day and night in our machine-shop truck and when the big show started on the night of July 14th most of the machine-gun outfits were equipped with the Rainbow mounts. This permitted them to take shelter behind low objects and conceal themselves in wheat-fields. It only weighed about two pounds and one man could carry the gun and mount assembled together. This proved a very great advantage when we moved to the next show on the Chateau Thierry front and had to follow up the German retreat.

"On the 15th of July the whole shop came very near to being blown off the map. A shell fired from a 14-inch naval gun and aimed at the rail-head across the road from our shop, fell short. It landed in a swamp about 100 feet short of our shop and although it opened a hole over 40 feet in diameter and 25 feet deep, no casualties resulted.

The moment at which Gouraud was thanking the Rainbow and telling them the lessons of the Champagne the defensive half of the Second Battle of the Marne just over, the Aisne-Marne Offensive which constituted the Offensive half was in its second day of success. This Battle in which the tide of German success was turned to German defeat bore out General Petain's statements in February, 1918, and the latter part of July of the same year.

In February in an order received by General Gouraud he had said "The enemy will undoubtedly act quickly to take advantage of Russia's defection and America's not being ready".

A number of days after the attack of July 18 had begun General Petain said to General Gouraud "Today all hopes are permitted".

In an order to the 4th Army, September 25th, the day before the general attack on the Germans in France began, Gouraud said in one paragraph "The 4th Army, the 15th of July fought a battle which permitted all the successes which the French and Allies had invariably had since".

In an order issued the 11th of November congratulating the 4th Army on the part which it had played he said amongst other things: "It is four months since the enemy, filled with pride and confidence, attacked with 15 elite divisions (on your front) in that grand Offensive which he called 'the Offensive for Peace'

and which by capturing for him Rheims, Chalons and Verdun was intended to lead him to Paris.

"The 15th of July you broke his power and his hopes and on that day victory changed sides. Since, it has remained faithful to us."

The Division as it left knew that it had not only had the honor of taking part in one of the greatest battles in history but had also successfully passed one of the hardest tests a soldier can face: to stand up without flinching and successfully stop a full-fledged modern attack made by an hitherto victorious enemy.

The price paid was 256 killed, 7I died of wounds and 1240 wounded or a total of 1567. Most of these casualties occurred on July 15th. The only prisoners lost were those of Lieut. Vaughn's sacrifice detachment.

The commanding officers of the various French regiments and Divisions along side of which the units served issued commendatory orders.

General Naulin issued the following:

HEADQUARTERS 42ND DIVISION
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
20 JULY, 1918.

MEMORANDUM No. 242.

The following order of the 21st Army Corps published for the information of all concerned:

21st Army Corps
Staff.
3rd Bureau
No. 2, 595/3

GENERAL ORDERS

At the moment when the 42nd Division is on the point of leaving the 21st Army Corps, I desire to express my keen satisfaction and my sincere thanks for the services it has rendered under all conditions.

By its valor, ardor and its spirit, it has very particularly distinguished itself on July 15 and 16 in course of the great battle when the 4th Army broke the German offensive on the Champagne front.

I am proud to have it under my orders during this period;

my prayers accompany it in the great struggle engaged in for the liberty of the world.

General NAULIN,
Commanding the 21st Army Corps,
(Signed) NAULIN

OFFICIAL:
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
(Signed)
By order of MAJOR GENERAL MENOHER:
Brigadier General, General Staff
DOUGLASS MACARTHUR,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
WALTER E. POWERS,
Major, N. G., Adjutant General
Division Adjutant
GENERAL DISTRIBUTION.

General Gouraud's commendatory order was:

HEADQUARTERS 42ND DIVISION
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
JULY 17, 1918.

MEMORANDUM:

The following letter is furnished Brigade, and Regimental and separate unit commanders for publication to their respective commands:

4th Army
Staff.
3rd Bureau
No. 6, 954/3

July 16, 1918.

SOLDIERS OF THE 4th ARMY

During the day of July 15th, you broke the efforts of Fifteen German Divisions supported by ten others.

They were expected according to their orders to reach the Marne in the evening: You stopped their advance clearly at the point where we desire to engage in and win the battle.

You have the right to be proud, heroic Infantrymen and Machine Gunners of the advanced post who signalled the attack

and disintegrated it, aviators who flew over it, Battalion and batteries which broke it, staffs which so minutely prepared the battle field.

It is a hard blow for the enemy. It is a beautiful day for France.

I count on you that it may always be the same, every time that he dares to attack you, and with all my heart of a soldier I thank you.

