the area east from its support position on the north slope of Cote 263 to Hill 286. On returning to the troops to move them to positions selected, the battalion scouts were ordered to follow the line of hills from Hill 286-288 back to our old positions and learn the exact location of the Boche front line. They ran into Germans in ambush just west of Hill 288 and lost two men as prisoners. These were the only men lost as prisoners by this battalion during the entire war.

"By 1:00 P. M. Co.s 'A' and 'B' the support companies had moved into positions south of Hill 288. By dusk Co.s 'C' and 'D' moved over and had taken positions as the assault companies for the next attack. One platoon of Company 'A' commanded by Lieut. Breslin of Malden, Mass., was placed south of Hill 286 in liaison with the 127th Infantry of the 32nd Division. Battalion Headquarters was located in what appeared to be a shaft of some sort of a mine which had caved in and filled the shaft leaving a hole approximately fifteen feet deep and about thirty feet across the top with trees growing in its sides. By digging a platform or shelf into the side of this hole a shelter was secured for the operation of the telephone section and the battalion headquarters. During the entire night of October 13-14 the Germans

kept up a harassing fire from machine guns and minenwerfer from Hill 286 and the ridge running to Hill 288 enfilading both of my lines and reaching to battalion headquarters. Men were wounded with machine gun fire running messages to battalion headquarters. During the night long range artillery fire from south of Gesnes fell just in front of our assault lines some of the shells falling so close to the west company as to cause casualties from the shell splinters. Efforts were made all through the night to get this artillery fire raised so it would fall on the trenches on Hill 288 but at 8:00 A. M. Oct. 14 it was still coming and falling short. The combination of the Boche machine gun fire from Hill 286 and the short artillery fire from our own artillery forced our attack when it was finally ordered in the direction of the junction of the roads just a short distance southeast of Hill 288. It was there that Company 'C' secured the first hold on the ridge.

"The orders given the 1st Battalion were that the attack would be initiated by the 32nd Division against Cote Dame Marie at 5:30 A. M. Oct. 14. and that the 1st Battalion 168th Infantry would attack as soon as the 32nd Division came abreast. Lieut. Breslin commanding our liaison platoon from Company "A" was instructed to keep constantly in touch with the left of the 127th Infantry 32nd Division so we could move out when they came abreast of us. The 32nd Division did not advance at 5:30 A. M. Oct. 14 nor had they advanced at 8:00 A. M. at which hour the 1st battalion moved out on orders to advance regardless of the movements of the 32nd Division.

"Acting on these orders the 1st Battalion moved forward at 8:00 A. M. with a withering enfilade fire coming from Hill 286 from machine guns and minenwerfer and from all along the ridge from Hill 286 to Hill 288, and also under the short fire of friendly artillery. By 10:15 A. M. we had succeeded in getting a foothold on the ridge to the right of Hill 288, but it was 1:00 P. M. before we had the whole of the trenches on Hill 288 in our possession. It was an hour or two later before a platoon from H company had moved to the rear along the ridge and had mopped up the machine guns which kept up the enfilading fire against our support troops from Hill 286. From this it will be

seen that the 32nd Division was not moving forward with us or in advance of our attack.

"As soon as Hill 288 was safely in our possession I ordered Companies 'C' and 'D' to reorganize and sent a message to each of the two support companies to be prepared to pass through the lines of Companies 'C' and 'D' when ordered. Lieutenant Bly commanding Company 'A' came forward with his scouts and headquarters group to make a reconnaissance of the ground from which his company would take up the attack. While on this mission he ventured forward to the north and east of Hill 288 and rounded up a group of the enemy killing several and bringing back sixteen prisoners. While these prisoners were being examined at Battalion Headquarters on the south slope of Hill 288 the Boche shelled the hill quite heavily and some of the prisoners were wounded. From the information secured from these prisoners plans were made for the carrying on of the attack and at 4:00 P. M. Companies 'B' on the left and Company 'A' on the right went over the top of ridge of 288 supported by machine guns and the fire from a captured minenwerfer, to clear the north slope of Hill 288 and secure Hill 242. Company 'B' on the left was able to make good progress but Company 'A' struck strongly defended strong points heavily wired in and was definitely stopped. As it was getting late in the day and it would be dark before troops could be brought up to make an encircling movement around to the east and the 32nd Division was not up on our right, these two companies were withdrawn to the shelter of the ridge at 288 and placed in position for the night.

"Just at dusk Colonel Langdon, 127th Infantry, 32nd Division, came to the battalion P. C. on the south slope of Hill 288 and from him we learned that the 32nd Division had made an advance over Cote Dame Marie and would be on our right along the road extending east from Hill 288 but quite some distance to the east, so it was necessary to call for a company of the 2nd Battalion to extend our line to the east to contact with them. Captain Haynes sent forward Company H for this duty. All through the early evening hours the Boche covered the crest of Hill 288 and the ridge road to the east with machine gun fire from the vicinity of road bend (304.5-85.2). These were the strong points which had stopped the attack of Company 'A'.

"Orders from General MacArthur came forward through regimental advanced P. C. after darkness ordering the First Battalion to form up and move on Cote de Chatillon and capture same with bayonet. The attack to be made in conjunction with the attack of the 167th Infantry who were to make their attack from the woods southwest of la Musarde Fme. As it was impossible to move to the north in the general direction of la Tuilerie Fme to Cote de Chatillon on account of the wire and mass of machine gun fire directly on our front and a flank movement to the left in order to clear and evade the machine gun fire and the wire, would have later on caused intermingling of our battalion and that of the 167th in the darkness, the regimental advanced P. C. was advised of the situation and a little later orders were received calling off the attack for the night.

"The attack of October 15th was started by Company 'A' on the right and Company 'B' on the left as the evening before. But Company 'A' profiting by the information gathered the evening before moved farther to the right and made an encircling movement against the strong points north of Hill 288 and Hill 242. This move netted about one hundred prisoners but did not entirely clear the area. This was accomplished by a later attack which carried our lines to the base of Cote de Chatillon and la Tuilerie Fme. While making the final attack of the day against the base of Cote de Chatillon I was following Company 'B' just to the west of Bois de Romagne; everything was quiet and the movement was progressing as in a drill. I called to one of my runners to go to Company 'C' and tell Lieut. Witherell to push forward faster so as to move out of the woods in which he was then in. This runner (I do not even know his name) started off to deliver the message. In a couple of minutes the Boche machine guns opened up all along the base of Cote de Chatillon and a minenwerfer also began to fire from the direction of la Tuilerie Fme. A minute or two later I turned around and here was my runner with blood dripping from both of his hands. He had been caught in the swing of a burst of machine gun fire and wounded in each of his arms. Still he had come back to me and reported that he had not delivered my message.

"The next day we stormed and captured la Tuilerie Farm and the Cote de Chatillon, the 167th Alabama operating on our left.

"Thus in three days' heavy fighting the Regiment had broken through the Kriemhilde Stellung by capturing Hill 288, carried Hill 242 the fire from which flanked both 288 and the Cote de Chatillon thus adding greatly to their defense and with the 167th Alabama pulled the keystone out of the German position by capturing the Cote de Chatillon.

Major Ross passes quickly over his sending out a patrol to determine the exact position of the German line before the attack though by doing so he saved many lives in his own battalion. This because the patrol found out that the jump off position assigned was still in the hands of the enemy.

No better example of the difficulties which result from the lack of definitely locating a front line exists in the experience of the Division in France than this assignment to the First Battalion 168th Iowa, of a jump off position which was still in the hands of the enemy.

Fortunately Major Ross knowing how often front line positions are wrongly identified on the map and how frequently when correctly marked at the time, the enemy by his fire or infiltration causes subsequent changes, was not to be caught. As he tells in his account he sent out a patrol.

Here is the story as told by Lieutenant Turner who commanded the patrol. He says:

"We relieved the First Division in the Argonne the night of October 11th and on the 12th it was reported that enemy snipers were operating behind our front lines in the Bois de Romagne. With Sergeant Fleming and the rest of the scouts I spent most of the day patrolling the woods in search of snipers. The leaves were still thick on the trees. If any of the enemy were still there, they were silent undoubtedly realizing that a concerted effort was being made to find them. We had no further complaint from this source. The attack on the German lines in the Argonne was planned for the morning of the 14th and the First Battalion was ordered to lead the attack.

"The morning of October 13th, Major Ross was ordered to shift the First Battalion to a jump-off position, given as a road running east and west across Hill 288. There was considerable evidence that the line of departure was in the hands of the enemy. Therefore as the occupancy by the First Battalion of the jump-

off position would have to be made under cover of darkness, Major Ross ordered me to reconnoiter the jump-off position designated in the order to find out whether it was occupied by the enemy. My patrol consisted of fifteen scouts and four or five men of 'D' Company under Lieutenant Spaulding. Sergeant Bill Fleming was my second in command. The road along the top of Hill 288 was an old grass road with brush along the sides. The patrol worked forward, paralleling the road and was preceded by an advance group of five or six men under Sergeant Fleming. As the patrol neared the fork of the road about five hundred yards west of the summit of Hill 288, Sergeant Fleming sent back word that he had seen two Germans about two hundred yards up the road. Fearing that there was some mistake I halted the patrol. Both Spaulding and myself checked our bearings on the map and found that the place where the Germans had been seen was well within the sector which the First Battalion was ordered to occupy. While we were discussing the situation, Sergeant Fleming joined us and offered to lead a small party up the road to see if there were any more Germans in the vicinity and to capture the two that had been seen.

"As every one of the scouts volunteered to go with him, Sergeant Fleming chose Privates Dye, Hench, Scrivner, Schearer, Kenyon and O'Hair. Fleming was to lead with the first three close behind him and the others fifteen or twenty yards back, with myself and the balance of the scouts about fifty yards in the rear, as support. The patrol started forward cautiously, utilizing such cover as the edge of the road afforded, so as not to attract attention. However, the leading men had not covered half the distance when a machine gun from the crest of the hill at a point where the Kriemhilde trench crossed the road, opened up on them. Dye and Scrivner were killed. Those in the rear scattered to seek shelter on the side of the road. With my support I advanced until the incessant machine gun fire drove us to cover, and kept us down. A party of twenty-five or thirty Germans, who had been lying in ambush beside the road, got in between us and Fleming and Hench. Fleming and Hench continued to return the fire of the enemy until Hench fell, badly wounded. Fleming, in the meantime, had secured some cover in a shell hole and held off the enemy until his ammunition was exhausted. Fleming thought Hench dead, and believed if he played possum he might

elude the Boches and get back to his own lines. However, a number of Germans pounced on him from the rear and knocked him unconscious with a rifle butt. They dragged both Hench and Fleming off with them as prisoners.

"Hench was so badly wounded that he died on the 18th. Fleming was taken to the rear as a prisoner. The Germans expected an attack in the Argonne and were anxious to secure information. Fleming was closely questioned by a German intelligence officer, but he stood his ground and gave no information of value, notwithstanding numerous threats made and inducements offered. After several days of quizzing without results, the German officer slapped Fleming on the back and said, 'You're a damn good soldier.' Fleming remained a prisoner in German hands until just after the Armistice when he was released.

"The information that the enemy was in full possession of Hill 288 and of the jump-off positions which the First Battalion were expected to occupy that night, was expensive in that it cost us one prisoner and the lives of three men. However, it was very valuable information in that it would undoubtedly have cost the Battalion many lives and perhaps complete disorganization had it attempted to occupy, under cover of darkness, the positions originally assigned. Major Ross promptly acted on the intelligence thus secured and choose a position to the South of the hill as his line of departure. The assault on Hill 288 and the attack took place the next morning as per schedule."

The following incident illustrates the battle as seen by the Iowa Chaplain, the Reverend Roscoe Conkling Hatch:

"One night I had just hiked back that long valley (since I returned I learn the newspaper correspondents even then called it 'Death Valley'), when I met about thirty-five men stalled because they did not know the way to the 1st Battalion. As they were a ration detail it was important to proceed, and with their usual fine 'Let's go!' they started with the young runner I had found. It was raining and our feet sank in the mud as we carried the heavy containers. About daylight we got there and almost at once I started back to go out with a burying detail. As I went down crossing at right angles I met two litters being borne by some men of another division. The men were very tired and I took one place. When we got down near the ambulance, I

spoke to the young fellow on the litter. He was ghastly white but quite calm. Hit in the stomach! About twenty years old and evidently very unsophisticated. After talking a few minutes I said, 'Boy, I think you are pretty badly shot up. It may take some time to get to the hospital, suppose you give me the name and address of someone who would like to know someone saw you, and as soon as I can, I will write.' He gave me his sister's address. I told him that he must not forget that there was a certain part of him which no Boche shell or bullet could reach, and he said, 'I know that, Chaplain, for you see I have my faith.' Said he was a Methodist.

" 'But Chaplain, you should try and comfort the poor fellow on the other litter, for he lay near me for a long time before we were found. He is very miserable and says he has no belief.' I went over and looked at the exact opposite type of man. About twenty-five, and his face showed he had been through the mill 'Hello, boy, I am a Chaplain of the American Army and was wondering if there was not something I could do for you.'

" 'Well, you can! Get ter hell out of here!' 'Oh, come now, I want to help. Isn't there someone I could write to for you? You are badly hit, and may not be able to do it yourself for a long time, and you know the people at home get anxious.'

" 'I told you to get ter hell out of here. You just want to talk about the Church and hell-fire and all that damn rot; I know your kind. I'm man enough to die alone.'

" 'There is no church about here, and I don't believe in hell-fire. We are just friends, forget I'm a minister. Now what can I do?'

" 'Well, I'll tell you. I was pretty rotten at home, Chaplain. My dad kicked me out and I broke my mother's heart. I drifted to New York and then one day I found I had enlisted and was glad. I made up my mind that I would go back home after the war and show dad he had a man for a son, but this damn thing,' pointing to his wound, 'has gotten me now.' I could not persuade him to give me his name or address and he just said that the War Department would give notification enough. I told him that if he would let me write his father what he had said, it would be a heritage always for him to prize, but the lad held to his decision.

I have since heard from the sister of the other lad who lived in Minneapolis. Both answered the call of the Great Commander."

The then Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Bare commanded the 167th Alabama in this contest. The following is his personal account:

"The headquarters of the 167th Infantry was in the northern edge of Bois de Montfaucon on October 5-10, 1918. There was no shelter and the entire regiment slept in the woods. The men had only one blanket, it rained almost continuously and turned real cold. Col. Wm. P. Screws, Commander of the Regiment, was sent to the hospital on October 10, 1918, on account of illness. As Lieutenant Colonel of the Regiment I assumed command and about noon on October 10th I received orders to proceed at 3:30 P. M. to Bois de Baulny which is three or four miles east of Exermont. Early on the morning of October 11, 1918, officers and men from each Company were sent to the front to reconnoiter the position to be taken over. We arrived in the outskirts of Exermont at night on October 11th, relieving the 18th Infantry. I established Regimental Headquarters for the night in a hole in the side of a hill at la Neuve-Forge Farm, just across the valley from the 84th Brigade Headquarters.

"Late that night General MacArthur came over to my headquarters on more or less of an inspection tour. While we were talking the Germans were constantly shelling the valley with gas shells, mostly mustard and tear gas. I remember well that both the General and I consumed so much of the gas that neither of us could hardly see or talk on account of the effect of the fumes.

"The regiment had gone into position on the night of October 11th occupying that part of the line skirting the northern slope of the Bois de Romagne directly south of the Cote de Chatillon. The Cote de Chatillon was the key to the situation and was very strongly fortified with concrete machine gun emplacements. The 3rd Battalion and the Machine Gun Company took over the front line. The 2nd was in support and the 1st in reserve. During October 12th and 13th our artillery kept up fairly constant fire on the Cote de Chatillon.

"We made one daylight attack on October 14, 1918, starting at 8:30 A. M. and reached the second objective at 9:40 A. M. Our casualties were not heavy because I realized early in the ad-

vance that it would be futile to attempt to take the Cote de Chatillon by frontal attack and therefore I stopped the advance and held our objective.

"That night I received orders to take the Cote de Chatillon by night attack, using only bayonets, not a shot was to be fired. I realized that it was impossible to get through the barbed wire entanglements which surrounded the entire Cote de Chatillon on the south with two bands of barbed wire each about 30 or 40 feet wide. After explaining the impracticability of such an attack the order was rescinded. We were held up all day on October 15, 1918, by enemy machine gun and artillery fire.

"Up until this time the leading elements of the 167th Infantry were in a salient. However the 168th Infantry on our right had advanced, by hard fighting, until abreast our left along the front edge of the Bois Romagne. Therefore everything was in readiness to move forward. As the Cote de Chatillon was the strong point in the line and the key to the situation it had to be taken.

"Late the afternoon of October 15, 1918, I received a message from General MacArthur to report to his headquarters near Exermont. It was about 2 ½ miles from my headquarters and the only available road for transportation, ambulances, etc., serving that part of the front, was nearly waist-deep in mud. I reported to General MacArthur at the appointed time. There were present Col. Tinley of the 168th Infantry, Major Cooper D. Winn of the 151st Machine Gun Battalion, General MacArthur, and myself. General MacArthur stated that he was expecting a very important telephone message. In just a few minutes the telephone rang. General Summerall was on the line. We could hear his verbal order over the telephone to the effect that the Cote de Chatillon was the key to the entire situation and that he wanted it taken by 6:00 P. M. the next evening. General MacArthur told him: 'We will take the Cote de Chatillon by tomorrow afternoon by 6 o'clock or report a casualty list of 6,000 dead. That will include me.'

"We then talked over the various ways by which our objective could be reached. I explained in some detail to General MacArthur about how strongly fortified the Germans' position was and that on account of the Cote de Chatillon being so close under Hill 263 that it was impossible for our artillery to drop any

shells directly on the concrete machine gun emplacements or to destroy the wire. I told General MacArthur, however, that I believed that I had a plan which would be successful but that I would have to encroach on Col. Tinley's territory. General MacArthur asked me to outline my plan. As stated above, the 168th Infantry was on my right flank. There was a deep ravine on my right flank between Hill 263 and the hill just east where the left of Col. Tinley's regiment was entrenched. The 165th Infantry on my left could not advance because of the enfilade fire and the open fields on the west side of the Cote de Chatillon. I told General MacArthur that I could move a battalion around the eastern side of Hill 263 by the ravine and around the edge of the 168th Infantry's boundary and with the proper over-head fire of rifle and machine gun fire keep the enemy down until my troops could reach the northern edge of the woods and attack the Cote de Chatillon from the east side and rear. Although he was a Colonel and I was only a Lieutenant Colonel, Col. Tinley spoke up at once and said: 'I will be delighted to not only cooperate in every way I can but will take orders if necessary from Col. Bare.' Major Cooper D. Winn of the Machine Gun Battalion spoke strongly in favor of overhead machine gun fire. General MacArthur acquiesced in my plans and we proceeded back to our respective headquarters.

"I telephoned ahead and had all of my battalion commanders meet me at my headquarters, a hole in the ground. After trudging back through the mud and slush, occasionally stepping on a dead soldier covered in mud, I reached it. I then told my battalion commanders of my plans to take the Cote de Chatillon the next day, October 16, 1918. The 3rd Battalion in command of Major Geo. A. Glenn of Montgomery, Ala., was assigned the duty of going around the enemy's flank and making the attack from the east and rear. The 151st Machine Gun Battalion, as well as machine guns and rifles from the 168th Infantry, were ordered to fire a constant over-head machine gun barrage on the enemy's support position. Up until a certain hour of the engagement these machine guns would also fire directly on the enemy's machine gun emplacements. The 3rd Battalion started moving at 6:10 on the morning of October 16th. The 2nd Battalion moved forward in the rear of the 3rd Battalion; the 1st Battalion moved up to sup-

port position on Hill 263. The going was tough on account of the method used to get the men in the proper location. It took all day to do this. From the top of Hill 263 where I could witness the entire battle I saw the assault succeed with the result that by 4:30 in the afternoon we had the Cote. Our casualties were light considering the well fortified and advantageous position of the enemy. We captured two companies of German prisoners; stopped two counter attacks during the day and by 9 o'clock that night our men, in fox holes, were occupying the high ground to the north of the Cote de Chatillon. The Cote de Chatillon could not have been taken had it not been for the excellent esprit de corps under most difficult circumstances of the officers and men of the 167th, 168th Infantry and the 151st Machine Gun Battalion. The next few days were spent in consolidating our position, patrolling and locating enemy lines. It was hard fighting as we were attacked several times but each counter attack was repulsed by our troops inflicting severe losses on the enemy. The regiment was relieved on October 22, 1918, by the 165th Infantry and sent back to the woods just south of Exermont for a few days of much needed rest.

Here is Major Ravee Norris' story:

"After the 168th moved to the right there was a gap between their left and my right of at least a thousand yards. I kept patrols in this gap in order to keep contact and also to find out if the Germans were filtering into the woods between the Iowa regiment and the Alabama one. The Germans did filter in and later fired into our flank.

"After our first unsuccessful effort to break through the wire in front of Mousard farm and around the Cote de Chatillon I tried sending out patrols to cut the wire.

"However, they never succeeded as each time they clipped a strand, the clear metallic sound which followed, warned the Germans who promptly concentrated machine gun fire on the spot where the wire had been cut. They also tossed over a liberal supply of potato masher hand grenades. My first patrols were of seven or eight men each. However, as each of them suffered heavy loss in killed and wounded I then tried patrols of two or three men each.

"Most of them never came back!

"Thus the wire remained untouched though a number of men of the regiment had sacrificed themselves in their endeavor to open the way for their comrades to assault the German position.

"After dark the fourteenth, much to my surprise and consternation I got an order to assault the Cote de Chatillon with the bayonet!

"No firing allowed!

"I called up regimental post of command and protested to Baer. I said 'It is nothing short of murder to send men in on such an assault when everything which has happened during the past two days and two nights has shown that such an attack simply cannot succeed.' I then went over step by step everything that I had done. Baer replied, 'I am sorry, Norris, but this is a direct order and must be obeyed.'

"I therefore decided to go back to Baer and personally explain the situation. Before I left the Company Commanders of my two leading companies having received the order came to me where I was on the edge of the woods and said practically in unison, 'What in hell does this order mean? Such an attack will never succeed. You know that, Norris, as well as we do!'

"I told them that unless the order was rescinded the attack would have to be made, and that therefore they would make their preparations.

"On getting back to Baer I found he felt the way I did but that unless the order was rescinded the attack would have to be made.

"I returned to my post of command feeling decidedly downcast as I knew such an attack could not succeed and that the more courageously it was pushed the greater the number of men who would be killed and wounded trying to do the impossible.

"Much to my relief, the final order did not come during that day. However, that evening I got a message to report to the regimental post of command at six o'clock the next morning. Early in the morning I packed my musette bag, shook hands with the officers near me, said 'Good-bye, I undoubtedly am headed for the S. O. S., for raising hell about that bayonet

attack.' I then turned the command of the battalion over to the senior captain and went back through the woods to Baer's post of command.

"I don't know when in my life I felt bluer, or more disconsulate. I felt so down that I did not notice the enemy's shells which made the route back anything but a pleasant autumn stroll through the woods.

"When I walked up to Baer instead of handing me an order relieving me, and sending me to Blois or 'Bluey' as the soldiers called it, for reclassification, he said, 'Well, the bayonet attack is off. We have other plans, and we want you here so that there can be no mistakes.'

"Well, sir, my spirits went about as far up as they had been down. Of course, I didn't want to be relieved above all for telling the truth. Far beyond that, however, was the thought that the lives and limbs of the men for whom I was responsible and many of whom I not only knew bill also knew their parents were not to be needlessly sacrificed.

"This was the thing which sent my spirits soaring!

"Along with that and perhaps equally as strong was the delight that the regiment instead of having an assault which failed with heavy loss on its record, was going to be given their first real chance to capture the Cote de Chatillon.

"After talking to me the night before Baer had gone to see General MacArthur, MacArthur had gotten an airplane photograph made of the Cote de Chatillon and its defenses. This photograph showed one chicane or passage thru the wire a short distance to the right of Mousard farm. This chicane had been left by the Germans to enable reliefs and supplies to reach the men who had been in the woods from which the 1st Division had driven them and which we had taken over from that division.

"Quite elaborate plans had been made for the capture of the hill. They included a frontal attack. After listening for some time to all the details without being asked my advice I finally became impatient and said: 'I have been up there forty-eight hours! I am to make the attack. Am I to have nothing to say about it?'

" 'Well, what have you got to say about it ?' replied Baer.

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

Famous Hill 272, overlooking the Rainbow Battlefield of Landres-St. George and the Cote de Chatillon. It was this Hill, the capture of which by the 1st Division caused the German Colonel to say he could not believe it was true. Later the P. C. of the 83rd Brigade, the 165th New York, and 166th Ohio, were established on it.



—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

The northern edge of the Bois de Chatillon, Landres-St. George in the Center. Note the wire and first position of the Kriemhilde Stellung. The view in this photograph shows how Cote de Chatillon dominated the German position.

" 'We will never take that hill by just attacking it from the front,' I said. I then went on to explain that while the overhead machine gun and the artillery concentration were keeping the Germans down I would send about 100 men whom I had in support to infiltrate along the hedge which ran from the edge of my wood up to the gap in the wire. From this they could reach a hedge which ran parallel to the southeast face of the Cote de Chatillon. Its western slope facing the open space in which three of my companies had held on for two days was really its front. The southeastern slope which faced the woods and at the southwest point of which was Mousarde Farm was the German left flank of the Chatillon position, though it did directly face part of my battalion.

"I showed Baer and the others how by doing this, then when the artillery and machine gun fire lifted and the Germans expecting a frontal attack from the west would be busy getting ready to repel it they would be caught in the flank by my hundred men who had filtered through the gap in the wire to a position along the hedge during the machine gun and artillery barrage.

This plan was agreed upon.

"I picked up my musette bag and went back through the woods to my post of command on their edge. Here I told my company commanders the good news about the abandonment of the bayonet attack and the plans which had been substituted for it. I put Captain Tom Fallow in charge of the hundred men who were to infiltrate through the gap. I told him that in accordance with the plan he would have thirty minutes during which the barrage would undoubtedly keep the Germans with their heads down.

"About ten the next morning the barrage came down. Fallow led his detachment along the hedge and thru the gap in the wire and then along the hedge parallel to the southwest face of Chatillon. Joerg, who was Acting Lt. Colonel, had come up to command the whole movement. So as I thought my first responsibility was with that part of the attack which had been included in the plan upon my recommendation and insistence I followed Fallow.

"When our barrage lifted, Fallow's men were thru the wire and scattered along the hedge which was on a slight rise. The Germans immediately spotted us and began firing with machine guns. Fallow's men waited for three blasts on his whistle which was the agreed upon signal to charge.

"I had just gotten thru the wire when the machine gun fire started. A bullet got me thru the heel bringing me down. As I lay there I heard Fallow's three blasts on the whistle and then the yell of our men as they jumped forward to charge.

"Fallow's attack cleaned up the machine guns on our side of the hill and then broke on the left rear of the Germans facing west and firing at our men advancing in the open on that side of the hill. Those Germans not killed, wounded or captured promptly ran north. Finally with the help of reserves coming to aid them they established a line across the northern slope of the Cote de Chatillon. We did the same. It was in shell holes and behind any natural cover available. To our right this line was continued by the Iowans who had captured hill 242, cleaned the Germans entirely out of the woods in front of then, crossed the open and captured La Tuilerie Farm and charged up the slope of Chatillon at the same time as Fallow.

"It was on this line that Private Thomas O. Niebaur, who as a replacement from Idaho, won his Medal of Honor, a decoration won by so few and in so many cases only at the cost of their lives.

"Niebaur, who was a little fellow and quite young, was an automatic rifleman. With other automatic riflemen he had been put out in the front shell holes to break up the counter attack which was expected and soon came.

"The German artillery, as their observers watched their men being driven off the hill by ours, brought down a stiff concentration on the territory where our new line was lifted for the counter attack; it came down again after that attack failed. Neibaur finding his shell hole not very large decided to move to a big one which he saw a short distance off. He ran over and jumped in.

"He found he had landed in the midst of a bunch of Germans who had taken shelter there!

"Before he could realize the situation they had jumped on him, disarmed him, and made him a prisoner.

"To add to his troubles a bullet had pierced the calves of both legs just as he jumped into the hole.

"Shortly after when the artillery concentration was over and the fire had become less dangerous they decided to return to the German line taking Neibaur with them. In the excitement they had forgotten to take his automatic pistol. In their rush from the Cote de Chatillon to the shell hole they had dropped their own arms. In their desire to be as unencumbered as possible they had left Neibaur's automatic rifle in the shell hole. Therefore they were unarmed.

"Once clear of the hole Neibaur drew his automatic pistol and forced most of them to turn around and return to the American lines as his prisoners.

"While this was going on I was lying on the ground trying to judge by the sounds what was going on. The yells of our men as they went up the hill getting fainter I knew they had not been turned back. The yelling and firing which broke out further north and then the German artillery fire, the shells of which instead of bursting in my vicinity were obviously well to the north of me convinced me that we had been successful.

"However, I was terribly anxious as after all in war you never can be sure a fight is all over.

"Finally, a sergeant from Fallow came back to me and said or rather yelled 'Captain we've got the hill, and a lot of these G—d d—mned Heines as well.' I laughed with relief and also they tell me had tears in my eyes.

"After the bitter days of seeing my men in the open to the west of the hill suffering from artillery and infantry fire; this both from the hill to their front and the Germans near Landres-et-St. George to their left flank: after the anxious nights of sending out patrols to cut the wires, only to have them fail, and most of them never to come back after the crisis of the bayonet attack order; it was certainly a wonderful feeling of relief and happiness to have the old regiment succeed in its job in such a splendid fashion.

Here is the story in Sergeant Atkinson's own words. He says:

"After severe losses we finally reached our objective at about 4:30 P. M., October 14th. We began to dig in for a possible counter-attack. Evidently the enemy must have seen us or sensed what we were doing for shortly after we began to dig in our lookout man discovered about 250 Germans coming very fast. There was only one thing that we could do. I had only one Stokes mortar that was in working order. All of the I other members of my detachment were equipped with rifles. I put them on the line and they opened fire at once. As it takes only three men to operate a Stokes, I could spare them. I sent Private John C. Austin to observe the effect of our fire.

"I took the Stokes and held the barrel between my legs, had one man to load and the other man to help him. Our first shell made a direct hit and caused the enemy a lot of casualties in their ranks. Also the rifle fire from the rest of the platoon was effective. I continued firing as fast as we could with the Stokes. The rest of the detachment kept their rifle fire up. We broke up the counter-attack. They stopped advancing so fast but we kept pouring it into them. About ten or fifteen minutes after we had opened up on them the Second Battalion under Major Abner Flowers came up. While my detachment had broken up the counter-attack we were glad to see the Second Battalion as they cinched our position."

Private Neibaur's citation accompanying the Medal of Honor is:

"On the afternoon of October 16, 1918, when the Cote de Chatillon had just been gained after bitter fighting and the summit of that strong bulwark in the Kriemhilde Stellung was being organized, Private Neibaur was sent out on patrol with his automatic rifle squad to enfilade enemy machine gun nests. As he gained the ridge he set up his automatic rifle and was directly thereafter wounded in both legs by fire from a hostile machine gun on his flank. The advance wave of the enemy troops, counter-attacking, had about gained the ridge, and although practically cut off and surrounded, the remainder of his detachment being killed or wounded, this gallant soldier kept his automatic rifle in operation to such effect that by his own efforts and by fire from the skirmish line of his company, at least 100 yards in the rear, the attack was checked. The enemy wave being halted and lying

prone, four of the enemy attacked Private Neibaur at close quarters. These he killed. He then moved alone among the enemy lying on the ground about him, in the midst of the fire from his own lines, and by coolness and gallantry captured 11 prisoners at the point of his pistol and, although painfully wounded, brought them back to our lines. The counter-attack in full force was arrested, to a large extent by the single efforts of this soldier, whose heroic exploits took place against the sky line in full view of his entire battalion."

The man who was in the best position to see and understand the whole situation with respect to the 165th New York was Major Donovan, who commanded the front line elements of that regiment throughout the critical period of the combat.

Here is his account from their entry into line in relief of the 1st Division, until he was carried off the field a day and a half after he had been badly wounded in the leg, and had, incidentally won the Medal of Honor. Donovan says:

"I went ahead to make a reconnaissance. The early morning of October 11th, I reached the headquarters of the 18th Infantry. They were in the cellar of a destroyed building in Exermont. Lieut. Col. Hunt was in command. He told me that Brig. Gen. Frank Parker, who had succeeded to the command of the Division when General Summerall was given the Fifth Corps, was on the hillside forward of Exermont. I found General Parker, who had with him a Lieutenant named Daly. Daly said 'We are up near Landres-St. George. I will take you forward.' We went forward until we found the leading elements of the Infantry, which were then on the Cote de Maldah. A Lieutenant was in command of the front line battalion. He naturally was exhausted by the difficult fighting the Division had been through. His dead were all around.

"Starting with Exermont, where I had seen some dead of the 35th, Kansas-Missouri Division, as well as those of the 1st Division, everywhere on my reconnaissance I saw the dead, both Americans and Germans, mute testimony of the hard fighting which had taken place in this area.

"There were many more American dead than German, showing the determination of the Americans to go forward regardless of cost.

"I asked about the ground in front of the Cote de Maldah, and whether or not any of their people were out there. I was told that no one was out there and that it was a hell of a place to be.

"I went back to the regiment and explained the positions we were to take. It was decided that Reilley's 1st Battalion would lead. He and I went forward with the Battalion.

"Instead of putting it on the reverse slope where we relieved the elements of the 16th Infantry, I decided to occupy the whole of the Cote de Maldah so as to prevent the Germans from getting any part of it and thereby perhaps making the reverse slope untenable. As the 18th Infantry was in lower ground to the left rear of the 16th, and the 16th was at the point of the salient occupied by the 1st Division, the Cote de Maldah was obviously the key of the whole situation, and therefore must be firmly in our hands.

"The use of a Battalion of the 16th as the last reserve of the 1st Division and the splendid attack which it made, which resulted in the Capture of Hill 272, which dominating the Cote de Maldah, caused its fall also, had resulted in this Battalion being between two battalions of the 18th Infantry. Therefore, we took over some of the ground on our left occupied by the 18th Infantry, which led to the subsequent difference of opinion between our regiment and the Ohio one on the left as to exactly where the boundary between the two regiments was.

"After Reilley's battalion was in position, he went forward from the Cote de Maldah with a patrol. He found some 1st Division dead, and two 1st Division wounded, whom he picked up and brought back. Captain Rowley, who took over the position on the left crest of the Cote de Maldah, and to its left, found a Captain of the 166th Ohio there with some of his men. He told them that they were to the right of their position and they moved to the left. I spent the rest of the night on Hill 212, back of which I had put the support battalion, the 2nd.

"The next morning, that of the 12th, I went forward to the Cote de Maldah, to look over the situation with Major Reilley. We couldn't see a German anywhere. We could not see the 167th Alabama but had been told that they had relieved the 26th In-

fantry, the leading elements of which were on the northern edge of the Bois de Romagne facing the Cote de Chatillon.

"There was a gap, mostly of open country, between our right and this Bois de Romagne. The Sommerance-Romagne sous Montfaucon Road ran in front of the Cote de Maldah, then up through this gap between ourselves and the Alabama regiment, through the Bois de Romagne and over the crest of Hill 288, one of the strong points of the Kriemhilde Stellung.

"The country to our front was entirely open and devoid of any cover except a few small groups of trees and holes in the ground. We could see the Cote de Chatillon to our right front. It was obvious that as we moved forward unless it was immediately captured by the Alabama regiment on our right, German fire from it would hit our advance on the right flank.

"As the battle map shows, this Cote de Chatillon, like Hill 288, was one of the strongpoints of the Kriemhilde Stellung, and as it showed that the wire and trenches directly to our front turned to the southeast running in front of both the strong points, that is to our right flank and the front and right flank of the Alabama regiment, it did not look as if that regiment, despite its wonderful fighting qualities, could get the Cote de Chatillon before we would find ourselves out in the open catching fire from it in our right flank.

"To the front of the Cote de Maldah just across the Sommerance-Romagne sous Montfaucon Road there was a slight dip in the ground through which ran the stream Gras Faux after coming out of the Bois de Romagne and before reaching Sommerance on its way to the Aire River. As this afforded some cover, and was approximately to the immediate left of the northern edge of the Bois de Romagne from which the Alabama Regiment would jump off, I decided after talking the matter over with Major Reilley and Captains Rowley and Finn that this would be a good jump-off position.

"The decision to use this as our jump off position and the word which came to us on the 13th, that President Wilson had arranged to discuss peace based on his fourteen points, by telephone from Regimental Headquarters, were the two principal events which stuck out in my mind between our taking over the line and our attack early the morning of the 14th.

"About an hour after this message first came Reilley sent word to Rowley and Finn telling them of this report and saying 'if you get it squelch it right away. Do not give it to the men.'

"However, it had already gotten around to them, because here and there we could hear a man say 'Why the hell should we do any more fighting now?'

"Reilley, his two captains, and myself talked with some of the non-coms about the need not to be led astray by such rumors, because it would weaken the spirit of the regiment, and if it was true we should strike all the harder so as to make the Germans more willing to yield to the President's terms.

"Another thing I did was to provide for extra bandoleers of ammunition and extra canteens of water. Besides having both sent up from the rear, I arranged to have men collect the bandoleers from the dead and wounded after the advance began, and the canteens from the dead. Much to our disgust, some of the canteens sent up from the rear were uncovered French ones, the metal of which reflected the sun, so that, of course, no one wanted one of them anywhere near him.

"That night I sent out a patrol to look over the sunken road we had chosen for a jumping off point. Their leader, whom, as I remember, was Knolles, reported to me on his return that he had gone beyond the sunken road and found nothing on the way out, but that on the way back they had fallen over a small German outpost. His patrol fired at the outpost and the outpost fired at them. However, he ran into no other Germans than this one outpost. From this I concluded that the Germans had no position south of the sunken road.

"Another matter I took up at this time was to remind the battalion and company commanders that the standard attack formation was not the best one to use but that we should profit by our experience in the Ourcq and St. Mihiel battles to gain ground forward by moving a few men at a time and infiltration rather than attempting a continuous simultaneous advance.

"The morning of the 14th, after waiting until the time set by our orders, we started out from the sunken road. As soon as we had passed a line abreast of the northern edge of the Bois de Romagne, the jumping off position of the Alabama regiment

on our right, we began to get fire from the Cote de Chatillon, as well as from the Germans to our front."

Here, Major Merle-Smith, who with Captain Rowley was listening to Donovan's description, interrupted. He said:

"Yes, this fire increased particularly as we passed through the ravine through which runs the little stream which empties into the Rau de St. George, at the town of St. George. I particularly remember this because right in the middle of our sector, along both banks of this stream, there is a patch of woods which gave us a little cover as we passed through it."

Here Captain Rowley interrupted to say: "Yes, I remember these woods because they were just in back of our first objective, which we reached about ten o'clock in the morning. Our second objective was the town of Landres-St. George. We got into the wire in front of the German position on the hill between us and St. George that same morning but couldn't get through."

Here Colonel Donovan resumed his story: "As soon as we began to move forward the men on the right commenced to drop, some because killed and wounded, and other because the fire was so heavy from the Cote de Chatillon. I said to Major Reilley, 'Where the hell is that coming from?' He said, 'Why, that is from the Cote de Chatillon, of course.' I remember I was standing there and the thought struck me, 'I am just like a tenderfoot out west, because those damn Germans are shooting at my feet.' I said to Reilley, "We're worse off here than we would be if we moved forward.' We were then at the head of the support companies of the assault battalion. I had with me the little headquarters I always took along in combat, made up of Betty, Wheatley and several others. At the same time I sent one of these men to get a platoon of machine guns, the fire of which I intended to use to keep down the German fire. We all moved further forward, going across the stream on which were the little woods and up the slope on the other side. Some of the leading men got into the wire at the top of the hill. Men were dropping all over. It was a pretty difficult place. Those who got into the wire were killed or wounded. The rest finally came to a halt on the slope running up from the stream along which there was some cover here and there but not much.

"It was here I ran into Mike Walsh, who had a stick in his hand. I said 'Mike, you are a G—d fool. Throw away that cane and if you must carry something take a rifle.'

"This brings us to about noon of the first day. During the afternoon I tried to move men forward on the left by infiltration. It was during the afternoon that Mike Walsh was shot in the wrist. Sometime during the afternoon the regimental telephone people got a telephone to me where I was on the hillside. As quickly as the line was cut, which now seems to me to have been every few minutes, they would get it repaired so that I had communication with the rear on and off for the rest of the day."

Here Captain Rowley interrupted again to say: "We got some fire here from the Cote de Chatillon but not as much as we had gotten when further to the rear. All during this combat there was a band of fire from the Cote de Chatillon, across the rear of where we were at this time. We also got shrapnel fired by the German field guns in the Bois Hazois. They had direct observation on a large part of the territory from the Cote de Maldah north to just in front of the German wire."

Donovan resumed: "In the afternoon de Lacour brought forward two machine guns to near my P. C. there on the hillside. When night came I told Major Reilly 'Have your men get all the wounded and carry them back.' I decided to stay where I was, because while it was not the position from which I could best command the assault and support battalions, I did not want any of the men to think that I was quitting them when they were in such a difficult position. The telephone worked some of the time so I was not entirely out of communication with the rest of the troops under my command.

"I called up Merle-Smith, whom I had left in our jump-off position and said 'Check up on the Alabama and Ohio regiments on our right and left, as we have no direct contact with them, with the consequence that it looks as if we were in a forward salient by ourselves.' "

Here Major Merle-Smith interjected: "I succeeded in getting in touch by telephone with the Brigade Headquarters of the 84th Brigade and was told by MacArthur that the 167th Alabama was well forward of the Bois de Romagne and across the same little stream we have talked about before."

Donovan went on: "I made a reconnaissance to the right, and ran into some of the 167th Alabama. Kelly, whom I had sent to the left, ran into a German, apparently making a reconnaissance, because he ran off. Kelly didn't contact the 166th.*

"When it was well after dark I made up my mind that it might be possible, now that neither the German garrison nor the Cote de Chatillon nor their artillery in the Bois Hazos could see us, to break through to our immediate front. I talked the matter over with Captain Bootz, who thought that a company would be about the right force to send. He tried it, but lost a number of men without getting through. He came back to me and said 'We have got too many green replacements to do this sort of work. All day long we have been trying to keep them from bunching up, but they will do it and are even worse at night, when they can't see each other unless they are bunched up. The Germans are jittery and at the slightest noise bring down a heavy fire. I think we had better wait until morning, as you can see all we have done so far is to thoroughly wake up the Germans. Look at the rockets going up along their whole line."

"Some of the men who made this attack were captured by the Germans, proving once more that it is often the bravest men who take the greatest risks who are captured, when a heavy battle is going on.

"One of these prisoners succeeded in escaping in the dark. I am sorry to say I have forgotten his name now. He came back and said that there were Germans in front of their wire only about 100 yards away from where we were then. He said that there were plenty of Germans back of the wire, and that more were coming up.

"I was so damned tired I had about reached the point where I didn't give a damn if they did counter-attack.

"The next morning Kelly attacked. Just as he was starting out we were all greatly encouraged to see some tanks coming along the Sommerance Road. Kelly's battalion was my old battal-

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* The leading elements of the 166th Ohio at this time were practically abreast of the New York regiment but they were to the west of the ravine in which ran the little stream mentioned above. After this stream passed through the sector of the 165th New York it gradually swung north, thus being enfiladed in that portion of its course between the New York and Ohio regiments, by fire from the German position.

ion, so I knew all the older men in it. Just before Kelly started I walked around amongst them telling them that we had to go through and that they were the fellows to do it. When they started forward I went with them. I had hardly started when I was shot in the knee. I always thought it was a rifle bullet, but the men near me said it was a machine gun one. At any rate down I went. Just as I did so, I saw the tanks coming back. I was told that one of them had gotten into the wire, but where they had attacked was on the other side of a slight fold in the ground so I did not personally see it. Also I was lying ground so my vision was limited. I sent Wheatley over to one of the tanks. He came back and said the driver was shot in the eye. I then asked for artillery fire. My request was promptly complied with, but the fire was not heavy enough to keep the Germans down and give our men a chance to break through.

"About this time the Germans started a counter-attack from just south of Landres-St. George on the right of our sector. Fortunately, during the night the regimental trench mortars, which I had sent for, had been brought up by Summers. As soon as we were certain the Germans were getting ready, we opened on them with the Stokes Mortars, which were in the north edge of the little woods we have mentioned before on the stream in the middle of our sector. De Lacour's machine guns were also there."

Major Merle-Smith interrupted here to say: "There is a good account in 'Father Duffy's Story,' of an act of heroism at this time. Here it is:

" 'When Colonel Donovan called for the Stokes Mortars to repel the threatened counter-attack on the morning of the 15th, the pieces were set up under the slight protection of the sloping ground, but from this point the gunners could not observe the accuracy of their own fire. So Sergeant Fitzsimmons ran forward to the top of the slope, making himself an easy cockshot for the German gunners while he signalled to his own men his corrections on their aim. He escaped himself by a miracle and had the satisfaction of seeing the shells dropping right amongst the Germans who were gathering for the attack, and doing dreadful execution.' "*

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* Page 281, "Father Duffy's Story" by Francis P. Duffy, George H. Doran Company.

Donovan resumed: "The fire of the machine guns and Stokes Mortars broke up the counter-attack.

"This counter-attack convinced me that Kelly's position invited enemy attempts to cut him off. Also he was suffering badly from direct fire from the German artillery in the Bois Hazois, to say nothing of fire into his right flank and rear from the Cote de Chatillon.

"I therefore sent word to him to retire. He sent back the reply that he would only do so with a written order. Therefore, lying on the ground, I wrote out an order and sent it by one of I my runners, Mack Rice. It was just at this time that Colonel Anderson, then a Major, in command of the reserve battalion, came up to where I was."

Colonel Anderson who had come in with Captain Fecheimer, as Donovan was telling about writing the order, broke in at this point. He said: "Yes, I got in just after you had sent off the order to Kelly by Rice. I had heard that Donovan had been shot through the leg, so started up to see him. It was then about seven o'clock in the morning. It was broad daylight by the time we got to where we could see him. He was lying in a fox hole on the reverse slope of the hill just in front of the German position. His position was not only isolated but an extremely dangerous one."

Captain Fecheimer took up the story, saying, "Yes, indeed, it was both isolated and dangerous. I remember saying to myself, 'How in hell is anybody going to get him out of here?' Colonel Anderson and I laid down on the ground because of the heavy fire. Donovan said 'hello' to us, and then as a number of pieces of shell, and bullets, hit near us he said to Anderson, 'You'd better get in here with me.' And to me, 'Fecheimer, you get over in that fox hole over there.' I looked at it, and there were already two men in it, so I looked around for another one. Seeing an empty one just behind the one Donovan had pointed out, I got in it. Shortly after, a shell landed in the one with the two men in it, blowing them both to pieces. One was O'Connor from E Company and the other was the regimental color sergeant Sheehan."

Kelly's battalion was brought back to the line of the little stream, where it dug in the night of October 15th. Its strength was then six officers and about four hundred men. This line was held from then on as the front line of the 165th New York. Don-

ovan was carried back in a blanket to the regimental dressing station established by Major Lawrence.

Here Father Duffy saw him, but let him tell the story:

"He (Donovan) looked up from the stretcher and said to me smilingly, 'Father, you're a disappointed man. You expected to have the pleasure of burying me over here.' 'I certainly did Bill, and you are a lucky dog to get off with nothing more than you've got.' He was in great pain after his five hours lying with that leg in the shell-hole, but it had not affected his high spirits and good humor. He was still of opinion that the regiment could get through the wire, with proper artillery preparation and coordination of infantry forces."*

For his conduct in this action, Colonel Donovan was given the Medal of Honor. This is the citation:

"Colonel Donovan personally led the assaulting wave in an attack upon a very strongly organized position and when our troops were suffering heavy casualties he encouraged all near him by his example, moving among his men in exposed positions, reorganizing decimated platoons, and accompanying them forward in attacks. When he was wounded in the leg by a machine gun bullet, he refused to be evacuated and continued with his unit until it withdrew to a less exposed position."

Major Reilley and Captain Finn tell the following tragic story of Captain Mike Walsh's one day in the front line. Captain Finn says: "Mike Walsh had been in the Regular Army and the National Guard twenty-seven years at the time of this battle. The knowledge he had gained in the Regular Army made him so useful that he was continually given jobs with the rear echelon of the regiment. He was always trying to get rid of these jobs and get up to the front line, particularly as he was an expert rifleman. Finally on this day he got permission to join Major Reilley's battalion. When he reported to me he said, 'I'm coming to join the army now. I am no longer in the boy scouts. After twenty seven years I am finally in the war.' "

Major Reilley, taking up the story at this point, says: "Walsh seemed like a kid out of school. As we were advancing there was a little check due to the enemy's fire from the Cote de Chatillon, so I pushed up toward I Company, with which Walsh was

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* Page 285, "Father Duffy's Story," by Francis P. Duffy, George H. Doran Company, New York, N. Y.

advancing. I had a little lad named Roberts, an Indian replacement from Oklahoma, who was a dead shot with the rifle.

"As we were going forward, the three of us quite close together, there were some of those plopping bullets that were landing close to us. Walsh said: 'That's a sniper. That means a chance for us.' Walsh and Roberts tried for some time to locate this fellow. Finally they found him in a clump of bushes right at the turn of the road.

"So the two of them started a little private war with the sniper. Each took a different range and fired trying to pick him off at once. He was on the side of the hill about six hundred yards away. As they both fired, he jumped up and started running for his own trenches farther up the hill. As he ran they both fired again. I saw his arms go up, the gun drop out of his hand, and he fell.

"Walsh said again, 'I'm in the army now; I'm out of the boy scouts at last.'

"Later when I was in a different part of the field de Lacour reported to me that Captain Walsh had been hit. I went over to the sunken road, where I found him. I said 'What is the matter, Mike? Are you hit?'

" 'Yes, I am hit in the arm,' he answered.

" 'That's all right, Mike,' I replied, 'You have it coming to you. You will now get a nice rest between white sheets with plenty to eat and be warm and comfortable and come back to us when you are well again. You go back now and get your arm fixed.'

" 'I couldn't leave my men up front,' he replied.

" 'We can't go any further for the moment, so are going to hold on here; therefore you go back and save that arm. Get that nice rest in the hospital and then come back to us,' I answered.

" 'Is that an order?' he asked.

" 'You're damn right it is,' I replied.

"That night as we lay in the position, I think it was Corporal Fielder of 'I' Company and another man who came up and said, 'Major, as we were coming up just at dusk tonight we saw the body of Captain Walsh on the right of the road about a hundred and fifty or a hundred and seventy-five yards in the rear of the

sunken road. The whole back of his head is caved in. We would like to go out and bring his body in.'

" 'I will give you no such order. He is dead, and I am not sending live men after dead men, but I am not stopping you,' I replied.

"They went out and got him, bringing his body back to where it could be buried."

Besides Major Donovan, Sergeant Michael A. Donaldson also won the much coveted Medal of Honor. Here is his citation:

"The advance of his regiment having been checked by intense machine gun fire of the enemy, who were entrenched on the crest of a hill before Landres-St. Georges, his Company retired to a sunken road to reorganize their position, leaving several of their number wounded near the enemy lines. Of his own volition, in broad daylight and under direct observation of the enemy and with utter disregard for his own safety, he advanced to the crest of the hill, rescued one of his wounded comrades, and returned under withering fire to his own lines, repeating his splendidly heroic act until he had brought in all the men, six in number."

Here is the eye-witness account of Sergeant J. J. Bevan of the Intelligence Section of the Headquarters group of the 2nd Battalion, 165th New York. He says:

"At the time of the taking over of this sector by the 165th, the Second Battalion, in reserve, took up a position in the Bois de Montrebeau upon the night of the relief. The following morning the battalion intelligence officer and I advanced to make a reconnaissance of the forward positions. I was at that time a sergeant, experienced in observation and map work, as well as scouting, sniping, and patroling. We advanced through the village of Exermont, which at the time was practically deserted. In one of the buildings we found the remains of a German dressing station which must have been hit by a shell of large caliber. Doctors and orderlies, together with the wounded, had all been killed by the explosion, and their blackened bodies lay all over the place. From this point we continued, passing over hillsides strewn with the bodies of the dead of the 1st Division, until we reached the Cote de Maldah. Pausing here only long enough to explore the top of the hill, we passed around to its right and advanced almost due north in the direction of Landres over the terrain, later covered

by the attack. Upon reaching the road from Sommerance, we followed it in a northeasterly direction until we came within clear sight of the enemy wire. Our impression was that it was in excellent condition and of considerable depth, and having fulfilled our mission, we returned in a leisurely manner to the Cote de Maldah without having actually seen any of the enemy or being fired upon.

"It was planned that the intelligence section of the Second Battalion should do most of the work prior to the attack, leaving the other two battalion groups fresh for their duties later. Accordingly I proceeded immediately to prepare and operate an observation post on the top of the Cote de Maldah. Two nights prior to the attack Lieutenant Knowles and men of the Third Battalion intelligence section went out on a patrol covering the terrain I have previously described. I do not believe that they were able to get as close to the wire as we were. They were forced to return along the road towards Sommerance, crawling in single file along the gutters to avoid direct machine-gun fire and shelling. On the morning of the attack I was on duty at the observation post. The visibility was very poor, and we were unable to see more than about a kilometer.

"About the time that the Third Battalion began its advance, Lieutenant Irving, regimental intelligence officer, relieved me at the glasses. For an hour or two I lay on the top of the hill, about which the whizz-bangs were breaking frequently, until finally Irving told me to return to my battalion. I asked him if he would give me a report for Major Anderson, which he did, scribbling it on a field message. It was to the effect that the attack was progressing favorably, that our first objective had been reached on schedule time, and that we were well on our way to the second. I was rather skeptical of this, because with my field glasses I had been able to see practically nothing of what was going on. I found the Second battalion well on its way up to the forward positions, and remember well Major Anderson's skepticism as he read the message.

"During the afternoon the Second Battalion moved into the positions occupied by the Third prior to the attack. Sergeant Michael Darcy and I prepared a fox hole for ourselves, and proceeded to make ourselves as comfortable as possible, congratulat-

ing ourselves that not a shell seemed to fall in our immediate vicinity, most of the shelling being in front of the Cote and further to the rear. About this time I was called upon to guide an officer up to the forward positions. I cursed my fate at having to leave my position of comparative comfort and safety. I took him through very heavy shelling to his destination. I returned through heavy shelling which was particularly strong to the right of the Cote, the only place where troops could pass. With a feeling of relief I reached my position to find that in my absence exactly three shells had fallen in the vicinity, perhaps the only ones during that day. Sergeant Darcy had left our fox hole for a short time, and two other men had occupied it. One of the three shells made a direct hit, killing one of the men instantly, wounding the other man fatally, and slightly wounding Darcy who was returning. One of the shells contained gas, which reached Darcy who was unable to put on his mask because a piece of the shell had struck his nose. Having seen what happened to the other two men, he immediately crawled to their assistance, disregarding his own condition. He bandaged the one who was still living, but the man died in a few minutes. Darcy was affected by the gas to a point where he could eat nothing, being nauseated every time he tried it, yet he refused to be evacuated as a casualty, remaining with us for several days, until it was certain that our battalion was not going to attack. He was later recommended for a D. S. C., but I am quite sure he never received it.

"I have a very clear recollection of the relief of the First Battalion by the Second. As I have previously said, the clear space to the right of the Cote was almost constantly shelled, as the enemy knew that all movement, either forward or backward, including ration parties, ammunition carriers, and returning wounded, had had to pass this spot. Furthermore, it was under direct observation at such times as visibility cleared up. As our group passed this point and proceeded down the hill to the forward positions, the lieutenant in charge called me over. With very evident seriousness he told me not to let the men know it, but that we were taking over an impossible position from which we could neither advance nor communicate with the rear, because of the enemy positions on our right flank and the trenches and

wire on the crest of the hill in front of us. About this time we were issued new maps, which as I recall it, were quite different from the few we had been given earlier with regard to the indication of enemy trenches, wire, and machine-gun emplacements.

"Captain Rowley commanded 'M' Company of the Third Battalion on the morning of the attack. They found themselves in front of the enemy line, entirely to the left of the Sommerance Road, 'I' Company being on the right. The wire was unbroken on his front, and it was impossible to get men through as fast as they were being picked off. To their left they found a chicane and with heavy losses were able to get a group of men through behind the wire, but seeing the impossibility of being able to support them, Rowley was compelled to order them to withdraw."

There follows the story of Private Joseph B. Connolly which illustrates excellently the danger and hardships of this battle. Connolly says:—

"The 17th of October, 1918, at about 11:30 A. M., twelve of us were picked from the Machine Gun Company, 165th Infantry, to take a Machine Gun nest, situated about 300 yards to the left of our position. We left in squad formation. About 200 yards from the enemy position, we spread out and moved slowly ahead under extremely heavy shell fire, large and small caliber.

"Nick O'Neil, the champion cigarette bummer, was crawling along on his belly in a ditch, Private Henderson carried the musette bag with the clips and extra barrel. I carried the tripod and other attachments. These things always weigh a ton under the circumstances. After advancing about 100 yards we crossed a steep embankment which had a 60 degree angle drop. We figured it a good spot to set up the gun, as there were three trees a little back of us.

"In crossing the embankment a shell came over; missing the tops of our heads it dug a hole which seemed to us as big as the Grand Canyon. Afterwards we were told it buried several men alive. Another hit the roots of the tree nearest us, knocking it down. By some miracle it missed Henderson and myself in falling. The branches of the tree just brushed us while fragments of the shell slightly wounded both of us. A third shell hit the

stony part of the embankment, spraying shrapnel over us and adding more misery as it broke my leg in two places. The shells seemed to rain around us at this point. They dropped all around the corner of the embankment, under which we were luckily sheltered by the three trees which had fallen across one another, giving us some protection and thus undoubtedly saving our lives.

"Fearing loss of blood would finally bring on unconsciousness, I dragged myself slowly and as best I could by using some shrubbery growing along the embankment. When I finally got to the top I found that the shelling had increased. However, I cheered up on finding that there were four men in a shell hole not far off. They were unable to reach me because of the shells which forced them to stay put. I crawled back down the embankment. In coming down this steep slope my leg, which had been broken above the knee, flopped over and the heel of my hobnail shoe hit me on the head in back of the ear. It almost knocked me unconscious. However, I was only dazed for a few minutes. Soon after the shelling ceased and four men from 'B' or 'D' Company (as there was no time for salutations, they are unknown to me.* If they are alive they will enjoy knowing that I pulled through), came over the embankment to my aid. Using a blanket as a stretcher they wormed their way out to our dressing station situated in an orchard.

"Just as they were approaching the dressing station, the blanket split right down the middle and I found myself in the mud. I hit it like a ton of brick. Just then a gas shell came over, so the boys had to beat it again for a hole and adjust their masks. After about twenty minutes, they came back, picked me up, and carried me to a dressing station."

"The rest of the patrol polished off the German Machine Gun nest, I learned when I asked about it afterwards."

Let Private William H. Meade, one of Connolly's best friends, tell the rest of the story:

"Arriving at the first-aid station, which was nothing more than two first-aid men waiting under a tree about sixty rods back from a ravine in which the action was taking place, it was found

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* Author's Note—James Billy is the man who organized and directed his rescue.

they had no facilities for the case of Connolly or the three other men who were there at the time of Connolly's arrival.

"As there was no serum for the necessary injection against lockjaw, the four men were forced to wait for the ambulance and finally the men were loaded on—two on top and two on the bottom. It must be remembered that, though the first-aid men could do nothing to help under the circumstances, they made the men as comfortable as possible.

"During the ride in the ambulance Connolly was lying in an upper bunk on the right—the car a Ford—and held just four men. After twenty hours of jolting, bumping and halting for such landmarks as would direct them, Connolly and his buddy below found that death had released the two men on the other side of the car from their agony. From there on the ride was on for another sixteen hours in deathly silence. Outside of their occasional groans of pain due to the bumping ride which terminated at the hospital in Neilly, one of the Paris suburbs, after seventy-two hours, it was found that Connolly had contracted lockjaw to add to his already overflowing cup of misery. This condition was taken care of—an operation performed—and today Joseph B. Connolly is living happily in Detroit, Michigan, with his mother and sisters in very good health."

The assault battalion of the 166 Ohio on the extreme left of the division was the Second commanded by Major George T. Geran. Here is his account:—

"Up to the night of Oct. 11-12, the history of the 2nd Battalion is no different from the balance of the Regiment, but on that night, the 2nd Battalion relieved a Battalion of the 1st Division about half a mile south of Sommerance, and took the advance position for the Regiment. The next day, the 12th, we consolidated ourselves in this position, and while doing so, discovered several very severely wounded Germans, a part of the result of the previous activities of the 1st Division. One of these Germans was the worst beaten up man I have ever seen. He was a machine gunner and had been worked on about the head and face with the butt of a rifle. We evacuated these wounded prisoners on the afternoon of the 12th.

"The night of the 12th-13th, a strong patrol of G Company entered Sommerance, and in doing so, drove out a small German unit that had been occupying the town.

"The afternoon of the 13th, we received our instructions for the attack the next morning, and during the night of the 13th-14th, 'G' and 'H' Companies took up their positions for the advance, which positions were on a line just south of Sommerance, although, 'G' Company completely occupied Sommerance that night.

"The 2nd Battalion advance began about 8 o'clock the morning of the 14th, with 'G' Company under Capt. Caldwell on the right, and 'H' under Lt. Steele on the left. 'E' under Capt. Doellinger and 'F' under Capt. Stevenson in order from right to left were in support. The advance was bitterly contested. The leading elements of 'G' and 'H' finally reached a point on the forward slope of the ridge just south of St. Georges, and were held there by direct machine gun fire. These elements dug in and remained there, unable to advance further. On the left, Lt. Steele with 'H' Company had a number of patches of woods, all being German machine gun posts, to clean out in his advance. In conjunction with a Company of the Division on our left, he cleaned out one piece of woods, and some 80 German prisoners were captured. When the leading elements of 'H' reached the forward slope and joined up with 'G' on their right, the advance was definitely stopped.

"The 2nd Battalion had suffered rather heavily on this advance, losing about 300 men in killed and wounded. That night we were relieved by the 3rd Battalion of our Regiment. One of the best experiences of the ineffectiveness of, and the losses due to, untrained troops was shown in this attack. While in the Montfaucon woods a few days previous, our Battalion had received about 300 replacements, all of them of the very finest type of men, but utterly untrained. Some of them had been called from their homes as late as July, 1918. None had had more than four weeks training. Being close to the front when they came, we had no opportunity to train them ourselves. As far as possible we distributed them amongst the old men. While taking position on the night of the 13th-14th for the attack of the 14th, I was informed that many of these men had to be instructed how to load their rifles. Of the 300 men we lost that day, 240 of them were these new men, and the majority of the

balance were non-commissioned officers who lost their lives in attempting, during the fighting, to keep these untrained men from bunching up. The fighting on this occasion was not nearly as severe as when the Battalion took Serenges-et-Neszes on the Ourcq River. But at Serenges we had all thoroughly trained and veteran troops. And I venture this assertion with all conviction, that with the same outfit as we had at Serenges, we could have taken St. Georges, that day with half the. loss. These replacements were of high intelligence but they did not know what to do under fire."

The regimental intelligence officer of the Ohio regiment, Captain R. R. Gowdy, who always got his information by being with or close to the assault battalion tells the following account:—

"Finally the order came to move into line and early on the morning of October 11th the regiment entered the Bois Montrebeau, prepared to relieve a part of the 1st Division. The scene that presented itself was one which none of us who survived will soon forget. The heroic dead of the 1st and 35th Divisions lay scattered in small groups over the fields and through the woods, bearing mute testimony to the fierceness of that awful struggle and giving evidence of what was ahead of us. German machine gunners in pairs lay dead in their gun emplacements, where they had fired until the last minute, making the Americans pay dearly for the ground gained. Horses and mules, dead either from artillery fire or sheer exhaustion, were strewn over the field, and the stench arising from their bodies added the last element of grimness to the picture.

"During the night 11-12 October, the 2nd Battalion relieved elements of the 1st Division, on a line just south and slightly east of Sommerance, the 3rd Battalion going into support on the southwestern slope of Hill 240, and the 1st Battalion in reserve in the Bois Montrebeau.

"Little happened on the 12th except the exchange of artillery fire. On the 13th, the enemy kept up a rather heavy artillery bombardment of our front line until 3:45 p. m., when he attempted a weak infantry attack that led to nothing. This comparative inactivity was soon to end, however. About 11 p. m., on the 13th, an order was received for a division attack on the following day.

"Company 'G' under Capt. Caldwell, and Co. 'H' under Lt. Steele moved into Sommerance that night and awaited the hour for the attack. Our own artillery preparatory fire was heavy, while the German fire was comparatively light at the beginning, although he was directing some fire on Sommerance.

"October 14th, '18, at 8:30 a. m., the regiment advanced to the attack, and at 9:37 a. m., Hill 230 was taken. Enemy artillery fire had gradually increased, and by 9:30 was combing our back areas. The machine gun fire had also increased, and his resistance was stubborn. Our first and second objectives were reached however, and at 11:00 a. m., the Brigade Commander directed that the attack be carried on after reaching the 4th objective. Shortly after noon the enemy resistance stiffened greatly and he inflicted heavy losses among our two assault companies. The leading elements of our 2nd Battalion, after bitter fighting, finally reached the forward slope of the ridge south of St. Georges, from which line further advance was definitely stopped for the day by heavy enemy machine gun fire.

"On the left, Co. 'H' had a number of patches of woods, all infested with enemy machine guns, to clean out during the advance. In conjunction with a company from the 82nd Division on our left it took 80 prisoners, which became mixed with prisoners taken by our flanking division, and were taken to the rear by that organization.

"At 1:10 p. m., our O. P. reported that the roads north of Landres et St. Georges (on our right) were crowded with traffic. Enemy avions were using machine guns on our troops around Sommerance and were generally very active in the afternoon, having complete air supremacy.

"The ravine on our right flank running directly into the enemy line continuously gave us trouble. I spotted an enemy machine gun crew going into position to enfilade our line. I had our one pounder drive them out.

"At 2:20 p. m. word was received that the Division Commander was very anxious to gain and hold the heights beyond Landres-et-St. Georges, and to this end an artillery preparation fire was started at 3:30 p. m. and continued until 5:00 p. m. At this time strong patrols were sent out from the assault battalion.

Practically no further ground was gained during the day, however.

"The casualties in our assault battalion, the 2nd, were rather heavy during the day, the total reaching 267, or about 30%. The 'going' had been hard, and the price paid was heavy. As in preceding engagements, the main defense weapons of the enemy were machine guns and automatic rifles, artillery and airplanes, all of which were intelligently used.

"At 10:50 p. m. a brigade order was received directing the relief of the 2nd Battalion by our 3rd Battalion, the same to take place during the night. This was accomplished without any particular incident. The 1st Battalion moved up to support positions on the southern slope of the hill just south of Sommerance, and the 2nd Battalion formed a part of the Brigade Reserve.

"October 15th, '18, at 1:00 A. M., an order was received directing a continuation of the attack, the artillery preparation to start at 7:15 A. M., with the infantry attack following at 7:30 A. M. Sixteen tanks were sent up during the night to assist in the attack. Companies 'L' and 'M' were to be in the assault waves, 'I' and 'K' in support.

"The order for the relief was received at a late hour, and at 5 :40 A. M., the following morning it had not been completed. By 6:30 A. M., the enemy had become very active with H. E. and gas shell fire, and at 7:20 A. M., his infantry attacked our 3rd Battalion, which had completed the relief, and was laying a barrage on our front line.

"The tanks assigned to our support were late in getting into place, but our infantry attack started according to schedule without regard to the enemy attack. The fighting again was terrible, and the expected assistance from the tanks amounted to nothing, for at 8:55 A. M., all tanks were withdrawn due to heavy casualties among them and mechanical trouble.

"At 9:22 A. M., 'L' Company reported that it was unable to advance due to heavy machine gun fire from enemy trenches south of St. Georges, while Company 'M', under Lieutenant Monnet, was having some real hand-to-hand fighting in the woods on our left.

"We were not alone in being held up, however, for the 165th Infantry on our right and the 82nd Division on our left were

having the same trouble. Word was received that our artillery would start heavy zone fire-sweeping at 10:15 A. M., in order to allow battalion commanders to reorganize their forces. This firing kept up till noon and at that time the infantry resumed the attack.

"Company 'M' cleaned out the woods and Company 'L' reported that its right flank was exposed due to the ravine between it and the 165th up which the Germans fired continuously when not using it for infiltration into our line. Further attempts were made to advance by both assault companies, but withering and well-timed machine gun fire from the enemy made them unsuccessful.

"The casualty list was quite heavy during the day, the percentage of officers especially being large. In Company 'I', the Captain and five Lieutenants were evacuated, leaving only one officer with the company. Lt. Belhorn was among those sent back, and just before he was put in an ambulance, he sent a message to his battalion commander. The message concluded with, 'Excuse holes in this message blank, but it's the only one I have.' Subsequently it was found that the holes were made by machine gun bullets which had passed through his dispatch case and caused his wounds.

'Little was accomplished on the 16th. The relative positions of our battalions remained the same. The attack scheduled for this day was called off. We were to hold ourselves in readiness to continue the attack if so ordered.

"At 10:30 word was received that the 82nd Division on our left had moved forward, and we were instructed to send out strong patrols at once.

"At noon, Captain Hutchcraft, commanding Company 'K', personally took a heavy patrol and attempted to gain entrance to St. Georges from the western edge. After having heavy casualties from machine gun fire and fire from airplanes overhead, he was forced to retire. The day's accomplishments were very little, the defense tenaciously holding the St. Georges-Landres-et-St. Georges line.

"Criticism by Colonel Hough and other high ranking combat officers regarding the clothing and food situation resulted in some relief as far as clothing and blankets were concerned. The rations, however, still consisted mainly of canned food and hard bread.

"A general attack had been scheduled for the 17th, but was called off pending the arrival of reenforcing artillery. We had been admittedly weak in this arm while attempting to carry on an intensive offensive action, and the combat commanders had repeatedly stressed the need of more artillery. The result was that movement of more guns into the sector was started on the 17th and the scheduled attack called off.

"A report was circulated the afternoon of the 17th that the enemy had retired along the whole front, but the experience of a patrol sent out from the 1st Battalion proved this to be false.

"On October 20th another general attack was scheduled but called off because of the capture of a general staff officer of another division, who reputedly was carrying plans of the impending attack. On this same date our regimental line was extended to the right as the 83rd Brigade took over the whole division front.

'Two pictures of Colonel Benson W. Hough stand out during this period. The first occurred on October 16th, when Colonels Hough and Reilly were coming back from Division Headquarters at Cheppy, where they had been notified that Colonel Reilly was to command the 83rd Infantry Brigade. The two Colonels had been sleeping together so as to get the maximum warmth from two blankets and two raincoats, overcoats, sweaters and heavy underclothing being mostly noticeable because of their absence. They were sleeping in a shelter on the hillside which was somewhere between a glorified fox-hole and the first stages of a dug-out, as it was only covered with a few planks, perhaps an inch of earth and some branches to camouflage it.

"On the way back Colonel Hough broke out into a hearty laugh. When asked what about, he said, 'Oh, two things. First, I am wondering if the Brigade Commander will condescend to sleep with his subordinate and secondly, I suppose you will now spring your rank to insist that I gave you the cooties when you know it is the other way around.'

"The other picture is of Colonel Hough's eagerness before the battle was hardly over to begin making arrangements by which each of his battalions in turn would be put in reserve in the Bois de Boyon on the reserve slope of Montrefagne. This so the men in small groups could be sent down into Exermont where he had rigged up a place for them to bathe and get rid of at least some

of their cooties. It was characteristic of the man that while giving the utmost attention to the purely martial side of his duties, he was always thinking of how to make their performance easier for the human beings under his command."

Confirmed by his success in the St. Mihiel advance and in the double raid on Haumont les Lachausse and Marimbois Ferme in his conviction that machine guns should be used under one command, Major Winn entered the Argonne confident that he could give the attacking infantry the support they so often badly needed in an attack.

The capture of the Cote de Chatillon, the key to the Kriemhilde Stellung, in which his machine guns played so large a part was soon to justify this confidence.

The story is best told in his own words. Here they are:

"The movement of my battalion from St. Benoit to the Argonne was made without particular incident. One of our mules got so hungry on this march that on a night's stop in the Bois de Montfaucon, he chewed up the tail of my raincoat. My orderly had left it strapped to my saddle which he had placed on an ammunition wagon for the night.

"When we arrived in the field just east of Exermont we were to arrange for relief of the First Division. The Germans were giving this area rather constant and vigorous artillery bombardment. Not much cover was available. It was therefore necessary to make a very quick disposition of each unit, in order to take advantage of what protection could be had from the terrain. During this job which was about as pressing and vigorous a one as I ever had, I was handed a communication from Division Headquarters. When I opened it I found it contained peremptory instructions to report immediately how many cans of Lilly Brand tomatoes had been issued to my battalion; how many had been used and how many had been found to be swollen and spoiled. You can imagine my disgust and my reply by the messenger was to tell whoever sent it to 'Go to Hell'.

"The companies of the Machine Gun Battalion of the Second Brigade which we were to relieve were assigned to infantry battalions. Therefore the battalion commander of that machine gun battalion could not tell me what were the positions of his guns. Also there was no information at Brigade Headquarters

which would indicate their positions. Instead of taking time to hunt out the infantry commanders and the machine gun positions we agreed on a line upon which relief would be made. This was a line just north of lateral coordinate 384. I moved Companies 'B' and 'D' of my battalion up the valley north of Exermont to Hill No. 263 in le Petit Bois. I kept the battalion train and Companies 'A' and 'C' near Exermont.

"At this location we had a machine gunner's dream come true when General Summerall ordered General MacArthur to take the strongly fortified Cote de Chatillon. In the plans for the attack on this position I obtained permission from General MacArthur to deliver a special machine gun barrage. The barrage from my battalion was to continue for 45 minutes—30 minutes of this time was to be prior to the start of the infantry attack. During this 30 minutes I was permitted to fire on all portions of the Cote de Chatillon. At the end of the 30 minutes my barrage was to lift so that it would clear the crest of Cote de Chatillon and sweep the reverse slope. The infantry advance was timed that this 15-minute fire would cease before they arrived near the crest of the hill. Near the highest point of the Cote de Chatillon, there grew a group of fir trees. The center of this group was designated as a reference object from which a certain number of guns were to be laid. Each gun was given a space 50 meters wide to cover. Thus the whole area of the hill was blocked off so that each gun had a specific target. The remaining guns were given individual targets, such as located trench lines; a light hand railroad line which reached the top of this hill, and other conspicuous points.

"Every trench was enfiladed. In order to use the positions necessary to properly cover this target it was necessary to dig our guns in on the forward slope of Hill 263. Here skeleton crews of three men were stationed to operate each gun. They were protected as well as possible from shrapnel by digging in and other improvised cover.

"The firing data of each gun was carefully figured. The gun crews were given permission to fire as rapidly as possible without overheating the gun itself. We had ample time to bring up from our ammunition train a large supply of ammunition for each gun. We needed the time as there were no roads and

the mud through which the carts had to travel was deep and sticky. One of our mules died in his tracks trying to pull his cart through this quagmire. I not only put all of my companies in position on Hill 263, but also every gun they possessed, including spare guns. Thus in firing this barrage I had 60 guns in action. During the 45 minutes of this barrage nearly 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition were fired. The infantry were able to occupy the Cote de Chatillon under the barrage with very little resistance. Instead of the heavy casualties which we had feared and expected, the losses for the whole brigade were relatively slight. Because of the success of this barrage General MacArthur cited the 151st Machine Gun Battalion.

Here is the story of Private Kindness, the young full blooded American Indian of the 150th Wisconsin Machine Gun Battalion. He says:

"We entered the Argonne Forest and were in reserve in the woods called Bois-de-Montfaucon from October 5-11 inclusive. We got orders to go up. We marched at night. As we neared our position we stayed for a night in some woods one-half mile southeast of Apremont. We were to relieve the 1st Division. I remember going out in an open space that morning. What I saw I will never forget. There on the ground lay dead Germans and Americans from the 1st Division. I looked them over. One dead U. S. doughboy sat up against a tree where he had died, his rifle leaning against the tree. Another dead U. S. doughboy lay there with a hole in his head big enough for me to lay my hand in. I needed tobacco bad, and there lay a sack of Bull Durham. It was wet from the rain but I used it as I knew he never would again. Then a little farther away lay a dead German in a foxhole, a bullet hole in the center of his forehead and a hand grenade clasped in his hand. He lay there on his back stretched out, with eyes wide open. I can still see him there as he lay. I'll never forget that.

"Well, we advanced that morning to a large hill near Sommerance and set up our guns and dug in. Our platoon was assigned to throw a barrage over the infantry. As the infantry advanced into the valley my squad was firing. I was on the gun then. We were exposed to the enemy's fire, and they got our range and started a creeping barrage on us. It was terrible

as we looked in the valley below and saw the 166th Infantry walking right into that fire. All the time the fire on us was getting heavier. Finally it became too dangerous so someone yelled, 'out of action', so we scurried back of the hill to cover. Our platoon leader got hit. I saw him lying on a stretcher dying with a big hole in him. He died soon afterward. He gave the order 'out of action' but stayed until all the men were clear. Then he was wounded. Soon we went back to our guns. Our gun squad found our gun upset and a large shell hole almost under it. We had left just in time.

"That evening our first platoon, which was in the line, needed help so our platoon was called up there to help them. Along about 2:30 A. M. two of our boys lost both legs half way to the knees by shell fire as they were sleeping in their foxhole together. I remember it very well as I was called to help them to the dressing station about a mile back. That was terrible too, as we tried to locate a stretcher but couldn't so had to use two shelter halves to carry them, causing such suffering as I hadn't seen before. We'd go about 200 feet and then give them a rest. It took three men to carry each man. Doty kept asking for water. We'd give it to him and to Woods also. We were not allowed to smoke, of course. They did want a cigarette so badly. We couldn't give it to them. Towards morning we got them back O. K. I've never seen either of them since. Doty lived and married a war nurse, but I hear Woods died.

"Our company commander had given us orders when we left to go to the kitchen and bring some food out to the front line when we returned. We started with a non-commissioned officer in charge of us. He wanted to see our Captain about supplies so he said he'd see us back to the front with our food. But we didn't make it. We started and about half way we ran into heavy shell fire, and were stopped cold. The N. C. O. decided we would lay in shell holes till it let up. Shrapnel was bursting overhead, one small fragment just missed hitting my right hand as I lay in my shell hole. Soon the officer gave us orders to go back individually to Hill 288, taking cover. We started. I for one didn't go under cover long. I knew that the boys up in front were exposed to shell fire and I didn't feel right lying there behind that hill under cover. So I just went ahead alone and

helped carry in wounded soldiers, no matter who they were. I never knew. I'd go out and meet them and help them to the dressing station and go back for more. I done that till our company was relieved from the front line, and the shelling was heavy too.

"I had no orders to do it, and I guess no one ever knew it, but I felt better doing that than dying there while my buddies were in the front line. Our Captain Finn got shot in the ankle that day and refused to go to the hospital. He was a real soldier. My hat goes off to him. Our Lieutenant Ames got wounded in the leg that day also. We lost several men, and plenty wounded. There were two brothers, Lange. The oldest one was killed in plain view of the younger one. The sight broke the younger one's nerves. He shook like a leaf. He pulled out his pistol. He started to go over alone and clean them up. He yelled, 'They got my brother, I'll get them, I'll get them, let me at 'em'. It took two or three to hold him. Finally they lead him to the dressing station. He went from there to the hospital as a bad case of shell-shock.

Here are a few extracts from the diary of Sergeant Smith, of Company 'D', 150th Machine Gun Battalion, originally 'I' Company of the 4th Pennsylvania Infantry, and for a time Company 'C' of the 149th Machine Gun Battalion.

"October 12th. Out over the line we see many of our dead. Fifty-four of our pieces of artillery in position back of us. * * * Fortified in the afternoon. Boche planes attacking our kitchen squad with their machine guns. Wild skrimmage for cover."

"October 14th. Moved out at 4:45 in the morning. Attacked at eight in the morning. Private Leonard killed almost instantly. I just turned long enough to see him fall. We advanced in full view of one of Fritz's observation balloons. He sure gave us a warm reception. * * * Nine in the morning. We dug in and Fritz pulverized the ground over which we had advanced this morning. We paid dearly for our gains. Fritz bumped off four of our boys with one shell. * * * Many of our men going back wounded. Dug in the side of another hill late in the afternoon. * * * It began to rain and our holes got soaken wet. Many of us were sick with disentery. * * *

"October 16th. Still raining. Sure it is hell to be lying

in shell holes half filled with mud and water and practically no food. First platoon under Sergeant Rettgers has been cut off from food for the past two days."

"October 17th. Liaison again with 1st Platoon. Sure glad to get food. Boche artillery combing the hill continuously." *

Captain M. A. Means whose company was originally made up of Pennsylvanians from Lancaster and vicinity and started out as "B" Company of the 149th Penn. Machine Gun Battalion, later becoming "D" Company of the 151st Machine Gun Battalion, tells the following:

"On October 11th we reported in accordance with our orders to the Headquarters of the 2nd Infantry Brigade 1st Infantry Division. There was no time for reconnoitering so guides were promised to show us the position of Company 'D' of the 2nd M. G. Battalion which we were to relieve. Failure of the guides to show up caused the first delay. While others were being secured the men had to sit tight because of the shell fire and gas. At last guides were found and they started. The night was very dark the valleys and woods full of gas. Twice the guides caused the companies to be lost. Finally Captain Means found the advance command post of the 26th Infantry. The Colonel's quizzing of the runners found one who knew where the company was to go. Again they started crossing a deep valley full of gas. It was very hard for the men to breathe carrying heavy equipment and wearing gas masks. The entire company was in single file and close together so as not to lose direction. They made the way up a long slope through the brush to the base of Hill 263. Here after considerable searching they found a Captain commanding a battalion of the 26th Infantry. He told Captain Means that things were very much up in the air. All they could do was to get the men into holes on the slope of Hill 263 and wait until daylight. The field and combat trains had remained at Eclis-Fontains. They were later moved to Exermont.

"When daylight came it was discovered that the right of the division was up in the air. There was an interval of at least a

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* Page 94, et seq., "The Reading Militia in the Great War," by J. Bennett Nolan, published under the auspices of Historical Society of Berks County, printed by F. A. Woerner, Reading, Pa.

quarter of a mile which was uncovered. 'D' Company was at once ordered to move back and take position on Hill 281 in order to cover the opening until the position could be properly organized. It was found that Hill 288 directly to the right of Hill 263 was still in the enemy's hands and that they had a direct are on our troops. Late that day 'D' Company under heavy shell fire was ordered to move to the right forward slope of Hill 263 to cover the sharp angle where the division bent back as well as the swamp across their front and the Cote de Chatillon directly in front. A sunken road ran across this section of the hill. 'D' Company dug in under the back of this road, at the same time establishing firing positions in front of it, all under a heavy flank machine gun fire from Hill 288. The Company's guns assisted very much in the taking of Hill 288 a day or two later.

"On the 14th the 151st Machine Gun Battalion with 'D' Company on the right in position on the forward slope of Hill 263 was ordered to cover the attack of the 84th Infantry Brigade with overhead supporting fire. At 9:00 a. m. the guns opened with fire in accordance with the plans of the attack. The Infantry crawled and crept forward until they were within a few yards of the German line. At the exact second arranged upon the machine gun fire was raised. The Infantry sprang forward and caught the Germans before they could leave their trenches. This was the attack that put the first hole in the last organized positions of the German forces on the American front. The Kriemhilde Stellung line was broken and broken by the 84th Infantry Brigade with its machine gun battalion supporting with overhead fire.

"The fire was very effective. Captured German officers and even medical officers and men stated that the bullets had been so thick that they were unable to do anything. Just as the barrage opened everything seemed to drop on 'D' Company. There were but three men at each gun. The rest of the company was dug in as well as possible for protection along the sunken road. For a few seconds some of the Company's guns were put out of action but they were quickly started again. Shells seemed to be breaking every where.

"On the 15th and 16th the battalion from its same positions on Hill 263 fired a terrific overhead supporting fire for the taking of Mussard Farm, Tuilerie Farm and finally the Cote de Chatillon. In this last attack every gun in the battalion was again employed. Every foot of the enemy's trenches was covered so perfectly that the attacking troops were able to advance almost to their objective before receiving any of the enemy fire.

The artillery had its troubles also.

The men at the guns like the machine gunners being unable to scatter the way the infantry can offer a group target which enables one shell to do much more damage than is the case of a shell burst amongst infantry.

The drivers with their arduous and never ending task of hauling ammunition have the same experiences as the supply and ambulance drivers, dark nights with shelled roads and moon light nights with enemy airplanes dropping bombs to add to the damage done by the shells.

The following taken from the "History of the 151st Minnesota Field Artillery" covers fairly well the experience of the 149th Illinois except that the latter was the artillery support of the 166th Ohio Infantry.

"Vast quantities of ammunition were required for the artillery preparation, and all through the night of the fourteenth, in rain and mud, along roads almost constantly under shell fire, and with horses so weak that many of them died on the roads, the drivers hauled shells to the gun positions. Meanwhile the German artillery was active and during the night casualties were suffered in Batteries 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'F' of the 151st. At day break on the fifteenth the American gunners began delivering the message of death to the Cote de Chatillon, and all through the morning the bombardment continued. In one respect conditions were more favorable than on the preceding day—the weather made aerial observation difficult, and German aviators were unable to direct the work of the artillery with much success. * * *

"The artillery support rendered by the 151st in the operations against the Cote de Chatillon marks perhaps the highest achievement of the regiment during the war. Four of the batteries had been engaged in destructive and two in raking fire. There

were occasional opportunities for fire on fleeing targets. From a shell-hole observation post on Hill 260, Captain George C. Ferch, regimental adjutant, directed one particularly fine bit of artillery work which broke up a counter-attack by German infantry. When a group of Germans, estimated to number about two hundred, was observed to be gathering in the south edge of the woods on the Cote de Chatillon for an attack, a few words were spoken into the telephone and almost immediately shells from the 151st were decreasing the number of enemy combatants in that part of the battlefield. * * *

"The monotony and unpleasantness of the situation were somewhat relieved for the men by the performances of German and American aviators. Whenever the weather permitted—perhaps every third day the enemy sent over large squadrons of airplanes hunting for American balloons and airplanes. On October 18 it was estimated that more than one hundred German planes came over the lines near Exermont. They were attacked by American aviators and two of them brought down. One occupant of a German plane jumped from his machine and the men of the 151st Field Artillery had their first and only view of a successful parachute descent. It was on this day, also, in full view of the batteries, that an American and a German plane crashed head-on and fell. That night the Americans, in order to show that they had not been intimidated by the German demonstration, flew to Buzancy and bombed the town. Again, on October 22, the spirits of the men were somewhat revived when the sun came out and aerial activity was resumed. From their places at the guns and echelons, they saw the enemy bring down six observation balloons, while the Americans succeeded in bagging one German 'sausage'."

The following extracts from the dairy of Colonel George Leach, commanding the 151st Minnesota, are of interest:

"Wednesday, October 16th. The Infantry fought all day for the woods on the Cote de Chatillon. We shelled it continually and fired on fleeing targets and at dark our Infantry was in the edge of the woods. A very difficult job with heavy casualties. It must be expressly noted that the Germans here never give up, but die fighting. This has been especially apparent during the last

few days. My P. C. was harassed all night with artillery fire, but we were too tired to care.

"Thursday, October 17th. It is rumored this morning that General Foch visited the Commanding General last evening and said we must take the Cote de Chatillon or leave 6,000 dead on the field. Whether he said it or not,* the rumor certainly had its effect for tonight the Infantry have taken it. Much harassing fire all day and tonight we are getting a great deal of gas. The weather is rainy and the mud about as bad as it can be. The horses are dying very fast from lack of feed and overwork. The men are getting sick from bad weather but the esprit is fine."

Here is a short extract telling something of the experiences of the Howitzer Regiment, the 150th Indiana Field Artillery. It is from the diary of Sergeant Elmer F. Straub, who later was to become the Adjutant General of Indiana.

Speaking of October 12th, he says: "We traveled until 5:30 P. M. and finally pulled into a little valley near Cheppy where we unsaddled, watered and fed the horses. The country around us is simply in one big uproar; there are a very great number of American six-inch rifles and all of them are firing; then, too, there are several German six-inch guns right close to us and they have been turned around and are now being fired toward the Germans; the country is a little cleaner than that country we just left. At 7:30 the pieces and all the equipment that goes with the guns were gotten ready and finally we pulled out for the position. It took us, with the pieces, until 11:30 to get to the position because the roads were so congested, and then too it started to rain and it was very cold. The roads were hilly and dark and one also had to be careful of not falling with the horse. We finally pulled into position just to the right of Exermont, and a h— of a position it is, too, I must say. It is in a valley that is simply full of shell holes and mud and many old German cantonments that are about all shot to pieces. There is a little creek that runs thru the valley and its course is all deflected on account of the shells that have burst in its course. Mud is a foot thick and the hill in front of us is so steep that we can not see over a square in front of us. Exermont is a mass of ruins and is an awful place to get

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* This is an excellent example of how rumors based partly on fact and largely on imagination percolate through an army.

into or out of. Our kitchen is in an old torn up cantonment and there will have to be a general house cleaning before they will be able to put any of the kitchen into working order. * * *

About October 13th he says: "The weather is very miserable, damp and cloudy and at times it rains so we are trying to keep off the damp or rather wet ground as much as possible. There is quite a bit of firing going on and all of the men are busy either making their homes or carrying ammunition. During the afternoon we had to relay the pieces as the men built large wooden platforms for the guns so that they would not sink in the mud. We also had a notice placed on our bulletin board that the Germans had accepted our peace terms but that the fighting would continue until a commission had met to arrange matters more systematically. The firing is nothing to speak of although there is some; a few German shells come over once in a while, just enough to make it annoying. * * *"

Speaking of October 14th, he says: "The battery has been firing continuously since 12:00 last night and we are only four kilometers from the front lines. * * *"

On October 15th amongst the serious things of the day, he finds space to inject the following humor: "I got a lot of h— this morning from Lieut. (Charles D.) Clift because I had tied my horse over night to one of the wheels of the limbers, and since the horses are not getting a great deal of food my horse decided to have a square meal and he ate three of the spokes out of the limber wheel and now they are afraid that it will not hold up on the next trip. About 3:00 P. M. Capt. (Clarence E.) Trotter came down and told me to get some junk together because we were going forward to look things over. I took the aiming circle and we started out, we went to the top of a hill: that we thought was No. 204 but after all of the climbing we did we found that we were on the wrong hill and we could not see a thing. Down we went again and after much puffing and an hour's climbing we got to the top of hill number 204; from there we could overlook the whole valley below, including our 'doughboys' and the German front lines. * * *"

While the rest of the division except the artillery brigade was in reserve in the Montfaucon Woods, the 117th Ammunition Train was busy hauling ammunition day and night. This was

mostly the heavy ammunition used by the 150th Indiana F. A. During this period they not only had to work up and down bombed and shelled roads every night, but also each night their camp was visited by German bombers. After driving all night over shelled and bombed roads, the drivers on getting back to camp would frequently find their shelter tents and their belongings scattered in fragments as the result of German aviation bombs.