"GOURAUD"

By command of MAJOR GENERAL MENOHER.

DOUGLASS MACARTHUR,

Brigadier General, General Staff

Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

WALTER E. POWERS,

Major, N. G., Adjutant General

Division Adjutant

CHAPTER XV

AMERICAN REINFORCEMENT GIVES FOCH FIRST AND LONG HOPED FOR CHANCE TO ATTACK GERMANS.

General Gouraud's defensive July 15 and 16 was the first time since Russia's dropping out of the war freed more than a million German troops to reinforce their western front that a German attack had been stopped dead by the Allies.

Now for the first time General Foch had the means to make a counter attack on a large scale.

From the time of the Rapallo conference after the Italian defeat in October, 1917, Foch had argued and fought for a policy of immediately vigorously counter attacking any German assault by striking it on the flank with a general reserve.

Accepted in principle by the Allies as the correct thing to do nevertheless it had never been done.

Why?

Because both Marshal Haig and General Petain were so afraid that their own lines would be pierced by the next German attack that they were unwilling to spare any troops to make up the General Reserve Foch wanted. Once formed he intended to station it in a central position such as the region around Paris so that it could attack the flank of any German successful drive against either the British or French front.

After the German successful attack on the British in March had driven a big salient far into the allied line at the junction point of the French and British fronts, plans had been made to attack it on the flank and cut off the Germans within it.

Similarly after the successful German attack against the French in May in which they drove another big salient into the Allied line this time reaching to the Marne, plans were made to attack it.

In each case the troops necessary could not be found because of the desperate lack of reserves described in Chapter XII.

However, as time passed, two things happened in what

Lloyd George had so aptly described as the race between Hindenberg and President Wilson.

The first was that the constant German attacks were using up the available German reserve. However, as the French and British were suffering even more due to their heavy losses in killed, wounded and prisoners, the Germans would have maintained a superiority in numbers except for the second thing which was happening.

That second thing was the increasingly rapid arrival of the American reinforcement from the United States.

This American reinforcement first raised the Allied strength on the Western front to that of the Germans. It then brought it to a greater number so that the Allies once more had that superiority of numbers on the Western front which they had lost when Russia's dropping out of the War enabled the Germans to bring their masses of troops and guns from the Russian front, west to reinforce their French and British fronts.

It was this American reinforcement which gave the French the additional troops necessary to so stiffen their line that combined with Gouraud's elastic defense, the German offensive of July 15 was stopped.

It was this American reinforcement which gave Marshal Foch the reserves necessary to counter attack for the first time. This he did from Soissons to Chateau-Thierry on the Eastern flank of the Marne salient the early morning of July 18. The American 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 26th Divisions, a force equivalent to eight average French, British or German Divisions, took part in this blow.

It was a surprise not only to the German troops to its front but also to the German High Command who thought, as had been true in all other attacks, that the Allies lacked the reserves necessary to make any such counter attack. As a consequence they had even taken troops from this front for use in the attack in the Champaigne July 15.

This was the first of the long series of Allied attacks made from then on until the Armistice.

The second of these attacks was the long planned highly successful one made August 8 by the Canadians and Australians in which the French joined upon the salient made by the Ger-

mans in their March attack upon the British. The failure of some of the German troops to stand up to this attack caused Ludendorf to label August 8 the "black day" of the German Army.

The attack begun July 18 had two phases. The first was that in which the blow between Soissons and Chateau-Thierry compelled the Germans south of the Marne to retreat North of it or run the risk of being cut off and captured. The second was that in which the Germans took up a position on the Ourcq, the center of what was left to them of the salient. They were driven from this position by the attacks of the 42nd, 3d, 28th, and 32d American Divisions and the French.

These two phases, with the fighting on the Vesle to which the Germans retreated after being driven from the Ourcq, are called the "Aisne-Marne Offensive". This offensive coupled with the Champagne Defensive of July 15 and 16 make up the two phases of the Second Battle of the Marne.

The Second Battle of the Marne is the decisive battle of the great war of 1914-1918 from the time the Russians dropped out of the War in 1917 until the Armistice. Therefore, it is one of the decisive battles in the history of the world.

The following are the reasons why it is a decisive battle:

First, because when it began, the Germans had the initiative as they had had throughout 1918. That is they could strike when and where they pleased while all the Allies could do was to wait while wondering where the blow would come and whether or not they could stop it. When the battle was over this was exactly reversed. The Allies now had the initiative.

The second reason was that when the battle began the German High Command believed it had the numbers necessary first to successfully carry through their attack and second when they had exploited their victory to the fullest possible extent to turn on the British once more and strike them a crushing blow. Thus they planned to win the War.