October 14th, they moved to near the little town of Cheppy, where was the P. C. of the Rainbow Division.

During the heavy fighting the trucks hauled ammunition day and night, almost continuously. To quote from the Memoirs of Company A, "It took several hours to make one trip on account of the long distance, poor condition, and traffic on the road."

In a commendatory order dated October 26, 1918, General Charles P. Summerall, commanding the Fifth Army Corps, commended the 67th Field Artillery Brigade as follows:

"This Brigade has remained continually in action since the entrance of the Division into line, and by self-sacrificing devotion to duty and the high skill of its officers and men it has contributed greatly to the success of all operations."

Private Victor Kunst of the 117th Maryland Trench Mortar Battery tells the following:

"Having been tipped off way ahead of time, by a Captain of the 32nd Division, that we were going into a "Hell hole" when we arrived in our positions we proceeded to dig in on a side of a slope.

"My brother and I had a fairly nice fox hole to stay in overnight. Everything was quiet until about dawn I heard a shell whistle over and the bang woke me up. Suddenly I heard a loud voice yell "Oh Vic, My God, I'm hit." I quickly jumped out and found that it was a comrade of my own squad who had been in a similar fox hole a little distance away, but because of a necessity he had ventured out into the open, and a piece of the shell I had heard, hit him. I picked him up and carried him into our fox hole and told my brother to look after him while I ran after first aid which was in the village nearby. In the meantime my brother got a couple of Frenchmen with a stretcher

and on my way back from the village I met them carrying our comrade to the first aid station. My poor friend, whose name was Wolfe, was groaning loudly and begging 'For God's sake don't tell my mother and don't tell my father.' He was sent to the field hospital, suffered for two days, and finally died. He was an only son.'

The men of the 117th Missouri Signal Battalion had a very difficult time maintaining communications in the sector. In the first place, the entire absence of any but one good road, and that on the flank of the Division, and used also by the division on the left, made movement throughout the divisional sector very difficult. The country everywhere was rugged and broken, with enough underbrush and forests to make movement difficult. The wagon tracks and road trails which did exist wound in and out in the bottom of gulleys and ravines with the consequence that the rain had made them very slippery when not quagmires of mud.

Added to this was the continuous heavy artillery fire all over the sector, and in its front areas machine gun fire used by the enemy as harrassing fire in the same way as that type of fire is used by the artillery to prevent communication.

However, the Signal Corps made a record in that no unit of the Division was ever without communication for a longer period than thirty minutes.

Colonel J. Monroe Johnson, commanding the 117th South Carolina and California Engineers, says in his report:

"The 1st Engineers (1st Division) had throughout their campaign been used as combatant troops. Therefore, the roads were impassable, and it was with great difficulty that supplies could be carried forward.

"The regiment was moved to Exermont and ordered into Division Infantry Reserve, remaining three or four days and serving in that capacity. The road situation growing rapidly worse. At the request of the Division Engineer, the 117th Engineers were released from that duty and put to work on the roads, with the exception of Companies 'C' and 'F' who were sent into the attack for cutting wire, assisting the tanks, and for operating Bangelore torpedoes for demolition of wire entanglements. Company 'F' suffered a considerable number of casualties. * * *

"The use of the Bangelore torpedo in this style of warfare being absolutely ineffective, its attempted use was executed over the violent protest of the Division Engineer. It had proven absolutely ineffective in the St. Mihiel fight, and was found more useless in this fight. After this attack was over, which netted the Division the Cote de Chatillon and beyond, the German defensive position, the energies of the regiment were directed to road work and the roads rapidly put in good shape.

"The use of the 1st Engineers as combatant troops caused great congestion of traffic on roads due to their imperfect condition. The use of the 117th Engineer Regiment as Divisional Reserve was a very grave mistake and continued this bad road condition for six unnecessary days."

As is always true in war, along with the tragic and serious there were some humorous incidents. The then Captain Talbot, the motor transport officer of the Division tells the following:

"It is a good sign of the character of Rainbow men to say that very few of them have entered into a penitentiary for stealing after the training they got in France. As you will recall, the two Brigadier Generals had National cars. There were very few Nationals in France which also extended to spare parts.

"At Cheppy, Brigadier General Lenihan's car came in contact with a hostile shell which punctured the radiator, cut the frame and smashed the bevel gear and pinion. The car was rushed to the shops for repairs with urgent orders from the General to have it back in an hour. Remember again there were no parts available, mud was anywhere from six to eight inches deep, and there was a war going on. Down the road a piece, stalled in the mud, the driver having gone for gasoline, sat a National car of some other Division, and in it, peacefully reposing and dreaming of home and mother, was a general of large proportions.

"Two men with mechanical knowledge, a desire for service, and brave hearts, jacked this car up with the sleeping general in it; and quietly and efficiently removed the bevel gear and the pinion. Gas drums were stolen from the air service (balloons to you) and the frame was welded, every man taking his life in his hands if it had exploded. The radiator was closed up and the damaged portion sealed in, and General Lenihan's car was re-

turned with two minutes to spare; and, to keep the story straight he was a little impatient over the delay.

"The sequel came when the general who had been deprived of his motor power came into camp and demanded parts. He was convinced that none were available, and left his car to seek parts elsewhere. He was no more than oven the hill to Varrennes, when his car was reposing on the shelves of what was facetiously called the Forty-Second Parts Department."

Then turning to the serious side he tells the following with respect to the service of the 117th Texas Supply Train to which he originally belonged:

"From our entry into the Exermont region every officer and man of the Train was tested to the full, as they worked under a continual shelling and bombing night after night. Almost every night the German bombing plane bombed our camp on the hills between Cheppy and Varennes. On this front the train did valiant work rationing the Division Units up to the minute. Where the men in the front line did not get their rations, it was due to the difficulties experienced by the regimental details in getting them to the front line from the points at which we delivered them to the regimental supply people.

"Besides this, on several occasions our supply trucks were used to carry ammunition up to the battery positions. They did so regardless of whether or not these positions were being shelled. Our trucks were also used to help evacuate the wounded. Also, as the distance from the main source of supplies at Cheppy and Varennes to the front was considerable, we soon decided to establish advance dumps, which we did, thus shortening considerably the distance which the regimental supply people had to go."

A good but modest summary of the work done by the 117th Sanitary Train is the following account by Captain Buck:

"It was evident after the first few hours of the advance that most of the motor ambulance work would be from Exermont to Baulny. There were no roads leading to the 84th Brigade and their wounded had to be transported to Exermont by handlitters and by mule ambulances. The 83rd Brigade was more accessible. During the first few hours their wounded also were brought to Exermont. Afterward an ambulance relay station was established at the cross roads, one kilometer to the right of Fleville. This

station was reached by Jersey and Tennessee motors. Practically all of the wounded of the 165th Infantry, and for a short time from the 166th Infantry, were handled through this station and sent direct to Baulny. Toward evening the roads were opened into Sommerance and motors enabled to reach the battalion aid stations of the 166th Infantry in that town.

"The ambulance company litter bearers worked under the most trying conditions ever experienced in the Argonne. There were no roads and even the foot paths were rendered impassible by mud which was often a foot in depth. They were forced to pick their way across country, dodging around shell holes and through thickets. This work had to be continued day and night with little food or rest. The enemy kept up a harrassing fire on all back areas and continually drenched the valleys with gas. It is no wonder that the men were soon exhausted, working under such conditions, and frequent reliefs were necessary."

Here is the way the Medical History of the 42nd Division* sums up their experience in the Landres-St. George Battle:

"In the first week a shortage of blankets and litters developed owing to neglect of the evacuation hospitals in not returning them by the ambulances that brought in patients but this was soon remedied. The exposed positions and the close proximity of the opposing lines were responsible for a number of casualties and many effectives were also lost through evacuation because of influenza and exhaustion from exposure and the hard service. Living conditions were unbelievably bad and men existed in 'Fox Holes' half filled with water for days at a time. The weather added to the natural discomforts with almost continual rain and cold.

"Here was established by one organization at least, what to the writer's mind, was an ideal system of aid stations for regimental work. The battalion stations of the advance, support and reserve battalions were either with or in close proximity to the battalion P. C.'s, thus providing perfect liaison with the line; the regimental station was near that of the reserve battalion and had

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* Begun on the Rhine and finished later by Major Harry D. Jackson and Captain Thomas K. Lewis, M. C. U. S. A., assisted by Colonel David S. Fairchilds, Jr., Division Surgeon, Major Angus MacIvor, Assistant Sanitary Inspector, and fourteen officers and enlisted men of the 117th Sanitary Train.

telephone connection with the three battalion stations as well as with the regimental P. C. and the ambulance companies in the rear. One dental equipment, set up for use, and the detachment office were in the rear with the supply company and were in touch both by runner and by telephone. The ambulance company liaison officer and the sergeant were with the regimental surgeon and two motor ambulances were held at the regimental aid station where there was reasonable protection. Through use of a code, the presence of casualties in any of the battalion aid stations was made known by phone to the regimental surgeon, and an ambulance was at once dispatched to that station. This arrangement had the advantage of not unduly exposing ambulances and their drivers and, at the same time, keeping the surgeon in close touch with his regiment and its needs. It resulted in most satisfactory evacuation service for all concerned. As on former occasions an aid man was detailed to each front line company but the physical hardships of this service far surpassed that of any previous one and wherever possible these men were relieved every twenty-four or forty-eight hours by other men of their detachment who had been on duty in the aid station.

"Aid stations were of every imaginable variety, some few, fortunate enough to be able to occupy partially ruined houses with splinterproof cellars, were able to function normally, others worked in frame shacks in woods or against hills and a number had not even this shelter but were forced to carry on in the open or in shell holes. To former experience and the present perfect liaison with the ambulance companies, can be attributed the smooth and efficient working of evacuation against the apparently unsurmountable obstacles that were ever present in the Argonne-Meuse campaign. Four bearers, sometimes eight for relaying or relieving, struggled back over shell-torn, muddy paths to animal drawn ambulances which took up their burden of the harrowing drag over roads, the passage of which taxed four mules to their utmost and mired vehicles over their axles, to the waiting motors. The experience of former days was here confirmed and strengthened in the advantages of the canvas Musette bag over the Medical Department Web Belt. The belt was uncomfortable, a man wearing it could neither sit down nor lie down, without removing it, nor could he reach dressings in the rear pockets readily.

The bag was not a burden to carry, could be easily removed from the shoulder if needed and permitted the carrying of a greater variety and amount of dressings."

An interesting side-light on the conditions which the Medical Corps had to overcome, is furnished by the following : *

"Roads and bridges were either destroyed or mined. Buildings left behind crashed down on those who were foolish enough to think they afforded shelter.

"In the woods the mud was almost knee-deep. Gas saturated the air above from the continuous bombardment of the enemy. * * * So impassable were the roads at the front that relays were necessary in transporting patients from the lines. Often they were carried on the shoulders of the litter-bearers through the muddy, shell-raked woods, for two or three miles. There they were taken back in mule ambulances to the more solid roads where they were consigned to motor vehicles for a still longer ride. Many were carried a hundred miles before they were at last in clean, soft hospital beds. At the best speed possible, it was hours before wounded men could have efficient treatment. * * * After long days of drizzling rain the nights would be clear and always with the moon came the bombers. Up and down the roads they flew dropping death in the congested columns of ambulances, supply and munition trucks. * * * The triage of the Tulsa Ambulance Company * * * was located in the wine cellar of a partially destroyed farm house known as l'Esperance Farm. It was but a few feet from the road along which supplies for three divisions were carried. A cross road was but a hundred feet from the station in one direction, with an ammunition dump there. Across was a bridge. All around were camped the rear echelons of the artillery and infantry. * * * Shells fell in the road in front, about the ammunition dump, and on the hill behind the dressing station every few minutes. Earth was thrown in the food being prepared in the open kitchens many times. * * * To escape the gruelling fire the men dug holes in the hillside for their blankets. Over these they stretched their tents. These kept the blankets partially out of the water, which seeped

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Page 17, Tulsa County in the World War, Compiled by William T. Lampe, published by the Tulsa County Historical Society.

continuously into the hillside resting places. The farm house dressing station was shunned by all when not on duty."

Colonel Hughes says, "To add to our troubles stomach disorder caused by bad water was prevalent throughout the Division. Perhaps half the men were really hospital cases, but under existing conditions we could not afford to deplete the strength of the Division by evacuating.

"Incidentally, there were numerous cases of men and officers whom the divisional surgeon wanted to evacuate but who refused to go.

"As the weather grew colder discomfort and even suffering was caused by the lack of winter underwear and overcoats. This coupled with the hard continuous service of the division in the open was inevitably taking its toll.

"After all it was in August when the long march to San Mihiel was begun. That march was made night after night with the days spent in woods. Then came the San Mihiel attack followed by two weeks in the open in the St. Benoit Sector. Then the quick movement to the Argonne again night after night with days spent in muddy villages and woods, and the weather cold enough at night at least to make for discomfort. Then came for the Infantry the period in the cold muddy Montfaucon woods, while the artillery supported first the 3rd Regular Division and then the 32nd Red Arrow Division; then the march across the rear of the 32nd Division with all the difficulties attending a march across the lines of supplies of the troops added to by losses from enemy shell fire, then more muddy cold damp woods, followed by the relief of the 1st Regular Division and then this period of combat with heavy losses and always in the open!

"It was not to be wondered that the physical resistance of the Division was below par."

Here is General MacArthur's answer to the claim made in the history of the 89th Division that the Rainbow Division had been "thrown back". He says, "I cannot understand any such if claim. Not only was no part of the Division thrown back, but all ground gained by the 83rd Brigade was held under extremely difficult circumstances while the 84th Brigade captured Hills 288, 242 and Cote de Chatillon, thus breaking completely through the Kriemhelde Stellung. Three days after we had captured Cote

de Chatillon I found some Germans in the woods to the east of Tulierie Farm, a nuisance, so got permission to go after them. I pinched them out by a direct attack from the neighborhood of Tulierie Farm and an attack in their rear by a detachment from the Cote de Chatillon which got between them and their own people. We captured ninety prisoners.

"Far from being thrown back we broke through a prepared German line of defense of such importance to them, that their retreat to the other side of the Meuse River was already forecast because of the advantageous position given the American Army for the attack of November 1st."

A few extracts from Colonel Judah's daily summary of Intelligence will serve to give a picture of this battle as it was seen at the time. In that from noon to noon, October 13th-14th, Colonel Judah says:

"Up to five-thirty A. M. October 14th, when our troops commenced their assault the enemy infantry had remained quiet. Upon our advance the enemy in large force, with plentiful machine guns and strong artillery support, stubbornly resisted our assaults and fought so steadily that but few prisoners had been taken. Hill 288 was so strongly held that it was taken only after it had been completely surrounded and the garrison was practically annihilated. * * *

"Prisoners from the 9th Grenadier Regiment, 3rd Guard Division, captured on our right by the 32nd Division, and sent back through the 84th Brigade, state that they were sent into line last night with orders to hold at all cost."

It is interesting to note that these prisoners came from the Champagne front and stated, as did prisoners captured from the 41st German Division, that *they relieved no troops in the line but were sent in to reinforce it.* The next noon, that of October 15th, Judah reports:

"The afternoon of October 14 and the morning of October 15th have been characterized by violent and sustained infantry fighting in which the enemy infantry has tenaciously held his positions supported by a great number of machine guns and strong artillery fire. The enemy artillery has maintained an effective fire on our infantry advance and has used large quantities of gas shells on

our support troops and as far back as Exermont. The enemy air service has shown less aggressiveness than during the preceding period. Our attack has progressed very slowly, encountering savage resistance at all points and finding particularly strong obstacles in the woods of Cote de Chatillon and at La Tuilerie Farm. Our right flank continues to suffer an enfilading fire from Hill 286 (in front of the 32nd Division) and the surrounding woods."

The same day he sums up the activities of the Division as follows:

"Our infantry continued its attack throughout the afternoon of October 14 and the morning of October 15 and has faced powerful obstacles of terrain, organization and enemy resistance. Progress has only been won by hard fighting through enemy wire and under the frontal and enfilading fire of enemy machine guns and artillery. As our advance is now in the form of a narrow wedge, our front has been lengthened and has been subjected to fire from both flanks where the enemy has massed great numbers of heavy machine guns. The slope along which runs the St. Georges—Landres-et-St. Georges Road and along which are located the enemy machine guns, has been the back bone of resistance to the 83rd Brigade. On the right, the 84th Brigade has been bitterly resisted from Cote de Chatillon and La Tuilerie Farm. Both brigades have been under constant fire of 77s and 105s placed well to the rear and of machine guns in front and on the flanks. Our artillery has fired heavy barrage fire and fire of destruction on enemy points of resistance but owing to enemy control of the air has been unable to secure adequate regulation. We have fired 23,000 75s and 2,600 155s."

In a summary from noon, October 15th, to noon the 16th, he sums up the activities of our own troops as follows:

"Throughout the afternoon of October 15 our infantry continued its attacks upon the enemy positions. After prolonged and bitter fighting and under the frontal and enfilading fire of artillery and machine guns, the 168th Infantry succeeded at dark in capturing La Tuilerie Farm which remains in our hands at the time of this report. On the remainder of our front we have made no material gain. On October 16 our troops were ordered to hold their positions and not to attack. Our artillery, severely

handicapped by poor observation due to lack of visibility and of aerial reglage, has fired upon special targets at the request of infantry commanders."

In his summary, noon to noon, October 16th-17th, Colonel Judah sums up the activities of our own troops: "On the afternoon of October 16 the 84th Brigade by terrific and prolonged fighting against well organized and savage defense, succeeded in penetrating the Kriemhilde Stellung at its apex on the Cote de Chatillon which is said to be the strongest point between the Argonne and the Meuse. At this point there is a heavily wooded slope with strong wire. Here a large garrison with artillery support and the usual large supply of machine guns upon which the enemy base their defense, offered grim battle and was driven back foot by foot by the furious attacks of our infantry. We now hold Cote de Chatillon and have organized the forward slope of the hill against possible attacks. Two enemy attempts to dislodge us during the afternoon were complete failures and resulted in the capture of prisoners. On the left our troops maintained their positions under the fire of enemy artillery and the crossfire of enemy machine guns. Our artillery continued its harassing fire and concentrated lethal gas upon the enemy support positions."

The prisoners taken belonged to organizations which had been sent from the Champagne to reinforce the German position in the Argonne. The number of different units sent in to reinforce their Argonne position is shown by the following taken from the Judah's summary October 17th-18th:

"The Division has captured prisoners from twenty-three enemy divisions, including three Guard and one Austro-Hungarian Division as follows: 1st Guard, 3d Guard, 4th Guard, 10th, 13th, 28th, 40th, 41st, 52d, 96th, 192d, 195th, 201st, 216th, 227th, 233d, 5th Landwehr, 8th Landwehr, 10th Landwehr, 21st Landwehr, 77th Reserve, 6th Bavarian Reserve, 35th Austro-Hungarian Division; and from nineteen independent units as follows: 3d, 30th, 42d, 51st, 65th, and 51st Landwehr, Foot Artillery Regiments; XV Ersatz Foot Artillery Battalion, 14th Sturm Battalion, 16th Sharp Shooter Machine Gun Battalion, 4th Minenwerfer Battalion, 67th and 97th Labor Battalions, 216th

Agricultural Battalion, 70th Sound Ranging Troops, 22d Railway Section and the XIII Ludwigsburg Regiment."

General Pershing sums up the importance of this victory as follows:

"The importance of these operations can hardly be overestimated. The capture of the Romagne heights, especially their dominating feature, Cote Dame Marie, was a decisive blow. We now occupied the enemy's strongest fortified position on that front and flanked his line on the Aisne and on the Heights of the Meuse. Unless he could recapture the positions we held, our successes would compel him to retire from his lines to the north, as we were within heavy artillery range of his railroad communications.

"The main objective of our initial attack of September 26th had now been reached. Failing to capture it in our first attempt, the army had deliberately, systematically, and doggedly stuck to the task in the face of many difficulties and discouragements. The persistent and vigorous effort with which divisions forced their way forward to the goal is the outstanding glory of our service in France." *

General Pershing goes on to show that the Germans were greatly impressed by the steady pressure of the Americans in the Argonne, and that undoubtedly this greatly influenced Marshal Von Hindenburg's writing to the German Chancellor on October with the result that the Chancellor telegraphed October 6th, through the Swiss Government, to President Wilson.

General Pershing also says: "The First Army was a tried and seasoned force equal to the best on the Western Front at the time I placed it under the immediate command of Major General Liggett.** In order that the Army might understand the value of the recent achievements and realize the urgency of continued vigorous effort, I sent the following message to the new First Army Commander on October 17th:

" 'Please have the following transmitted as a telegram to Corps and Division Commanders:

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* Page 341, Vol. II, "*My Experiences in the World War,*" General John J. Pershing, Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York, N. Y.

** October 12 General Pershing put the American troops holding the St. Mihiel Salient under Command of Major General Robert L. Bullard, designating them as the Second American Army.

" 'Now that Germany and the Central Powers are losing, they are begging for an armistice. Their request is an acknowledgment of weakness and clearly means that the Allies are winning the war. That is the best of reasons for our pushing the war more vigorously at this moment. Germany's desire is only to gain time to restore order among her forces, but she must be given no opportunity to recuperate and we must strike harder than ever. Our strong blows are telling, and continuous pressure by us has compelled the enemy to meet us, enabling our Allies to gain on other parts of the line. There can be no conclusion to this war until Germany is brought to her knees. Pershing." *

At the same time he quotes the following from Hindenburg's "Out of My Life": "The pressure which the fresh American masses were putting upon our most sensitive point in the region of the Meuse was too strong." *

There is no better evidence that General Pershing's plan made within a month of his arrival in Europe the summer of 1917 was the one best calculated to make the maximum use of the American reinforcements to the Allies by having an American army of at least a million men concentrated under his command and operating to strike and keep striking the Germans at a critical point in their line. The First American Army early in October reached a strength of about 900,000 Americans. This was reinforced by more than 100,000 French, mostly artillery, aviation, and in the services of various kinds.

Besides the American troops in the First and Second American Armies the 27th and 30th American Infantry Divisions were with the British, the 2nd and 36th American Infantry Divisions and also three infantry regiments of the 93rd Colored Infantry Division were with General Gauraud's Fourth French Army in the Champagne, three American Infantry divisions were in French trench sectors in Lorraine and the Argonne, and other divisions arriving or just arrived and not yet at the front.

Summing up: "In the second week of October, 1918, twenty-nine American divisions, the equivalent of about fifty-eight European divisions, were in action." *

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* Page 341, et seq., Vol. II, *"My Experiences in the World War,"* General John J. Pershing. Frederick A. Stokes Co., New York, N. Y.

Hindenburg spoke correctly when he spoke of the fresh American masses, as the number of American troops in action the second week of October exceeded the force which Russia's dropping out of the war had enabled him to bring from the old Russian front in the East to the Franco-British front in the West with every justification for the belief that this tremendous reinforcement would enable him to bring victory to German arms.

The only thing that General Pershing now lacked to complete the carrying out of his plan was to resume the American attack in the direction of the Moselle route into Germany. This was the direction of the St. Mihiel attack, but which he had had to stop short because of Marshal Foch's insistence that he attack north through the Argonne instead.

However, this idea was never forgotten. The result was that step by step as the American First Army advanced through the Argonne, General Pershing had division after division on its right fight their way across the Meuse, to the top of the ridge on its eastern bank, the long ridge on which is Verdun. This pivoted the First American Army on its right around Verdun, so that finally it was in continuation of the line of the Second American Army, which stretched across the plain of the Wovre and faced Metz, the guardian fortress of the western portal of the Moselle Route into Germany.

CHAPTER XXV

KRIEMHILDE STELLUNG BROKEN—WHAT DIVISIONS WILL EXPLOIT THE VICTORY ?

The breaking of the Kriemhilde Stellung by the Rainbow and Red Arrow Divisions had completely changed the situation. From the day the Cote de Chatillon fell, to MacArthur's 84th Infantry Brigade, information gathered by Rainbow patrols and from prisoners captured showed that the Germans considered what was left of the Kriemhilde Stellung in their hands from in front of Landres-St. George west to be merely an outpost position for their main line of defense. This had now become the woods and hills to the north of the valley in which is Landres-St. George and St. George.

Thus it was evident that the knock-down, drag-out, vicious fighting which decides victory in any hard-fought battle, was over. The next phase was that of exploitation, or reaping the fruits of victory already gained.

To whom would the honor go of carrying out this exploitation?

General Pershing fully recognized the importance of the breaking of the Kriemhilde Stellung, but believed that a short pause was the best way to obtain the maximum results.

He says: "The enemy's most important defensive position on the Romagne heights was in our firm possession, and his final defeat was merely a question of time. He had fought desperately to hold his ground, but had been compelled to give way steadily before our effective blows. We could have gone forward without special preparation and succeeded, within a reasonable time, in driving the enemy from the field, but the situation led to the conclusion that his complete defeat could best be accomplished in one powerful stroke by a well-organized offensive. * * *. "

"The 28th of October was tentatively designated as the date for the beginning of the next general advance, but the French Fourth Army, which was to support our attack on the left, notified

us as late as the 27th that it could not get ready in time, so the attack of both armies was fixed for November 1st." *

Following its customary practice for quiet periods in the line the Division Headquarters ordered the whole front held by one infantry brigade while the other was put in reserve and thus given a period of rest. It was the turn of the 83rd Infantry Brigade to hold the line and of the 84th to be in reserve. Therefore, on October 20th the Division issued Field Order No. 41 which gave the 83rd the whole front of the divisional sector, which had been slightly changed on the right to equalize the fronts held by the two Divisions of the Fifth Corps. The Rainbow at this time had a longer front than the 32nd at its right.

Practically, this worked out that the front occupied by the 167th Alabama was taken over by the 83rd Infantry Brigade while that portion occupied by the 168th Iowa fell to the 89th Division, which on this date relieved the 32nd.

The 32nd Division had then been in line continuously since the night of the 30th of September, 1st of October. In these twenty days of almost continuous combat the Red Arrows had advanced from just south of Cierges, fighting forward first with the 1st Division on their left, until stopped by the Kriemhilde Stellung, and then with the 42nd, broken that last German-prepared defensive position in the Argonne, it had earned the rest and the praises now accorded it.

While only the 83rd Infantry Brigade was in line, the Division fully expected to renew the attack. The 83rd Infantry Brigade longed to sweep over the wire and trenches still held by the Germans just in front of them, drive them down the rear slope of the ridge through St. George and Landres-St. George up the slope on the other side and out of the Bois de Hazois from which the German artillery had so harassed them during the three days heavy fighting and from which they still did from time to time.

The brigade felt that satisfaction was their due because while in no way detracting from the splendid victory of the 84th Infantry Brigade, in breaking through the Kriemhilde Stellung and capturing the Cote de Chatillon they knew that some of the credit for this victory was theirs.

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* Page 351, *My Experiences in the World War*, by General John J. Pershing, Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York, N. Y.

While giving the greatest credit to their sister infantry brigade, they wondered if the fact had been sufficiently recognized that the assaults of the 83rd Brigade had been made in the open without cover or concealment of any kind while the other brigade at least had the concealment afforded by the woods through which they attacked.

With the chance to clean up, get a little sleep and fairly regular hot meals, the spirit of the 83rd Brigade was soon again an eager one.

The various orders issued for a future attack were received from time to time.

The Brigade was anxious to gather in the fruits resulting from the great determination and courage which they had shown in hanging onto the ground they had gained thus insuring to the 84th Brigade the freedom to concentrate their attack on Hill 288 and then the Cote de Chatillon. This without fear of the Germans striking them in the left flank or as was true for a time with the 167th Infantry during some of their attacks on the Cote de Chatillon in the left rear.

The fight of the 83rd Infantry Brigade in this battle is one of the best examples of the fact that ground gained and number of prisoners captured is far from being the rule with which to measure the military importance of a combat. If the 83rd Infantry Brigade and in particular its right regiment, the 165th Infantry, which occupied by far the most dangerous position of any regiment of infantry on any part of the whole Argonne front at this time, had not advanced to the immediate front of the main German position and had not desperately hung on there, the subsequent operations might have been in favor of the Germans.

As long as the Brigade hung on they were a threat to the Germans in their immediate front with the result that the enemy's infantry and artillery could not come to the aid of the defenders of the Cote de Chatillon. Also the position of the 165th Infantry was such that the defenders of this hill could not ignore them in order to concentrate, first, on the Alabama Regiment alone, and later when the 168th Infantry had captured Hill 288 on that regiment as well as the Alabama one when their combined

attack first threatened and then successfully carried the Cote de Chatillon.

Fifty-five years before, New Yorkers and Ohioans made up part of the Army of the Potomac, which so gallantly advanced across the open plain between the Rappahannock and the stone wall at the foot of and making the first line of defense of Mary's Heights on which was the Confederate position. Cut down by the deadly accurate fire of the Confederates, assault after assault was repulsed. Nevertheless the Union troops held their grounds out on this open plain throughout the rest of the long day. They stolidly took their losses, refusing to retire, until after dark when orders were received from General Burnside then in command of the Army of the Potomac. One of the regiments in the Fredericksburg assault was the 4th Ohio. While the 166th Infantry does not claim this Civil War regiment as their parent, there are undoubtedly certain connections between it and the 4th Ohio of 1916 which in 1917 became the 166th. The 69th New York in the Fredericksburg assault is the direct ancestor of the 69th New York of 1916 which in 1917 became the 165th. There is no break in the lineage as the regiment has been in continuous existence.

Though the assault at Fredericksburg failed to capture the Confederate position the troops making it have always been given the highest praise. This for the courage they displayed in their repeated assaults and the fortitude shown in staying on that open ground for the balance of the day despite their losses.

In the Landres—St. George Battle the 165th Infantry not only repeated its Fredericksburg history in making repeated assaults but stayed there in the open receiving fire not only from the front but also from the right flank and in some cases even the right rear until the capture of the Cote de Chatillon by the 84th Brigade entirely changed the whole situation.

The way in which this battle inevitably recalls Fredericksburg also serves to emphasize the fact that the Rainbow Division not only represented the whole country but in its units demonstrated the end of the unfortunate schism which caused the Civil War. At Fredericksburg clad in confederate gray was the 4th

Alabama Infantry. As good infantry soldiers they took their toll of the men in blue making assaults out there in front in the open.

In this Landres—St. George Battle to the right of the New York regiment was the same 4th Alabama Infantry, now the 167th U. S. Infantry, both regiments wearing the same uniform and fighting the same enemy for the same country, the United States of America.

It is an interesting historical fact that Fredericksburg was the second field in which these two regiments had been opposite each other in the Civil War. The first one was that of the First Battle of Bull Run in which the 4th Alabama and the 69th New York fought each other in the neighborhood of the Henry House.

The capture of the Cote de Chatillon completely changed the relative situations of the Americans and the Germans. This, because along with Hill 288 and the Cote Dame Marie, it was the key position of the Kriemhilde Stellung.

A glance at the map shows that the Kriemhilde Stellung runs from Champigneulle practically due east through St. George and then to Landres et St. George. Here, it turns southeast continuing in that direction until it reaches the southeastern point of the Cote Dame Marie where again it turns east, running just south of Romagne sous Montfaucon. Thus from Landres et St. George to the Cote Dame Marie inclusive it faces not south but southwest. The piece which faces southwest is more than five kilometers as the crow flies. Included in it are the Cote de Chatillon, Hill 288 and most of the Cote Dame Marie. These hills dominate the country to their front, that is, to the southwest. This is particularly true of the Cote de Chatillon because a large part of the country to its front is open territory, while that to the front of the other hills is heavily wooded as are these hills.

With the capture of the Cote de Chatillon and Hill 288 by the 84th Infantry Brigade and the Cote Dame Marie by the 32nd Division, the whole situation was changed. First, the Kriemhilde Stellung was broken beyond repair, secondly, the five kilometer stretch facing southwest having been lost, the Germans could no longer look down on and fire into the right flank of the American troops advancing on Landres—St. George. This posi-

tion of enfilade being gone the Germans were back on a practically east and west line from which they could only fire to their front. What was worse for them was the fact that the partial capture of the Boise de Bantheville by the 32nd Division and its complete mopping up by the 89th Division meant that the left flank of their position in front of Landres St. George was partially infiladed and therefore, in danger. This because its defenders while facing south to meet a continuation of the attack made by the 83rd Infantry Brigade would be caught in their left flank by the American assault coming from the Boise de Bantheville.

The capture of the Cote de Chatillon also meant that instead of the Germans looking down into the American position the Americans now looked down into the German lines. Thus, the American artillery observers were able to make the whole valley of the Rau de St. George, which had formerly been hidden entirely from them, unsafe for the Germans. They could also for the first time see down the Rau de St. George toward Imecourt, thus harrassing all this region in rear of the German position on the ridge between Champigneulle and St. George.

Thus, thanks to the courage and endurance of the 83rd Infantry Brigade and the breaking through of the Kriemhilde Stellung, by the capture of its key positions by the 84th Infantry Brigade and the 32nd Division, the Americans were now in the position to gather in the bountiful fruits resulting from the hard successful and bloody fighting which they had engaged in.

At this time several changes were made in the command of units. Brigadier General Michael J. Lenihan gave up command of the 83rd Infantry Brigade, and reported to General Hunter Liggett, commanding the First Army, who shortly afterwards put him in command of an Infantry Brigade of the 77th Division.

Colonel Henry J. Reilly, who after the Champagne defensive, and again after the advance across the Ourcq to the Vesle, had been recommended to command a Field Artillery Brigade, succeeded General Lenihan.

Major Curtis Redden was put in command of the 149th Field Artillery, succeeding Colonel Reilly.

Colonel H. D. Mitchell gave up the command of the 165th New York to Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Dravo, an infantry officer of the Regular Army, who was the machine gun officer of the 42nd Division.

The new Commanding Officer of the 83rd Infantry Brigade had long been convinced that the infantry did not get the maximum support from the heavy machine guns which these weapons were capable of giving. His study of the use by the Japanese of machine guns in the Russo-Japanese War had led to his being given the job of organizing, making up the drill regulations, and firing regulations, for one of the first machine gun platoons organized in our army.

A year later he made a special trip to Europe to study the German machine gun organization and tactics.

He was convinced that the best use of any weapon is determined by its fire power and the limitation of its movement under enemy fire due to the size of target, which it presents.

Of course, the first thing to be sought is the maximum use which can be made of a weapon's rapidity and accuracy of fire to destroy the enemy groups whose resistance is taking a toll in dead and wounded from the advancing infantry, frequently even to the extent of stopping them and pinning them to the ground.

However, this maximum advantage cannot be taken if in moving to the firing position selected the weapon and the men who serve it are so badly damaged that they cannot function or if when they reach the position the enemy's fire obliterates them.

Another side of the question is the fact that the infantry struggling forward under heavy fire do not want in their midst any prominent target which so attracts the enemy's eye that they inevitably concentrate fire on it and everything around it.

Therefore, in each combat the question is how to obtain a proper balance between the powers of heavy machine guns and artillery guns consisting of their long range, rapidity and accuracy of fire, and the limitations imposed on their use by the size target which they present. This so that the infantry, while advancing, may be certain of the maximum fire to keep down or destroy the enemy.

Of course, the failure of heavy machine guns when using overhead fire, like the failure of the artillery to keep down the enemy fire, has led to the desire on the part of many infantry commanders to have both weapons actually accompany the assaulting infantry.

In such cases the infantry commander fails to understand that a heavy machine gun being carried forward in several sections by its crew just like a limbered field piece is not only furnishing no fire but needs an appreciable length of time in which to come into action. They are like the artillery officers who fire on the targets they think most important instead of devoting their whole attention to accurately locating and smothering with fire the targets the infantry wants suppressed.

In other words, these infantry officers fail to understand that what they want is not an accompanying weapon, which cannot fire as it moves, but an accompanying fire which is always with them.

Therefore, the commanding officer of the 83rd Infantry Brigade asked the Division Headquarters to assign him the 151st Georgia Machine Gun Battalion, which belonged to the 84th Infantry Brigade, and the 149th Pennsylvania Machine Gun Battalion, which belonged to the Division.

Major Winn, commanding the 151st Georgia Machine Gun Battalion, had long been convinced that what the infantry needed was not accompanying machine guns, but accompanying machine gun fire. He had proven it in his brilliant use of his machine guns in the successful attack on the Cote de Chatillon. Major Graef, commanding the 150th Wisconsin Machine Gun Battalion, and Major Palmer, commanding the 149th Pennsylvania one, had been gradually coming to the same conviction from watching their men shot down while carrying heavy machine guns forward with the infantry and therefore not firing. This instead of having the majority of their casualties suffered while serving their pieces and helping the infantry forward.

Therefore these three Battalion Commanders entered into and carried out with enthusiasm the plans of the 83rd Brigade Commander to emplace all their machine guns so that they were ready to fire at all times; to establish observatories similar to the artillery ones from which to watch the enemy and to harass

him with bursts of machine gun fire; for a defensive barrage; and for an accompanying machine gun barrage for the attack which the 83rd Brigade was preparing to make.

When a copy of the plan for the accompanying barrage reached the Fifth Corps Headquarters October 23d it was promptly incorporated in their plans for the attack which was finally made November 1st.

Colonel Hughes, the Rainbow Chief of Staff, tells the following as partial explanation of the tremendous artillery support given the Second Division for their attack through the Rainbow's 83rd Infantry Brigade, November 1st:

"Throughout the balance of our stay in front of St. George-Landres-St. George, I carefully studied the German position for machine gun locations, as did also the commanding officer of the 83rd Infantry Brigade then in line. He sent out numerous patrols.

"At his request we had given him Winn's machine gun battalion of the 84th Brigade, and the divisional machine gun battalion, the 149th Pennsylvania. These he had implaced with his own machine gun battalion and given missions of harassing fire similar to artillery fire of the same character, a defensive barrage, and what was of more importance, an overhead accompanying barrage to support the infantry in the coming attack which we expected to make.

"Thus when the orders came for the general attack of November 1st, which was to be made by fresh divisions with the consequence that the Second Division was to pass through us, we had unusually complete information, as well as preparation, to turn over to the Second Division.

"At the time this new order came out, General Menoher and myself, the division commanders of the other divisions then in the Fifth Corps, and the artillery brigade commanders of our own, the First, the Second, and artillery brigades of the other divisions, and the corps artillery commanders, all were called to General Summerall's headquarters.

"After I had explained the situation as we then knew it in the greatest detail, General Summerall ordered all artillery commanders to confer with me so as to be sure that every German machine gun position was fired on for destruction.

"General Menoher took Major Cooper D. Winn, Jr., along, to answer any questions which might be asked about his use of his machine guns in the capture of the Cote de Chatillon.

"General Summerall, amongst other instructions given to us by him, personally ordered that Major Winn be put in charge of the accompanying machine gun barrage. This resulted in Winn carefully checking up the more than 122 machine guns as to location and targets to insure the same kind of a devastating machine gun fire as that used in the capture of Chatillon.

"The Second Division in their attack on the first of November, as a consequence, did not have a man wounded by machine gun fire until they were at least a mile north of the position in front of St. George-Landres-St. George, the fire from which, coupled the flanking fire from the Cote de Chatillon before its capture, had prevented the 83rd Infantry Brigade from breaking through, despite a number of assaults which reached the wire."

The Corps Commander, Major General Charles P. Summerall, issued at this time a memorandum, which was confidential, and sent to general officers, Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels only.

The subject was Leadership. Here are a few extracts:

"Division, Brigade and Regimental Commanders will prepare and coordinate with the greatest care all the details for an assault. The most perfect arrangements must be made to insure the placing of the Infantry in position and to have the assaulting battalions follow as closely as possible upon the barrage. At the same time they will insure the most intense fire upon objectives and upon all possible enemy positions by artillery and machine guns not assigned to the advancing battalions. They will further insure progress, by the employment of automatic rifles, machine guns, Stokes mortars, 37 mm. guns, and accompanying pieces of artillery with all assaulting battalions.

"During the progress of an assault, Brigade and Regimental Commanders will occupy posts from which they can be cognizant of events, and from which they can exercise a determining influence upon the combat.

"Should a Battalion fail to function, the Regimental Commander must promptly intervene, and should the Regimental Commander fail, the responsibility for intervention rests upon

the Brigade Commander. Should an assault fail, Division, Brigade, and Regimental Commanders will at once visit the units in concerned, and by thorough investigation will determine the reasons for the failure and fix the responsibility therefor. Disciplinary or corrective measures will at once be adopted.

"Partial and improperly prepared successive assaults will not be ordered to retrieve failure of the original effort.

"All Commanding Officers must actually dominate their units by active association with them and by an earnest preparation and presentation of every task required of them."

During this period of preparation, General Menoher, the Division Commander, decided upon a thorough discussion with his two infantry brigade commanders of all details and possibilities of the coming attack. He sent word to General MacArthur and Colonel Reilly to meet him at General MacArthur's C. P. in la Neuve-Forge Farm.

To insure the utmost privacy, the meeting was held not in General MacArthur's office downstairs, the walls of which were covered with maps continually being brought up to date by Major Walter Wolf, the Brigade Adjutant, but upstairs in the bedroom under the farm roof in which General MacArthur slept. In one corner was the typical French built-in bed. In the center of the room was a metal wood-burning stove, then red-hot. The floor was of rough plank, uncovered. There was a wooden table with three wooden chairs. There were two windows, none too large, through which the gloomy light of a wet winter's afternoon filtered through dirty panes of glass.

After explaining the general situation and how important General Pershing considered the coming general attack of the First American Army, General Menoher asked General MacArthur his opinion.

General MacArthur jumped from his chair and started walking up and down, as he always does when talking about something in which he is greatly interested.

In his brilliant way he soon showed that there was no phase of the matter which he had not thoroughly considered from every possible point of view. His discussion was such a comprehensive and complete analysis that his two auditors regretted then

and afterwards that there was no stenographer present to take it down and preserve it.

He showed how the Argonne had been from the beginning of the general attack September 26, the pivot of the greater part of the German line in France. He pointed out how, aside from the map, this was shown by large scale withdrawals of the Germans in front of the French, the British and the Belgians while always stubbornly resisting in the Argonne only losing ground when forced from it by combat.

He led to the inevitable conclusion that the last main fortified line of resistance of the Germans in the Argonne having been broken when the Kriemhilde Stellung was broken by the Rainbow and the Red Arrow Divisions, it only remained to gather in the fruits of victory by a determined advance, which would drive the Germans north of the Meuse River. He said the Rainbow Division was fully capable of playing its part in such an advance.

When General Menoher asked Colonel Reilly his opinion the Colonel told him that the reports brought in by the patrols sent out by the 83rd each night and the information gathered at the observatories which watched the German lines all day showed that the main German position was no longer in that part of the Kriemhilde Stellung directly to the front of the Rainbow, which still was in German hands. He said that with the accompanying artillery and machine gun fire already prepared, and above all, a sufficient force of artillery to smother all German infantry strongpoints to the immediate front of the attack, he was certain a highly successful advance would be made.

He said, too, that in visiting the different parts of the 83rd Infantry Brigade, he had talked to individual enlisted men and officers of all ranks, and that as a consequence he was convinced that they not only would make a successful attack, but were anxious to have the opportunity given to prove it.

When, after several postponements of the attack in which the 83rd Infantry Brigade was to participate the order came that the attack would be made instead by the 2nd Division, the Commanding Officer of the Brigade sent the following letter to General Summerall the Commander of the 5th Army Corps:

HEADQUARTERS 83rd INFANTRY BRIGADE
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
France.

Oct. 23, 1918.

From: Commanding Officer, 83rd Infantry Brigade.
To: Commanding General, 5th Army Corps, thru channels.
Subject: Attack by the 83rd Inf. Brigade.

1. I hereby request that this Brigade, instead of being relieved by the 2nd Division or any part thereof, be allowed to make the attack now contemplated. The Colonels commanding the 165th and 166th Infantries are of the same opinion as am I, that the attack will be carried through should this permission be granted.

HENRY J. REILLY,
Colonel, U. S. A., 149th F. A.,
Cmdg. 83rd Inf. Brigade.

General Summerall who as was his custom visited the Brigade from time to time, came up again shortly thereafter. With the Brigade Commander he walked over a considerable portion of the position of the brigade, stopping now and then to talk to officers and men. Colonel Reilly particularly remembers introducing the General to Captain Hutchraft of the 166th Infantry whom Colonel Hough had designated to command his assault battalion in the coming attack before the order had come giving the 2nd Division the mission.

Captain Hutchraft said that the assault might be difficult but that it would be successfully made. He showed himself full of confidence in the ability of himself and his men to break through the German position.

Before leaving General Summerall expressed himself as pleased with the confidence shown by the men and officers with whom he had talked. Since the war, one day* when Colonel Reilly was in General Summerall's office in the War Department, the General said:

"I have always regretted that the 83rd Infantry Brigade was not allowed to attack the first of November. I had wanted them to do so but the Army wanted to put in fresh divisions with the

* Afternoon of Tuesday, January 22, 1929.

Artillery barrage which I had planned and behind which the Second Division advanced. The 42nd would have gone ahead just as fast as the Second went. They would have been in Landreville Wood that night and before Beaumont the next morning. I have always considered it would have been only fair to the 42nd Division to have permitted them to have made this attack."

The old timers amongst the officers and enlisted men of the Rainbow Division while greatly disappointed that the Rainbow was not to make the attack were glad to see some of their friends in the Second Division.

Those who served in the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection and the Boxer Campaign in China, welcomed the sight of the globe mounted on an anchor the insignia of the sea-soldiers, the Marines, whom the Army is always glad to have with them as they know they will always live up to the traditions of their song "From the Halls of Montezuma". They found that Brigadier-General Wendell C. Neville who commanded the Marine Brigade was the same fine soldier and companion as he had been many years before in China.

Also they were delighted to see the old number 9 insignia of the 9th Regular Infantry which has missed practically no American campaign since it was first organized early in the 19th century. Like the Marines this regiment took part in the Boxer Rebellion in China, one of the most picturesque as well as hard campaigns in the history of the American, British, French, Russian and Japanese Armies, all of which furnished the troops which fought it.

The 23rd Infantry, 5th, 6th and 7th Field Artillery also contained friends with whom previous meetings in Latin America, the Philippines, China and the United States could be discussed while exchange news about mutual friends.

Secret Field Orders No. 46 Headquarters 42nd Division, 15:50 hours, 30 October, 1918, provided for the relief by the Second Division of all units of the Rainbow except the two front line infantry battalions of the 83rd Infantry Brigade, the machine gun battalions and the 67th Field Artillery Brigade.

Secret Field Order No. 46, Rainbow Headquarters, 11:15 hours, 31 October, 1918, passed the command of these units and of the sector to the Commanding General and Division at noon October 31st, 1918.

CHAPTER XXVI

HELPING THE SECOND DIVISION LAUNCH THEIR ATTACK

All the artillery and all the machine guns of the Rainbow fired in the Summerall barrage which so licked up such German infantry resistance as there was to the front of the 2nd and 89th Divisions November 1, 1918 that their infantry moved forward more easily than did the infantry in the St. Mihiel battle.

One reason for this slight resistance was that the capture of the Cote de Chatillon by the 84th Infantry Brigade reduced the German position in front of St. George—Landres St. George to an outpost position. This because any troops there were in danger of being flanked out, cut off and captured by Americans coming from the woods to the east and northeast of the Cote de Chatillon.

The main reason, however, was the "Summerall" barrage. In this barrage General Summeral1 did for the 2nd and 89th Divisions occupying the front of all his 5th Army Corps what he had done as Commanding General of the 1st Division first in the battle south of Soissons for his infantry brigades and then in the Exermont Battle for each of his regiments in turn.

After the first few days fighting at Soissons, when the German resistance was stiffening because of new divisions being thrown into the line determined to hold the heights southwest of Soissons, General Summeral1 decided that he would concentrate practically all his artillery fire in front of one infantry brigade and thus help it go forward and then do the same for the other brigade. In this way each brigade would get practically twice as much artillery fire as it normally got when the divisional artillery had to cover the whole front of the division.

When he first told his infantry brigade and regimental commanders what he intended to do, they protested, saying that a brigade without any artillery covering fire would be smothered by the enemy's fire.

He insisted that this would not happen because as they all knew from their own experiences in the Spanish American war

and in the Philippine Insurrection as well as in the present war, that “fire draws fire.” Anyhow, he told them, this was what he was going to do.

He did it!

Once the infantry saw the greatly increased artillery support which this handling of the artillery gave, they were both convinced and delighted.

In the Exermont Battle while the division started with a barrage covering the whole front, General Summerall shifted to this method just as soon as each of his regiments was held up by determined resistance. This time, however, instead of helping them forward by brigades, he did it by regiments. It was by this method that the 1st Division so gallantly took all the hills north of the Exermont ravine. These were the same hills which became so well known to the Rainbow, not only because of the more than two weeks they spent on and around them but also because of the evidence of the 1st Division’s determination in their dead thickly strewn on the forward slopes. These the 42nd Division buried not without some loss in killed and wounded from enemy shell fire.

The best proof of the value of this method of artillery support was the capture of Hill 272, the crowning achievement of the 1st Division in the Exermont battle. In the assault on that hill the infantry was preceded by a barrage made up of a large part of the light field guns available while the entire regiment of howitzers pounded the crest and southern slopes where any reserve would be massed.

For the assault of the 1st of November, General Summerall had accumulated enough artillery of all calibers to give this type of fire not to one regiment at a time, or one infantry brigade at a time, but to the entire front of two whole divisions;—the Second Division and the Eighty-ninth on its right.

Mixed with the terrific artillery fire, was an overhead machine gun fire, of all available machine guns.

There is little doubt that never before in history had infantry advanced under the protection of such a truly terrible fire.

In May 1915 General Mackensen broke through the Russian line on the Dunajec River in Galicia by the first use of an artillery

barrage on a large scale. This break through was the beginning of the German-Hungarian advance which drove the Russians out of Poland, out of Galicia and back into Russia proper. Russia made subsequent offensives. None of them, however, was able to recover either territory lost or the position which enabled them to so threaten the Germans as to seriously endanger their position on the Western Front. This in order to meet successfully the threat of Russia's millions.

The blow to Russian morale was such that it can be said safely that this defeat was the beginning of the break down which led to Russia's withdrawing from the war. This, of course, was a victory for Germany because they no longer had to fear a tremendous attack in their rear while fighting the Allies on the Western Front. Also they could move practically all the troops and guns they had had on the Russian front to the west to fight the Belgians, British and French.

What Mackensen started in May, 1915, General Summerall put the crowning touch to in his barrage of November 1, 1918.

To get an idea of what the "Summerall" barrage really meant let us compare it with first the artillery support which the 1st Division had during the Exermont-Gesnes battle and second that which the 42d Division had during the subsequent battle of Landres-St. George.

The 1st Division in its battle had had a total of 108 guns of all calibers.

The 42d Division had had a total of 144 guns of all calibers.

In the attack of November 1st, the 2d Division had a total of 284 guns of all calibers. The 89th Division to its right had a total of 252 guns of all calibers. In addition the 5th Corps had 72,155-mm. guns for use on the combined fronts of the 2d and 89th Divisions.

In other words, 608 guns of all calibers furnished the artillery support for the attack of the two divisions on its front of seven kilometers, on November 1st.

The assault was preceded by a two hours fire of destruction.

Then the "Summerall" barrage began covering the entire front of the attack. It had a depth of 1200 meters. For the first

eight kilometers of the infantry advance they walked behind this—what shall we call it, for it certainly was too deep to be called a "wall"?—"area" of moving fire.

The barrage was a mixture of bands of high explosives and shrapnel and for the first part of the advance a machine gun barrage as well.

A number of officers of the Rainbow Division who knew of the unusual character of this barrage went over the ground as the 2d Division cleared it. They were all struck by the density and regularity of the shell holes. They noticed the comparatively small loss of our own infantry as evidenced by the few dead and wounded. They saw ample evidence in the dead and wounded in the German position of the almost certain chance that any German in it, manning a weapon would be promptly hit. They saw amongst other evidences of the density of the fire that there was not a tree lining the road between Landres-St. George and St. George which did not have several machine gun bullet holes in it.

The following table worked out by the Historical Section of the General Staff at the request of the Rainbow Historian gives an excellent picture of the tremendous weight of artillery projectiles which so beat down German resistance that our infantry had only to follow behind its own artillery and gather up the German remnants.

Number Rounds	Material	Wt of Total No of Rnds. in Pounds	Wt. of Total No. of Rnds. in Tons (2000 lbs.)
134,048	75 mm. Mk. 111 Shell with P. D. Fuze, Mk. III	1,883,374	941.68
134,048	75 mm. Mk. I Shell with P. D. Fuze Mk. III	1,706,431	853.20
15,009	75 mm. Mk. I Shapnel	239,393	119.69
4,763	105 mm. H.E. Shell	157,179	78.59
1,081	155 mm. L77 French Shell	102,695	51.35
573	155 mm. LS17 French Shell	54,435	27.22
24,563	155 mm. GPF HE Shell Mk. III with P.D. Fuze M. III	2,347,977	1,173.99
4,114	155 mm. French Shell (St. Chamond)	390,830	195.41
3,116	8-inch Mk. I HE Shell with Mk. III P. D. Fuze	633,200	316.60
301,315	Total Number of Rounds	7,515,514	3,757.73

General Henry J. Hunt, who was Chief of Artillery of The Army of the Potomac was always interested in getting the exact facts of any situation. He says: "There were expended upon the field of Gettysburg 569 tons of deadly missiles including all the various kinds of shot, shell, shrapnel and ball known to this country and Europe."

In other words, the Union and Confederate Army in the three days Battle of Gettysburg including infantry as well as artillery ammunition only expended approximately 16.6 per cent of the weight of projectiles of the artillery ammunition alone used in the attacks of but two divisions on one day, the Second and Eighty-ninth divisions on November 1, 1918.

The crushing effect of the artillery fire the 1st of November upon the German infantry and the consequent protection which was afforded our own infantry in their enthusiastic assault was the crowning artillery achievement of General Summerall in the Great War.

It was an achievement which places his name with those of the great artillerymen of history such a Drouot who at the critical moment gave Napoleon the Great, an artilleryman himself, crushing artillery fire against the enemy's infantry. In our own army it places him with General Henry J. Hunt, the Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, whose skillful use of the Union artillery at the Battle of Gettysburg was the determining factor in the defeat of Pickett's assault. This assault directed against the center of the Union line its weakest part would, if successful, have cut the Union army in two and undoubtedly crowned the Confederacy with victory.

Summing up afterwards, General Summerall said:

"In all modesty, my employment of the artillery accounted for the unvarying success of my infantry, as the covering of echelons of the assault line in advancing by all the guns virtually multiplied them by three or four, and thus neutralized the enemy. The barrage of November 1st was the realization of my dreams and the fulfillment of my doctrine."

Napoleon I wrote: "The better the infantry the more one must husband it and support it with good batteries."

The result of these fundamental and drastic changes in the conditions under which the Second Division attacked Nov. 1st and those under which the 42d Division made their assaults on October 14th and subsequent days is well illustrated by the accounts of eye witnesses.

One of the most important of these is Major Thomas T. Reilley who commanded the front line battalion of the 165th Infantry at the time of the Second Division relief and attack. What he says also shows how pride in their own outfits and love of an argument causes soldiers to dispute even in times of danger.

In this case there was the rivalry between the Marines and the Army added to that between Regulars and National Guardsmen.

Here is what Major Reilley has to say:

"The night before the Marines jumped off as they were coming up to replace us I was in the Cote de Chatillon maybe forty yards from the nearest edge of the woods towards the town of Landres et St. George. There were wires behind us. We were through the wires, the first thickness anyhow. I heard a noise to the left. As we were supposed to keep quiet so as not to give away the jump-off I went toward the noise. I saw a crowd coming along the lines. They were making invidious remarks about the 42d Division. They were razzing the outfit.

"I went up to them and said, 'What in hell is all this noise about?' One fellow spoke up. He mentioned his name: I think it was Olsen. He said he was a major in command of the unit coming in to replace me in the jump-off. I asked him what the hell he meant coming through our lines and saying anything to the outfit. The conversation went back and forth. I got a little hot-headed.

"The basis of his argument was that the Marines would show the Rainbow how to get through the wire which had stopped them.

"I finally told him that if he made another crack at the outfit there would be a private war right there. It made me angry to have him roasting our outfit when he had not seen what we had been up against while I knew, having been in the middle of it.

"In the morning at the jump-off I followed the first wave of the Marines up to the edge of the woods. I stayed there a while watching as like all the mornings in that position there was mist

coming from the ground. You couldn't see much at first. I never heard any artillery like it. We had had rumors that the order for the attack to be made on October 28th had been cancelled. However, the rumors had been coming up with the units bringing up the food that the roads were just simply jammed with artillery. The sound of that barrage confirmed the rumors.

"As the light came and the mist cleared it looked as if a volcano was riding, right up the hill to the front. The Marine units just marched behind it in a line of skirmishers and the usual attack formation. I suppose though coming through the woods and trenches must have broken it up as it didn't look any too regular at that stage.

"After the first couple of battalions had passed I went down towards the town just to see what had happened. Just before I left the edge of the woods a German came in with his hands up. Spoke broken English. He hadn't been hit. He said that he hadn't seen anything like that barrage in four years. He told one of my men that he had been a bartender in Brooklyn. Then I joined the outfit and went back."

The other front line battalion of the Rainbow left in line until the Second Division attack passed through was the one of the 166th Ohio, commanded by Major George T. Geran. He says:

"The concentration of our artillery preparation was so intense, during the night of October 31st-Nov. 1st, that the Germans began coming across the line towards morning and surrendering. By the time the infantry attack began on the morning of November 1st, several hundred had come over. They would be collected in droves of as high as 150 and sent back with a single guide and no guard.

"While I was standing in the road leading north of Sommerance, on this occasion, a bunch of prisoners came along, among them being a German lieutenant. Just below us in the valley, a battalion of the 150th Indiana Artillery, 155 Howitzers, had taken position and were banging away in salvos of eight. This position was not more than 500 yards behind the front line. This German officer said, 'Good morning' to me, and looked in astonishment at the two batteries, and said, 'My God, what are they doing this close up? Why don't they put bayonets on them?' I

said to him, 'How come you speak such good English?' He replied that he had lived in the United States before the War, for about fifteen years. Had come over to go to Agricultural School in Wisconsin, and had settled in Milwaukee. I then asked why he was in a German uniform. He said that he had gone back to Germany in the summer of 1914 to visit his people, and was there when the War started, and that he had been compelled to join the Army; had been at it ever since, and had risen to his present rank. That although he was a naturalized American citizen, he had not minded it much until America got into the War, but since then he had felt like a traitor, and wondered if he would ever be permitted to return to Milwaukee. He gave my orderly an old German silver watch, saying he might as well have it as for some M. P. to get it. So the German M. P.'s must have frisked prisoners, too!"

Few appreciated the difficulties and danger with which the trench mortar people were always confronted. First, because the short range of their weapons made it necessary to set them up in the most forward positions. Second, because they could not help being a large prominent object on the landscape and therefore a good target.

Here is Captain Greene's story of some of the difficulties they encountered in preparing for and taking part in the November 1st attack:

"While setting up our trench mortars to support the attack of November 1st we were compelled to work under many handicaps. To begin with, we were using a comparatively small amount of men in the line and it was necessary to have our ammunition hauled up by the infantry carrying it on their backs. This had to be done at night as the position we were setting up was exposed to the enemy view. Of course this put the infantry in a bad humor to start with. Then when we asked for detachments to be put in front of our position to keep the German patrol from stumbling into our midst, there was a lot of good-natured griping.

"Our emplacement was entirely destroyed by enemy shell fire two nights before the attack so we had to set it up again the night of October 31st and set our guns on our objective. We were none too sure that we were going to destroy the graveyard which was set in the 'V' of the two roads leading into Landres-et-St. George.

"I knew that when the advance started Colonel Reilly or some other high-hat would be snooping around to see if our mission had been accomplished, so after our shoot we decided to go over with the first wave of the infantry and see if we had actually landed any bombs in the enemy machine gun implacements.

"Therefore, Lieutenant Morrow with Sergeants Stout, Wilson, Warner and myself, with considerable misgivings, came upon our objective, and you can imagine our delight when we found that we had actually completely destroyed the graveyard with its trench system and two strongly fortified machine gun implacements. While we were looking over the damage we had caused and were collecting souvenirs from the many dead enemy, the Germans changed their barrage and laid it down along the road and in the town. When the shells began to fall we naturally sought cover in the trenches. We all headed for a shallow dugout. In the scramble we landed practically in the laps of a German medical lieutenant and two orderlies. For a few minutes nobody knew who was surrendering to whom as there was so much 'Kamerading' going on.

"Finally after the barrage had lifted we left the dugout to continue our survey and collection of souvenirs after sending the prisoners to the rear. The German lieutenant told us that we had caught the machine gun section in the midst of a relief and had practically wiped out both detachments. We found a German major among the dead with his head practically blown off, dressed in a brand-new uniform with a gorgeous pair of new Cordovan boots and belt of the same material. He had on all his campaign ribbons. He looked like he might have been dressed to attend a formal military function instead of being in the front line on the eve of a major battle. There was considerable scrambling for his decorations, belt and pistol.

"During this shoot we had used about half delay fuse and half instantaneous fuse. The bombs with the instantaneous fuses had been particularly effective on the enemy personnel and barbed wire. The delay fuses had completely destroyed the trench system dugouts and machine gun implacements. Some of the holes were large enough to put in one of the old sliding Mack trucks.

"After congratulating ourselves on the fact that we had actually landed bombs on our objective we decided that the luck

of the 117th Trench Mortar Battery was running true to form, so with a pat on our backs we returned to our eschelon."

Here is the story of the experience of Corporal Charles L. Albert of the 117th Trench Mortar Battery:

"Shortly before midnight, October 31, Sergeant Stout came around asking for volunteers as stretcher bearers. I did not volunteer (of which I have never been proud). I had just returned from a detail carrying ammunition to the gun positions. When the gun crews and litter bearers left Sommerance that night I felt lonely and a little ashamed because I had not volunteered to go along with them. The Second Division Engineers had confiscated our nice comfortable cellar; so, shortly before the show started, I crawled into an improvised shelter back of a wall near the crossroads. I believe there were several other fellows from the battery in the same shelter with me. I watched the Engineers, Tanks and Marines move in. We saw them deploy. We heard them start over. We had never been 'over the top.' I wanted to see action.

"I started over. I passed the trench outside of Sommerance, past the old German caisson with its two dead horses and the dead German who was still unburied although we had seen his body there every night for the past ten days. I passed some of my own battery returning after they had finished firing. I passed our gun positions, now deserted. There were more shell holes. There were bodies in American uniforms.

"I passed litter bearers on their way back to the dressing stations. I helped them over the rough places, until groups of German prisoners started to appear and were pressed into service in assisting the wounded. By this time I observed that the German dead became more and more numerous.

"I ascended a slight grade and jumped into a machine-gun implacement. The gun was pointed in our direction but was silent. The body of a German machine gunner was beside the gun. His helmet was off. I picked it up and started on to a road.

"A Marine was kneeling at the side of the road. He had been killed instantly. As he fell his bayonet pierced the ground with the result his rifle held him in the position in which I found him. As I entered St. George the German shelling increased. Someone said, 'Watch out for a counter attack.' I decided that

I had seen enough. A column of German prisoners with only one sentry was heading down the road toward Sommerance. I fell in as a sentry."

The only telephone liaison forward was the line laid by the Regimental telephone detail of the 149th Illinois Field Artillery. As was the case in every battle it was the job of this detail to keep up with the advancing infantry, laying a line as they went. Also they kept this line open.

Consequently the 149th F. A. in all its combats except for the few minutes necessary for its linemen to repair a break always had telephonic liaison with the infantry it was supporting.

In this case due to the fact that this detachment was the only one which continuously kept up with the advancing infantry the regimental line became for all practical purposes a divisional one.

Here is the account of what they did as Corporal W. J. Maxson in charge of the regimental telephone detail of the 149th F. A. tells it:

"Nov. 1, 1918, at 7:30 A. M. with Corp. Stevens, his three drivers, Pvts. Robinson, Navarro, Clements and four linemen, Pvts. Taylor, Hoover, Chapman and Fields, I left Sommerance. Cutting our line in at the Second Bn. central we went forward on the Sommerance-Landres St. George road. The machine gun resistance the enemy had put up from their front line had been overcome and our reserves were advancing. The shelling was quite strong, especially along the roads, so I went ahead of the cart and signalled Corp. Stevens his movements by arm signals.

"We left the road, detoured to the left and at a trot advanced to the crest of the hill on which the German front line had been. Here I halted the cart in a small cut on the road where the men and horses could rest with the protection of the banks of the cut. I then went forward to a point some three hundred meters to the left of the road and with two linemen cut a breach in the first wire large enough to allow our cart to pass. Then picking out a place where the shells had partially filled in the trench, which the enemy had deepened and strengthened, I signalled the cart to move up and they trotted through.

"We trotted down the slope and started to ascend the next hill following up a cut where a gap had been left in the second

wire. We passed the crest of the next hill, down the far slope and across the St. George-Landres St. George Road to a ford where I had planned to cross the creek.

"Lt. Lombardi * had told me that this ford had been located by aerial photographs but as I did not know its nature, I went forward to examine its possibilities. The enemy was shelling this ford but the shells were landing to the right and in soft ground which made them less effective. I signalled the cart ahead at a trot and they crossed without difficulty except that the off wheel horse went down under the pole and this made it necessary that we stop while Corp. Stevens and I unhitched the horse in order to get him free to stand.

"All the men waited by the cart, despite the disconcertingly heavy shell fire.

"We trotted forward again to the protection of a small ravine running up on to Hill 253, where I was to meet our observation and liaison detachment. We made our way slowly up 253, the ground being so shell torn as to make the going tedious. About the time I met the O. and L. men at the road between Immecourt and Landres St. George, Lt. Lombardi's runner (Sargeant) reached me with the message that the infantry were up to schedule. We passed the reserve infantry at this point.

"We then followed along the left edge of the wooded crest of Hill 253 and down the slope. We forded the Agron with no trouble, then northward again crossing the Landreville-Immecourt Road. Here the shelling was general and the machine gun bullets were coming in from our left flank which was not advancing as per schedule. Using the lowest ground possible we went forward toward Bayonville over our last hill. I gained the crest and noticing a small ditch ahead I ran up to pick out a place to cross. The cart was close behind me. A small dog was running along beside it. A machine gun bullet hit him in the shoulder.

"I had turned to signal the drivers to the place for the easiest crossing when a shell landed close to their left and short. Then the cart stuck. I then realized we were in direct observation and being bracketed. I reached the cart; Corp. Stevens and the

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* The 149th F.A. liaison officer with the Infantry assault battalion.

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

French couple, prisoners for four years, greeting “Doughboys”. Brieulles sur Bar, Ardennes, France, Nov. 6, 1918.

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

Just out of reach—the ground just south of Landres-St. George.

driver were working with the horses. I tried to start them but they could not move. Another shell came in. I ran back and found that a small wooden spool that hung suspended below the cart had worked over into the wheel. I called 'Forward' to the drivers and we started as the fifth shell hit very close to us. We galloped across the ditch toward the junction of the Chemery road with the Bayonville-Landreville road.

"Here a Marine officer told me I was 'within two hundred meters of the Boches,' so I ran my cart into the cover of a cut on the Chemery road and told the men to start pulling the remainder of the wire by hand down the road toward Bayonville. Here one of Lt. Lombardi's runners (Gilmore) came up with a message which I telephoned in. Then as the wire had been pulled off the cart I sent the empty cart and reel back to Sommerance and continued the line into Bayonville by the small wooden reels I had brought along. This line was brought into Bayonville just as the Marines had finished rounding up the prisoners from the houses.

"We then set up our station in a basement and from here the Marine Signal Sergeant ran his line forward so that they could send messages back without using runners as they were forced to do before.

"The line was used to send messages back both from our own Liaison officers and from the Marines. It was over our line that I forwarded the messages which stopped the short fire of two heavy artillery pieces which had caused the Third Bn. of the Marines to halt in their advance.

"The success of the line, I think, lay in the terrain being studied carefully and the course being closely followed as had been planned two days before and by the fearless assistance given me by my men, both those who went with me and the linemen who followed to repair the breaks which shells made from time to time.

Here as the Division after two weeks' exhaustive fighting and front line service in the open under enemy fire, pulled itself together for its final march in pursuit of the enemy and its final combats is an excellent time to give Colonel Fairchild's summary of the medical operation.

All the more as he so clearly brings out the much greater effect shock and wounds had on the officers and men than was true of the Champagne or Ourcq battles when they were in good physical condition, warm, and well fed instead of being run down, wet, cold and not so well fed.

He says:—

"As the Division moved into the Argonne we established ourselves at Dombasle. Then we moved forward to Avocourt. Here we established Hospital and Ambulance Service for the wounded. There were a few from our infantry then in reserve, some from the 37th Ohio Division but most were from our Artillery Brigade then supporting the 32nd Division.

"After remaining here a few days we moved on to Cheppy. The nature of the combat at this time was confusing to the mission of the Medical service. The fighting was sometimes a running engagement and sometimes a defensive one and the Division elements changed positions so frequently that it was difficult to maintain contact and establish suitable installations for prompt medical service. Despite this, it is believed that our mission was satisfactorily carried out, not only from the front line to the field hospitals, but also from these Divisional Mobile Hospitals on back to the evacuation hospitals at Suilly, and Vaulercourt. Evacuation of lying wounded was by our Division Ambulances. In every instance they were delivered to evacuation hospitals in as good condition and with as little pain and surgical reaction as was compatible with the nature of the haul.

"As the Division moved across to occupy the position relinquished by the 1st Division our hospitals took over the hospital locations of the 1st Division at Cheppy, exchanging tentage and much medical equipment, and promptly proceeding to function. We cared for a great number of cases brought in by our ambulances. Some were brought by ambulances which followed the troops into action. Others were brought back by ambulances dispatched from the ambulance Battalion Station which had taken position on a road junction about two miles to the north. Considerable difficulty was encountered in keeping the ambulances moving from the front to our hospitals due to road congestion.

"In the first place, there was a great deal of traffic. To make matters worse, the roads were frequently blocked by broken down

trucks, bogged down wheels, vehicles stranded across the road due to skidding, and other accidents. Despite the fact the hospitals were within five miles of the front line, delay from the above causes occasioned many serious and detrimental effects on certain types of cases, especially those in which shock and hemorrhage were instrumental. However, the doctors and men of the Medical Department never ceased in their untiring efforts to relieve the wounded soldier of pain, to restore him to health, and to save life and limb. They plied themselves faithfully despite the hazards and discomforts of their lots. Many of them worked three and four days without rest or sleep, night and day, subsisting only on what could be foraged from passing rolling kitchens. With all this the high morale and esprit de corps prevailing throughout the department was remarkable. No mission, no matter how difficult, nor dangerous, was beyond accomplishment.

"As soon as the Division's position became stabilized, all four field hospitals were advanced closer to the front, being placed on top of the Baulny hill. At the same time the ambulances were parked at Apremont from whence evacuation relays were established between the front lines and the hospital group. The wounded were cared for in a very simple and efficient manner. An unusual feature of these tactics was the location of the hospitals completely exposed to the enemy. At the same time the greatest care was used to display the red cross, and to keep the activities thereabouts confined strictly to a medical nature. For two weeks we functioned undisturbed: quite differently from the experiences of some others who found their positions jeopardized by the presence of combat troops, particularly artillery.

"During periods of great activity when the casualties were many each first line division established a sorting and diagnosis station which drained in an hour glass fashion the wounded from all the battalion and ambulance stations of the Division. It was the most forward station established by a divisional medical unit at which all casualties finally arrived. It was known as a *Triage*. It was usually located in a central position on the natural line of drift or evacuation of the wounded and at a distance of from three to five miles from the front line. It was established and operated usually by a field hospital company. However, if its facilities were over-taxed the *Triage* was established by an am-

bulance company or a combination of ambulance and field hospital equipment and personnel. If there was any one point along the line of evacuation more important than another it was this *Triage.* It was here that all wounded were cleared. It was a place where the front line surgeon sent his walking wounded, received medical supplies and reinforcements, and to which he applied for all emergency needs. It was the nearest point to the front at which the patient received major surgical treatment. It was often a control point for ambulance service. It was a point in which every medical officer forward of this point had a deep concern and to which he looked for directions. It was where the medical chiefs could always be found through proper liaison. It was a point always known to all by orders from the Commanding General (who had previously received advice regarding its location from the Division Surgeon).

"From a long and continuous experience of nine months' unbroken service on the front line, and after participating in five of the greatest battles of the war, in which 41,268 cases were hospitalized by the medical department of the Rainbow Division, I am able to say that the system which we developed is open to very little improvement. In fact, though different names are used for the units in the plans of today, our system was the foundation for, if not actually identical with the one now taught in the Medical Field Service School. During our war experience it became necessary only to have this *Triage* location designated to put the entire medical department in complete order without lost motion.

"It was the universal policy to evacuate immediately to the rear all cases capable of standing the trip. Treatment at these field hospitals, therefore, resolved itself into preparation of mildly wounded for early return to their organizations, and of cases too serious for evacuation. Very early in the campaign it was realized that for the most part the field hospitals must rely upon their own resources for the care of such cases. It was especially difficult in view of the necessity of keeping in proper touch with the actively fighting unit which moved rapidly from one sector to another. It was necessary for the hospitals to be as mobile as the fighting units of the Division and to be ready at a moment's notice to shift locations to one more accessible to the wounded, no

matter the hospital be operating at the time in tents, well-equipped buildings, or barns.

"In regard to sterile dressings, the supply of these was often exhausted so that it became necessary for the hospitals to do their own sterilizing—using a Thresh-Fodden for the purpose. It served admirably.

"To enlarge further upon the treatment of shock much credit is due the regimental surgeons and aid station personnel for their splendid care and treatment of fracture and hemorrhage cases thereby lessening the shock reactions in the severely wounded. Upon arrival at the field hospital, the cases were sorted and classified according to their transportability. Most attention was given to the proper disposition of shock cases. These cases were immediately taken to the shock room for special treatment. The litter bearing the patient was placed on two horses: and the surgeon made a hurried examination to determine any open or concealed hemorrhage. If none was found, the patient was covered with warm blankets and heat was applied beneath the litter. The heat was supplied by burning generally four cans of solidified alcohol well protected by metal boxes open at one end only. The blankets were then dropped over the sides of the litter to the ground. Further, the patient was fortified by warm drinks in small quantities, provided of course he did not have an abdominal wound or that he was not slated for an early operation. The heart was stimulated by subcutaneous injections of caffein citrate or camphorated oil. Morphine was freely used for its relief of pain and for its general beneficial effect. (It was an important adjunct to the suppression of internal hemorrhage.)

"A study of shock cases treated at the field hospitals leads to interesting and valuable conclusions concerning the etiology of shock. During the early days of the Division's active campaigning, when the weather was warm and the soldiers were still in good condition both mentally and physically, the number of shock cases was relatively small. It was also observed during this period that even those cases in severe shock responded gratifyingly to treatment. (Youthful enthusiasm rose to the surface. The men laughingly recounted tales and experiences along the battle line. Furthermore, though recently snatched from the jaws of death, they eagerly inquired how long it would be before they could return to the line.)

"In striking contrast was the clinical picture presented by the wounded during the closing weeks of the war. Not only were the shock cases greater in number, running from 17-20% of the severely wounded, but they were far graver in character and reacted very slowly to the most energetic treatment. Worn out by long fighting, with little chance for rest, exposed to the cold with insufficient protection or warmth, constantly wet and insufficiently fed by cold food because of the risk of building fires along the line, the men were at the low water mark of fitness both mentally and physically. Their reserve was gone so that the type of shock then exhibited was more profound and durable than that theretofore encountered. Soldiers with only moderate wounds began to arrive at the hospitals in deep shock, from which they often failed to rally under any form of treatment.

"It was found in our experience that war surgery, like all traumatic surgery, presented three great problems, viz.: shock, hemorrhage, and infection. We also found that prompt operation was indicated in the following: First, certain of the compound fractures of the skull; second, intrathoracic wounds of the sucking type, where relief could be afforded by removing missiles, foreign bodies, or pieces of bone from the lungs (the thoracic cavity being cleansed also of clots after which the chest was closed without drainage); third, all abdominal cases where a hemorrhage might be fatal or a peritonitis imminent; fourth, cases requiring amputation to remove at once the shock focus; fifth, a class of joint cases where frequent rapid infections might be averted; and sixth, all hemorrhage cases.

"This is the way we handled the supply question: The Medical Supply Unit in combat was always stationed with the Advance Triage. When conditions demanded it, an auxiliary supply station was sent ahead to the advance Ambulance Dressing Station. From the Triage and A. D. S. (advance distributing point), the front line was supplied through ambulances and litter bearers. A notice or verbal message from the regimental or battalion surgeons to the A. D. S. were sufficient to secure immediate compliance to requests for replenishments. Seldom did an emergency arise which required a special trip by an ambulance. In variably, ambulances from the front brought requests, while those returning to the front bore the supplies. Only the hearty co-

operation of the units of the whole medical department made it possible to both care for casualties and transport supplies. Without this cooperation this would have been impossible, due to the limited transportation allowed the Medical Supply Unit. A fair and comprehensive picture of the difficulties which this unit had to overcome may be formed if you draw a mental picture of managing an only drug store in a city of thirty thousand people. This store must operate day and night, must change location every few days or even daily. There are only eight clerks and more cannot be obtained. There are but two (3-ton) trucks at your service. Your city is under constant shell fire and bombardment from the air.

"Whatever the achievements of the Medical Department in providing care and evacuation to the multitudes of casualties incurred in the engagements of the division, much credit is due the line troops for their loyal co-operation."

Here is a description of what the personnel of the 117th Sanitary Train went through:

"The mule skinners of Tennessee and some of those from Colorado will long remember Exermont and 'The Valley'. During the. drive and the thirty days that the Rainbow held the line, the old army joke, the mule ambulance, came into its own. The wounded from half the division were brought over the almost impassable trails into Exermont by these hybrid relics of the dark ages. The work was done under constant shell fire, and more than one driver learned how it felt to have his animal shot down in the harness.

"Although it is not in the line of a hospital man's duty to operate an ambulance, several did so on this occasion. Because Tennessee's mules became exhausted by the constant strain of day and night work, relief teams were called in from Colorado and their drivers came with the mules. It is not army regulation that a driver always go with his team, but a matter of mutual affection. During this month the casualties among these long-eared members of the train were ten killed and fourteen wounded. The fact that all these mules received their wounds in harness (in line of duty) and none of the drivers received a scratch showed that the day of miracles had not passed. On one occasion Ernest Wyrick of Tennessee lay pinned under an overturned am-

bulance for more than an hour while help was being brought to release him. Aside from the mud bath he was none the worse for the experience.

"Ambulance men grew to have almost a horror of towns on this sector. Exermont, Fleville, Sommerance, all were subjected to an almost constant shelling and gassing. Three ambulances belonging to New Jersey were destroyed in Fleville by one shell. Sommerance, being within 600 yards of the German lines, received particularly warm attention from the enemy.

"Probably the most pleasant memories of Baulny were centered about its dug-outs. There were few men in the train who did not at times have a warm affection for them and frequently a desire to quickly explore their depths. Such feelings were usually strongest between dark and daybreak as both Boche shells and planes were more numerous then. These underground homes had been constructed by the Germans when preparing the place as a part of the old Hindenburg Line. Many of the galleries ended in steel and concrete 'pill boxes', which were a part of the trench system covering the hill. Of the town above ground, little was left, a constant rain of shells and bombs having reduced all the buildings to wreckage. This fact, of course, necessitated the use of tents for all surface homes.

"While here, Oregon operated a gas hospital. They were visited by many officers from gas schools and divisions in training. Their work was conceded to be the best in the A. E. F. A total of 1,182 patients passed through their hands at Baulny.

"It fell to the lot of D. C. to co-operate with the men of the Ambulance Section at the *Triage*, in somewhat the same way as at Essey, in the St. Mihiel salient. Two litter squads, one of ambulance men and one of hospital men, met each incoming ambulance. Patients who were able to travel farther were loaded by the ambulance squad into another machine and hurried to the rear. Those who required nourishment or new dressings were taken to the ward tents and held until they gained strength to enable them to travel.

"Through this *Triage* 5,800 patients passed. Of this number, 293 were so seriously wounded that operations or special shock treatments were necessary before they could be safely evacuated. At the time of leaving this location, seventy-one men

had been buried in the hospital graveyard, twelve of whom died in ambulances on their way back from the front. This shows that a total of 6,982 patients were handled at Baulny. They came from five American divisions besides some French, and a few German prisoners.

"The train suffered more casualties in the Argonne than on any other front." *

The marked characteristic of the Argonne campaign from its beginning September 26th to the last combats along: the Meuse and on the heights above Sedan just prior to the Armistice is how each of the American general attacks was made under a different set of conditions from any of the others.

The first attack, that of September 26th, was a successful surprise one. Therefore, while the Germans were holding a heavily entrenched position which they had been working on for the four years they had been in it, they were not expecting the attack and were caught with a relatively small member of troops and those not always of the best quality. The American surprise was so complete and the numbers of their infantry and the fire of their artillery so overwhelming that the whole of the German trench system was captured and the fighting carried well into the open country beyond.

The Germans promptly realizing this dangerous threat to the pivot of their whole line in France, at least as far west as the Somme River began pouring in divisions from the other parts of their line to hold the Americans in the Argonne. This to give their troops to the west a chance to withdraw from the salient which they occupied.

The second series of attacks begun by the American Army on October 4th while fought out in open country, was a bitter, stubborn contest between the Americans determined to drive ahead under the leadership of General Pershing whom, like General Grant in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania only had his will to fight increased each time his attacks were stopped with heavy loss.

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* Page 112, "Iodine and Gasoline" by an Associated Staff (A History of the 117th Sanitary Train).

The Germans were equally determined to hold. Veteran divisions of the best quality were put into position. They were divisions made up of men and officers who knew how to take the maximum advantage of the steep and numerous hills, the deep ravines, the woods of various sizes to gain the maximum cover for themselves. This, while inflicting heavy losses on the attacker by the way in which every feature was turned into a strong point well protected from direct attack and always able to bring a flanking fire on the attackers of its neighboring strong points.

Stubbornly, frequently stopped with heavy losses, sometimes driven back from captured positions, the Americans continued to attack until every hill, every forest, every farm strongpoint of the Germans had been taken.

This closed the second period. When it came to an end, the Germans occupied the strong natural position partially fortified and everywhere well wired of the Kriemhilde-Stellung, while the Americans were in. front of it on open ground everywhere dominated by the crests and hills of this Stellung long before carefully picked as the position of final defense before crossing the Meuse River, in the Stenay-Sedan-Meziers region.

In the heavy fighting the middle of October the 42nd and 32nd Divisions broke through the center of this position. Not only this but they captured the very strongest part of the line, the Cote de Chatillon and Hill 288 being taken by the 42nd Division and the Cote Dame Marie by the 32nd. Everywhere to the east as far as the Meuse this line then fell into the hands of the Americans. To the west from just northwest of the Cote de Chatillon it remained in German hands. However, that portion of it in front of Landres-St. George and St. George and even across the Immecourt Ravine, was dominated by the Cote de Chatillon now in American hands. Worse than that, from the German point of view, the ravine of the Rau de St. Georges in which are these two villages and which is the upper part of the Immecourt Ravine was flanked by the Americans in the Bantheville woods.

Thus the eastern end of that part of the Kriemhilde-Stellung which remained in German hands was of no value to them except as an outpost position. Consequently, their main position was moved back to the north of the Rau de St. Georges.

Here they were again in the open and with no such tremendous advantage over the attacking Americans as was true when they occupied the Kriemhilde-Stellung and the Americans were in the open territory in front of them. It was under these very different local conditions that the American general attack of November 1st took place.

Furthermore, by this time their troops had either been driven back or had voluntarily withdrawn from the greater part of the salient in France. It is interesting to note that at this time except in the extreme north of France and in Belgium, the German line roughly occupied the same position it was in the third week of August, 1914, in their advance which terminated in their defeat in the First Battle of the Marne.

From the beginning of the general attack of the American, French, British and Belgian Armies September 26-27, 1918, to the break through of November 1st there are two important facts which prove that the American attack in the Argonne was of decisive importance because the pivot of a large part of the German line in France.

The first is there were no voluntary retirements of the Germans in the Argonne until after the November 1st attack. When the Germans yielded ground in the Argonne it was because driven off in battle.

On the French front, to the left, the Germans voluntarily withdrew on a wide front from October 5-7 and on a far wider front from the Argonne to the Oise River from October 11-13.

On the British front they similarly withdrew from October 10 to 12 and to a considerable depth October 17-23.

On the Belgian front they retreated from October 17-20 to a considerable depth.

The second fact is that they heavily reinforced their front in the Argonne not only with divisions from the St. Mihiel front, and the quiet sectors in Lorraine but also from the French and British fronts where they were being attacked. (See sketch map at end of Chapter.)

Both these facts prove the Germans considered the Argonne the pivot of a large part of their retirement in France and their consequent determination to hold it if possible.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE RACE FOR SEDAN

The Rainbow had entered the line for the last time. It was to make its last forced marches within the next few days. It was to fight its last battle and suffer its last losses in wounded and killed at the hands of the enemy.

Some of its detachments were to get closer to Sedan, that city which has played both such a glorious and unhappy part in French history, than any other American troops got.

The Rainbow was about to play its part in one of the most dramatic incidents of the war—the race for Sedan. For years to come this race will furnish the theme for divisional rivalry between the Rainbow and 1st American Divisions. As with some of our famous Civil War rivalries it will interest future historians so much they will dig out the last details of this struggle between these two American divisions and the French one to their left to gain the right to emblazon on their Colors and Standards "Capture of Sedan."

Throughout their advance in the Argonne the American troops had been fighting over ground over which the German armies in August 1870 had advanced once they found that the Emperor Napoleon III was marching the French Army of Chalons from the district around Rheims northeast. This with the intention of crossing the extreme northern part of the Argonne, the Meuse River near Stenay and Mouzon and thence southeast across the plain of the Woevre to the help of Bazaine's French Army beseiged in Metz by the Germans. Finding this movement was going on the German columns which had been marching west toward Paris quickly were turned north to stop it. Some went north through the Argonne, others through the eastern Champagne. Thus their line of advance was in general the same as that of the Americans and the right of Gouraud's Fourth French Army during the final weeks of the War of 1914-18.

Catching up with the French they cut them off from their attempted relief of Bazaine's French Army in Metz, drove those

in the Argonne north towards Sedan and those which had already crossed the Meuse, along the northern bank of that river towards that same city.

The Rainbow when it took over from the 78th Division in the Petites Armoises region occupied some of the same ground as did the Germans when they first made contact with the French. Moving north towards Sedan the Rainbow in November, 1918, drove the Germans in the same direction as had the Germans driven the French the last of August and the first of September in 1870.

What caused the "Race for Sedan"?

The race between the 40th French Infantry Division the right of General Gouraud's Fourth French Army, and the 83rd Infantry Brigade the left of the American First Army, was caused by several changes ordered in the boundary between the two.

The race between the 42d Division, the left division of the 1st American Army Corps, commanded by Major-General Joseph T. Dickman and the 1st Division, the left division of the 5th American Army Corps, commanded by Major-General Chas. P. Summerall, was a difference of opinion as to what the phrase—"Boundaries will not be considered binding" meant.

Up to the last week in October Sedan had been within the zone of action of the First American Army commanded by Lieut. General Hunter Liggett. However the French High Command changed the boundary so that Sedan was in the French Sector. The boundary was drawn through Mouzon. That would have put all the ground over which the First Corps subsequently made its last advance in French territory.

This was undoubtedly done to satisfy the French sentiment which considered the capture of Sedan from the Germans the only answer to their defeat there in the Franco-Prussian War.

However after the November 1st break through a high ranking French liaison officer told the American First Army there was no objection to the Americans capturing Sedan. At this time the boundary ran from Tannay through Chemery and Bulson to Bazeillis just north of the Meuse River. In this town is the famous "House of the Last Cartridge." In it during the Sedan battle of 1870, three officers and 50 soldiers cut off from their army refused to surrender but fought until they had but one

cartridge left. Captain Aubert fired that. The Bavarian attackers infuriated by their losses were about to finish off the survivors when one of their officers named Lissignano stopped them.

The house stands today with its plastered walls and ceilings pock marked by the Bavarian bullets.

As a consequence of being told there was no objection to the Americans capturing Sedan General Hunter Liggett sent an identical memorandum to Generals Dickman and Summerall. This at 6:30 p. m., November 5. Here it is:

"Memorandum for Commanding Generals, 1st Corps, 5th Corps.

"Subject: Message from the Commander-in-Chief.

"1. General Pershing desires that the honor of entering Sedan should fall to the First American Army. He has every confidence that the troops of the 1st Corps, assisted on their right by the 5th Corps, will enable him to realize this desire.

"2. In transmitting the foregoing message, your attention is invited to the favorable opportunity now existing, for pressing our advantage throughout the night. Boundaries will not be considered binding.

"By command of Lieutenant General Liggett."

It was the last sentence which caused the Race for Sedan between the Rainbow and the First Divisions

Neither the French nor Americans captured Sedan. The city of Sedan is entirely North of the Meuse River. It was not entered until November 14th, when the French took it over.

The American communique of November 8 announced its capture. The mistake was due to an American aviator who reported he had dropped newspapers to American soldiers in the streets. He had done so in some other town.

Divisional Field Orders No. 52 issued at 21:30 hours November 4th, ordered the Division to deploy and pass through the 78th Division at 12 hours November 5th along the line Petite Armoises-Verrieres-St. Pierre Mont.

Except for the receipt of some underclothing and overcoats, the men and officers of the Rainbow were in the same underclothes and more or less ragged condition as when the 2nd Division passed through them the first of November. The intervening days had been spent mostly in the open, as the few farm

houses scattered here and there and the small villages met with could provide shelter for only an infinitesimal number. The animals of the Division were worn down from lack of sufficient forage and from night after night spent on muddy roads which frequently ran up and down steep hills and which were always shelled. Days spent standing in the mud in ravines supposed to furnish them shelter but which were frequently fired into by long range enemy artillery or bombed by enemy aviators, improperly groomed because of the relatively small number of drivers by comparison with the number of animals; their condition was such that many simply dropped dead in harness while on the move.

Nevertheless, the morale of the Division was high and their desire to move forward an eager one. They had seen the Second Division make the attack which they felt was properly theirs and easily gather in the fruits of victory which were due to the breaking of the Kriemhilde-Stellung by themselves and the 32nd Division nearly two weeks before.

They had seen the First Division in reserve following eagerly behind the 2nd anxious for the moment when the 2nd might be slowed down or become tired so that they might relieve them, expressing their opinion when passing through as soldiers always do to their rivals.

The Rainbow did not know, of course, that this was the reason why the 1st Division was put behind the 2nd. The First Army Headquarters knew that the 2nd would never stop or admit that it was tired as long as the 1st was behind it waiting to relieve them.

The Rainbow sensed that the final drama of the war was near. They had played their part in all the principal American combats to date.

They were the third complete American divisions to land in France, only having been preceded by the 1st and 26th.

They had no desire to quit until the last shot was fired. They had no desire to hear that shot fired elsewhere than in the middle of the hardest fought American combat then going on.

They were reduced in numbers from death, wounds and sickness. They were worn down by being in the open constantly since the first part of September. But the men and officers pres-

ent as is always true in war of a first class combat unit were those of the most spirit and determination. They were willing to let the weaker ones fall by the wayside provided the Division as a whole went forward and took a part second to none.

The problem which now confronted the Rainbow was for the first time that of a real pursuit. However, the Division had no intention of opening itself to a surprise blow by marching along parallel roads in route columns covered by advance guards.

Just as in the advance to the Ourcq, where this precaution had kept them from being surprised, first when the 84th Infantry Brigade bumped up against Croix Rouge Farm, and second when the Division as a whole bumped against the German resistance on the north bank of the Ourcq; the Division now moved forward once more with its four infantry regiments abreast and each deployed for combat.

It was just as well. While the Germans were in retreat they had not confined themselves to covering that retreat with rear guards which only fired when forced to deploy to stop their pursuer. Instead, they left machine guns in every excellent position from which they could fire on, inflict loss on, and hold up their pursuers. Then, when, despite this fire, the Rainbow in pursuit continued to advance they would send half their guns to the rear, to settle down in another new position while the rear half continued to fire. Then, before the Rainbow got too close, the rear echelon would pick up its guns and retire to a new position covered by the fire of the guns already there.

By this means, and long-range artillery harrassing fire, the pursuit, while never stopped, was at least slowed down and compelled to submit to some loss.

It was just one more example of the fact that the Germans fully understood the changes in the application of old tactical principles which modern weapons, through their great range and their ability to instantly produce a great volume of fire, have made possible.

In the first battles of 1914, the Germans gave the Allies an unpleasant surprise by the numbers of machine guns which they used and the skill which they displayed in taking the maximum advantage of the fire power of these weapons. Probably more than was true of any one other weapon, their machine guns

brought about the defeat of the French in the two first great battles of the war—those of the frontier in early August, 1914. In these battles, the French infantry relying upon the superiority of the fire of their 75mm. field guns over the German 77 mm., advanced to the attack with great enthusiasm and confident of success. They soon found themselves confronted with a deadly machine gun fire, which it was impossible for flesh and blood, no matter how courageous, to overcome.

Throughout the war, the Germans had set the pace for the Allies in the use of these weapons.

In the last few days of the war, when in retreat and knowing that their Government was suing for peace, with their divisions and regiments greatly reduced in strength, the German machine gunner lost none of his skill in the use of these weapons, and in some cases as in their last stand on the hills above Sedan, died at their post rather than yield.

The Rainbow was deployed in its usual order by 12 hours, November 5th. It promptly moved forward and passed through the elements of the 78th Division.

The 168th Iowa, on the right, advanced with the 3rd Battalion in front, the 2nd in support, and the 1st in reserve. Late in the afternoon, contact was established with the left of the 77th Division in Stonne. The 3rd Battalion spent the night along the Stonne—Grandes Armoises Road, the 2nd bivouaced about a kilometer northwest of la Berliere, the 1st on the slope west of Oches.

The 167th Alabama advanced at noon between Berrieres and du Fond Barre Farm. At 16:50 hours it halted the 1st Battalion on the ridge just west of la Grange du Mont, which it outposted with A and C Companies while B and D were held in support.

The 2nd Battalion, which had been in support during the advance, was put on the right of the 1st along the ridge, just north of la Grange du Mont. It established contact with the 168th Iowa by patrols.

The 165th New York, the 1st Battalion in the lead, advanced without encountering resistance, through Sy and la Forge Farm. At the Chateau north of this farm enemy machine guns held up the advance, but were soon disposed of. Patrols were

pushed into le Vivier at 16 hours, the main body of the Battalion entering ten minutes later. At 16:30 hours Railiere Farm was reached, on the edge of the Bois du Montdieu. Here in accordance with Brigade orders an outpost line was organized while patrols were sent to the front. The 2nd Battalion in support bivouaced in the woods south of le Vivier opposite the gap between this village and the high ground occupied by the 167th Alabama.

An amusing incident, because illustrating the pride which soldiers have in their own organization and their consequent unwillingness to let anybody else outdo them, happened as the 166th Ohio passed through the 311th Infantry of the 78th Division on the ridge east of Tannay. The commanding officer of the 83rd Infantry Brigade, watching the advance of his Brigade, saw Sampson's battalion, the First of the 166th Ohio, which was leading its advance, suddenly halt. He went over and asked Sampson why he had halted when there were no orders to do so. Sampson replied that the Colonel of the 311th Infantry had told him to halt where; he was, that he could not pass through his Regiment. Sampson was told to immediately resume his march forward and not to stop no matter who gave him orders except his Colonel or Brigade or Division Commander. On being asked where the Colonel was, he said, "He went forward quickly with a small group of men." A hunt, not disclosing him, the matter was dropped in view of the advance.

Later it was reported by Major Sampson that he overtook the Colonel and his group of men at the south edge of the Bois du Montdieu. Though he did not know it until more than a year later, the Colonel was a West Point classmate of the Brigade Commander. He had won a D. S. C. near Grand Pre a few days before, and, as a consequence, though only a Lieutenant Colonel, had been put in command of the 311th Infantry. He did not want any other regiment to pass his in the advance.

Major Sampson moved into Bois du Montdieu, where at 16:45 he established a line along the northern edge, with patrols pushed to the front. The 3rd Battalion in support stopped for the night at the southern edge of the wood, while the 2nd in reserve bivouaced in and around Tannay.

Lieut. Col. Redden, commanding the 149th Illinois, got batteries “A”, “C”, “D” and “F” up in time to fire a short barrage prior to the jump off of the 83rd Infantry Brigade, by giving them the remaining fit horses of “B” and “E” Batteries. Upon their arrival, the Commanding Officer of the 83rd Infantry Brigade released the Regiment of Field Artillery of the 78th Division, the Colonel of which had objected to the orders to fire on the southern edge of the Bois du Montdieu and on Montdieu on the grounds that it was not known definitely that the enemy was occupying these places. Following the principle that it was better to waste a few shells on a position where it was logical to expect the enemy rather than to wait until the infantry advanced and proved him to be there by suffering loss in killed and wounded, the 149th Field Artillery was ordered to execute this fire and did so.

The 151st Minnesota Field Artillery struggled forward with four of its batteries in an attempt beyond the power of the remaining horses to keep at all times within supporting distance of the Infantry of the 84th Brigade.

At this time the Rainbow had no definite information as to the enemy position and intentions.

Since, however, it has been learned from German sources that after the American break-through of November 1st, the Germans in their withdrawal to the Meuse River issued orders late on November and which were to go into effect at three a. m. November 3rd, by which their troops were to occupy “Nachhut Stellung”.

This was not in any way a prepared position such as the Kriemhilde Stellung, on which a vigorous defensive was to be conducted with the object of stopping the enemy’s advance no matter what the cost. It was, on the contrary, merely a line marked on the map along natural defensive features. On it the German troops were to take up and fight a delaying action when the American troops had driven back to it the detachments left to harass their advance in some cases, and in other cases officers’ patrols out merely to keep the Germans reliably informed of that advance.

The name itself indicates this as it means “rearguard position.”

In the territory of the 78th Division, which the Rainbow had relieved, this position ran from just north of Oches to the crossroads approximately a kilometer west of la Derliere, thence to the Pont-Bar-Stonne Highway just south of Nocieves Farm and along its front to Pont-Bar, where it crossed the Bar River and the railway beyond. The Bar River approximately marked the dividing line between the left of the American First Army and the right of General Gouraud's Fourth French Army.

This front was held by the 76th Reserve, 195th, and 14th Reserve German Infantry Divisions.

These troops had been ordered to hold this position for two days, that is November 3rd and 4th.

The afternoon of the 4th the Third German Army headquarters ordered the beginning of the withdrawal to the "Brown Line", the movement to begin after dark the night of November 4th-5th. Rearguards were to be left in the "Nachhut Stellung" until 8 p. m. November 4th. This was done to hold up the American advance while at the same time delaying as long as possible the American reconnaissance and identification of the "Brown Line", the next line of resistance after the "Nachhut Stellung", on the way to the Meuse River.

The "Brown Line" like the "Nachhut Stellung", was not a prepared position on which a determined resistance was to be put up, but merely a natural line of defense picked out on the map to be held to fight a delaying action before retiring across the Meuse River. This "Brown Line" began on the Meuse River near la Sartolle Farm in the neighborhood where the 2nd Division fought its way across that river November 10th. It ran west to Youcq, near which town the 1st Division relieved the 80th Division the morning of November 6th. It then ran along the hills to just south of Flaba and thence to Mongarni Farm, which were occupied by the 77th Division November 6th. Thence it ran along the hills to the group of woods a kilometer south of Maisoncelle and thence to the ridge south of Chemery, from which positions the Germans were to be driven by the Rainbow, November 6th.

The position of this "Brown Line" is of importance to a clear understanding of what happened during the last days of the "Race for Sedan". The left of the "Brown Line" from the

German side, or right from the American side, rested on the Meuse River in the region where the Meuse, after making a loop around the high ground north of Pouilly, completes the arc of the curve on which are Mezieries, Sedan, Mouzon. From this curve the river runs in general south through Stenay to Verdun. As a consequence of this curve while the German left of the "Brown Line" rested on the river the German right or that part in front of the American army, that is the part of it on the hill south of Chemery, was fifteen kilometers directly south of the Meuse, as the crow flies, from Chemery.

Therefore as the Germans retired to the far bank of the Meuse River, their divisions, beginning with the left one, crossed the Meuse one after another as they reached it. This made those immediately to the front of Sedan the last to cross. Thus, when the 1st Division reached the Meuse, November 6th, it was not because they had advanced further than the Divisions to its left, and in particular the Rainbow Division, which was on the extreme left of the American army. It was because the curve of the Meuse River, made that river at least fifteen kilometers closer to the 1st Division than it was to the Rainbow. Also that curve made it the mission of the Germans in front of the 1st Division to cross to the farther bank when the divisions in front of the Rainbow were still under orders to stand fast on the south side of the river.

The 40th French Infantry Division, on the left of the Rainbow occupied a line for the night of November 5th with the right just east of Sauville. Sauville is just west of the Canal des Ardennes. The gap between the right of the French and the left of the 83rd Infantry Brigade, which was also the left of the 1st American Army, was not covered by patrols. This because the Brigade Commander decided that with the three battalions of the 166th Ohio echelloned in depth from front to rear and each in combat formation, there was no need to exhaust men, already worn down, by night patrolling on a flank when the enemy was in retreat. All the more so as this enemy was not showing any evidence of an intent to fight hard south of the Meuse River. During the day the enemy's rear guards had professedly withdrawn toward the "Brown Line", as the Americans drove them back. The 76th Reserve German Division, which had been

driven back by the 77th Division, on the right of the 42nd, and the 42nd, finally occupied a line north of Stonne in the Bois de Raucourt. This took them entirely out of the zone of the 42nd Division. By 15 hours all the troops of this German Division had reached the "Brown Line", their withdrawal uncovering the left flank of the rear guard of the 195th German Infantry Division.

This 195th German Infantry Division, instead of withdrawing, refused its left flank and put up the resistance encountered by the right of the 42nd during the day of November 5th. The 14th Reserve Division, on its right which conformed to the movements of the 195th opposed the left of the Rainbow. The night of the fifth the 14th Reserve Division, with the 195th on its left, occupied the "Brown Line" south of Chemery and Maisoncelle, on the northern side of the Valley of the Rau de Terron. The Rainbow faced them on the southern side with patrols well to the front.

During the day of Tuesday, the 5th of November, the 3rd German Army ordered the execution of the next phase of the "Kriegsmarch". This was the occupation of the Meuse River Stellung, the left flank of which was entirely north of the river. In front of Sedan a bridge head position was ordered occupied.

Following out these orders, the Wellman Group, in which were the divisions in front of the Rainbow, ordered its units to begin the evacuation of the "Brown Line" at 20 hours, November 5th, while leaving strong rear guards on that line. The 76th Reserve Division in front of the 77th American Division, and the 195th German Division in front of the 77th American and the left of the 42nd American, crossed to the farther bank of the Meuse, where they took up position on the high ground dominating the Reuse Valley. The 76th Reserve Division occupied Bazeilles, and the ground to its east. The 195th Division was on its right extending through Sedan. The 14th Reserve German Division occupied the Sedan bridge head south of the river from its banks at Pont Maugis west through Noyers toward Cheveuges. From there west the German line was held by divisions belonging to the Wild and Winkler Groups, which were in front of General Gouraud's 4th French Army. This movement was completed

shortly after daylight, Wednesday, November 6th, the rear guards remaining on the "Brown Line".

The orders issued for Wednesday, November 6th, are best told in the words of The American Battle Monuments Commission, "Summary of Operations":

It says:

"At 10:00 p. m., November 5th, pursuant to Field Order No. 91, First U. S. Corps, and telephone instructions subsequently received from the same source, the 42nd Division issued Field Order No. 53, directing that the pursuit be continued at 5:30 a. m., November 6th, the Meuse River be reached, and a bridgehead at Sedan be secured. The enemy rearguards were to be defeated, his troops and transport captured or destroyed, before he could effect a crossing. Disregarding sector limits previously prescribed, boundaries were changed by corps telephone orders as follows: east, Raucourt—Haraucourt—Angecourt—Remilly (all excl.); west, Chemery—Chehery—road Chehery-Sedan (all incl.). Interbrigade boundary became a line: Maisoncelle—Bulson—Noyers—Pont Maugis (all to right brigade). The division order of battle remained unchanged. The 83rd Brigade on the left received the special mission of providing strong flank protection on the left, particularly if the division outstripped the French in the advance."

Early the morning of Wednesday, November 6th, the Rainbow advanced, in its customary formation of the four infantry regiments parallel to each other, one battalion of each in the lead, one in support, and one in reserve.

The 168th Iowa, with the 3rd Battalion leading, advanced to the north edge of the woods, northwest of Stonne. Here it came under German machine gun fire from the rear guards of the 195th German Infantry Division, posted along the line of the Rau de Terron. This resistance was soon overcome. By 17 hours, the leading battalion was in the vicinity of Haraucourt. The left flank of the 77th Division had already passed through the town about two hours after the Division had overcome some slight enemy's resistance east and west of Raucourt.

The 77th Division was slightly in advance of the 42nd because the enemy's rear guards in its front had left the "Brown Line" at 5:30 hours or before the 77th had started its advance.

For the night, the 168th Iowa placed the right of its outpost line on the road running northwest from Angecourt. From here it ran along the north edge of the unnamed woods south of Thelonne. This high ground enabled it to command this town.

The 167th Alabama advanced with its 2nd Battalion leading, the 3rd in support, and the 1st in reserve. The line for the night was established by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions at 16 hours north of Bulson. At 17 hours the 1st Battalion was also put into line. Its position was a half kilometer northeast of Bulson. "A" and "B" Companies were on the reverse slope of Hill 314. "C" and "D" Companies were in the ravine road just north of Bulson.

The 165th New York with the and Battalion leading came in contact with the enemy's rear guards south of Artaise le Vivier, at 7:30 hours, successfully driving them back. They pushed on through Maisoncelle, skirting Bulson to the west. A number of patrols of the 1st Battalion, which had advanced with the 2nd, cleaned out Maisoncelle. Continuing north, they were fired on from St. Quentin Farm. At 12 hours the 2nd Battalion organized its line in front of the farm, from which it had driven the Germans.

Two companies of the 1st Battalion placed on the left flank as a left flank guard advanced through le Therme and Historia Farms, to the heights west of Bulson. They reached these heights at 15:45 hours and sent out patrols to the north to mop up the woods and protect their left flank. For the night the Battalion had a line along the north tip of the woods 300 meters south of Hill 299, and also along the east edge of Bois de Haye to Historia Farm. This second line, however, was not a front line position, as it was in rear of the first line.

The 166th Ohio advanced with the 1st Battalion in the lead, the 3rd in support, and the 2nd in reserve. Its patrols pushed through Neuville a Maire, and came under machine gun fire from the Germans on Hill 214 south of Chemery. This fire was stopped by a machine gun concentration, and shortly after the enemy was seen withdrawing over the hill north of Chemery. Ohio patrols entered that town at 11 hours, and moved into the valley to the south and east. By 13 hours the 1st Battalion was through Chemery and pushing north on the main highway Chemery—Chehery—Sedan. Here they almost immediately ran into enemy fire from the south edge of the Bois de Haye.

By the middle of the afternoon, the enemy's artillery fire had increased to such an extent as to show that serious resistance had been encountered. Therefore, the 1st Battalion halted south of the Bulson—Connage Road about 16:30 hours from which it sent one patrol from its right to Chehery, and another to the bend in the main road just north of Connage. The first captured a prisoner in Chehery. The second developed heavy machine gun fire from the wooded slopes northwest of Chehery. For the night an outpost line was established on the crest 500 meters north of the Bulson—Connage Road. The support and reserve battalions were in billets and bivouac in and around Chemery. After midnight, a patrol from A Company got to the north of Chehery.

There was no contact with the 165th New York on the right during the night.

The advance guard of the 40th French Infantry Division had its right flank at Omicourt just across the Bar River from Connage.

Their commanding general sent word to Colonel Reilly through Lieut. Lombardi the American liaison officer that they had received no order changing boundaries between the two armies and that therefore they had to march in the morning in accordance with the original boundary which put Sedan in their sector. However, as the relations between the two commanding officers was cordial it was agreed that any overlapping which took place would not become a subject of controversy.

It was obvious that the left flank of the 83rd Infantry Brigade which was also the left flank, of the Rainbow Division and of the first American Army, was the point most favorable for a German counterattack, if one was to be made.

This not only because it was the junction between the left of the First American Army and the right of the Fourth French Army but also because the valley of the Bar River and that river coincided in general with this junction and tended through the physical difficulties of crossing it to make continuous and adequate liaison difficult.

The Brigade Commander decided for two reasons it was not necessary to add to the fatigue and exposure of officers and

men already in many cases well below their normal physical condition by keeping patrols in this valley.

The first was, that he saw no reason why an infantry battalion deployed for attack roughly in a square of approximately a thousand yards a side armed with modern rifles and automatics with their power of almost instantaneously producing a tremendous volume of accurate fire should fear attack from any direction, any more than did the squares of Swiss pikemen of the 17th Century.

Patrols would only be in the way of any suddenly developed fire.

Both on the Ourcq and at San Mihiel the infantry of the division had shown that they were not worried about going ahead with their flanks unprotected.

The second reason was that there was every evidence that this time the Germans were retreating and not simply falling back from one excellent position to another, as was true when they fell back first to the Ourcq river and later to the Vesle river.

When the order for the night movement came as the French received no orders to advance simultaneously it was evident that the further the Division progressed the more its left flank on which was the Ohio Infantry Regiment, would be exposed. Again however, the Brigade Commander decided not to send out any patrol. This not only for the same reasons as those which caused them to make that decision on November 5th but also because as the movement was being made in the dark, such patrols could easily get lost and thus fall easy prey to capture, or cause one of those regrettable incidents of which the history of war is so full, where friendly troops fire into each other by mistake and kill and wound their own comrades before the mistake is discovered and rectified.

What the Germans were doing the day of Wednesday, November 6th, was of importance because it meant that before noon of that day the situation in front of the Rainbow Division and the right of the 4th French Army on its left, was an entirely different one from that confronting the 77th American Division on the right of the Rainbow and the 1st American Division on the right of the 77th.

The American advance north through the Argonne had been coupled with a second movement which at first secondary had gradually become more and more important.

This secondary movement was a pivoting of the First American Army to the right or northeast with Verdun as a center. It began the first week of October when the 33rd Illinois Division, swinging to its right, fought its way across the Meuse River and up the heights beyond just north of the northern defenses of Verdun on the east bank of the Meuse River. From then on, with each advance more and more of the divisions on the right of the American Army in the Argonne would fight their way across the river and, swinging to the right, drive the Germans off the ridge beyond. As this movement progressed, some American divisions, such as the 29th Blue and Gray, the 26th New England, the 79th Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia Division, and finally the 32nd Red Arrow Division were put in on the eastern bank of the Meuse and fought their way northeast. By dark, November 6th, the American line was across on the heights above the east bank of the Meuse as far north as a little beyond Dun-sur-Meuse. From there north to the front of the 77th Division the Americans occupied the west bank of the Meuse with the Germans facing them on the east bank. At 11:40 hours, November 6th, the rear guards of the 76th German reserve division, which had left their position on the "Brown Line" at 5:30 hours that morning, that is before the 77th American Division attacked, had crossed the river at Villers devant Mouzon. Five minutes later they blew up the bridge.

Thus, the only American division left with German resistance to overcome south of the Meuse River was the Rainbow, the extreme left division of the American First Army.

The 195th German Division in front of the Rainbow, was still south of the Meuse. Its rear guards had stayed on the "Brown Line" position until 8:30 hours, when driven off by the Rainbow advance from the front. It had held on despite the fact that its left flank was threatened by the 77th Division's advance and pursuit of the 76th German Reserve Division.

It met this threat by refusing its left flank beginning near Ennemane Farm (1200 meters south of Raucourt) and taking up a position running north along the railway. The attacks of

the 84h Brigade drove the rear guards of the 195th Division off the "Brown Line" and along with it their position along the railway. By 17 hours these rear guards still fighting were near Thellone. At 21 hours they crossed the Meuse at Allicourt and Remilly, blowing up the bridges at both places. This left only the 14th German Reserve Division in front of the 83rd Infantry Brigade. By night this Division was occupying the bridgehead from Pont Maugis through Noyers and along the hilltops and edges of the wood to above Cheveuges. This division was ordered to hold in force until 20 hours, November 7th, when the main body was to cross to the north bank of the Meuse, leaving a strong rear guard on the Sedan bridgehead on the south side to delay the American advances.

Thus, shortly after dark the night of November 6th, the only Germans south of the Meuse in front of any American troops were the troops of the 14th German Reserve Division facing the 83rd Infantry Brigade. To the left the German line was south of the Meuse and faced the 4th French Army. To the right of the 83rd Brigade, in front of the 84h Infantry Brigade, the 77th Division on its right, the 1st Division on the right of the 77th, and so on down to near Dun-sur-Meuse, where the 5th Division had fought its way across the River, the Americans were separated everywhere from the Germans by the Meuse River. In both the 77th and 1st Divisions preparations had been made to cross the river.

However, the night of November 6th-7th was not to be a peaceful one. The order which had changed the boundary between the left of the American 1st Army and the right of the French 4th Army, so that it included Sedan in the American sector, whereas formerly it had been well within the sector of the 4th French Army, had initiated a chain of events which were to culminate on Thursday, November 7th, in a dramatic situation involving the Rainbow, 1st Regular U. S. Division, and the 40th French Infantry Division.

The 42nd Division with the 77th on its right occupied the front of the 1st U. S. Army Corps, commanded by Major General Joseph T. Dickman. On its right was the Fifth U.S. Army Corps made up of the 1st Regular Division, the 2nd Regu-

lar Division, including the 4th Marine Brigade, and the 89th Division, commanded by Major General Charles P. Summerall. These two Army Corps, with the 3rd U. S. Corps, commanded by Major General John T. Hines on the right of the 5th Army Corps, made up the 1st American Army under command of Lt. General Hunter Liggett. The Second American Army, under command of Lt. General Robert L. Bullard, was on the right of the First American Army, stretching from just east of Verdun across in front of St. Mihiel to Port-sur-Seille just east of the Moselle River. These two armies made up a Group of American Armies commanded by General John J. Pershing.

The History of the 1st Division says:

"Shortly after noon on November 6th the Commanding General of the Fifth Corps arrived at the Headquarters of the First Division, which was located in an old prison camp at La Gros Faux. He handed the Division Commander a copy of the following order from the Headquarters, First American Army:

"Memorandum for Commanding Generals, 1st Corps, 5th Corps.

"Subject: Message from the Commander-in-Chief.

1. General Pershing desires that the honor of entering Sedan should fall to the First American Army. He has every confidence that the troops of the 1st Corps, assisted on their right by the 5th Corps, will enable him to realize this desire.

2. In transmitting the foregoing message, your attention is invited to the favorable opportunity now existing, for pressing our advantage throughout the night. Boundaries will not be considered binding.

By Command of Lieutenant General Liggett.

"The Corps Commander directed the Division Commander to march upon Sedan and to assist in capturing the place the following morning."

Major General Frank Parker, an officer of unusual ability. His great energy and courage had carried him from command of an Infantry regiment to the command of the 1st Division, the middle of October, immediately after the Exermont battle.

Upon General Summerall's departure, the problem of carrying out the order was his problem. The 1st Division was then

rapidly approaching the Meuse River to the far side of which the Germans had already retreated.

The question which came up on November 7th and which remains as yet unanswered is whether or not the First Army Headquarters in issuing the order and the 5th Corps in passing it along did not assume that units of the 1st Division were crossing or would soon be crossing the Meuse River with the consequence that any advance on Sedan would be along the east bank of that River.

The 1st Division History says:

"The problem that confronted him was that of the formation in which the advance and the subsequent attack should be made. It was manifestly impossible to move at night, except along roads. By using the best routes available, the Division would be taxed to the limit of human endurance to accomplish its mission. Two courses of action were available. The Division might move by the left flank down the valley of the Meuse and force its way over a narrow front to the high ground southwest of Sedan. In this case, both flanks would be exposed and the regiments would be unable to make a timely deployment should it become necessary to engage the entire force of the Division, as was to be expected from all previous experience.

"The other alternative was to have the columns march on a wide front and arrive on the hills southwest of the city, ready to deploy promptly at any time for an attack. The latter course was chosen, and all available roads were necessary for the moment.

"The march was ordered in five columns as follows, from east to west:

"Column 1: 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, by the road Autrecourt—Remilly—Wadelincourt.

"Column 2: 16th Infantry, (less one battalion) and Company 'A', 1st Engineers, by the road Pourron—Autrecourt—Raucourt—Haracourt—Thelonne—Noyers.

"Column 3: 18th Infantry (less one battalion) by the road Pourron—Autrecourt—Raucourt—Maisoncelle—Boulson—Chaumont, thence north.

"Column 4: 28th Infantry and Company 'D', 1st Engineers, by the road Stonne—Chenery—Chehery—Fremois.

"Column 5: 26th Infantry, by the road Stonne—Chemery—Omicourt—Hannagne—St. Martin.

"The Division reserve, consisting of the 2nd Battalion, 18th Infantry, the 1st Machine Gun Battalion and the 1st Engineers (less two companies) was assigned to the road La Besace—Raucourt, and then to follow the second column at a distance of one kilometer.

"The 6th Field Artillery was ordered to follow the 18th Infantry, and the 7th Field Artillery to follow the 28th Infantry. A Battalion of the 5th Field Artillery was to follow each of Columns 2, 3 and 4.

"The regiments assembled by dark and the advance commenced between 7:00 and 8:00 P. M."

The Battle Monuments Commission summary says:

"The plan of the 1st Division was to come into position with its right flank on the heights about 2 kilometers south of Sedan and its left flank along the same heights south of Villers sur Bar, deploy and advance with a view to reconnoitering the crossings of the Meuse during the night November 7-8, effect a crossing the morning of November 8th, and capture Sedan, moving to the west and north of the place."

The 77th New York Infantry Division undoubtedly also received the order to march on Sedan regardless of sector boundaries. However, neither in the History of the Division nor in "Memories of the World War" by Major General Robert Alexander, the Division Commander, is any mention made of this order.

General Alexander says in his book:*

"I had seen that the enemy was in rout and I believed that a crossing of the Meuse could be accomplished that night (6-7) with the least chance of serious resistance. There was an objective for such an attempt in the high ground just north of the village of Amblimont from which the defenses around Sedan would surely be taken in reverse, by observation at least. I know that the Division was almost at the point of exhaustion but I believed that it was still capable of making one more effort and I gave General Lenihan my personal order for the construction

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* Page 291, *Memories of the World War*, Alexander, The Macmillan Co., New York, N. Y.

of a footbridge across the Meuse and the passing of his brigade as soon as the bridge could be completed." * * * "It seemed to me that full advantage of the disorganization of the enemy should be taken; to accomplish that end the pursuit could not slacken even for a night as by the next day the Boche would have so strengthened his position that our crossing would be much more difficult than if we went over at his heels. I may repeat that it was, and is, my opinion that the crossing of the Division might have been accomplished that night of the 6-7 with a minimum loss and with every prospect of success. To wait four days as actually occurred was to give the enemy every opportunity to catch his breath and to improve his defenses."

At 14:45 hours the 7th the bridge was completed and at 15:30 hours two platoons of "A" Company, 305th Infantry, crossed to the east bank and organized a line not more than 100 yards from the river. The Battalion had been assigned an 800 meter front, extending east from the road intersection just southwest of Amblimont.

However, further movement across the river was stopped by telephonic order. General Alexander says:

"As soon as I reached a telephone I called up the 1st Corps and told Craig (now Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army) of the orders I had given in regard to the bridge and the crossing of the Division, adding that it was my intention to seize the heights above Amblimont and to support Lenihan with Price's brigade. * * * Craig agreed that my proposed line of action was all right but about half an hour later I was called to the phone by General Liggett (the Army Commander) in person and told by him that the 77th was too isolated to make the attempt; that he had no troops with which to support me. I explained to General Liggett the situation as I saw it but he was firm in his decision. I therefore called up General Lenihan (our wires had been replaced) and transmitted to him the orders of the Army Commander."

Of the march of the 1st Division the night of November 6th-7th, General Alexander says:

"Some of the elements of the 1st following the road on the left bank of the Meuse, passed through the villages of Villers

and Remilly; others (or perhaps the same) passed through Angecourt where Raymond Sheldon had the P. C. of the 307th Infantry, while still others went through Haraucourt where Price was for the night."

About 22:30 hours the night of November 6th when the five columns of the First Division were already well on their way northwest and when the 77th Division had been settled down for the night for some hours with its advance elements holding the heights above the Meuse the Rainbow suddenly found it had work to do before morning.

At that hour Colonel Grayson M. P. Murphy, the G-2 of the Division, read the following order twice over the telephone, first to General MacArthur, commanding the 84th Brigade, and then to Colonel Reilly, commanding the 83rd Brigade.

"Headquarters 42nd Division,
American Expeditionary Forces, France

Memoriam to Brigade Commanders

6 Nov. 18
21:00 hours

Orders from the 1st Corps are most positive and explicit that the pursuit be kept up day and night without halting, and that Sedan must be reached and taken tonight, even if the last man and officer drops in his tracks. If the troops have stopped for tonight, they will be aroused at once and sent forward.

(sgd) Chas T. Menoher,
Major General, U. S. A."

General MacArthur carefully studied what this meant. He took into consideration the position of his brigade already on the heights above the Meuse, with most of the enemy to his front already across the river; and the condition of the intervening country. He therefore sent his brigade Adjutant, Major Walter Wolf, to the Division P. C. in Maisoncelles, with the request that the order be modified to the extent of continuing the attack at daybreak, since the heights controlling the railroad into Sedan were already in the possession of his brigade, and a daylight attack over unfamiliar and rough ground gave greater promise of success than one made at night. This request was acceded to.

Thus the principal action of the Division was on the front of the 83rd Infantry Brigade, the left brigade of the American Army.

Colonel Reilly, commanding that brigade, sent the following written orders by his Brigade Adjutant Major Doyle in a motorcycle:

"La Neuville-Marie, Nov. 6, 1918, 10:30 P. M.

"To the 166th Ohio:

"Have just had read to me over telephone a mandatory order that advance be continued regardless of conditions throughout night; that if men were asleep they were to be aroused, that Sedan would be captured by morning. Wake up your two battalions in Chemery and start at 2:00 A. M. Let Major Sampson's battalion, which has led so far, rest where it is; have that battalion given hot food in the morning and start out in column of route, not later than 8:00 A. M. to catch up with the others. Sedan is only eight kilometers by road and five across country from you. Make such personal appeal to your men as you think best from your knowledge of them. Apparently the high commend sets great value on the capture of Sedan immediately. Therefore it is up to us to make a final effort no matter what it costs us. My next move from here will be to your P. C. at Chemery. If you leave before I get there telephone me. Redden will follow you up. If your left flank needs protection tomorrow Sampson's battalion and Redden's guns will be in a position to help you. Our advance tonight has one advantage and that is surprise. If I am not at your P. C. by daylight, send me a situation report to reach me by telephone not later than 6:30 A. M."

A similar written order was sent to Colonel Dravao, commanding the 165th Infantry.

To Major Graef, commanding the 150th Wisconsin Machine Gun Battalion, the Brigade Adjutant, Major Doyle, carried the following written order; written and dispatched at the same time as the other two:

"As soon as you receive this get your command ready to move forward at 2:00 A. M. Have captain of company nearest Bulson report to Col. Dravao with his company for duty until further orders. Whole Brigade moves forward at two A. M. in an effort to capture Sedan. Appeal to pride of your command and tell them General Pershing has personally stated to General Menoher the great importance of getting Sedan immediately and therefore it is up to us even if it is our last spurt. My message

center will be at Chemery, until further orders. No matter where I am you can reach me there. Send me a situation report as of 5:00 A. M. to reach Chemery not later than 6:30 A.M. Shove it hard and remember that you have two regiments to support and that the way to do it is by using all your guns at once. Every time you change position (P.C.) notify me personally."

Owing to the difficulties of communication in the rough country in which they then were that night and a heavy fog, Colonel Dravao did not succeed in getting his regiment started until daylight.

On the left Colonel Hough, commanding the 166th Ohio, promptly issued orders for the 3rd Battalion, to advance through the 1st, then on the outpost line, and march on Sedan, using the main highway. The 2nd Battalion was to follow in support with its leading elements a thousand meters in rear of the rear elements of the 3rd Battalion. At 1:45 hours, November 7th, Major Haubrich's 3rd Battalion with "K" Company in the lead, passed through the outposts of the 1st Battalion on the Sedan highway and marched north.

Major Geran's 2nd Battalion reached Chehery and vicinity. At about 3:45 hours, November 7th, the 3rd Battalion of the 28th Infantry, leading column No. 4 of the 1st Division, caught up here with Geran's 2nd Battalion of the 166th Ohio.

The leading elements of Haubrich's 3rd Battalion of the 166th Ohio had gotten about 1 kilometer beyond the crossroads east of Chevouges by 5:30 hours. Here they ran into machine gun and other enemy fire from German positions in the woods to the east and west and on the brow of Hill 307 to the north. Haubrich deployed his battalion along the road running southeast to Cheveuges, with "I" and "K" Companies in the front line and "L" and "M" in support.

Their further advance was then stopped by the enemy's fire which greatly increased when full daylight permitted them to see the number of American troops in the valley to their front and reports from their left showed them their whole bridgehead was under attack.

At 9:20 hours the 83rd Brigade issued an order for the support and reserve battalions to move into line on either flank of Haubrich. The 1st Battalion moved at 13 hours into position

in the ravine near the Chateau Racan, where its advance halted, until 16 hours, when it received orders that it was being relieved by the French. This relief was made after dark. The Battalion marched to a bivouac position in the valley south of the Chemery—Maisoncelle Road.

The 2nd Battalion in obedience to these orders moved Company "E", which was in the lead, into position about 300 yards north of Chehery, Companies "F" and "G" took positions to the left of that town and "H" in the rear. The Battalion remained in these positions until relieved by the French just before dark. It then marched to a bivouac position something over a kilometer southwest of Chemery.

During this time the 3rd Battalion of the 28th Infantry moved as follows: At 7 hours it emerged from the woods south of Chehery, promptly coming under the fire of the German machine guns on the ridge east of Chehery and the wooded rim of the amphitheatre running north. The attack formation was taken up with "I" Company on the right of the front line, and "K" on its left, supported by "L" and "M". The leading elements reached Chehery at 7:40 hours. "I" Company advanced in two lines of squad columns through the fields on the right of the Sedan highway, "K" in column of platoons near the stream west of the highway, "K" deployed when near Cheveuges. A patrol of "L" Company sent to the right along the eastern edge of the valley was stopped by the enemy's fire. Later a platoon sent out on the same mission was also stopped. About 400 yards south of Cheveuges the Battalion deployed and halted.

After a short pause the advance was resumed. The right Company ran immediately into heavy enemy fire from Hill 307 and the edges of the Bois de la Marfee. The left Company moved under cover of Cheveuges not encountering any resistance until it left the northern edge of the town. After an advance of about 500 yards from the town, it was brought to a halt by enemy fire from Hill 307 and the edges of that same wood.

A half hour before noon the line of the 28th Infantry was ordered organized. As it was still under fire from the right flank as well as the front, "A" Company, then in support in Chehery, was ordered to work through the west edge of the woods northward to clean them out and cover the right flank of the 3rd

Battalion. This was done with the result that the front line moved forward about 300 yards until approximately abreast of the leading elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 166th Ohio. Here the enemy's fire halted them. They remained in this position until they started their withdrawal the middle of the afternoon.

The 26th Infantry, making up the fifth or extreme left column of the 1st Division, on reaching Chemery, instead of turning north, marched to Malmy and then to Omicourt.

This put them directly in front of the 40th French Infantry Division. This division having had no orders to move during the night, had only begun to move forward early in the morning from the general line along which the 83rd Infantry Brigade had halted the evening before, but from which it had moved north when the orders for the night attack came.

The Germans resisted in the woods north of Omicourt. However, the 26th mopped up the woods.

During the afternoon and evening the 26th Infantry was relieved by the Infantry of the 40th French Division.

The 165th New York with the 2nd Battalion leading, advanced at 7:30 hours. It immediately came under heavy fire from the high ground to its north. Despite their ammunition having been exhausted, "G" Company and part of "H" Company, assaulted Hill 346 with the bayonet, killing, wounding, taking prisoners, and driving off the Germans.

That afternoon at 13:30 hours the advance was continued beyond the hill. Shortly before 14 hours, the 3rd Battalion, which was then in support, passed through the 2nd, assaulted and took Hill 252. About this time some of the 16th Infantry, which had advanced along the road Pont Mogis-Thelonne, attacked the hill from the north.

Around 16 hours, the 165th New York sent out two patrols towards Wadelincourt. These patrols, each of about 20 men, succeeded in getting to within 100 yards of the town. However, the enemy's fire was so strong that they retired again. The 3rd Battalion dug in as did the elements of the 16th Infantry on its right.

The 16th Infantry was withdrawn after dusk.

Shortly after the 3rd Battalion of the 165th had relieved the 2nd on Hill 346, the 1st Battalion was ordered to move forward. When west of Chaumont, it came under heavy machine gun fire from the Bois de la Marfee. Shortly after it was ordered to mop up this wood. It mopped up the eastern edge but was prevented from entering the woods by friendly artillery fire from a French battery which despite messages sent to have it raised continued to fire. At this time an order was received to cover the left flank of the 3rd Battalion. This was done despite enemy fire into the left flank as the movement forward to Hill 252 was made. Both Battalions were relieved by the French about dawn.

Brig. Gen. Douglass MacArthur says: "By nightfall of the 6th of November, the 84th Brigade was on the top of the ridges overlooking the Meuse River. The enemy in front of the 77th Division on my right had already crossed to the north bank of that river. There was no strong body of the enemy to my immediate front between me and the river. Such enemy troops as there were to my front were detachments sent out from the enemy's rear guard, the position of which was primarily in front of the 83rd Infantry Brigade and the French on their left.

"As the country is rugged and difficult, with very few paths or roads, I saw no reason, in view of the general situation, to push my men forward during the night. Upon my presentation of the case to Division Headquarters, they agreed.

"Early in the morning, before daybreak, my orderly officer came into my room at Bulson and said that there was an officer of the 1st Division outside. I was very much astonished to hear this, but went out and found it was Colonel Ericsson.

" 'What are you doing here, Ericsson?' I said.

" 'Here are my orders,' he replied.

"After glancing at them, I said, 'Where are your troops now ?'

" 'The 16th Infantry is coming up the river road now. The 18th is coming along by the Maisoncelle-Bulson Road,' he answered me.

"I was very much surprised, but made up my mind that the first thing to do was to avoid any chance of units of the 84th Brigade mistaking men of the 1st Brigade for Germans and firing

into them, various incidents of this kind in wars of the past flashing through my mind.

"It was not only dark, the way it was at Chancellorsville when Stonewall Jackson was killed by his own men by mistake, but it was also foggy. I therefore decided to personally go out to warn different units, and to be on hand to take charge of any incidents which might happen from the mixture of the two brigades.

"It was while I was doing this, accompanied by my adjutant, Major Walter Wolf, that, due probably to my cap, an officer and some men of the 16th Infantry mistook me at first for a German. The stories which have been going around about my being taken and held as a prisoner are founded on this incident and, of course are greatly exaggerated."

At 6:30 hours the 167th Alabama advanced with its 1st Battalion in the lead, in columns of twos, down the Bulson-Thelonne Road. When opposite the Hill west of Thelonne it formed for assault, "G" Company on the right and "E" on the left of the front line with "F" and "H" in support. It passed the crest, and moved northeast to Noyers. About one kilometer northeast of Chaumont there is a long, narrow, unnamed wood. Enemy machine guns in this wood stopped the advance for a few minutes. This fire not only got the leading companies, but also the support companies then on the crest of the hill, because at this moment the fog lifted and the Germans could see clearly to their front. The leading companies drove the enemy out of the woods, assisted by an attack of elements of the 16th Infantry coming from the Pont Maugis-Thelonne Road, and by other companies of the 167th Alabama moving from southwest of Noyers. The Battalion then advanced until by 15:30 hours it was in the ravine west of Noyers. Here it remained for the balance of the day, out of front line contact on both flanks. Such remaining Germans as had not already crossed the river, did so after dark.

The 3rd Battalion in support at noon sent "M" Company to occupy Thelonne. It did so and established outposts beyond that town. Half of Companies "K" and "L" were organized into a patrol, and ordered to advance to organize a position to the east of Pont Maugis just south of the Meuse River. The remainder of these two companies and "I" Company were held in support.

At 14:15 hours the patrol reached Pont Maugis, where it ran into the German rear guard whose fire drove them back to Thelonne. About this time the Battalion was ordered into reserve south of Bulsom. The German rear guard was now threatened on its left flank by the attacks of the 83rd Infantry Brigade and the 16th Infantry. Therefore, it was withdrawn from Pont Maugis, about 16 hours, to Hill 252. Here it was attacked by the 165th New York, and elements of the 16th Infantry, as already told.

The 1st Battalion was not in contact with the enemy from the time the 2nd passed through it at the beginning of the morning's advance of the Alabama regiment.

On the extreme right of the Rainbow, the 168th Iowa moved forward at 6:30 hours with "I" and "M" Companies supported by "A", "K" and "L" of the 3rd Battalion in the lead. It encountered little resistance until the leading elements started to descend the hill west of Aillicourt and Remilly toward the road running northeasterly in the direction of the Meuse River. Then they were in sight of the enemy on the other bank of that river. The fire was so strong and so accurately directed that they withdrew to the road near the crest. As it was obvious that the enemy to their front had crossed the river, the line was organized here.

Some of the elements of the 16th Infantry had passed through the outposts of "I" Company of the 168th Infantry shortly after midnight. These had passed on and were the elements of that regiment which later in the day fought alongside the 165th New York. However, other units of the 16th Infantry which were following them, with the lifting of the fog had come under fire from the Germans on the other bank of the Meuse River. When these Germans saw the 168th Infantry come over the crest and start down the hill, they shifted their fire from the 16th Infantry to the 168th. This permitted these groups of the 16th Infantry to take shelter in defiladed ground in front of the 168th Here they remained until after dark. During the day the 2nd Battalion of the 168th Iowa remained in support at Beau Menil Farm and the 1st in Reserve near le Lavoir Farm.

In the afternoon a non-commissioned officers' patrol was sent out by "M" Company to investigate Pont Maugis. However,

the Germans after having been driven out in the morning, had reoccupied it. They drove the patrol back with their fire.

In the meanwhile on the left the French 40th Infantry Division was entering the situation.

The Commanding Officer of the 83d Infantry Brigade had finished going over the situation with Colonel Hough at Chemery and issuing his orders for the 166th Ohio and the 149th Illinois Field Artillery which had come up. He was preparing to go up the wooded hill between Chemery and Chehery from which there was a good view to the front and from which easy access could be had to both his infantry regiments, when in came Colonel Le Comte Denie of the French 40th Infantry Division. He stated politely but firmly in French that the French had made inquiries through their echelons of command as far back as General Petain's headquarters; that no change in divisional sectors had been made; that as had been pointed out the day before the main highway leading into Sedan was not the dividing line between the American left and the French right; that instead the road running through Chemery-Bulson-Thelonne was, as had been stated in the order at the time the advance was started; that all troops of both the 42nd and 1st Divisions to the left (west) of this line were out of their sector, in that of the French, and therefore should be immediately removed. He added that this being so beyond any reasonable doubt he requested Colonel Reilly to immediately notify the Commanding General of the 42nd Division in person requesting him to remove his troops to their proper sector.

Colonel Reilly replied in French that he did not feel that he should leave his own brigade while a combat was going on, but that he promised to immediately notify General Menoher, the Division Commander, of the message which he had just received and of the circumstances under which he had received. Colonel Denie thanked him, shook hands and left.

The following letter was immediately dictated by Colonel Reilly to the stenographer, whom with his typewriter he always carried in the seat alongside the driver of his car.

"HEADQUARTERS 83RD INFANTRY BRIGADE"
American Expeditionary Forces,
France, November 7, 1918.

"From: Commanding Officer, 83rd Infantry Brigade.
To: Commanding General, 42nd Division.
Subject: A. Arrival of the 1st Division within our lines.
B. Complaint of the French 40th Infantry Division as to our sector limits.

"A. 1. The attached map shows the position of the front line of this Brigade at 10:00 a. m. today, and the positions of the two front line regiments of the 40th French Infantry Division. They have been held up for the time being by machine gun fire coming generally in the direction shown by the arrows. There is also some artillery fire which has increased in the last hour. Preparations are being made to continue the advance.

"2. Early this morning a battalion of the 28th Infantry came in in rear of the 166th Infantry. They said they had orders to take Sedan. I ordered the two leading battalions of the 166th Infantry to close up and not to let the 28th Infantry pass them. The 28th then was kept in rear of these two leading battalions until they came up against the fair amount of resistance which they are now facing. This battalion then passed our support battalion by going alongside the road, and crowded up into our first line where it now is held up in the same manner as our own troops. A major of the Signal Corps of the 1st Division arrived in Chehery early this morning and stated that he was going to establish a P. C. there for the 1st Division. On being told that he must be mistaken, he said, no, that the 1st Division was advancing in five columns, one of which was behind us, and the four others were coming across the front of the division in columns roughly parallel to the Meuse. Later this morning the Division Commander, Major General Parker, with one of his Brigade Commanders, entered Chehery and told Lt.-Colonel Campbell of the 166th Infantry, who is stationed there, that he was going to cross the river and go into line to the left of this brigade and that he also was going to the right of the Division and was going to advance on Sedan.

"3. On receipt of this information I ordered the 166th Infantry to continue their preparations for advance and advance

as soon as they could. The 165th Infantry so far has not come in contact with the 1st Division. A liaison officer sent to General MacArthur reports that his brigade has already come in contact with columns of the 1st Division coming from his right.

"B. 1. Yesterday I reported to the Division Commander that the dividing line between this sector and the French sector as assigned to me was not the same as that assigned to the 40th French Infantry Division; that our sector cut diagonally across the front of theirs. Yesterday I also, as previously reported, sent a liaison officer to the 40th French Infantry Division with a map showing the sector as assigned to me. This morning I received the attached note which protests against the sector limits in which I am now operating, * * * It is to be noted that not only are we in front of the French according to the limits which they understand but that the 1st Division, by extending our line to the left, will be in front of the French even should they accept the sector limits assigned to me.

"2. Lieutenant Lombardi of the 149th Field Artillery, whom I sent to the 40th French Infantry Division yesterday as a liaison officer, has just returned and makes the following report:

"The Chief of Staff of the 40th French Infantry Division called for me this morning and showed me an order coming from the 6th French Army Corps, dated November 6, 1918, and giving the eastern limits of the sector of the 40th French Infantry Division as follows:

CHEMERY west (included)—BULSON (to the 1st American Army Corps)—CHAUMONT—NOYERS—PONT MAUGIS and Pont-Maugis (the last three points to the French Army Corps).

He stated that the Americans were on the main road CHEHERY—CHEHERY—FRENOIS, and were in CONNAGE, and that their presence on this road rendered practically impossible the advance of the French in their sector. He therefore requested me to go to my Brigade Commander, give him this information, and request in the name of the General of the 40th French Infantry Division, that the American elements be moved further east and away from this main road."

HENRY J. REILLY,
Colonel, U. S. A., F. A., Cmdg. 83rd Inf. Brigade.

Colonel Reilly immediately sent this letter by motorcycle messenger to the Division Headquarters. A very short time thereafter he got an order to report in person to General Menoher at Division Headquarters. He found it in a small masonry building in Maisoncelles. As he stepped in the door he met Colonel Hughes, who said, "The General is talking over the telephone to General Dickman, the Corps Commander, but come right in with me as General Dickman may want to talk to you because General Menoher has just been reading him the letter you just sent over."

The room was a small whitewashed one with a red brick floor. The only furniture was a couple of tables, a few chairs, some of Colonel Hughes' maps on the wall and General Menoher standing talking into a telephone fixed to the wall.

As Colonel Hughes and Colonel Reilly entered he turned around, saw them and then turned back to the telephone, saying, "Here he is now." General Dickman's reply could be heard, though the words were indistinguishable. The tone was loud and one of anger.

As he finished, General Menoher turned around and said, "Colonel Reilly, General Dickman wishes to speak to you now."

Colonel Reilly stepped to the telephone. Before he could say anything, General Dickman said, "Is that you, Reilly?"

"Yes, sir," was the answer.

"I want you to carry out the following exactly as I tell you. Do you understand that?" said the General.

"Yes, sir," replied the Colonel.

"I want you to personally find Major General Parker and tell him that I order him to immediately withdraw the 1st Division from its present position to the rear and outside of the sector of the 42nd Division. Do you understand that message?" were the words which came thundering over the telephone.

"Yes, sir," said the Colonel once more.

"You understand, I want you to find him immediately and deliver that message in just the words that I have given you," said General Dickman.

"Yes, sir, I understand exactly what you want done and will do it as you have ordered without any variation," replied Colonel Reilly.

"Then ask General Menoher to come to the phone once more," said the General.

General Menoher returned to the phone and stood there while again the voice but not the words of General Dickman could be heard.

Turning around but without putting down the receiver he said, "Colonel Reilly, General Dickman has just repeated to me his instructions to you. There is nothing more except your prompt execution of them."

"Yes, sir," said the Colonel, and started for the door. As he left, he could hear General Menoher saying, "Yes, General, he is leaving this instant to carry out your orders."

Colonel Reilly left to find General Parker whom he expected to pick up somewhere between Chemery and Chehery as the highway to Sedan undoubtedly had become the axis of the attack of the 1st Division.

As he was passing through Chemery he ran into Brigadier General "Bill Nye" (Henry W.) Butner, who commanded the 1st Artillery Brigade. He said, "Good morning, General Butner, haven't seen you since the day we relieved you in front of Exermont, when just before I made my reconnaissance you furnished me with a mass of details from your own map. Where is General Parker? I have an order from General Dickman which I am to deliver him in person as quickly as possible."

"Oh, he's gone south. The whole division is moving out. He was in Chehery but General Summerall drove in there 'like a bat out of hell' with his usual recklessness under fire. Why he wasn't killed I don't know, because the Germans had direct observation and fire on the road as he dashed in. He ordered General Parker to immediately withdraw the division. Some of them are already out and the rest are withdrawing," replied General Butner.

"I don't know where he is now, but he is well south of here," he added after a moment.

Whatever the criticisms and misunderstandings arising from the interpretation of the words, "Boundaries will not be considered binding," every soldier who has experienced the hardships of war must admire the spirit and determination shown by the 1st Division in their long night's march following a day of battle,

followed by a day of battle on the hills around Sedan, and finished with another long march.

Of the march to Sedan, the History of the First Division says: "The sufferings of that night march will remain one of the most memorable of the war's horrors. The men were already worn physically and mentally. Again the rain soaked their heavy packs and made the destroyed roads even more muddy for the weary and sore feet. Progress was slow in the darkness and the craving for sleep was overpowering."

Summing up what the Division had been through, the 1st Division History says:

"Between 4:30 P. M. November 5th and Midnight November 7th, the Division had marched or fought without sleep or rest. The 16th Infantry had covered 54 kilometers; the 18th Infantry 53 kilometers; the 26th Infantry 71 kilometers, and the 28th Infantry 52 kilometers. The other units had marched in proportion."

During this time they had lost 10 officers, killed and wounded, 477 enlisted men killed and wounded, 4 missing and 15 prisoners.

Whatever the rivalries brought on by the race for Sedan, the men and officers of the Rainbow who saw the men and officers of the 1st Division go down before the enemy's fire and who afterwards buried the dead of the 1st Division, felt admiration for their spirit in the attack and sorrow for their dead because they were officers and soldiers of the same army, wearing the same uniform, fighting under the same flag, to defeat the same enemy.

The following are extracts from a letter written November 8th by Major General Frank Parker, commanding the 1st Division, to Major General Charles P. Summerall, commanding the 5th Army Corps:

"On the afternoon of November 6th at about 2:00 p. m. the Corps Commander came in person to the P. C. of the First Division and gave a verbal order to the First Division to march immediately on Sedan with mission to cooperate and capture that town.

"This order was carried out with all possible expedition, the First Division, which was at that time completing its operation upon Mouzon was assembled and directed upon Sedan.

"The operation consisted clearly of two phases, the first the march of approach into position and the second the deployment after arrival into attack formation and the seizing of certain heights adjacent to the town, looking to the attack thereafter.

"At the time of starting it was not known that part of the country lying north of the line Stonne-Mouson and west of the Meuse was occupied by friendly troops. It was necessary therefore to conduct the march so as to cover this territory as completely as possible and to use as many routes as were practicable in the direction of Sedan.

" * * * This march was so directed as to place the right flank of the Division on the heights two kilometers south of Sedan, with the left flank along the same heights south of Villers sur Par, with a view to investigating the passages of the Meuse during the night of the 7th and to make a crossing on the morning of the 8th and capture the town, moving to the west and north of it.

"The operation was carried out smoothly, the heights south of Sedan having been taken by the Division at about mid-day, when the Corps Commander came in person to the P. C. of the Division Commander and gave him instructions to have the Division moved further toward the east so as to entirely clear the line of advance of the 42nd Division. The Corps Commander gave distinct orders to the commander of the First Division that it must be moved completely out of the way of the 42nd Division. These orders were about to be given when a subsequent order caused the immediate withdrawal of the First Division from the vicinity of Sedan, this movement commencing at about 4:00 p. m.

"In the early evening of November 6th, two staff officers were sent respectively one to the 1st Corps and one to the 6th Division reaching the 1st Corps Headquarters at about 9:00 p. m. and Captain Ackers of the 1st Division reaching the Headquarters of the 6th Division at about 6:30 p. m., to inform those headquarters of the proposed movement of the First Division.

"I wish to state that if the First Division has entered territory that belonged to other troops that the fault has been mine, but there has been an absolute honesty of purpose and an entirely single minded purpose to cooperate fully and entirely unselfishly

with our comrades of the 42nd and 77th Division, for both of which the First Division has not only the highest professional admiration but likewise the warmest feelings of personal friendship, as has been shown on all occasions and in all echelons, without exception, wherever the members of these divisions have come in contact with each other."

General Summerall says :* "From the moment of the breakthrough by the Fifth Corps on November 1st, it was evident that the hour of realization of the American tactics (open warfare) was at hand. * * * After November 1st the rapid gains of the First American Army caused the front line divisions to lose contact and the net work of telephones by which liaison had been maintained no longer existed. Each division was virtually fighting alone as it progressed. * * * It has been a tradition in our military history that advancing and attacking the enemy was the crowning quality of a leader. At 8 a. m. May 12th, 1864, Burnside reported to Grant 'I am unable to connect with Hancock.' Grant replied 'Push the enemy. That's the way to connect with Hancock.' It was such a reputation that gave Hancock the title of 'The Superb.' * * * While returning from the visit to the First Division on November 7th (told of in General Parker's letter), I met General Menoher commanding the 42nd Division, and his staff, in cars moving his P. C. forward. He did not stop, though he could have and reported to me any complaint that he had to make of the First Division. Following him I met General Gatley, who commanded the 67th Field Artillery Brigade, accompanied by his staff in cars. I stopped him and he informed me that the Division Headquarters was changing command posts. I asked about the operation. He exclaimed, characteristically, that the Brigade had shot h--l out of the Boche and all was going fine. His command post was with the Division Headquarters, and he would have known of any complaints. Had he heard any, I am sure that he would have told me."

While this was going on, the French 40th Infantry Division continued to advance in accordance with the original boundary between the left of the 42nd Division and the right of Gouraud's French Army, that is the boundary which ran through Chemery

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* Letter to Rainbow Division Historian.

just to the left of Bulson, to the right of Noyer Pont-Maugis, through Noyer Pont-Maugis, thence across the river and just to the left of Bazeilles.

Their left boundary was just to the right of Vendresse Saint-Aignan sur-Bar, to the left of Frenois Gairle thence across the River to Flowing, the plateau which in 1870 was the scene of the three desperately gallant but unsuccessful charges of General Marguerite's cavalry. This put Sedan exactly in the middle of the sector of the 40th French Infantry.

The movement of the French brought them behind the 26th Infantry on the extreme left of the 1st Division, and along, through and into the territory occupied by the 166th Ohio, and the 28th Infantry. On the right it brought them up to the 165th New York, and the 16th Infantry.

At 13 hours, November 7th, the headquarters of the 42nd Division in a G-3 memorandum ordered the 83rd Infantry Brigade to withdraw from the line as soon as these French units were in a position to carry out the relief.

This memorandum brought the boundary between the Americans and the French back to the original one which the French had claimed throughout and still claimed had not been altered as far as they knew or could find out.

At the time of the relief the 83rd Brigade with the 149th Field Artillery in support was in an excellent position to drive the Germans from their position on Hill 307 and in the Bois de la Marfée back to and across the Meuse.

A glance at the map shows that the final position of the Third and First battalions of the 165th New York, and with the Second Battalion of that regiment and the First and Second Battalions of the 166th Ohio and the 150th Wisconsin Machine Gun battalions available to continue the attack; the Germans in front of the Third Battalion of the 166th Ohio and in the Bois de la Marfée were in a critical position.

Their withdrawal after dark proved they understood it.

The 84th Infantry Brigade through Field Order No. 55 was ordered to take over the Division front which now, incidentally, corresponded in general to the front already held by that brigade.

Paragraph (c) of the order said:

"After clearing the sector of hostile troops the elements of the 84th Infantry Brigade will be organized well in depth under direction of the Brigade Commander. Forward positions subjected to shell fire will be held as lightly as circumstances permit. Rear elements will be placed with a view to defending the ridge south of Bulson-Thelonne."

The order also provided that after the relief of the 83rd Infantry Brigade by the 40th French Division, the Brigade would be concentrated in an area south of Maisoncelle and north of the Bois de Montdieu.

It is interesting to note that fate in crowding the 83rd Infantry Brigade out of the line, while leaving the 84th in, had conformed to the schedule of the Rainbow Division, which was to have its brigades alternate in line when in a quiet sector, though always putting them abreast for real combat. It was the turn of the 84th Brigade to be in line because the last time this situation arose during the last half of October, it had been the turn of the 83rd Brigade to be in line.

At 10:25 p. m. that evening in Chemery Colonel Reilly received the following message from Lieutenant Lombardi, his liaison officer, who was with the French Colonel of Infantry of the 40th French Infantry Division. The message was from Connage:—

"The Infantry of the 40th French Division has received an order to advance, beginning this evening at 23.00 H.* and to push on to the Meuse before daylight.

"The prescribed itinerary is as follows:

"251st Inf. along the route Nationale which leads to Sedan.

"150th Inf. in two columns as follows:

"(1) Dirt road from Ferme de St. Quentin and going first east then north, passing by Hill 230, and going toward Wadelincourt, keeping to the west of Noyes-Pont-Maugis.

"(2) More to the west—from Ferme de St. Quentin, passing to the west of Hill 320, going through Bois de la Marfee, Petit Corcy.

"161st Inf. Divisional reserve. The headquarters of the

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* Hours or 11 p. m.

40th D. I. is now at Connage. Those of the Division in the Chateau at La Cassine.

"The general commanding the Division sent me to the I. D. * this afternoon.

"Lombard."

From early in the morning when there no longer was any doubt that the French were convinced that the 83rd Brigade Infantry was out of its sector and there was no doubt that the First Division was on the ground in full force and not simply represented by a battalion or two, Colonel Reilly's mind had gone back to the Civil War controversies on which he had been brought up as a boy in the Regular Army.

He felt certain that even if no controversy resulted from the situation, there would always be a friendly rivalry between the 1st and 42nd Division as to who got closest to Sedan.

His experiences with the French, first as a war correspondent from 1914 to 1917, and then as an American Officer at the front, had shown him that the French Officers were as chivalrous in war as he had found them on various peace-time visits to France in the decade prior to the war. He therefore made up his mind to ask his French neighbors if he could send a company of infantry of the 83rd Brigade to accompany them n the advance just outlined in Lombardi's note.

He therefore wrote and sent the following note by mounted courier to Lieutenant Lombardi:

"Please tell I. D., immediately, that our Divisional Commander, General Menoher, myself and the officers and enlisted men of this brigade, would consider it a great compliment to the 42nd Division and the 83rd Brigade, should we be allowed to have a company accompany them into Sedan, preferably to take part in the attack with them, but should they not wish that, to follow them. We have been at the front continuously now without 'permission' for nine months and having served with the 5th and 6th French Corps in Lorraine, and with the 20th Corps in Champagne, July 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, would feel highly honored to cross the Meuse at the same time as the French. Two of our patrols have been within 200 yards of

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* Infanterie Divisional, Headquarters of French Colonel commanding the three infantry regiments of the Division.

Wadelincourt this evening. They report a few machine guns. Most of the fire they received, however, was from across the river.

"HENRY J. REILLY,
Col. F. A., Cmdg. 83rd Inf. Brigade.

Shortly after midnight the reply came in the form of a note written in purple ink on a white page criss-crossed with vertical and horizontal red lines and numbered with a large black 37 in the upper right-hand corner—obviously torn out of a notebook. The translation is as follows:

"8th of November at midnight 30 minutes.

"The Colonel commanding the 40th Infantry Division, French, to the Colonel commanding the 83rd Brigade, American:

"Very honored by the request which has just been addressed to him by the Colonel commanding the 83rd Brigade, American: the Colonel commanding the Infantry Brigade, 40th, French, agrees with the greatest pleasure that an American company accompany the infantry of the 40th Division of Infantry tomorrow in its advance on the Meuse and especially up to Sedan if that happy result is accomplished.

"The order for the advance must come from my chief of corps, but the commander of the American company selected to attach itself to the operations of the 40th Infantry Division need only report either to me or to the commander of the regiment as he wishes, in which case he will present this note.

"The Colonel commanding the 40th Infantry Division thanks the Colonel commanding the 83rd American Brigade and his brave officers to have addressed such a request to him which has touched him deeply.

"Vive l' Amerique! LeComte Denie."

Here is Captain Baker's own story of his detail with the French—

"At 7:00 o'clock on the morning of November 8, 1918, Co. 'D', 166th Infantry, marched north from Chemery with the mission of reporting to the Commanding Officer, 251st Infantry (French), and participate in the capture of and entry into Sedan, as a representative unit of the 83rd Infantry Brigade. About the middle of the afternoon I learned that the headquarters of

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

One of the last shells fired by the Germans at the Rainbow Division, Near Sedan. It killed Lt. Estep of the Signal Corps, who took this picture. The undeveloped negative found in his camera on his body was this picture.

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

Closest to Sedan, D Company, 166th Ohio, front row left to right, Capt. Boularron, Lieut. Col. Ludovic Abel de Ville, Capt. Faivet, all of the 40th French Division. The Americans are: Capt. Russell Baker, Co. D, 166th Regiment Infantry, 42nd Division; 1st Lieut. Alison Reppy, commanding 1st Battalion, 166th Regiment Infantry; Capt. R. Gowdy, intelligence officer, 166th Regiment Infantry. This one company was selected to have the honor of entering Sedan in triumph with the French forces. Frenois, near Sedan, Ardennes, France, November 8, 1918.

the regiment was in Frenois. I reported there to the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel deVille, and was most cordially received by him and the members of his staff.

"The other officers assigned to the company were: 1st Lt. George E. Crotinger, Marion, Ohio; 1st Lt. Colvin H. Todd, Bastrop, La., and 1st Lt. Thomas L. Freeman, Arlington, Mass. In addition Captain Robert Gowdy and 1st Lt. Allison Reppy, regimental and battalion intelligence officers, came along.

"Late that afternoon the Regimental Commander informed me that he was sending a patrol to reconnoiter the bridge over the Meuse River into Sedan, asking if I cared to be represented. I detailed the 3d Platoon, commanded by Lt. Crotinger, to accompany the French patrol. They left Frenois at 5:30 p. m. and returned at 2:30 a. m., being unable to advance beyond the village of Torcey. The 1st Platoon, commanded by Lt. Todd, went out at 8:30 p. m. with another French patrol. It returned at 4:00 a. m., having reached the village of Forges. There were no casualties in either patrol.

"That evening Colonel de Ville and his staff entertained our officers at dinner. Compared to meals we had been having, this one was a real banquet. A few months before, my father had sent me a few small silk United States flags. Upon completion of the dinner I asked Lieut. Reppy to present one of them to the Regimental Commander. Colonel de Ville accepted the token in a manner that brought tears to the eyes of many of us.

"The following morning the Commanding General, 40th Division (French), came to Frenois. Following the introductions he informed us that the enemy had requested an armistice, that his division would take no decisive action pending action on this request, and that therefore I was at liberty to rejoin my regiment.

"Appreciating the honor that had been bestowed upon us by the brigade and regimental commanders and hoping that we would be able to enter Sedan with French forces, I decided to remain, pending receipt of orders from my own regimental commander. Later that forenoon they came.

"The return march was started at noon, November 9th.

Upon arriving at Cheveuges one of our brigade staff officers gave me instructions to bury the American dead in the vicinity of the cemetery there. Approximately a dozen bodies were found. They were mostly men from the 1st Division. There were several from our regiment. After receiving permission from the village authorities to do so, the bodies were interred in the village cemetery, which the German shells had pretty badly mussed up on the seventh.

"The night of November 9-10 was spent in Chemery. We resumed the march the following morning and joined the regiment that evening at Sommouthe.

Thus the Americans who got closer to Sedan than any other Americans belonged to Company D of the 166th Ohio. Therefore the Ohio Regiment, the 83rd Infantry Brigade and the Rainbow Division have the honor of having had elements closer to Sedan than any other American regiment, brigade and division.

Here is the personal story of Major Robert Haubrich who commanded the 3d Battalion of the 166th Ohio, the leading battalion of that regiment on November 7th.

He says:—

"At about 11:30 P. M. November 6th, a runner from regimental headquarters called me and stated that Col. Hough wished to see me at once. I went to the regimental CP where I found all Battalion Commanders of the regiment present. Col. Hough stated he had just received orders from the Brigade Commander to advance at once with the object of reaching Sedan by daylight. He read the order.

"Col. Hough said to me: Haubrich, you're IT!

"Col. Hough was asked if the 165th on our right and the French on our left were to attack at the same time and he said: 'Yes, that's my understanding.' I returned to Battalion Headquarters and at once notified the Company Commanders to prepare their Companies to move toward Sedan, but said: 'You will feed your Companies first.'

"I designated Co. 'K' under Capt. Hutchcraft as the advance guard and ordered him where we moved to proceed along the Sedan road. After all arrangements were made for the Battalion to march, I again went to Col. Hough's headquarters.

" 'Do you know what this means?' I asked the Colonel.

" 'Of course, I do,' he replied.

" 'How in the Hell am I going to do it with the distance I have to go by daylight?'

" 'Well, what's your idea?' he answered.

" 'Well, Colonel, I am just going to use an old-fashioned advance guard and pay no attention to the French or the 165th, because it is very dark and the territory is very rugged,' I said.

" 'That is exactly what I would do,' the Colonel said.

"We left Chemery about 2:15 A. M. and proceeding north toward Sedan. After going about three kilometers a German 77 was seen about 350 meters to our left. They were firing on some empty barracks in the vicinity of Chemery. One of my staff suggested that I send a patrol across the valley to put this gun out. I said, 'No, so long as they are not firing on us. Our mission is to reach Sedan. The more of a surprise we are the better our chances.' Before the end of the column had passed a small rocket went up in the vicinity of this gun. They ceased firing immediately.

"At Chehery we passed through the 1st Battalion. My Battalion was marching in columns of two's, one column on each side of the road. Just beyond Chehery after passing through the 1st Battalion I had my Captains, including Captain Hutchcraft, Commander of the advance guard, come to me. While telling them the formation to take, a German machine gun fired about forty shots on the road just ahead of us. There were no casualties. I immediately sent out a patrol but the Germans left too quickly for the patrol to catch them. The morning was more or less foggy.

"About 5:00 A. M. we reached Cheveuges. The advance guard at that time had approached to about little more than three kilometers from Sedan. There was heavy shelling and machine gun action. I put the Battalion P. C. at a small house where the road to Cheveuges branches off from the main highway. At dawn I sent a patrol through the town of Cheveuges and drove out what remained of the German forces. Three patrols I sent to the right were unable to contact any American troops. The only contacting made on the right, left and front were Germans.

"About 7:30 A. M. Lieutenant Donnen reported that Captain Hutchcraft had been killed in an attempt to make a reconnaissance up the hill to our front.

"At this time I ordered L Company to occupy the ridge to our right. About 9:00 A. M. the 3rd Battalion, 28 Infantry, First Division, attempted to cut through our lines. I got contact with the Major in command, and sent word I had asked our own artillery to comb the woods to our right and left and the hill in front of us. His battalion dug in in the vicinity of Cheveuges. I was wounded about this time and walked to the aid station at Chehery where I remained until dusk. During the afternoon the First Division was withdrawn from the Sector and French troops began coming in. The Battalion was in command of Captain Virgil Peck while I was away. The French relieved us about 2:00 A. M. November 8th."

The following story is told by Private Thomas B. Reed, one of the members of Captain Hutchcraft's patrol:

"On November 6, 1918, Co. 'K', 166th Infantry, 3rd Battalion, of which I was a member, advanced all day, in support of the 1st Battalion. Late that day we billeted in a town called Chemery. Was this so-called halt welcome!

"It meant a chance to stretch out and rest till the next day, or at least that is what we thought. Before that night was over, we learned we were wrong. The middle of the night we were called out with orders to advance on Sedan. Co. 'K' was ordered to send out an advance guard, Sedan being our objective.

"Captain Hutchcraft, commander of my company, had said that he would not send a man where he would not go himself. He chose the 4th Platoon, and instead of placing a lieutenant in charge of it, which most men would have done, he took command himself. We started out. It did not take us long to reach the outpost line established by the 1st Battalion for the night. We passed through, and on up the road, two columns of men, one on each side of the road, at about fifteen paces interval.

"The night was dark as pitch, except for an occasional flare of light in the cloudy sky, from artillery which was bombarding at the time. It was a relief to pass through this vicinity, I don't mind telling you, even though going through shell fire is a common occurrence for men at the front.

"Many a man on that patrol was never to come back!

"Shortly after the first signs of dawn we had advanced ten or twelve kilometers and reached the edge of another town (Cheveuges), as the road we were following did not go directly into it. At the side of the road there were several old men and women of French nationality, who had been prisoners since the Germans had taken the town, at the start of the war.

"They looked at us in awe. Well they might, as we learned later they did not know America was in the war. We managed to make out the best we could, from their meagre description, that a detachment of Germans had left the town a short time before while it was still pitch dark.

"We had advanced some distance past the town when a machine gun manned by some Germans cut loose at us from down in a valley some distance away. We took cover along side of the road, in a ditch, and returned their fire. It was not long until they picked up their gun and hot footed it out of there, on up the hill out of sight. We took the road once more. After advancing quite a distance we came to a bend in the road to the left, which went around the base of a hill.

"At this point Captain Hutchcraft halted the platoon. I can see him yet, standing there pondering to himself what move to make next. He finally decided to leave the road and go over the hill to our right. We deployed as skirmishers, and started up. At the top there was a thicket of scrubby bushes and scattered trees, which made an ideal place for the enemy to lie in ambush, as we were not long in finding out.

"We had advanced within a hundred feet or so of the top, when all of a sudden Hell in capital letters broke loose. It was in the shape of machine gun fire. Some of those machine guns were using tracer bullets. The air all around us was filled with red hot balls of fire, so thick it seemed you could cut it with a knife.

"Our Captain was among the first to go down mortally wounded!

"The only thing the remainder of us could do was to lie as close to the side of the hill as possible, and pray to luck. There

was absolutely no chance for the men who remained to take the hill. The odds were too great against us.

"We hadn't been down long until the man to my right, Larry Lancaster by name, raised up on his knees and rolled over backwards about twenty feet down the hill. I got a glance at his face just before he fell back. The expression of agony I saw was something I will never forget!

"I crawled back to him. That few feet was the longest mile I ever traveled. I don't mean maybe!

"One of his legs near the ankle was torn to shreds, or at least it seemed so to me at the time.

"I put a turniquet on his leg, and stopped the bleeding the best I could, with what I had to work with. What I used was what was left of his legging.

"I never will forget that day spent on that hillside. It seemed a couple of weeks until darkness came to relieve us from our critical position that night."

The then First Lieutenant Robert R. Gowdy tells the following with reference to the rivalry between the 166th Ohio and the 28th Regular Infantry:

"On November 7, 1918, I was Regimental Intelligence Officer on duty at Regimental Headquarters 166th Infantry. As such I was with the various Battalions and Companies of the Regiment and my knowledge was gained personally, by contact and by observation and only the report of the most advanced patrol was obtained from any other source. As soon as our advance guard came in contact with the German forces early in the morning of the 7th I went forward to the leading Battalion and there I remained during the day in observation. I do not believe any elements of the 28th ever reached our leading patrol. I observed their whole attack, from the time they first came under rifle and machine gun fire from the German positions upon the crest, until they were completely stopped and their right wing forced to take shelter along the road among the men of the 166th Infantry. The right of the attacking forces did not pass more than 200 yards north of the road intersection leading over to Cheveuges though the left wing might have advanced further as they were not so plainly visible due to the conformation of the ground I was not present with our patrol but was with the Major of

the 3rd Battalion when reports from the patrol were received by runner and knew where they were by the position on the map.

"The 28th Infantry, I do not believe, was EVER on the crest of that hill as it was occupied by the enemy at nightfall Nov. 7th. Our patrol had been sent out before any elements of the 28th ever appeared in our rear and they certainly would have seen the oath had they passed beyond the 166th and firing would have not kept up from the crest of the hill if the 28th had reached there. I personally saw French troops returning late that same evening and they stated that the enemy still occupied the heights. The French did not go over the crest of the hill until the morning of the 8th at daylight. They found no resistance as the enemy had withdrawn during the night. The hill was still occupied the night of the 9th when we were withdrawn and the 28th had withdrawn some two hours previous to our withdrawal. Some of the 28th did get into the little cemetery beyond the village of Cheveuges but that is a long way from the crest of the hill as I was over there late in the afternoon myself. At the time I was there, I saw no men of the 28th Infantry in the village.

"Patrols from the 28th could not have advanced to the hill, or rather cemetery in the morning and found men of their battalion there as they did not appear in our sector until about 10 or 10:30 A. M. and withdrew about 4 or 5 P. M. that same day. Again I say, I do not believe any elements of the 28th Infantry ever reached the crest of the hill overlooking the Meuse river and City of Sedan. I went with Company 'D' 166th Infantry early the morning of November 8 to accompany the French into Sedan. We marched along the road where we had been the 7th over the crest of the hill to Frenois and there were no American troops other than this Company, in that Sector. The French relieved us the night of the 7th and as I have stated previously, the 28th withdrew some hours previous to our withdrawal.

"At the time we left the Germans still held as they had all day, that horseshoe rim of hills. No American troops gained its crest.

"It seems to me that the whole thing hinges on G. H. Q.'s definition of a front line in Mobile Warfare. 'The most advanced line held by a division with an organized force will be considered the front line. It is, in general, the line which would be pro-

tected, in case of an attack, by the divisional artillery barrage. A line joining points reached by patrols will not be given as the front line.'

"I am certain that the line of the 28th was not in advance of that of the 166th."

Corporal Walter E. Fillman of the 166th Ohio has the following to tell of the Sedan race:

"One of the Prussians who helped surround the French and bring on their surrender at Sedan in 1870 was Ernest Koenig. After the war, like all good soldiers, he returned home and raised a family.

"Forty-eight years have elapsed since that victorious event, and as Shakespeare said, 'The web of our life is of a mingled yarn, good and ill together.'

"Fate decreed that another epoch should be reenacted at this historic spot. Four grandsons of this old veteran were in the vicinity of Sedan. Three were in the German army, but the fourth, their cousin, was in the American 'Rainbow.' I might add that Company 'E' 166th Infantry from Marysville, Ohio, was known as the 'German Company' of the Regiment.

"During the early morning hours of November 7th, 1918, the 2nd Battalion, 166th Infantry, filtered into the village of Chehery. It was one of those gray, foggy days with the cold so penetrating that we were glad to be on the big push north towards Sedan.

"Just beyond Chehery, Captain Herman C. Doellinger directed me to take out a patrol and advance until we drew enemy fire. I selected Willie Blanton, a long legged, rangy boy from the hills of Kentucky; Harrison Ford, a husky congenial lad from Tennessee. Both of these boys had demonstrated their mettle to me in previous reconnoitering patrols. Charles Minnick, a big athletic friendly chap from Washington, Iowa, and James Dawkins, a black-eyed fellow who had just come into the company as a recruit from Alabama, completed the personnel of my patrol.

"Like all patrols, we deployed and cautiously felt our way forward. We bore off in a northerly and easterly direction along the west slope of a rugged ridge of hills dotted profusely with trees and underbrush. West of us, about three kilometers away, in the valley below, lay the town of Cheveuges. Our patrol pro-

gressed slowly, taking advantage of all objects which would conceal our advance. About noon I had a feeling we were near the heights overlooking the Meuse River and that Sedan was just over the brow of the ridge we had been skirting all morning. It was a temptation to go up over the skyline, but I dared not jeopardize the position of the patrol by unnecessary exposure.

"Coming out of a clump of bushes, Ford and I had the familiar experience of having a machine gun bullet singing our way. Mother Earth can be hugged extremely close on occasions like this, and now was no exception. We dropped back several rods and soon Blanton informed us that there was a town west of us which was occupied by the Germans.

"I sent Blanton back to the outfit with the information that we had contacted the enemy. While he was gone we were surprised to see a fairly large column of soldiers marching north on the main road out of Chehery. When the column reached the road that goes west toward Cheveuges the German small artillery pieces on the Meuse River Heights just ahead of us opened point blank fire on the marching infantry. From this vantage point we could see that there appeared to be confusion and all of us were of this opinion that the advancing column was not Company 'E' for there were too many men.

"I withdrew the patrol, that we might have better protection from the machine gun fire, and to await further instructions from the company. Upon Blanton's return, we learned that elements of the 1st Division and the 3rd Battalion of our Regiment had been advancing up the road toward Cheveuges. We returned to the remnant of the company now in charge of Acting First Sergeant Spain James since all the commissioned officers were incapacitated. We were lying near a cemetery wall north of Chehery. Much to our discomfort the Germans knew we were there and dropped their H. E.'s among us. One of these shells dazed me and I was taken to the first aid station in Chehery and after being ticketed for the hospital I waited around until night for the ambulance. The first aid station was busy since so many boys were wounded from; the 1st Division, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of our regiment. I felt a little ashamed of myself and after hitting a rolling kitchen where I got hot slum gullion, I returned to the outfit."

Private John E. Shimp, of the Supply Company of the 166th Ohio, says: "On the morning of November 7th, with kitchens smoking, we followed the regiment north towards Sedan. We reached the vicinity of Chehery, where we came under direct fire from the Germans on the hills to our front. However, we got to cover with the loss of only one man, a cook of 'H' Company. "As thrilling as that experience was, it was nothing by comparison with the day that Captain Graves of I Company caught me in the act of selling a pair of his russet shoes to a mechanic from L Company. I know why he was called 'Hell-Roaring Henry.' Give me the German shells around Chehery any time."

Private Shimp was assigned a team and a wagon on the arrival of the regiment in France in November, 1917. He never was away from them until he turned them in when the regiment left Germany for home. Three times he had a team of two mules killed by enemy fire while he was taking supplies to his regiment.

Sergeant William J. Fleming of "H" Company, 165th New York, tells the following story of the capture of Hill 346 and of Major Bootz's dispute with the detachment of the 16th Infantry:

"The Regiment was deployed as follows: Assault—2nd Battalion, Major Bootz; Support—3rd Battalion, Major Reilley; Reserve—1st Battalion Major Merle Smith.

"The 2nd Battalion was deployed: Assault—'G' and 'E' Companies; Support—'H' and 'F' Companies.

" 'H' Company was in support of 'G' Company on the left. We were fighting the rear guard of the German army. Their machine gun crews were entrenched on the top of each hill and kept up their fire until we reached a certain point when they withdrew to the next hill. Our ranks were pretty well thinned out by that time and it was often necessary for us to send some men from the support to help Company 'G' drive the enemy out. Ammunition was low, as were rations. The enemy had cut large trees which fell across roads, had blown up bridges and railroads and had halted the progress of our wagons so that we had not heard from them since the advance started. Therefore, when we came in sight of the last hill before Sedan everything was in readiness for its capture by the support company and here's how it happened.

"When we reached a position across the valley from Hill 346 the enemy fire became more intense and it was evident that he intended making a more determined stand. Major Bootz commanding the 2nd Battalion was following behind the company on our right. He halted the advance and called the four company commanders together. While they were in conference our company in support was halted on top of a treeless hill making a nice target for machine guns. We did not have enough ammunition to gain fire superiority so we took it upon ourselves to remedy the situation in the only way we knew—get out of the line of fire.

"We decided to move forward closer to Company 'G' and at least put the opposing gunners to the trouble of changing the range. We advanced in squad rushes but this proved too slow so when we had formed our line we tried platoon rushes the second time. This also was too slow so we just picked ourselves up and ran to the cover of the wood where 'G' Company was halted in the valley in front of Hill 346. Of course when the members of that company saw us coming up to them they kicked like steers about us drawing fire and bunching up. About this time 1st Sergeant Neary who was with the Company Commander and had seen what had happened, caught up with us. He stepped out in front saying, ' "H" Company follow me!' Instead of stopping in the shelter of the woods or the ravine at the foot of the hill we kept going right up the next hill. When the Germans saw the company rushing up the hill towards them they stood up with their hands in the air. One German got away with a gun through a small trench in rear. Soon after that our Company Commander ordered the prisoners turned over to Company 'G'. Those prisoners were taken by the First Platoon which I commanded. The Second Platoon was on our left and I could see them but I could not see the Third or Fourth Platoons as they were around the curve of the hill. They also were successful and got a machine gun crew which they did not turn over to 'G' Company. The next command was 'Dig in.'

"About an hour later another line of khaki-clad figures came along and halted on our line. Capt. Stout of 'G' Company challenged their right to bunch up and their commanding officer replied that we had dug in in his sector. It was some of the 16th

Infantry of the 1st Division. After a lengthy argument and comparison of maps they withdrew to the rear in a column of squads.

"Late that afternoon we were ordered out of our fox holes to advance on Sedan. Our fox holes were along a road on the slope of Hill 346. This road was on very high ground and it was necessary to scramble down a very steep hill to reach the marshy ground over which we had to travel to reach the stream. As we hit the marsh the Germans brought their artillery into action for the first time in that sector and you can be sure we were glad on reaching the stream to get the order to return to our fox holes.

"Shells kept dropping all night in the ravine in back of us but our position on the road under the side of the hill was very safe and no casualties resulted. Next morning we pulled out for the last time. The French troops moved in."

Major Reilley who commanded the 3d Battalion tells the following of the last day of combat of that battalion:—

"In the advance on Sedan the Second Battalion was in advance. It was advancing against German machine gun detachments which were fighting a rear guard action. It drove them off hill after hill. The message came back to me from Captain Bootz in command of the Second Battalion that his unit was running out of ammunition, that he would assault the next hill with the bayonet and asking the Third Battalion to jump through when he captured it. When I received the message I sent messages to the different company commanders to keep moving forward. I then hurried to Hill 346 which the Second Battalion was then taking to make a reconnaissance so as to be able to give the company commanders their orders when, they reached there. As I reached the road running along Hill 346 which slanted to the southeast I saw a German machine gun crew. Some had been killed and others severely wounded, including a lieutenant. The elements of the Second Battalion were scattered about. Just as I was approaching a lieutenant came up the hill with a group of men.

" 'Well, Major, we have taken the hill,' was this Lieutenant's greeting to Bootz.

‘ “We’ve taken the hill; where in hell is your booty?’ yelled Bootz, pointing to his own prisoners and captured machine guns.*

“There was a mound on the north side of the road. From it I looked down to a valley running approximately parallel to the hill we were on. Meanwhile my companies kept advancing. I had received orders to advance further by the time they approached the road.

“The advance was made down Hill 346 and up Hill 252 opposite in the face of comparatively severe machine gun fire. The battalion reached the crest of Hill 252 drawing off killing and wounding the German machine gunners. Some they bayonetted. From its top the Meuse River was in plain sight nearby.

“As we jumped from Hill 346 against Hill 252 ‘M’ Company was in the lead and ‘L’ on the right. We faced machine guns slightly flanking the hill. The ground was very slippery. In trying to go down my feet went out from under me and I did a typical Charley Chaplin fall. A machine gun bullet creased my tin hat. The fall was the only thing that saved me. Night soon fell—a dark night at that. I sent out a strong combat patrol from ‘M’ Company. This patrol was to push forward, reconnoiter the river, find out what places it could be crossed and if Wadlelincourt was not occupied, were to penetrate it, and to hold it as long as they could. The patrol was heavily fired upon and suffered considerable loss most of its 18 members being hit. The sergeant in command, Barrow, was badly hit. Corporal McLoughlin with two men pushed forward, made a reconnaissance of the river, and reported the condition of two bridges. I think one of them had been smashed. ** As Wadlelincourt was held in some strength the job of taking it was left until morning. During the night the Germans fired heavily upon our hill both from the front and from a wooded hill across the river slightly to the southeast of Sedan. This fire was both machine gun and artillery fire.”

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* Twenty-three prisoners and six machine guns.

** Attempts of Rainbow Historian to get in touch with the survivors and get their story have been unsuccessful.

"At this point Lieutenant De La Cour said, 'When Bootz I reported he had no small arms ammunition I was in Bulson. I was ordered to take small arms ammunition forward on machine gun carts at daylight. I took it forward in bandoleers. They filled up all of my carts. I met Bootz on the road on Hill 346 the morning of November 7th. There were some wounded Germans lying around. Then you came up. Next this platoon of the First Division came up the road on our right flank. I don't recall the Lieutenant's name. He was in the 16th Infantry. This Lieutenant made a remark to Bootz: 'What are you doing on our hill; this is our hill.' Bootz replied 'Your hill! here are my wounded men, here are my prisoners; where is your booty?' "

Major Reilley continuing said: "When I was making my reconnaissance from Hill 346 a one-pounder came along with Ahern, formerly of 'B' Company in command. I brought the corporal and Ahern behind a dirt mound which was about four feet high. It was good protection. I designated the targets for the one-pounder, and placed it behind this mound. In our advance down the valley and up Hill 252 on the other side, the onepounder was very effective. Each shot seemed to be knocking your hat off as they were firing from directly behind us. They scored a lot of hits. In my opinion they were a great help in capturing Hill 252 and the machine guns on top of it."

One of Major Bootz's Captains, J. F. Conners tells the following:—

"The 165th Infantry continued the attack of November 7, 1918 with battalions in same assault formation as on November 6. The Second Battalion under Major Bootz was in bivouac in the small woods south of Ferme St. Quentin. We drew machine gun fire immediately; the German rear guard machine guns firing from Chaumont. Upon arrival at the Chevens-Chaumont Road increased fire from machine gun, one pounders and trench mortars checked the advance temporarily. This fire came from retreating machine gunners. We waited for Headquarters Company for assistance with one pounders, and then continued the advance. Companies 'G' and 'H' passed thru Companies 'E' and 'F' on Hill 321. The Second Battalion continued beyond the crest of Hill 346 before the Third Battalion passed through to take up the

attack. However, we soon retired from the northern slope of Hill 346 to the sunken road on its reverse slope.

"I saw troops that I presumed to be a skeleton battalion from the 167th Infantry at a point southwest of Noyers. This detachment was in column of two's, resting near the dirt road at that point, about one hour after Companies 'G' and 'H' passed thru Companies 'E' and 'F'.

"After our capture of Hill 346, I saw a detachment of an officer, and about two squads arrive. It was very late afternoon at that time. There was a discussion between the Officer, Major Bootz and myself concerning priority. Our possession of captured material ended the discussion. Major Bootz directed the officer to join his unit in a direction easterly of Noyers. This was about one hour after the arrival of our battalion."

Captain William B. Given, Jr. has the following to say about contact between the 165th and 16th. He says:—

"The last day of the advance toward Sedan the Third Battalion of the 165th Infantry passed through the Second which had captured Hill 346. Company 'L', of which I was Captain, was the advance wave on the right flank. Sometime around the middle of the afternoon we halted, having taken our objective, Hill 252.

"Soon after this, I went over to the right of our line to make contact with the 77th Division should any of their troops be there. There were no troops at that time within a reasonable distance but later on we saw a small group moving up into this position. After stopping their advance, an officer and another man came over and asked what our unit was. They said they were of the 16th Infantry the First Division under orders to go forward, which they had been doing so but had gotten lost in the process. After further talk the officer decided to hold the position until the French relief of the line moved up that night.

"About dusk a heavy enfilade fire from the 88's began and continued until after dark. Knowing that our neighbors had been in an especially dangerous position, due to the contour of their position, I went over to see how they had fared and discovered, to my surprise, that the unit had withdrawn. I think it was an understandable and proper move—they did not belong there and the line was well taken care of without them.

"From a personal standpoint, the biggest event of that afternoon for me came about the time the 88's started. Lieutenant Ralph Knowles, who had been in Company 'L' and at the moment was on the Regimental Intelligence Staff, turned up with a messkit filled with hot rabbit stew and French fried potatoes, which he insisted was for me. The eating had been light that day and the stew was fine. He had seen that a house which we passed was occupied and had found the original French woman still there and glad to do anything for the American troops which had just pushed out the German occupants."

Major Merle-Smith who commanded the First Battalion of the 165th New York gives the following account of its activities the last day of combat:—

"Under orders at dawn the Battalion moved to Ferme Quentin collecting the detachments which had formed the left flank guard of the Regiment during the night, and at the Ferme reported to Colonel Dravo then in command of the Regiment. We were ordered to remain in readiness. About one-half hour later we received orders from Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson who was at Chaumont to advance northward and mop up the eastern edges of the Bois de la Marfee from which our leading Battalions were receiving some machine gun fire from German detachments. About that time a French artillery officer reported to me and stated that he had part of a battery of 75s and asked for instructions. I requested him to search the southeastern edges of the Bois de la Marfee and the woods north of Hill 346 until 11 o'clock watching our advance. We then advanced northward along the southeastern edges of the Bois de la Marfee cleaning out several German machine gun detachments, capturing two machine guns, killing two or three of their crew but capturing no prisoners. This operation was to the left rear flank of our leading Battalions.

"On arriving at the top of Hill 346 just south of the string of woods running east and west on the northern slopes of that Hill, I planned to send one company through the woods to Ferme des Sourds to our left flank and with the rest of the Battalion advance directly north through the woods to support the left flank of the attack of the leading Battalions. The leading Battalions had by that time skirted these woods to the east. The

patrol which I had sent out had proceeded some time before through the woods and later reported to me that an enemy company was deployed beyond them. The plan mentioned was not executed—not because we came under enemy fire, but on account of the fact that the fire of the French artillery was not raised at 11 o'clock as requested. These woods were heavily under shrapnel fire from our own artillery. We waited on Hill 346 for about 20 minutes after a message had been sent to the French artillery to cease their fire. There being no sign of slackening of the fire the Battalion was marched around the eastern edge of the woods referred to under a rather heavy enemy artillery fire causing a number of casualties. On the way we received orders to march forward and cover the left flank of the Third Battalion which, at that time, was attacking Hill 252. The 1st Battalion was marched forward over the northeast ridge of Hill 346 passing through the 2nd Battalion and took up a position shortly before dusk on the left flank of the 3rd Battalion. A patrol was sent out to a point of the Bois Marfee with instructions to remain on outpost during the night and to try to get in touch with the Regiment on our left. They first reported that they were unable to make contact with any troops on our left but sometime in the early morning reported seeing an American patrol. A line of outposts were established continuing the left flank of the 3rd Battalion. These outposts were posted by me in the dark.

"We also established contact with machine gun and other units of the 1st Division which were posted in the valley on the reverse slopes of Hill 252, in the rear of the 3rd Battalion of the 165th Infantry. Before dawn we received orders that we were to be relieved by French infantry, detachments of which we guided to the position of the 3rd Battalion. Upon being relieved at about dawn we marched out to join the rest of the Regiment.

"I am inclined to believe that detachments of the 16th Infantry took little part in the actual capture of these Hills 346 and 252. From what I could see of the operations from time to time, it appeared to me that detachments of American soldiers which later turned out to be the detachments of the 16th Infantry filtered in on the rear of our first line troops echeloned on our right flank. They were under heavy artillery fire from German bat-

teries across the Meuse and filtered up the valley between Hill 252 and the northeast slopes of Hill 346 in the rear of the 3rd Battalion of the 165th Infantry which was then storming Hill 252. There may have been small groups on the right flank of the advance lines of the 3rd Battalion in the attack. Some of these detachments remained in the little valleys referred to above while others I believe retired during the night to our right rear. They were in an exposed position on account of the enemy artillery fire from somewhere in the vicinity of Bazeilles."

The following are extracts of G. O. No. 29 issued by Lt-Colonel Dravo a few days later:

"The undersigned desires to express to the command his appreciation of the valor, fortitude and cheerful perseverance of the men and officers of this regiment and the pride he feels in having had the honor to command men who put forth such a magnificent effort in the closing days of action of the great war just concluded.

"Deprived of their rations by the speed of their pursuit of an enemy they drove before them from ridge to ridge, and compelled to snatch what little rest they could in rain-soaked shelters hastily constructed at nightfall, the determination of the Regiment to conquer never flagged and to every inquiry of the Regimental commander the unvarying reply was, 'We are alright.'

"The dash and elan of the 2nd Battalion under the command of Capt. H. A. Bootz, when, their ammunition being exhausted, they charged over Hill 346 and cleared it of machine gun nests with their bayonets, the coolness and courage of the 1st Battalion under Capt. Van S. Merle-Smith in clearing the east edge of the Bois de la Marfee, making possible the advance of the 2nd Battalion; the advance of the 3rd Battalion under Major T. F. Reilley from Hill 346 against increasing resistance to Hill 252. Wadelincourt and the banks of the Meuse east of Sedan add another brilliant page to the already glorious history of this regiment.

Ably supported by the machine guns under Lt. R. DeLacour, and the one pounders under Lt. T. J. McCarthy the regiment pushed its advance to the gates of Sedan.

Major Walter B. Wolf, who was at the time adjutant to Brigadier General Douglass MacArthur, gives the following ver-

sion of his capture :* "The General and I were proceeding across country to Beau-Menil Ferme where Colonel Tinley had his Regimental Headquarters. We were north of the Bulson—Haraucourt Road and proceeding along through the fields east of the Haraucourt—Menil Road when we were overtaken by a small patrol, commanded by Lieutenant Brown, of, I believe, the 28th Infantry of the 1st Division, at a point about one hundred yards south of the most southerly point in the woods between Beau-Menil Ferme and La Forge Ferme, which latter we were about to take over as our own headquarters. We had just finished speaking with the Reserve Battalion of the 168th Infantry, and were about two hundred yards away from our own troops. The patrol leader said he had a flank mission, and was in process of cleaning the woods of Germans. He was considerably surprised when he learned he was somewhat in the rear of the line of the P. C.'s of the Right Brigade of the 42nd Division."

"Alabama's Own in France" ** tells the following of the last day:

"During the advance patrols were heavily shelled by the enemy's artillery at close range. * * * On the hill to the right of Pont Maugis, Lieutenant Estep, an official photographer from A. E. F. Headquarters, was killed. He had gone out with the advance patrols, had taken a number of pictures, * * * when killed by a high-explosive shell.

"Most of the resistance met with in this advance was in the way of machine gun nests. In falling back the enemy gunners made use of an animal drawn wagon by means of which the machine guns were transported back to previously prepared positions. Here the guns were again set up, firing until the patrols forced them out of their nests. * * * Late that afternoon, the kitchens of the 1st Battalion arrived with hot food. It was a memorable occasion for the men had only two days' reserve rations to supply them almost three days, as no hot food had been received since the early morning of November 5th, about sixty

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* Letter of Colonel Leach, July 28, 1922, from War Diary of George E. Leach, Colonel 151st Field Artillery.

** Alabama's Own in France, by William H. Amerine, Eaton & Yettinger, New York, N. Y.

hours before. The reception given the contents of the kitchen may be easily pictured.

"It was, however, the fault of the enemy, who had so completely blown up roads and bridges. * * * The wagon trains, kitchens and cooks had been on the road day and night."

Here are some of the experiences of the 168th Iowa, taken from their history: *

"Little difficulty was encountered until they (3rd Battalion) reached the top of the hill west of Aillicourt and Remilly, and started down the steep forward slopes to the road leading northeast to the river. Here a fire of such violence, both machine gun and artillery, caught the forward companies, that the whole battalion was finally withdrawn by Major Yates to the road near the crest of the hill and ordered to consolidate the position.

"Below them on the right lay the Meuse and its flooded flats, and to the north in plain sight rose the steeples of Sedan itself.

"Directly in front of 'M' Company, in the hollow between it and Pont Maugis were parts of two companies of the 16th Infantry unable to move one way or another on account of the severity of the machine gun fire, but when the 3rd Battalion appeared, it drew upon itself the greater part of this fire so that these two companies were able to gradually withdraw. All day long the 1st Division men, many of them wounded, dribbled back to our lines, and it was from them we learned of their nocturnal skirmish with the enemy in Pont Maugis. * * * Soon after the line had been established on the hill a patrol was sent to Thelonne. * * * The Germans * * * were now shelling. The scouts under Lindsay B. Smith, of 'L' Company, picked up four Boche found hiding in the village and brought them back to our line. Another patrol under Sergeant Hoke of 'M' Company attempted to enter Pont Maugis that afternoon, but the Germans were still there in force and turned their minen werfer on the advancing Americans. The same patrol finally succeeded in getting in the next morning. A detachment from the Alabama regiment had just come up but had not yet entered. A group on the

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* The Story of the 168th Infantry, by John H. Taber, The State Historical Society of Iowa.

outskirts was recovering some of the 1st Division dead. In the village our patrol found more dead, and in the cellar eight wounded men of the 16th Infantry, who told them that the Germans had withdrawn during the night without bothering to take them along as they had no transportation for them. In the doorway of the church stood a 77 pointed at our lines, surrounded by a pile of empty shell cases. Throughout the day of the 7th, the troops on the hill were kept on the jump. They were shelled continually, and were also receiving much machine gun fire. With the aid of glasses they could see the gunners of a Boche battery across the Meuse load their pieces and could even see them pull the lanyard, but they were powerless to stop them for they were out of rifle range and our artillery had not yet caught up with us. At another time a Boche train was observed taking on troops and steaming away unharmed."

Here is Major Winn's account of the last action of the 151st Machine Gun Battalion with his conclusions as to the proper use of heavy machine guns to give the Infantry the maximum support in its advance.

He says:

"In the advance of the 84h Infantry Brigade which began on November 5th, from St. Piedmont to Bulson, the terraine was extremely difficult. Very steep valleys transversed at right angles our line of advance. We picked the twelve best mules in each company and made most of this advance with the guns and ammunition on the carts. It was known that the Germans were retreating rapidly. I knew therefore that it was only by using the mules that we would be able to keep up with the Infantry. During this advance we did not lose a single animal from enemy fire. The men of a machine gun section were practically wiped out by shrapnel, although the mules hauling the carts of this section were not injured. In this advance we almost had to lift the carts up and down the hillsides, they were so steep. In places we had to unhitch the mules and drag them up the steep inclines. In one place we used a tall barn door to build an improvised bridge across a deep stream, so that the mules and carts could get across.

"On the 6th and 7th of November, the 151st M. G. B. was billeted in the town of Thellone. This was the point of the Battalion's farthest advance in the Argonne Offensive. General Mac-

Arthur told me we might cross the Meuse River. In order to prepare for that emergency, together with Captain Travis of 'C' Company, I went to the town of Pont Maugis, on the Meuse three kilometers South of Sedan. Here we made a reconnaissance in order to anticipate placing the machine guns to protect the crossing of the river. This was an interesting experience, as this area was severely bombarded by the Germans. At that time also we were not sure that all enemy troops had crossed the river.

The night of November 7th, the Germans bombarded Thellone. Up to that time it had not been fired on because of the French civilians who were still living there. Two men of my battalion were killed and several wounded by direct hits on buildings which they were occupying. These were the last casualties suffered during the war from combat causes.

"This last advance served to confirm the opinions I had already formed as to the proper use of heavy machine guns in the attack.

"Based on the operations of my battalion, I am convinced that heavy machine guns are not adapted for use as assault weapons to accompany first line of infantry attack. This is a mission of light automatic rifles. The heavy guns should be employed to help launch infantry attacks by properly arranged overhead fire from angles which will not interfere with the infantry advance. All of the heavy guns in a brigade should be concentrated under one control. These guns should follow the infantry as rapidly as possible compatible with the necessity for transporting all of their heavy equipment and ammunition boxes. They should be immediately employed in the organization for defense when the infantry has reached its objective or been stopped by resistance. It is simply not reasonable to expect that a weapon which requires for use several pieces of equipment, each weighing 40 pounds or more, can be carried by hand fast enough to keep up with infantrymen who are operating with only a nine pound rifle. It is not only the question of transporting a forty pound gun on a man's back. It is more than that because the gun is of no use unless all of the equipment and a generous supply of ammunition arrives together at the point where the guns must go into action.

"An infantryman can scratch a hole in the ground with his bayonet for protection. A heavy machine gun must have a

group of at least three men to successfully operate it and must work from a tripod which places it above the ground. Therefore, it is not easily protected. When placed in action unprotected it presents a conspicuous target to attract enemy fire. It is my feeling that brigade commanders and commanders of higher units fail to realize that a mobile machine gun battalion presents its greatest strength in its ability to concentrate terrific fire, and would be much more useful than to have scattered the same number of guns among the infantry. This means many of them will find it impossible to function at all while those which do cannot fire in a manner commensurate with the potential power of this weapon. Therefore, to use them in this way is simply to dissipate their power to the detriment of the infantry and the benefit of the enemy."

Private Lloyd F. Kindness of the 150th Machine Gun Battalion tells the following as an example of what he and his comrades went through on November 6th:

He says: "Over to my right a shell broke in the middle of the road, right among some infantry, and killed about four or five of them. We then went over that way and got into the path of that shellfire. A shell would come and we'd drop down in the ditch. We went on like this until about midnight. I was the gunner then. I am small anyway. That Hotchkiss was sure heavy. We came to a steep hill with a road at the bottom. As we went down that hill they started shelling again heavy. I fell head first gun and all. I got up and went to the bottom very carefully after that. They told us not to talk aloud, only whisper, and be as quiet as we could. Finally I got on the road at the bottom of the hill.

"Some of our men stumbled into some wire that the Germans had placed there as a trap. When they did that why the Germans opened up with the machine guns and this was the closest call I'd had for some time. I dropped flat on the ground and could hear the bullets sing and whistle all around me. I laid my gun down against the bank and took my pack off and laid it down and got so I could use it for protection, someway it wasn't much of a protection but I felt it was a stonewall next to me. Suddenly I heard a dull thud and the man right next to me let out a yelp and said, 'I'm hit.' I said 'you are' in a low tone and then told him to be as quiet as he could, but he would not be

quiet. He got shot in the leg and went back, and I have never seen him since. I would like to though. Finally the Germans let up their fire after some of our men went down there and bayonetted them. I could hear some German shout, 'Heinie wasser, wasser.' Some German wanted his partner Heinie to bring him water, but he never got water, as he died soon."

Colonel George E. Leach writes the following in his diary * Thursday, November 7th. It illustrates the difficulties which confronted the artillery:

"At daylight rode to Stonne and inspected some of the horses which are in pitiful shape, for lack of forage. As I rode up to the horses' lines I saw a driver holding his horses out in a field where there was a little grass and he was tired beyond description, but told me that he had been grazing his horses since midnight. From there I went to Bulson and reported to General MacArthur. There is considerable fighting just north of the town. Stayed at Bulson all night in a dressing station with many wounded."

The following extracts from "Harness and Hitch, A Diary of Battery F, 149th Field Artillery, Rainbow Division," compiled by Eskil I. Bjork, a member of the Battery, and from the "History of C Battery, 149th Field Artillery," give typical experiences of the four batteries of that regiment in the final advance of the Rainbow:

From the "F" Battery account "November 5th. Rained. Reville at 4:00 A. M. * * * It was decided, in view of the condition of the horses, to reorganize the regiment into four batteries, horses and drivers of D and E Batteries being assigned to the other two batteries of their respective battalions to bring them somewhere up to fighting strength. * * * Beyond Brieulles a long stretch of the road had been dynamited by the Germans. We were forced to cross a wide swamp, where our engineers were engaged in constructing a roadway of logs and stones. Most of the carriages became stuck, the cannoneers being required to exert all of their energies to get them back on solid ground. * * * We went into position south of Les Petites Armoises.

"November 6th. Rained. Reville at 4:00 A. M. It had been an uncomfortable night, what with rain and cold and few blankets,

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* War Diary George E. Leach, Colonel 151st Field Artillery.

all of them wet. * * * Over bogs and across streams where bridges had been destroyed. * * * Dead horses were plentiful. * * * The dead horses attracted our particular attention because the flesh on the loins had been removed. * * * We were not long in learning the solution. At one point on our march we stopped at a lone kitchen manned by a grinning Algerian. * * * In La Neuville-aMarie * * * we were given a cordial reception. The inhabitants were wild with joy on being liberated after four years under German rule. * * * Over cups full of wine which they proffered us, the villagers told tales of the German occupancy. * * * Captain Stone had removed this boots and blouse and stretched out for a short sleep when he was ordered forward with the Battery Commanders Detail to accompany the Advance Guard Commander who had orders to take Sedan by daybreak.

"November 7th. Cold. We limbered and started northwards in utter darkness. * * * A short distance beyond Chemery we halted. * * * A column of infantry of the 1st Division passed by. * * * A Lieutenant Colonel of the 1st Division made inquiries of Corporal Bjork as to the artillery outfit that had reached such an advance point and stated that we were to be highly commended for managing to get our guns forward with roads and bridges in the condition he had found them. * * * We proceeded up the hill before us. The fog was beginning to lift. Apparently the first carriages of our column were observed by the Germans as we reached the crest of the hill, for immediately shells whistled overhead and exploded only a few yards from the road. With their heads ducked below the drivers urged their nags into a trot. We were merely going from the frying pan into the fire. On the down slope of the hill lay Chehery. Here we brought carriages to a halt to await orders from Captain Stone, who, with Corporal Hathaway, had gone forward and had selected a position 200 meters south of the town.

"The glint of doughboy bayonets was plainly visible as the infantry advanced to the attack of the hill less than two kilos ahead. * * * The entire valley was deluged with shells from enemy guns. * * * The 1st Division doughboys, crouching in ditches and shell holes, cursed us for attracting the fire of the enemy."

The story of the advance of "C" Battery, which is also that of "A", is the same one of difficulties overcome in getting forward. Here is their account of their last days of action:

"From Chemery we moved four kilometers to a position near Conage where we finally ran into enemy harassing fire. We dug a quick position and fired 158 rounds on the Bois de la Marfee and then moved forward ten kilometers to Bulson, overlooking the Meuse River. From a crest a little in front of the position we could see Sedan about five kilometers at our left front, and it was then that we first realized our objective. Of course, we had a vague idea that we were driving the Germans across the Meuse, but we had no knowledge of our close proximity to the famous city. About noon on November 9th, while Captain Reddington was adjusting the pieces and incidentally disturbing the retreating Huns on the other side of the river, we received orders to pack up and prepare to move to the rear. * * * We pulled back 15 kilometers to a field near Tennay. * * * The night was bitter cold and when we woke up in the morning shoes were frozen and top blankets stiff as boards. * * * The borrowed men and horses were returned to 'B' Battery and our poor animals fed hay for the first time in weeks. The next morning out of 100 animals on the line we had just 16 serviceable."

The 117th Ammunition Train sums up its arduous service in the following words:

"We hauled ammunition day and night up to the last moment."

Colonel J. Monroe Johnson tells the following of the activities of the engineers, showing that besides experiencing the same difficulties and hardships as the other units, they played a vital part in helping the Division move forward:

"On the night of the 3rd near Verpel, two detachments * * * remained on the very steep grade south of Verpel to aid traffic with snatch teams and other paraphernalia. These detachments made the heights the following day. On the night of the 4th at Authe * * * (an Engineer detail) spent almost the entire night aiding traffic over and repairing a by-pass across the creek near this village. * * * On the following day and night (they) were busy without regard to loss of sleep and food making reconnaissances.

"During this entire march from Exermont on the 3rd to Authe on the morning of the 5th, the regimental train was blocked in the traffic so that the men of the regiment went practically without hot food and only a modicum of cold food. * * * The afternoon of the 4th it was learned that the causeways across the Bar Valley, a distance of some one thousand feet, consisting of a fill, about fifteen feet high, had been entirely demolished by the Germans in their retreat, they having blown a crater in this fill about every 75 feet, which extended in most instances below the level of the original creek bottom."

Colonel Johnson then tells how he went to Division headquarters in order to get back two of his companies, one of which had been assigned to the 83rd Infantry Brigade and the other to the 84th. This in order that he might have the maximum number of men and officers to remedy this condition, which was holding up the heavier artillery and the trains of the Division.

Having gotten his regiment together, they at once constructed a corduroy by-pass across the Bar Valley, and also a by-pass around the demolished culvert about a half kilometer to the north of the road to Petite Armoises.

He says: "The 2nd Battalion was ordered on reconnaissance farther to the north and the construction of bridges already known to be demolished at Petite Armoises and Sy, and two bridges in the forest to the south of Sy. All this work proceeded night and day until finally the lines of communication were opened and two companies had gotten in direct contact with the Infantry before the Infantry reached its final objective. Also full reconnaissances were made along the Meuse River on our immediate front in advance of the outposts of the enemy."

Thus had the infantry been ordered across the Meuse, the engineers were present to build the bridges under fire with the same courage and determination as did the engineers of the 2nd Division when it fought its way across at Lettane to the heights beyond.

Major Garrett tells the following story on himself during the establishment of his telephone lines forward from Maisoncelle.

He says: "You know the condition all our horses were in due to lack of forage and hard marching, to say nothing of the

weather. One of my best men, named Slinker, who had been with me on the Border and for whom I really had the affection that a commanding officer gets for one of his best 'old soldiers', was driving a two-horse reel cart. I was standing by the central switchboard at Maisoncelle which was being run by one of my men named Robinson. I could see that someone had called in so I cut in on the line with the set which I always carried to enable me to hear what was going on without in any way interrupting the service. I heard Slinker say 'I am in the hell of a fix. One of my horses has just died from hunger and exhaustion. He is lying there dead in his tracks. Send me another horse right away as I cannot continue with this line until I get one and the infantry is going on ahead.'

"Before Robinson could answer I said 'Slinker, stop asking someone else to get you a horse and waste the time necessary to bring it up to you. You go out and get one immediately.' He answered with tears in his voice 'Major, there are no horses around here anywhere so I just can't get one.' I said 'Slinker, listen to what I am saying you go out and get a horse immediately, do you understand that.' He said 'Yes, sir' in the most mournful voice imaginable.

"In a few minutes I saw Robinson had been called again so I cut in again. I heard Slinker say 'That bald headed old so forth and so on ordered me to go out and get a horse when there aren't any horses around here. While I was talking to him a few minutes ago some so forth and so on stole my other horse. So now I haven't any horses. . . '

"Before he could go on I interrupted, I said: 'Slinker stop your complaining; you go out immediately and get two horses. Do you understand what I say?' He started to reply 'But Major there aren't any horses around here' when I interrupted him and said 'I don't want to hear anything more from you. You go out and get two horses right away and report in as soon as you have gotten them. I don't want any more conversation and I do want two horses in that reel cart and the cart moving forward with the infantry.'

"It was not more than a half hour later that Robinson reported to me 'Slinker has gotten his two horses and is going forward.'

"Sometime later, I got the story of how he got his horses. After talking with me he was desperate. He went out in the streets of the small village from which he had reported. He was just in time to see a long column of vehicles approaching him. As they passed through he saw a magnificent lead team hitched to a wagon. They were obviously excellent saddle horses never intended for draft purposes. In fact, one of them took a number of prizes in the jumping and saddle classes in the horse show we had on the Rhine.

"A sudden inspiration came to Slinker due to the obvious fact that these two horses were not draft animals. He rushed out, grabbed them by the reins and yelled as furiously as he could at the driver. 'Why you, so forth and so on, thief what the hell do you mean by stealing my two horses. Thank G—d I have caught you at last.'

"Much to his surprise the driver instead of arguing the question called back in a low tone, 'Don't make so much noise. Buddy honest to G—d, I didn't know they were your horses. I'll give them back to you but pipe down because the Old Man is asleep in the wagon and he threatened yesterday to send me to Leavenworth if he caught me swiping anything more.'

"So Slinker marched off not only with the horses but with the harness on their backs, hitched into the reel cart as quickly as he could and went off at a gallop. He too was afraid the Old Man would wake up. But for quite a different reason than that of the driver of the Old Man's wagon."

The difficulties of the 117th Sanitary Train are told in the following extract from the medical history of the 42nd Division:

"The day before the Division was to take up the advance, the Ambulance Section and three Field Hospitals entered Authe. Here a *Triage* was established and one field hospital opened up. One hospital was already in operation at Briqueny. Sixteen litter bearers were forwarded to each Infantry regiment and contact was made with the liaison officer. On the eve of battle, the ambulance section was confronted with a situation presenting many obstacles far more difficult of solution than those encountered on any previous front. Mobile hospitals were miles to the rear, and every road was jammed with transportation of all sorts. * * *

Once more the animal drawn ambulances became a most valuable and necessary adjunct. Six of these were immediately dispatched to each infantry brigade. The morning of the attack, five motor ambulances were dragged across the swamp by horse and manpower. A station was established on either side of the bad stretch of road (near Brieulles), each with a small personnel, and in addition a group of twenty litter bearers was detailed to carry patients across to the rearward stations, whence evacuation was completed by waiting motors. * * * November 7th, a relay station was established at Tannay, and another collecting station at Chemery. Casualties were now beginning to accumulate at Bulson and Chehery, and with the animal drawn ambulances and the few motors available, every effort was made to free the stations at these points. This work was augmented by the arrival of additional motor ambulances shortly after dark, which had finally been able to cross at Brieulles by the partially completed corduroy road then being constructed by our engineers. By 10 P. M. at Chemery two buildings previously used by the enemy as hospitals were filled to overflowing with approximately four hundred wounded. There was but a small detail of one officer and six men to care for this accumulation of patients. Meanwhile the slightly wounded were being relayed back to Tannay with what ambulances could be spared from the front. Later the assistance of a few empty ration trucks was obtained and relieved the congestion somewhat. Meanwhile a field hospital had moved forward to Tannay and was taking under its care the patients assembled there. * * * November 8th the situation was well in hand. When the Division was relieved, clearing of the field had been accomplished not only for the 42nd Division, but also for those elements of the 1st Division which had been ordered up to participate in the capture of Sedan. Directed to evacuate the area, there followed another forty-eight hours of continuous work for the ambulances evacuating from the field hospitals to Cheppy. * * * The ambulance section had accomplished the stupendous task of transporting its 1,422 casualties an average of 60 kilometers to the Mobile Hospital over many stretches of well nigh impassable roads and through difficult traffic jams."

Sergeants J. E. Fisk, Emil Huber, and A. E. Slattery of the 165 New Jersey Ambulance Co. combine to tell the following

story of the last advance on Sedan, when the ambulances were held up by the blown-out viaduct near Breiulles:

"Our captain sent us forward to see if there were some way we could get the ambulances around the swamp which the viaduct crossed. We spent about two hours jumping from bush to bush, frequently falling into the mud and water and then, to add to our troubles, on the way back a German airplane chased us with machine gun fire.

"When we got back we told the captain that we could find no way across.

"However, Captain Lewis told the company that we simply had to get the ambulances over to get the wounded beyond. Therefore, we started in right away to make an improvised road with such logs as we could get ahold of. The ambulances were sent over this road. When they got stuck in the mud, as they frequently did, the eighty men present, using ropes and logs under the wheels, would simply jerk it out by man-power. In this way, after a great deal of time and labor we finally got them all across."

This last operation cost the Infantry and Artillery of the Division 63 killed and 371 wounded. The Engineers had five wounded. The casualties in the other units of the Division are not available.

The total for the Division in the Argonne was 758 killed and died of wounds, and 3551 wounded, a total of 4309. The Rainbow lost but 37 as prisoners, none of whom were taken in the "Race for Sedan".

CHAPTER XXVIII

STRIVING FOR DECISIVE VICTORY FOCH COMES TOO LATE TO PERSHING'S VIEWS.

From the time General John J. Pershing at the end of his first month in France the summer of 1917 sent to Washington his first estimate of what was needed if the United States was to give the maximum help to the allies in beating Germany his strategy had been to strike with the maximum American force at the Germans in their weakest spot.

This weakest spot was the route into the heart of Germany which included the country on both sides of the Moselle River, and between it and the Rhine.

From earliest history this had been the central route of invasion of Germans and Gauls between what is today Germany and France. Another historic route was that through the plains of Belgium and north France. However, that was on the extreme flank of both the Germans and the Allies. Another route of invasion was across the Rhine just north of Switzerland, and through the northern part of Switzerland. This, however, was on the extreme right of the allies and the Germans and also had tangled up with it the question of Swiss neutrality and their ability to defend it.

On the other hand, the Moselle route as it can be called for convenience, led into the heart of Germany. It was the one and only one which gave the opportunity to cut off South Germany from North Germany. This was an advantage not only geographically but also politically because of the differences between the Catholic South and the Protestant North and the rivalry of the House of Wittlebach of Bavaria and that of Hohenzollern of Prussia.

It was the route the Emperor Napoleon III had planned to use in 1870 for these reasons and also because South Germany was still smarting under the defeat in war inflicted on it by Prussia a few years before. However, before he could do so the Germans used it to overwhelm the French armies in one of the shortest and most decisive wars in history. Shutting one French

army up in Metz and compelling its surrender they drove the other into the Sedan region where it was surrounded and compelled to surrender with Napoleon III; all in less than three months.

In 1914 the first two big battles of the war, called The Battles of the Frontier, took place one to the east of the Moselle, the other to its west. In both the French were defeated.

Marshal Foch had ordered and Marshal Petain had prepared an attack to take place on a large scale November 14th. It was to be made from the east of the Moselle from near Port-sur-Seille where rested the right of the American Second Army commanded by Lt. General Bullard to Embermenil Station in front of Luneville. This station was in the sector in which the 165th New York and one battalion of the 149th Illinois saw their first month's service at the front. The 149th had an observation post on the hill just above Embermenil Station.

Throughout the Argonne campaign as the First American Army advanced north, General Pershing had swung more and more of the Divisions on its right, to the right. As these Divisions turned to the right they would fight their way across the Meuse River and up the crest beyond, which roughly parallels the right or eastern bank of the river.

He did this for two reasons.

The first was to drive the Germans from this ridge and stop them firing into the right flank of the troops in the Argonne in the same way that those in and near the Argonne forest to the west of the Aire River had fired into the left flank of first the 35th Kansas and Missouri Divisions and then the 1st Regular Division.

The second reason instead of being a tactical one was a strategical one.

This ridge is a continuation of the one overlooking the Plain of the Woevre, called the Heights of the Meuse. These Heights were the ones the Rainbow saw on their left during the St. Mihiel advance until the second day when they swung to the right to face over the Plain of the Woevre towards Metz. Verdun is in the Valley of the Meuse with the Heights of the Meuse forming a barrier between it and the Plain of the Woevre. It was for this reason that the Forts defending Verdun from attack by Ger-

mans coming across from Metz and the rest of the Moselle region were placed on these Heights. For the same reason the Forts protecting Verdun from attack from the north were placed on these Heights.

As American Division after Division fought its way across the Meuse and drove the Germans from the Heights of the Meuse they faced in general northeast. Thus like the divisions holding the St. Mihiel Sectors they faced toward the Moselle route into Germany. Therefore as the First American Army advanced towards Sedan it pivoted on the Verdun region to the right. This until in general it was on a line which was a continuation of that held by the Second American Army, that is the line on which the troops had halted at the close of the St. Mihiel Battle. This halt it will be recalled was not because German resistance had stopped the American attack, nor because General Pershing wanted it stopped but because Marshal Foch had insisted that it stop on this line.

Thus when the Armistice came with the exception of the French Tenth Colonial Division to the east of Verdun the American Groups of Armies under General Pershing held a continuous line from near Port-sur-Seille to the east of Pont-a-Mousson on the Moselle River, to Pont Maugis just south of Sedan.

At this time the total line held by American troops was 83.9 miles.

Besides the troops with the First and Second American Army there were three regiments in the Lorraine French Sector, the 27th New York and 30th Divisions with the British and the 37th Ohio and 91st Divisions with the Belgians.

Thus though Marshal Foch had insisted on General Pershing stopping the St. Mihiel attack short and attacking instead in the Argonne, General Pershing succeeded in the first week in November in having two American Armies faced in the direction he had wanted to keep on going at the finish of the St. Mihiel attack.

The advance of the Americans in the St. Mihiel attack had driven the Germans back from the ground south of Verdun which they had gained in their famous assaults on that Fortress in 1916. General Pershing pivoting his Army to the right during the Argonne campaign had similarly driven them from the

ground they gained to the north and northeast of that Fortress during these same assaults.

Marshal Petain had given the Americans the credit for thus freeing Verdun from the German menace. *

That General Pershing was right in wanting to go ahead instead of stopping at the time of the St. Mihiel attack is shown by Marshal Foch's own orders!

October 20, 1919, ** Marshal Foch sent the first written order concerning an attack in Lorainne towards Metz and the country southeast of Metz which extending along the right bank of the Moselle leads to the Rhine between Mayence (the French bridge-head after the Armistice) and Coblentz (the American bridge-head after the Armistice). Incidentally, this was the territory over which the Germans made their first advance against the French in the War of 1870-71. At this time the Second American Army under Lieut. General Bullard was in line to the left of the French assigned for the attack. His line continued theirs. At the same time the American First Army as it pivoted to the right was steadily extending this line to the left or northwest. Thus the American troops were faced and facing more and more towards the territory on the left bank of the Moselle over which they subsequently advanced to the Rhine.

From then on increasing preparations were made for this attack. The day was finally set as November 14th. The reason for the attack in this direction as anyone can find out who will take the trouble to look up a variety of French writings on the subject, was that such an attack would separate the German Army into two parts and thus bring decisive victory.

There is evidence in these sources of French information that the attack could have been made during the first days of November had Marshal Foch pushed the preparations.

General Pershing, November 5th, had ordered an attack by Lieut. General Bullard's Second American Army to be made November 10th. This in preparation for a general offensive. However, the evening of November 8th a message was received

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* See Marshal Petain's volume on Verdun.

** Page 126; "Pouvait-On Signer L'Armistice a Berlin?" by General Mordacq, Bernard Grasset, Paris, France.

from Marshal Foch directing that pressure be applied along the whole front. Therefore the 7th Regular, 28th Pennsylvania, 33rd Illinois, and 92nd (Negro) began attacking at once. The Armistice halted the progress which they had made. For the attack of the 14th of November the 3rd Regular, 4th Regular, 28th Pennsylvania, 29th Blue and Gray, 35th Kansas and Missouri, and 36th Oklahoma and Texas Divisions had been designated. They were to operate on the left of the French and under the command of General Bullard.

There is no doubt that once this attack had been started the rest of the American Second Army and the First Army on its left would have joined in.

Thus from in front of Luneville on the right the French on a front of approximately 33 miles with the Americans on their left on a front of approximately 75 miles would have swept forward breaking through the German line engulfing the Fortress of Metz. This just as the victorious German Armies advancing into France had done in 1870 when the French held it. Such an advance with the Moselle Valley as the axis would undoubtedly have brought decisive victory!

The Armistice which was signed was the predecessor of a victorious peace. However, it left the German Army intact to retire to its home territory under arms, with its bands playing and its colors flying. This instead of returning as disarmed freed prisoners of War or in fleeing disjoined fragments as the result of a decisive defeat such as an advance by the Moselle route would have brought.

Despite an opposition such as few men have faced not only openly used against him in Europe, but surreptitiously at home in the United States, General Pershing had succeeded:

1. In getting a large American Army assembled in one part of the theatre of War in France. This instead of it being scattered in small units as replacements in the French and British Armies in France and dispersed in Russia, Italy and perhaps had he once yielded even to the Balkans and Palestine.

2. In training the American troops for warfare in the open including for the Infantry reliance primarily upon their rifles instead of machine guns as was true in the European Armies.

3. In having the American Army finally placed for a strategical blow which as far as can be determined from the available evidence of the strength of the Germans at that time with their absence of fresh reserve, and the steadily increasing number of fresh reserves on the Allied side would have produced decisive results.

Few Generals in history have faced and overcome such enormous difficulties.

There can be no doubt that Pershing's success ranks him with Washington, Grant, and Lee, the other great generals of American history.

The greatest number of American fighting men in France at any one time was 2,057,907 * excluding those in the navy. ** Of these 1,390,000 came under enemy fire in battle, and suffered a loss of 50,105 killed and died of wounds, and 193,606 wounded, a total of 243,711, at the hands of the enemy. This loss was approximately one out of every five of those engaged.

"The second week of October, 1918, twenty-nine American Divisions, the equivalent of about fifty-eight European divisions were in action. The maximum front held at one time by the American forces was 110 miles."

These figures prove that the American reinforcement more than counterbalanced the reinforcement to Germany's Army in France resulting from Russia's dropping out of the War in 1917. They show that the American reinforcement gave the Allies the supremacy in numbers necessary for victory.

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* The greatest number of Marines serving in the A. E. F. was 21,571.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE MARCH TO THE RHINE.

The long march to the Rhine was begun!

Those who made this march will never forget it. Marching in the winter under the best of circumstances is not particularly pleasant. Marching when physically exhausted from nearly three months spent in the face of the enemy with the exception of some marching at night is a hard task. When it is accompanied with the mental and spiritual let down which the knowledge that the fighting was over inevitably brought, the task was still more difficult.

As the Division marched up and down the steep hills of the Ardennes and saw what splendid positions nature offered the Germans for a defensive which could have covered every mile from the Meuse to the Rhine, they were glad that the enemy had not chosen to make such a fight but instead was peacefully retreating just ahead of them.

They had another cause for thankfulness as they began their march. It was that they had not been taken prisoner and put in German prison camps. The war prisoners turned loose by the Germans when the Armistice was signed were flocking into the Verdun region by the tens of thousands. While they were mostly French, there were also many Russians and some British amongst them. Some of the French still had the red trousers and red kepi of 1914 and 1915. Hardly any prisoner had a complete uniform. They wore every mixture possible of different kinds of uniforms and civilian clothes. Their shoes were worn out, in some cases their feet were bound up in rags. They were dirty, mostly unshaven, ragged and what was the most noticeable feature of all;— spiritless.

As the Iowa regiment crossed the Meuse four of the Ohio regiments who had been taken prisoner jumped joyfully out of the ranks of the prisoners to join their comrades of the Rainbow.

Probably many of them could not yet believe that they were actually free and that the fighting was over.

Another incident which drew the attention of the Division came when they entered Belgian territory. They were pleased with the warm welcome the Belgians gave them. On the other hand they were surprised to find the villages and towns and the inhabitants untouched by the ravages of war or invasion, as the stories which they had heard had led them to believe that the whole of Belgium had been laid waste and its population driven out or crushed under the iron heel of the invader.

To most the war was over with the announcement of the Armistice which began at 11 a. m. November 11th. They did not realize or if they did paid little attention to the fact that it was merely a suspension of hostilities which might not even endure the thirty-six days specified because each side had the right to terminate it on three days' notice. Thus the fighting could break out again at any time on three days' warning or at the end of thirty-six days by one side or the other refusing to renew it.

General Pershing issued a commendatory order of November 11. It was followed the next day by one from Marshal Foch.

It was:

"Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Soldiers of the Allied Armies:

"After resolutely repulsing the enemy for months you confidently attacked him with untiring energy.

"You have won the greatest battle in history and preserved the most sacred of all causes, the Liberty of the World.

"You have full right to be proud for you have crowned your standards with immortal glory and won the gratitude of posterity.

F. FOCH,
Marshal of France,
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies."

For the advance to the Rhine General Pershing had formed the Third American Army under command of Major General Joseph T. Dickman who had commanded the First U.S. Army Corps during the Argonne.

It was made up of the 1st, 3d and 4th divisions constituting the Fourth Army Corps and the 2d, 32d and 42d Divisions constituting the Third Army Corps. The Seventh Army Corps made

up of the 5th, 89th and 90th Infantry Divisions were added November 22d.

This Third Army began its advance to the Rhine at 5:30 a. m. November 17, 1918.

In accordance with the terms of the Armistice the advance to the Rhine was to be in five stages followed by the occupancy of bridgeheads on the farther bank; by the British with Cologne as a center, by the Americans with Coblentz as a center and by the French with Mayence as a center.

This arrangement was made to give the Germans adequate time to withdraw without danger of their rear guards coming in contact with the Belgian, British, American and French advance guards.

The first stage was from November 11-16, the second November 16-20, the third November 26-30th, the fourth November 30—December 4th, the fifth December 4-8 and the occupancy of the bridge-heads December 8-12.

The Third American Army advanced with the Third Corps on the left with the 2nd and 32nd Divisions in the front line and the 42d in reserve.

On marching south from the Sedan region the Rainbow was assembled near Landres-et-St. George by November 14th. Here they had an excellent opportunity to see how this battlefield looked from the German side.

They also had cause to regret the thorough destruction of Landres-et-St. George and St. George by the American artillery as the weather was cold and wet and no shelter was to be found in these villages.

Here the Division received replacements, men from depot divisions and from divisions not included in the new Third Army. It also received equipment and some clothing and other supplies.

The 3d U. S. Army Corps was commanded by Major General John L. Hines. *

The Rainbow began its march officially November 20th from the Brandeville region east of the Meuse. This territory was on the ridge running north from Verdun and had been captured from the Germans by the 5th Regular Division between November 3rd

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* Chief of Staff U. S. Army 1924-1926.

and 4th when it gallantly forced the crossing of the Meuse River and the Armistice on November 11th.

The Rainbow had previously crossed the Meuse at Dun-sur-Meuse after marching from the Landres-St. George region.

November 20th it passed the night in the Montmedy region, its last night on French soil until April of the following spring when on its way from the Rhine to Brest to sail for home.

The next day it marched into Belgium and spent the night in the Virton region. The night of the 22d was spent in the Arlon region. The next day, the 23d, the Rainbow crossed into Luxembourg and halted in the Mersch region.

Here it remained over Thanksgiving.

The Rainbow moved December 1 to the East frontier of Luxembourg between Echtemach and Wasserbillig just west of the Sauer River.

At last the Division set foot on German soil!

It crossed the Sauer River, the boundary between Luxembourg and Germany December ad spending the night in the Consdorf Region.

It then marched via the following regions, Welschbillig, December 3, Speicher December 5, Birrestorn December 6, Dreis December 8 and Adenau December 9th.

Here it halted until the 13th when it resumed the march arriving on the Rhine December 15th.

The Rainbow then settled down in the valley of the Ahr River which runs into the Rhine and along the Rhine from Brohl to Rolandseck. The Second Division crossing the Rhine to make up part of the garrison of the American Bridgehead, the Rainbow was now on the left front of the Third American Army.

Across the Rhine to most of the front was German territory unoccupied by Allied or American troops.

To its immediate left was the right of the British Army of Occupation.

As the Division reached the Rhine the terms for the renewal of the Armistice the first time were being discussed. There was some bickering but the Germans finally signed the 17th.

Had they not, the problem on which the Division was to work during its stay on the Rhine,—how to cross it in the face of enemy resistance—would have been an immediate one.

The Division Headquarters was established at Ahrweiler in the Valley of the Ahr. In general the division was billeted in its customary order of battle, the 168th, 167th, 166th and 165th from right to left along the front line—the Rhine, with the 151st back of the 84th Brigade, the 149th back of the 83d and the 150th, the Trench Mortar, the Engineers, the Signal Troops and the Trains in rear of the center.

Colonel Stanley Rumbough who was operations officer for the march has the following to say with respect to changes in the Division Headquarters and the difficulties of the march. He says:

"While we were at Buzancy several changes were made in Division Headquarters. General Menoher was relieved as Division Commander, having been given command of the Sixth Corps. Major General Charles D. Rhodes was placed in command. Col. Grayson M. P. Murphy was sent to London on special duty. I was made Division G. 3 in his place. Several days after this General Rhodes was sent on other duty and Brig. General MacArthur put in command of the Division. His brigade adjutant Major Wolf was made G. 3, while I was made Divisional Adjutant. This was on November 10th.

"When Division Headquarters were at Arlon, Belgium, November 22 Major General Clement A. F. Flagler was put in command of the Division. General MacArthur returned to the 84th Infantry Brigade, Major Wolf went with him as Brigade Adjutant, I was again made G. 3.

"November 21 Colonel Henry J. Reilly was relieved of commend of the 83d Infantry Brigade and Brig.-General Frank M. Caldwell of the Regular Army was put in command. Colonel Reilly had been recommended the third time for promotion to Brigadier General when put in command of the brigade the middle of October and the fourth time shortly after the Sedan fight. He returned to command of the 149th Illinois Field Artillery.

"Finally Lt. Colonel Dravo was denied promotion to the Colonelcy for which he had been recommended and was relieved of command of the 165th New York Infantry. He was succeeded by Colonel Charles R. Howland of the Regular Army.

"As a matter of interest, I preceded the Division into Arlon, Belgium. As I arrived, they were changing an arch over the street to read from 'Welcome the Returning Victorious German Army' to 'Welcome the Advancing Victorious American Army.'

"We had great difficulty advancing into Germany because there were not sufficient roads. The maps were good. The villages with their population were plainly marked. This is essential for billeting, as the billeting capacity of a village is considered ten times the population. I was fortunate in having as Chief of Staff of the 3rd Corps, Col. Chaffee with whom I had been at West Point and who like myself was an army boy brought up in the Regular Army.

"My first request from him was to try to give us additional roads. Enough roads is essential in moving a Division forward. Besides the difficulties of marching a Division all along one road, is the extremely difficult problem of supply. A very important thing is to get the orders for the next day's march to the different elements as early as possible the evening before. In making marches of this type, the units must be fitted into each other as the pieces in a jig-saw puzzle. What I did was to call Third Corps Headquarters as soon as I arrived at the new divisional Headquarters. Chaffee would then give me our roads, the position of the head of the column of our Division, and our general area. I want to state here that had it not been for the excellent work of our Signal Battalion commanded by Ruby Garrett it would have been impossible for me to get in touch with Third Corps Headquarters at an early hour.

"With this information from Chaffee I would then get out the divisional march order. I would do this in conjunction with G. 1, Colonel Gill, who would plan for supply, and also in conjunction with G. 2, who gives information with reference to our own troops and the enemy, besides supplying all necessary maps.

"As soon as the order was written it was sent by motorcycle orderly to the different regimental commanders and also commanders of the independent units. We were, of course, advised by G. 1 of the food dumps, points of evacuation, etc.

"There were but two items of real difficulty after we began moving forward. One was that according to the first plan we were to leave one day's march between the German rear guard and our advance guard. This was changed at the request of the Germans as looting was taking place between their rearmost troops and our foremost ones. Of course, to take up this distance meant longer marches. However, the Division took up the slack in two days. The second difficulty was that as we approached the narrow Ahr Valley, which led down to the Rhine, the roads became very narrow as they generally ran between the river and the high hills on both sides. This stretched the division out for many miles."

CHAPTER XXX

THE WATCH ON THE RHINE.

The Rhine at last!

Most of the officers and men of the Rainbow had heard the song "The Watch On The Rhine". Most of them in school had read if not learned: "A Soldier Of The Legion Lay Dying In Algiers, etc.", and how his thoughts went back to "Bingen On The Rhine", the place where he was born and brought up. Few had ever seen this historic river before. They were fortunate in being stationed along one of the most beautiful parts of its banks where the River Aahr running north through beautiful wooded hills finally empties into the Rhine. It was a region of German health resorts built around famous springs in the Aahr Valley and along the Rhine.

How the men and officers billeted in the big hotels did revel in the comforts which to them seemed like luxury!

Probably a remark of the famous "Red" the orderly to Colonel Hough who never hesitated to reprove the Colonel when he did not think the Colonel's cigars were good enough, sums up better than anything else what the members of the Rainbow felt.

"Red" was overheard to say "Come here quick Colonel, here's a real bathroom with electric light, hot water and everything else and my God it all works." In France the few times such conveniences were encountered they very often did not work.

The mass of the enlisted men and most of the junior officers went about their routine duties with nothing more serious on their mind or in their conversation than when they would get a leave and where was the best place to spend it. As the Division was the extreme left of the American Army, and next to the right of the British Army, some without waiting for a leave sneaked over into the British zone to see what it was like. Some of these bolder spirits even penetrated to Bonn when the word was passed around that the British M. P.'s didn't bother American soldiers as long as they could navigate with reasonable safety under their own steam. Some who had heard

of the delights of Coblenz, or perhaps it was curiosity to see the famous bridge of boats, risked a trip there without a pass. However, the Provost Marshal at Coblentz was a regular army officer who as a young man had served in the ranks in the Philippines. With this experience back of him and probably the recollection of being picked up by the Provost Guard in Manila when visiting that city without a pass, he was an expert at catching up with such visitors from the Rainbow and other divisions as had thought that one or more soldiers wandering around amongst the thousands who had a pass, would not be noticed.

In any case, this generation of soldiers showed that they had the same restlessness and desire to explore everything around them which has been one of the marked characteristics of the American soldier noticed by the officers of other armies who have come in contact with them in war.

In the march of terrible hardship with some fighting from Tientsin to the rescue of the besieged legations in Pekin in 1900 an English general commented on this. He pointed out that when the end of the day's march was reached and the European and Japanese soldiers threw themselves down utterly exhausted from physical fatigue, choking dust and terrible heat,—that it was never more than an hour before American soldiers could be found all over the country investigating villages, grave mounds and everything else which excited their curiosity.

A similar story is told of a French officer who having served awhile with an American division, reported back to his own French Division Commander. The French General said, "I don't want any long histories but tell me a few incidents which you saw which will illustrate for me the characteristics of the Americans."

The young officer replied, "My General, they are the most restless troops I have ever seen. At the end of a long march when they are apparently exhausted they take off their packs, put aside their rifles, get out their mess kits, fall in line at their kitchen to get their supper. Almost immediately and before they have eaten they start jiggling around banging on their messkits and impartially asking 'well, where do we go from here?' They have no sooner eaten, when they are all over the place and even miles away apparently instantaneously."

The other story he told his general was this. "My first battle with the Americans I was standing alongside of a staff officer. We were watching the advance through our field glasses. After awhile I began to notice men walking back who were not wounded. As their number increased I turned to my American colleague and said 'who are those men walking back apparently not wounded?' Without taking his glasses down he said in the most offhand fashion 'Oh, those are the generals and colonels being relieved by Pershing as the attack goes along.' "

While all this was going on the senior officers of the Division knew that the Rainbow might at any time face a serious situation. They knew that the signing of an Armistice does not necessarily mean the end of a war. They knew history was full of armistices which came to and end not with a treaty of peace, but with the resumption of fighting. They knew that each renewal of the armistice was a critical period because the Germans might refuse to yield to the increased demands which the allies and associated powers made each time. If they refused then hostilities would begin with the necessity to cross the Rhine and march and fight into Germany until the Germans yielded. Probably that would mean going as far as Berlin.

The last field order issued by the Rainbow division headquarters had to do with the mission of the division in case the Armistice came to an end. It was Field Order No. 81, 27th December, 1918.

It was a 13 page order giving all the details necessary to enable the division to meet any one of three situations. These outlined in part of the order were:

(a) To cross the RHINE to reinforce the III Army Corps.*

(b) To hold the line of the RHINE from BROHL to ROLANDSECK (both inclusive).

(c) To cross the RHINE and occupy the neutral zone between our Third Army Corps and the Second British Army on its left. This neutral zone extends along the east bank of the RHINE from SINZIG to OBR.

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* Made up of the 1st, 2d and 32d Divisions which occupied the Coblentz bridgehead west of the Rhine. December 13, 1918 the 42d passed to the IV American Army Corps.

This was not an order issued to meet an imaginary danger. The Armistice had to be renewed four times before the Versailles Peace Treaty was ready. Then for a few days it looked as if the Germans would refuse to sign the Treaty and force would have to be used to make them.

Each of the renewals of the Armistice was only accomplished after several days discussion. Each of these periods was one in which the War might have been renewed.

The first renewal was December 17, 1918 just as the Americans were settling down on the Rhine and President Wilson was arriving in Paris. The second was January 18, 1919 just as the first peace conference meeting was being held. The third was February 17 just as the League of Nations covenant was approved by the victorious powers and President Wilson sailed for home. The fourth was March 16 just as President Wilson arrived back in Paris from his visit to the United States.

Here is the account of the last work done by the Operations Sections of the Division by Colonel Rumbaugh, the G-3 of the Rainbow. He says:

"Arriving on the Rhine, the Division was placed with Headquarters at Ahrweiler, according to a plan of defense which was prescribed in general by the Corps, and worked out in detail by the Division Headquarters. We also at Division Headquarters worked out a plan for advancing further into Germany if it became necessary in conjunction, of course, with the Americans on our right and the British Divisions on our left.

"The next and really last of importance which the G-3 section got out was the entraining order to take the Division to Brest, the port of embarkation for home. Such an order is extremely difficult because it must be worked out according to train capacity, car capacity, and the problem of getting the proper units entrained at the proper time. With approximately 27,000 men in the Division which if put on one road, would be a column about 28 miles long with sick to be taken care of, the problem of supply and with poor rail facilities, it can be seen that such an order takes some thought and work.

"Division Headquarters worked on this order nearly two weeks. The actual issuing of the order, assigning the proper units to their entraining points, making certain that units did

not get separated, and drawing up the table probably took about five days.

To keep the Division ready for possible field service a series of drills and maneuvers were prescribed by higher authority.

To offset this, leaves were granted to various leave areas arranged for by G. H. Q. in different parts of France.

March 16, 1919 General Pershing reviewed the Rainbow on a plain near the Rhine between Kripp and Remagen. A few days later he sent the following letter.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
FRANCE, MARCH 22, 1919.

Major General Clement A. F. Flagler,
Commanding 42nd Division,
American E. F., Ahrweiler, Germany.

MY DEAR GENERAL FLAGLER:

It afforded me great satisfaction to inspect the 42nd Division at Remagen on March 16th, during my trip through the Third Army, and to extend at that time to the officers and men my appreciation of their splendid record while in France.

The share which the 42nd Division has had in the success of our Armies should arouse pride in its achievements among all ranks. Arriving as it did on November 1, 1917, it was one of the first of our combat divisions to participate in active operations. After a period of training which lasted through the middle of February, 1918, it entered the Luneville sector in Lorraine, and shortly afterwards took up a position in that part of the line near Baccarat. In July it magnificently showed its fighting ability in the Champagne-Marne defensive, at which time units from the 42nd Division aided the French in completely repulsing the German attack. Following this, on July 25th the division relieved the 28th in the Aisne-Marne offensive, and in the course of their action there captured La Croix Rouge Ferme, Sergy and established themselves on the northern side of the Ourcq. In the St. Mihiel offensive the divisions made a rapid advance of 19 kilometers capturing seven villages. Later, during the Meuse-Argonne battle, it was twice put in the line, first under the 5th Corps and second under the 1st Corps, at which later time it drove back the enemy until it arrived opposite Sedan on November 7th.

Since the signing of the Armistice, the 42nd Division has had the honor of being one of those composing the Army of Occupation, and I have only words of praise for their splendid conduct and demeanor during this time. I want each man to realize the part he has played in bringing glory to American arms, and to understand both my pride and the pride of their fellows throughout the American Expeditionary Forces in their record. My good wishes accompany your command on its return to the United States, and my interest will remain with its members in their future careers.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) JOHN J. PERSHING.

During the stay on the Rhine two important events took place—important because they were to link up the war service of the officers and men then in the American army with their future lives as civilians scattered throughout the union and earning their living in many different professions, commercial pursuits, trades, and on the land. The first of these was a convention to which was sent representatives from all the units of the division. Its purpose was to form a Rainbow Division Veterans Association so that the associations and friendships formed during the war service of the division might bring its members together at least once a year in an annual convention. This caucus was held at Neuenahr, March 28th, 1919.

Here the Rainbow Division Veterans Association was formed. The then Col. Benson W. Hough was elected President, and Sergt. Albert G. Brown, Secretary.

The anniversary of the Champagne battle July 15, 1918 was chosen as the date for the annual convention. Birmingham, Alabama was chosen as the place for the first convention.

A convention has been held on this date every year since. Today * the association has at least one chapter in every state of the Union and the District of Columbia from which the Division came and in Florida from which no unit of the division came. Like California a steadily increasing number of the veterans of the division have been settling in Florida each year.

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* 1936.

The other event was the caucus held in the Circque de Paris, France, March 15, 16, 17 to talk over the formation of a veterans association to embrace all Americans who served in the War.

Col. Henry J. Reilly and Sergeant Albert G. Brown were the Rainbow delegates to the Paris caucus. At this caucus the American Legion was born.

It was while on the Rhine that the medical history of the division which since has attracted widespread attention in medical circles was written. The Division Surgeon Col. David S. Fairchilds, Jr., conceived the idea and detailed Maj. Harry D. Jackson of the 166th Ohio, Captain Larue of the 167th Ambulance Company and later Captain Lewis of the 165th Ambulance Company to work it. The history full of important details with plenty of maps and appendices was completed by Major Jackson and Captain Lewis who were relieved from other duty and ordered to Ahrweiller to do the work.

Colonel Hugh W. Ogden of Boston who represented New England in the Rainbow had been Judge Advocate of the Division throughout its active service in France. He was promoted to be the Judge Advocate of the III Army and ordered to report to Major-General Deckman, commanding that Army at Coblenz.

In view of his high standing as a lawyer, both prior to and since the war, his views on the much-discussed question of the application of Regular Army methods of obtaining discipline to the American civilian soldier are of particular interest.

He says: "The so-called 'Kirnan Board' on which I served the last three months of my army service and which made a printed report to Secretary Baker dealt with the question of military discipline and such changes as the war suggested should be made in the Articles of War and in our court martial procedure. The subject could not have been more thoroughly investigated or more carefully considered. We had probably 250 to 300 written reports from practically all the general officers in the army and many others. The great preponderance of opinion in the recommendations submitted and the overwhelming preponderance of opinion among those who had had the responsible job of enforcing discipline under the guns was to the effect that the present

disciplinary methods of the army were in the main correct, easy to administer, and efficacious in producing the results desired. Those who wanted the most changes and found the most fault, generally speaking, were those who did not know much about it from experience.

"Those who knew least about it found the most fault. Like almost every other job in almost every other walk of life it has to be administered with brains, understanding, sympathy, and intelligence. Almost any system, good, bad or indifferent, will work in the hands of the right man. Conversely, in the hands of the wrong man, the best system in the world will be simply an instrument of injustice and oppression. We had no trouble with discipline in the 42nd Division. General Menoher and I never differed throughout the whole war as to what was a fair, equitable and humane disposition of any case.

"If General Menoher had been a martinet and I had been a subservient, lazy, ignoramus there would have been many unjust trials, improper penalties and unrest among the men. As it was, we had no trouble. At the end of the war only one man appeared before the investigating committee from the 42nd Division and said that he had been wrongly treated in the administration of justice. His trouble was that he had been kept in the guard house two or three months awaiting trial. As a matter of fact the officer he wanted to defend him was down in Langres in school and he particularly asked me not to bring him to trial until that officer got back to the Division to which, of course, I assented. In other words, if the system has 'jarred somewhat with the many Americans', it is not the fault of the system, it is the fault of the people who administer it. The Colonel of the 149th was known throughout the Division as the strictest disciplinarian of the unit commanders yet he had no trouble in administering discipline in that regiment any more than I did in the Division—why—because he had brains, common sense and did not take himself too seriously. As long as men of that description are army officers there will be no trouble. The answer is: 'Cherchez l'homme', which is another form of the old saying, 'Show me a Colonel and I will know his regiment', which of course applies to Captains and Major Generals as Well."

Mr. Manning Marcus, Field Clerk at Rainbow Head-

quarters, who spoke fluent German sums up the reaction of the Germans to the Armistice as follows:

"My conversations included discussions with men and women of all classes, and of every strata in the social and economic scale.

"The reaction of the ordinary laborer and his family was one of genuine thankfulness that the war had terminated. Whether the Allies had won or whether Germany had been defeated was of no consequence to him and his family. They only knew that no longer would they be used as cannon fodder, and no more would they be subjected to the tyrannies of their military superiors.

"Going up somewhat in the scale to the skilled laborer, the artisan, the small tradesman, and people similarly situated, there was also a feeling of thankfulness that the carnage was over and a strong desire to resume their normal status in civilian pursuits. But there was a note of regret that Germany had lost.

"When it came to people of higher intellectual levels, professional men, the larger merchants, manufacturers, mine owners, and owners of the large landed estates, there was evinced a real regret that Germany had lost the war. Noteworthy was the expression of regret over military defeat, before considering the political and economic consequences thereof. Among these groups there was a definite disposition to blame the loss not upon German arms, but upon disloyal defections on the part of a portion of the civilian population. This disloyalty, they said, manifested itself finally among the enlisted men, resulting in the loss of morale, discipline, and downright unwillingness to engage in battle. Among a substantial portion of these groups was sounded the prediction that this was not the complete finials of the war, although others among them genuinely hoped that a peace-time status would quickly be realized and be permanently maintained. As to those who said the war was not finished, there was elaboration of the point that it would be only a matter of time before Germany arose again in its greatness, establish its military superiority, and assert its hegemony in world affairs.

"Discussion by civil officials who in the main were of the monarchistic regime, officers and non-commissioned officers of the army, and persons with definitely large interests was at first

very guarded. However, once their confidence was gained, and the feeling established that the expressions of their opinions would not result in harm to them, there was disclosed an almost unanimous prediction that Germany would bend all its efforts to rehabilitate itself in every way, particularly militarily, and that it would be the supreme object of the country to avenge its defeat and humiliations. At that time, the Allied powers were in the process of determining the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. There was extreme interest as to the terms which would be imposed upon Germany.

"Those of the population who were harboring thoughts of later hostilities made their predictions before it was definitely known whether the Treaty of Peace would impose harsh or generous conditions.

"Summarized, my impressions gained as the result of conversations held throughout the areas occupied by the American and British forces, and including people in agricultural pursuits, and residents of villages, towns, and large cities like Cologne, Bonn, Coblenz, and Aachen, were that the more substantial and better educated portion of the population were for a resumption of hostilities when 'another day' came, and that by reason of their superiority, intellectual, social and material, the rest of the populations would be taught to think likewise. When we left the Rhine there was not a doubt in my mind that whenever Germany concluded its military power sufficiently mighty, she would use it."

When Colonel Hugh W. Ogden of Boston was relieved as Judge Advocate of the Division to go to the Third Army Headquarters at Coblentz his assistant, Major James J. Crossley of Portland, Oregon, formerly an infantry officer who had come to the Division late in October was made Judge Advocate of the Division.

Here is what he says about the discipline of the Division and of the German inhabitants during the period when certain the war was over there was a natural tendency to let down:

"Because the Division had been almost continuously at the front from some time in early July until the Armistice a great number of Generaly Court Martial cases, many of them important, had accumulated and had to be tried. After a careful investiga-

tion in which the Chief of Staff, Colonel Hughes, was of great assistance in about half of these cases the charges were reduced and the men sent back to their respective commanders for trial by Special or Summary Court Martials. The remainder were tried by General Court Martial, rapidly disposed of and the docket cleared up so that when the Division was ready to sail for the United States from Brest, France, in April, 1919, no cases remained.

"While at Ahrweiler the Burgomaster of Ahrweiler, the same office as our mayor in America, was arrested for violation of the terms of the Armistice. This because he had taken possession of the hospital supplies left behind by the retreating German army, sold them and appropriated the money for his own use. He was tried. Though defended by able counsel from Coblenz he was found guilty and sentenced to some three months in the Guardhouse with hard labor. He refused to labor and so was forced at the point of a sentry's bayonet to police up the streets of his home city of Ahrweiler. His gathering up cigarette stubs and trash caused great surprise and amusement to his fellow citizens.

"While on the Rhine there were only three serious cases. Two men of the 165th Infantry were convicted of the murder of a comrade by thrusting a bayonet clear through the body from the back. Each was given twenty years imprisonment. One man of the 151st Machine Gun Battalion was convicted of the murder of a comrade by shooting. He was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. Then a German Captain of a Machine Gun Company in the German army, who before the war was for many years a resident of New York, was convicted of causing uprisings at Zinzig, on the Rhine, headquarters of the 167th Infantry. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment.

"While the Division was at the front the men some times were not paid for several months. Though through no fault of their own they had no money to make purchases from the Y. M. C. A. contingent with the Division. These people would not sell them anything on credit. This though the men claimed that a great deal of the Y. M. C. A. supplies had been contributed by the folks back home without cost to the Y. M. C. A. The result was quite a bitter feeling arose against the Y. M. C. A. The consequence was that whenever some of the Y. M. C. A. were

charged with some offense and brought before a General Court Martial the feeling among the men of the division was very much against them. However none of the Y. M. C. A. General Court Martial cases led to conviction.

"One incident that caused considerable merriment among those who obtained the benefits therefrom and considerable grumbling from those who were deprived of the benefits thereof was the shipment of a large carload of eggs to the division. It was switched off at Zinzig. While intended for the whole division, the Alabama Regiment took immediate possession of the whole carload and lived happily on eggs for some time thereafter.

"Another incident was when a whole passenger coach load of disreputable German women came from Cologne up to Ramagen, the headquarters of the 165th Infantry. They were promptly herded back on board the passenger coach and sent back to Cologne.

"The fact that the war was over and the men of the division had fought so well resulted in a very strong tendency on the part of the General Courts Martial to either acquit the defendants or to impose light sentences where the charge was not serious. In some cases this was unsatisfactory to General Flagler who claimed it had a deterrent effect on the discipline of the Division.

"Taken all in all there was a fine spirit of cooperation and excellent morale among all the regiments, battalions and soldiers of this most excellent division."

The irrepressible "Bill Screws" has another explanation as to how the Alabamans got a whole carload of eggs. He says: "You know of course no Regular Army man would swipe anything. Also all Alabamans are equally innocent. Therefore how can you imagine a combination of the two doing anything like that. The State of Alabama sent the regiment a carload of tobacco which should have reached us about the time of the Champagne Battle. Not getting it I stirred things up every time I had the chance. When a car arrived consigned to us I thought: 'the tobacco has come at last.' However, it was a carload of eggs.

"Of course we Alabamans being the 'he-men' we are we would sooner 'chaw' on tobacco than eggs but we had the eggs and we didn't have the tobacco. So we lived on eggs for several days.

"I sent a few around to the other Colonels and the Generals to keep them from starting something because Alabama had eggs and their outfits didn't.

"It is a funny thing but every once in a while the War Department tries to make somebody in Alabama pay for those eggs, they never suggest paying us for the tobacco we didn't get."

Private Burton H. Powell of the Headquarters Company of the 150th Indiana tells how he got the Germans to supply plenty of wood after they had stopped giving the company their regular allowance. He says:

"It was my duty to haul the rations, fuel and other supplies for Headquarters Company. Before long we were getting only two pieces of wood about the size of a fence post. This was all that the German Government would furnish. I told Sgt. Oliver I could get him all the wood he needed but had to have the O.K. of Capt. Hoffman and Sgt. Ringo. It was immediately received.

"When we got up to Mt. Nevenahr where we usually received our wood all the wood had been hauled away. So as not to be outdone we tore down part of an old hunting lodge. You can imagine the noise of axes crashing and nails screeching as they were pulled out on a frosty night.

We got enough wood to last for two weeks. Next morning two snappily dressed Germans looked the pile over and made several remarks concerning the wood.

"Later when this wood was all burned up Sgt. Oliver wanted more. This time Capt. Hoffman told me to get another load of the best wood I could find regardless of where it was. He said he would back me up. That gave me plenty of brass. A Sunday morning the cooks were out of fuel. So Jim McLain and I started out for the east side of Nevenahr where plenty of wood was piled up along the railroad. That is where we loaded up, and I mean loaded up too!

"On our way back right in front of the town Mayor's office is where I got it. About 30 old German grandpas stopped me, they unsnapped the lines from the horses bits and such gabble you never heard. I couldn't understand what they were saying about me. I was stopped, stilled and stumped and was held for about 3 hours for neither Captain Hoffman nor Sergeant

Ringo could be found. I may as well tell the truth: there wasn't any getting away from those old heroes. They had me, team, wagon and wood. Imagine sitting there for three hours being held a prisoner by the Germans when it was their move to furnish fuel for the Army of Occupation.

"Finally Sergeant Ringo got on the scene and soon I was released. Let me say we had plenty of wood for the kitchen and also for the picket line guard after that and no one had to steal wood or coal to keep warm."

The following amusing experience is told by Sergeant Earl E. Young, a Pennsylvanian of the 150th Wisconsin M. G. B. He looked very much like the Kaiser, including the upturned moustache:

"On December 15th, 1918, we arrived at Bodendorf, Germany, after a hard month's march from France. We were tired and wanted a place to rest. We were told that we had reached the end of our journey. So we looked around. I and my Section were assigned to a small house. And as we entered we were met the family of Germans: man, wife and children. They showed us a small room where we were to live. It was about 6 foot by 12 foot. Not enough room for two men, much less a section of machine gunners. And it seemed as if all the chairs, stands, etc., were put in this room. I yelled for the (Kraut) to come and remove his furniture. He refused. I had the men remove it in no gentle terms. As I went to remove a large canvas painting of the Kaiser from the wall, the whole family let out a howl, telling us in no uncertain terms that he was the Kaiser. I saw that they would obey the Kaiser if no one else. So I drew my cold "45 automatic" and smashed the glass. Then I took the picture down and put it outside with the rest of the furniture. I then took from my pocket a photo of myself taken in France, and hung it on the wall in the same place, telling them 'Hock, dat is der Kaiser'. They looked at the photo and at me. I made them salute the new photo, which they did after a little argument. Within an hour's time all of the village knew of it. The other families came in, looked at the photo, then at me. Some were silent, other smiled and spoke.

"I told all that I would be the Kaiser of Bodendorf. And all during our four months' stay there I was known as the 'Kaiser of Bodendorf'. I even had a charge account at Meitzers general store under that name.

The 17th of March the Rainbow was transferred from the IV American Army Corps to the reserve of the 3d American Army. This was a sign the division was soon to be ordered home.

A week later orders came to begin turning in equipment, physical examinations and typhoid inoculation. Baggage and passenger lists were prepared.

Finally early in April the units of the Rainbow left the Rhine by rail for Brest, the closest French post to the U. S.

CHAPTER XXXI

HOMEWARD BOUND.

At last the Rainbow Division was on the Atlantic homeward bound after eighteen months' service in France and Germany.

Not only homeward bound, but what a difference there was in all the surroundings from those of the outward bound trip in October, 1917. Even the Atlantic Ocean seemed in a better mood because far less rough. Also now it was spring instead of fall. There were no life preservers always around each man's neck to continually annoy him as had been true on the trip over. This time there were no long, dreary, dark cold nights without lights, but pleasant spring evenings followed by comfortable nights and plenty of lights up to taps. The transports were far less crowded than they had been going over. Those units which returned on cruisers, besides being more comfortable, had the interesting experience of a voyage on a warship.

The food was better, of far greater variety and issued in greater quantities. In fact, every man could eat as much as he pleased, coming back not only for "seconds" but also "thirds" and "fourths" if he wished.

The experience on the Leviathan which carried more than 12,000 of the Rainbow on one trip was typical of that on the other transports and warships which took the Division home.

While the Leviathan now proudly carries a brass plate telling of the number of troops she transported during the war, there is no mention of a fact of much more interest to the average soldier. That is how many eggs he was allowed to eat on his way home.

The Navy Commanding Officer of this ship asked the Army Troop Commander the day before the Rainbow troops came on board what he thought the men would like best for their first breakfast. The reply was "eggs and lots of them". That first breakfast the 12,000 several hundred soldiers on board disposed of more than sixty thousand eggs.

Another record set on this trip of the Leviathan was made by the infantry of the Rainbow which was on board her. They coaled her.

When they were all on board eager to start, the Navy Commander came to the Troop Commander and said "Something has gone wrong with the arrangements for coaling the ship. The coal is alongside, but they did not send sufficient labor with it to enable my crew to coal the ship in time to catch the tide we must make if we are to sail today. I know that I cannot order the troops to help but if you see any way to do so, it will enable us to sail today instead of tomorrow." The Troop Commander told him the Army would be glad to coal the ship.

He sent for the Colonels and told them the situation. He told them to get their Field Officers and Captains together, explain it to them and then have them tell the men that it is up to them whether the Leviathan sailed that day or waited until the next.

With four bands to furnish the music and an unending stream of more than 12,000 soldiers eager to throw the coal into the Leviathan's bunkers, probably no ship was ever coaled so quickly.

Another noticeable difference between the trip back and the trip over was that on the one back the navy crews were no longer green landlubbers as most of them had been on the way over, but now thoroughly knew their business.

The Division Headquarters were set up in Brest April 5, 1919. The camp on the hills above this famous French Naval Harbour on the south side of the western end of the tip of the Breton Peninsular will long be remembered. It was the Division's last experience of the mud of France.

The first of the Rainbow to sail for home was the 117th Maryland Trench Mortar Battery which left April 9, 1919. April 15th, 17th, and 18th saw the rest of the Division at sea with the coast of France rapidly sinking below the eastern horizon.

This last date April 18th was eighteen months to a day from the departure of the first large convoy of the Division from Hoboken on October 18th, 1917.

Thus those officers and men who sailed from Hoboken on that date were entitled to their third gold overseas service chev-

ron. Overseas service began the day of sailing from the United States and ended the day of return.

The last unit to reach their home shores was the 117th Kansas Ammunition Train which reached Newport News, Virginia, May 1, 1919.

The Division officially ceased to exist with the demobilization of the Division Headquarters at Camp Dix, New Jersey, May 9, 1919.

Similarly the Brigades officially ceased to exist with their demobilization: the 83d Infantry Brigade at Camp Upton, Long Island, New York, May 5, 1919; the 84th Infantry Brigade at Camp Dodge, Iowa, May 12, 1919; and the 67th Field Artillery Brigade at Camp Grant, Illinois, May 12th, 1919.

The units from the twenty-five states and the District of Columbia were sent to the camps in their home states or nearest thereto and there demobilized.

Thus the famous 42d U. S. Infantry Division dissolved into twenty-seven thousand American civilians with the red chevron showing discharge added to the three gold chevrons of eighteen months of overseas service and the Rainbow, the insignia of the Division on the sleeve of the uniform which with $60 was given by the government to help start life over again in the case of the older men and to begin civilian life for the younger who had gone straight from school or home into the Army.

The active service of the Rainbow is well summed up in the following issued by Division Headquarters two days after the Armistice as the Division was getting ready for the march to the Rhine:

“The 42d Division has now been in France more than a year. From the time it assembled from the ports of debarkation the Division has remained continuously in the zone of the Armies, its first training area being within the sound of the guns of St. Mihiel. In February, 1918, the Division first went into line and has been in contact with the enemy almost continuously since that time until the Armistice signed by the Germans on November 11, 1918. Out of the 224 days of the Great War which have elapsed since it first entered the line the Division has been en-

gaged with the enemy 180 days and the balance of the time has been spent in moving from front to front or in reserve close behind the front.

"The Division has marched by road, traveled by camion and moved by train; it has held a wide sector front in Lorraine; it has been in battle in Champagne, in the Woevre, at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne. It was the only American Division to assist in the disastrous defeat of the Great German Offensive of July 15 on the battlefield in Champagne. From that time on it has taken part in every large American operation.

"In November, when German power was finally broken, the Division as it lay before Sedan had reached the northernmost point attained by the First American Army in its magnificent advance.

The American High Command has long rated and employed the 42d Division as a first class shock division. The French commanders under whom the Division has served have cited it in orders and now a captured German document shows the regard in which the Division has been held by the enemy. The Weekly Summary of Information for October 9, 1918, of the German Group of Armies which held the front from the Argonne to the Meuse, enumerates the American units on its front and makes the following statement:

" 'The engagement of the 42d Division is to be expected soon. It is in splendid fighting condition and is counted among the best American Divisions.'

"In the course of its service the Division has taken prisoners from 26 enemy divisions, including three Imperial Guard Divisions and 22 separate units, as follows:

"1st Guard, 3rd Guard, 4th Guard, 10th, 13th, 28th, 40th, 41st, 52nd, 96th, 192nd, 195th, 201st, 202nd, 203rd, 216th, 227th, 233rd, 14th Reserve, 77th Reserve, 6th Bavarian Reserve, 5th Landwehr, 8th Landwehr, 10th Landwehr, 21st Landwehr, 35th Austro-Hungarian.

Foot Artillery Regiments—3rd, 30th, 42nd, 51st, 65th, 51st Landwehr. 67th and 97th Labor Battalions, 53rd Field Artillery, 216th Agricultural Battalion, 20th Flight, Hq. XIII Army Corps, 18th Electric Battalion, 16th Sharp Shooter Machine Gun Battalion, XV Ersatz Foot Artillery Battalion, 70th Sound Ranging

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

"EHREN BREITSTEIN"

The German fortress at Coblentz, where the Moselle flows into the Rhine. The American flag over which was the most certain sign of American domination of the surrounding territory.



Courtesy of J. Herbert Ambler

The 150th Wisconsin M. G. B. aboard the U. S. S. Pretoria homeward bound. April 1919.

Troops, 14th Sturm Battalion, 4th Minenwerfer Battalion, 78th Field Artillery, 22nd Railway Section, XIII Ludwigsburg Regiment, 3rd Telegraph Battalion and 657th Intelligence Section."

The number of prisoners officially credited the Division is 1,317. Unwillingness to send many infantry soldiers to the rear guarding prisoners taken led in each of the Divisions fights to prisoners on finally reaching the rear being in the territory of neighboring divisions.

Also the number of prisoners taken like the number of miles of territory gained is seldom an indication of the fierceness of the fighting. This because the time when the largest figures can be shown in each of these is when the enemy is not fighting but running.

The Rainbow was 164 days in the face of the enemy. The only divisions which exceed this are the First with 220 days and the 26th with 193.

The next nearest to the record of the Rainbow are the Second (Regular and Marine) with 137 days, the 77th New York with 113 and the Fifth (Regular) with 103.

The Rainbow lost to the enemy only 112 prisoners, all during patrols within the German lines or during attacks. None by defeat.

The Rainbow lost 2,810 killed in action or died of wounds received in action and 11,873 wounded in action, a total of 14,683 at the hands of the enemy. This is more than 50 per cent of the authorized strength of the Division.

The exact number of replacements received by the Rainbow is not available. It was approximately 20,000. This would give an approximate total of 48,000 officers and men who served in the Division first and last.

Thus approximately 30.6 per cent of those who served were killed or wounded by the enemy or one out of every three and a quarter. This is a higher price paid than was true of most American Divisions.

The following poem covering the service of the Rainbow was made part of the Standard Burial Ritual of the Rainbow Division Veterans by the National Convention at Columbus, Ohio.

MEN OF THE FORTY-SECOND

In retrospect I see once more
A tented city beside the sea
I hear the muffled drum of war,
The bugler's call of Reveille.

An island camp, I see it form
In smould'ring glow of bivouac fires;
Shrouded in mist of Autumn morn,
Nestling close to Gotham's Spires.

I see the phantom forms of men
Swiftly form in straightened ranks.
With measured tread they march, and then—
I lose them on the fog swept banks.

I see them cross the mighty Main,
Setting their course for Biscay's shore.
At Saint Nazaire in fog and rain
They pitch their camp beside the Loire.

I see them trudge the Roman Way
Where Caesar and his legions stood.
Where Clovis vainly sought to slay
Every peasant of Breton blood.

And then again at Luneville,
At Reherrey and Merviller;
I see them camped at Hallainville,
And see the attack on Ancerviller.

I hear the Quads in midnight runs,
I see bright flares toward Montigny.
Hear the staccato of Chaut-Chaut guns,
The dull booming of a battery.

I tread the Champagne's chalky soil
With American and brave "Poilu"
I see the Prussian Guard recoil
Where Seeger kept his "Rendezvous".

I stand at Saint Hilaire-le-Grande,
I see again the shell-lit sky
On Bastile Night near old Chalons,
I heard Gouraud say “Stand or Die”.

And then the Ourcq—the shrapnel storm
The spot where valient Kilmer died
On nature’s couch, his crumpled form
Beneath the trees he glorified.

At Meurcy Ferme, I see the dead,
The bitter fight in Sergy’s street.
Hear the drone of planes high overhead,
At Fismes I see the foe retreat.

I see them wend their weary way
Through Neufchateau and Landauville.
I see them pause at old Mandres,
Then on toward quaint old Saint Mihiel.

In triumph I see them pass Beaumont,
I see them climb hard-fought Mont Sec.
I hear their guns at Exermont,
Guns that the enemy could not check.

I see the tangled Argonne Wood,
The bloody field of Sommerance.
The death trap road where Fleville stood,
My dying comrades—the last advance.

And then a “Rainbow” forms an arch
And through its portals in the van
I see the Forty-Second march—
And lo, the spires of Sedan.

Affectionately dedicated to my comrades, living and dead, who served their country under the colors of the “Rainbow” (42nd) Division.

By C. L. Corneille, Bat. B., 150th F. A.

OFFICIAL "RAINBOW" EULOGY

by

C. L. Corneille—150 F. A.

Note: Adopted at the 17th Annual Reunion of R. D. V. in Kansas City, July 13, 14 and 15, 1936.

Departed Comrade (s):—

You have reached the end of the Rainbow. Just a few short years ago, you stood shoulder to shoulder with us under the brilliant hued Arc that stretched from the quaint old province of Lorraine to the tangled forests of the Argonne. You have answered the call of the Celestial bugler, who sounded "Taps".

Your mission in following the Rainbow to its glorious end was not to find the proverbial "pot of gold", but one that had a more selfish purpose and would bring added glory to the Flag of our beloved country.

(A poppy is dropped upon the grave (s).)

A poppy from the fields of France. It is only a small token of our love for you, Comrade (s), but may the tears of a grateful Nation nourish it.

We salute you, and pray that when we answer the final call we will find you waiting for us on the "Eternal Parade Grounds".

Note: Taps is then sounded.

ADDENDA

While the Rainbow Division was serving as a part of the Army of Occupation along the Rhine, a universal desire arose to perpetuate in civil life the bond of war-time comradeship by forming an organization of all Rainbow Veterans. During March, 1919, the call for a Convention went out to all units of the Division and as a result, representatives from each unit of the Rainbow met in the city of Bad Neuenahr, Germany. There was formed the "Rainbow Division Veterans", which has ever since carried on and preserved the traditions of the Rainbow. Benson W. Hough, then Colonel of the 166th Infantry, was the unanimous choice for President.

Since its inception in Germany the peacetime organization has held an annual reunion to renew wartime comradeship and pay fitting tribute to our Rainbow dead. The Reunion occurs on July 14th each year and climaxes with the observance of "Champagne Hour", at the exact time when the guns opened up at the famous battle on the chalk hills north of Chalons.

The organization is the most closely knit of any American Division that served in the World War. It has an accurate and up-to-date mailing list of more than twelve thousand Rainbowers all over the world, to whom it sends "The Rainbow Reveille", the national publication.

The "Rainbow Division Veterans", which has forty-seven chapters and 550 national members-at-large to date, permits Rainbow comradeship in civil life, a most fitting memorial to our Rainbow dead, and a rich heritage to our descendants.

A history of reunions and National Presidents is as follows:

1919—Bad Neuenahr, Germany . . . . . Inception
1920—Birmingham, Alabama . . . . . Benson W. Hough
1921—Cleveland, Ohio. . . . . Matthew A. Tinley
1922—Minneapolis, Minnesota. . . . . George E. Leach
1923—Indianapolis, Indiana. . . . . William E. Donovan
1924—Columbia, South Carolina. . . . . J. Monroe Johnson
1925—Chicago, Illinois. . . . . Fred E. Crawford

1926—New York City, New York. . . . . Fr. Francis P. Duffy
1927—Des Moines, Iowa. . . . . Howard Smith
1928—Columbus, Ohio. . . . . Barre Blumenthal
1929—Baltimore, Maryland. . . . . William P. Screws
1930—Paris, France. . . . . John J. Mangan
1931—Macon, Georgia. . . . . Cooper D. Winn
1932—Los Angeles, Calif. . . . . Laurence P. Gibbs
1933—Chicago, Illinois. . . . . Noble B. Judah
1934—Detroit, Michigan. . . . . Wilber M. Brucker
1935—Washington, D. C. . . . . M. Manning Marcus
1936—Kansas City, Missouri. . . . . Ruby D. Garrett

National Officers—1935-36

Permanent Honorary President. . . . . Henry J. E. Gouraud, France
Permanent Honorary President. . . . . General Douglass MacArthur, United States
Honorary President. . . . . M. Manning Marcus, D. of C.
President. . . . . Ruby D. Garrett, Missouri
Vice Presidents. . . . . James E. Barney, Florida
Leland L. Whitney, Ohio
Dr. F. W. McAffee, Michigan
Ralph S. Ryan, Virginia
Secretary. . . . . Sharon C. Cover
4643 Nottingham Road
Detroit, Michigan
Treasurer. . . . . Raymond Ramsey, Missouri
Chaplain. . . . . Rev. James A. Murray, New York
Historian. . . . . Henry J. Reilly, Dist. of Col.
Judge Advocate. . . . . Hugh W. Ogden, Massachusetts
Sergeant-at-Arms. . . . . E. Don Hennessey, Michigan
Master of Ceremonies.
"The Champagne Hour" . . . . . J. Monroe Johnson, S. Carolina
Editor, "Rainbow Reveille". . . . . Harold B. Rodier, Dist. of Col.

NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

William P. Screws, Dallas B. Smith, Alabama; Lloyd B. Becker, California; Walker H. Colston, District of Columbia; Henry J. Reilly, Noble B. Judah, Barre Blumenthal, Fred E. Crawford, Jr., Illinois; Robert H. Tyndall, Daniel I. Glossbrenner, Indiana; Matthew A. Tinley, Howard Smith, Iowa; Jack A. Clarke, Stevenson Masson, Maryland; Wilber M. Brucker, Sharon C. Cover, Michigan; George E. Leach, Joe Justad, Minnesota; William S. Nevius, New Jersey; William J. Donovan, Grayson M. P. Murphy, John F. Joyce, Edward G. Reikert, New York; Benson W. Hough, Ohio; J. Monroe Johnson, South Carolina; William E. Talbot, Texas; William Bynum Hitt, James R. Dent, Virginia.

The "Rainbow Division Veterans" extend a cordial invitation to all Rainbowers to active membership in the National Organization. Any member of the old Rainbow Division who is not now on the mailing list, and therefore is not receiving the "Rainbow Reveille", should at once contact National Secretary Sharon C. Cover, 4643 Nottingham Road, Detroit, Michigan, and *identify himself with Rainbow*. The Eighteenth Annual Rainbow Reunion will be held at Kansas City, Mo., July 13, 14, 15, 1936.

SHARON C. COVER,
National Secretary.

APPRECIATION

The completion of "AMERICANS ALL", the History of the Rainbow Division during the World War, has been far from easy.

More than seventeen years have elapsed since the chronicled events occurred; the members of the Rainbow Division are dispersed all over the World; a multitude of new interests have engaged our individual attention; time and distance have heightened the difficulty. Accordingly it is with no small degree of appreciation that the Rainbow Division History Committee expresses its appreciation to each and every person who has had anything to do with the completion of this book.

No better Editor could have been found than the National Historian, Brig. General Henry J. Reilly. His intimate contact with General Pershing, Marshal Foch, General Gouraud, General MacArthur and all of the officers of the Division, as well as his knowledge of the records of the War Department and other sources of information made him the perfect selection.

General Reilly has produced a superb History of the Rainbow Division. As a matter of fact nothing like it has come out of the War from any source. Against the handicaps of time, distance and separation General Reilly has successfully produced a History that will rival anything written upon military subjects. While it is impossible to produce a history that meets universal approval, nevertheless the Committee expresses its profound appreciation for General Reilly's accomplishment.

The History Committee consisted of Federal Judge and Major General Benson W. Hough, Columbus, Ohio, Chairman, and following his death, former Governor Wilber M. Brucker of Detroit, Michigan, was appointed Chairman in his place. The other members of the Committee are Major General Matthew A. Tinley of Council Bluffs, Iowa, and Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Colonel J. Monroe Johnson of Marion, South Carolina. The Committee was appointed at the Detroit Reunion in 1934 by the joint action of the retiring and incoming Presidents and made a report of progress at the July 1935 Reunion in Washington, D. C. On August 16, 1935, General Hough stopped off in Detroit, saw Governor Brucker and told him that he had been giving some thought to the method of publication. Together General Hough, Governor Brucker, National Secretary Cover and Capt. Rea used the long distance telephone and telegraph, and by August 18, 1935, had sufficient financial commitments to justify entering into a contract with the F. J Heer Printing Company of Columbus, Ohio, to publish the book when written.

It was immediately ratified by Colonel Ruby D. Garrett, National President and Chapters were solicited to pay their portion of the expense. Unexpectedly General Hough died November 19th, 1935, in the midst of these preparations. Governor Brucker was selected to succeed General Hough as Chairman, and once again the work was taken up and went forward to completion.

It has been an enormous task to surmount the difficulties; to conduct the negotiations; to raise the money; to carry on voluminous correspondence with editor, publisher, and countless others. But the Committee feels happy over the success which has crowned our effort to publish this History, for which so many Rainbowers have waited.

National Secretary Sharon C. Cover deserves a great deal of credit for his assistance in the financing program. Clarence Houle, Chapter President of Michigan, and Cecil J. Wilkinson, of the District of Columbia Chapter both deserve honorable mention for their valuable assistance to the History Committee. Captain John R. Rea of Columbus, Ohio, did distinguished service in liaison work between editor, publisher and History Committee, and also made a material contribution to its success.

After all no History could be brought about without a publisher and Walter F. Heer, President of the F. J. Heer Printing Company of Columbus, Ohio, deserves a high degree of praise and commendation. He had faith in the Rainbow Division. They were ready to go ahead with the work when we had no money and only partially completed manuscript. The Committee has found this Company capable and cooperative all the way through. As a matter of fact Mr. Heer has permitted us to have three hundred pages more than originally calculated without increase in price. The quality of the work speaks for itself.

As we turn over this work to the Association, we feel amply rewarded for our work by our satisfaction in serving the old “Rainbow”,—which inspires us still.

BENSON W. HOUGH,
(Deceased)
WILBER M. TRUCKER,
MATTHEW A. TINLEY,
J. MONROE JOHNSON.

May 21, 1936