Before the battle was over the American and French attacks on the Germans in the Marne salient came so near breaking through their line that they had to call off the planned attack upon the British in order to send the reserves they had intended to use to the help of their hard pressed troops in that salient. (See map, end of Chapter XVII.)

Let us turn for a moment to General Petain's headquarters! We left it in Chapter XII, desperately planning the abandonment of their Lorraine front in order to get enough troops to stop the expected German attack, which materialized July 15 in the Champagne.

In his letter to General Pershing dated 4:30 p. m. French G. Q. G. July 18, 1918, Colonel Clark says "General Dufieux said 'This is the greatest day since the Marne' * * * Several have said 'Without the Americans this would never have been possible'* * * 'Every one's face was covered with smiles. One would impersonate LUDENDORF at the phone receiving the news of the counter attack and in mingled French and German give his conversation; two others would impersonate a meeting between the KRONPRINZ and LUDENDORF and convulse the audience with their gesticulations and conversation; another would pretend to mimic the KAISER and so on. And between laughs they would read the latest message, mark it on the map, shake my hand and utter eulogies about the Americans. Such words as Superbe, Magnifique, (magnificent), Epatant (Surprisingly good) were used many times'."

General Pershing says :* "With a preponderance of over 300,000 rifles,** the Germans inflicted a crushing defeat on the British in March, followed by another in April, and in May achieved a striking victory against the French. Allied manpower rapidly dwindled to a dangerous degree * * * With the help of British shipping our troops without which the Allied defeat would have been inevitable, had been pouring into France at a rate hitherto unbelievable.

"Thanks to this unprecedented movement, Allied inferiority in March had been within three months transformed into Allied superiority of over 200,000 men."

---

* Page 156 et seq. My Experiences in the World War by John J. Pershing, Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York, N. Y. 1931.

** Rifles used to indicate number of combat infantrymen, to which must be added machine gunners, artillery, engineers and services of various categories in proportion.

Summing up the situation just before the attack of July 18 began, General Pershing says** "In addition to the seven American divisions in line or near the salient, there were nineteen others in France, five in quiet sectors to the east, five behind the British lines, five in training areas, two in depots, and two just arrived. So that we then had in France at that moment the equivalent of fifty-two French or average British divisions. Omitting the five in training areas, the two in depots, and the two just arrived, there remained for service at the front a force of Americans equal in numbers to thirty-four Allied divisions.

"Thus at this time the American combat reenforcements to the Allies more than offset the reenforcements which Germany had been able to bring from the Eastern to the Western front after the collapse of Russia. Without the addition of the Americans the Allies would have been outnumbered by nearly 400,000 men."

In summing up General Pershing says:* "Thus the Second Battle of the Marne came to an end. Our strenuous efforts to place sufficient American troops in battle in time to deprive the enemy of victory in the summer of 1918 bore fruit in the Allied counter-offensive against the German salient about Chateau-Thierry. While our forces had played important roles in halting earlier German offensives, there were available here for the first time sufficient American divisions to join with those of the Allies in striking a decisive blow. The power of American arms brought to bear in the Marne salient made it possible to crush the last enemy offensive and commit him entirely to the defensive. He

---

** Page 154. My Experiences in the World War by John J. Pershing, Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York, N. Y., 1931.

* Page 211. My Experiences in the World War by John J. Pershing Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York.

suffered a costly and disastrous defeat by the determined attacks of our 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32d, 42d and 77th Divisions, which constituted a force equal to eighteen Allied divisions. To these should be added considerable numbers of American air units and corps artillery, medical and transportation troops. The preponderance of Americans at the critical periods of this offensive, coupled with their successes in the vital areas of the battle, brought about this victory. Nearly 300,000 American soldiers were engaged in these operations, sustaining more than 50,000 casualties."

The Rainbow with the 3d Regular and part of the 28th Pennsylvania Division participated in both the "Champagne Defensive" and the "Aisne-Marne Offensive".

The end of July there were 54,224 officers and 1,114,838 enlisted men who had arrived in France from the United States and become part of the A. E. F.

President Wilson was winning his race with Hindenberg.

CHAPTER XVI

THE BATTLE OF THE OURCQ COMPELS THE GERMANS TO ENTIRELY EVACUATE THE MARNE SALIENT.

The Division was now to have its first and only experience of being thrown into battle pell-mell, by units instead of going in as a whole ready to strike a united blow against the enemy.

It was true that in the Champagne battle the Division had not occupied a continuous front, but was interspersed with French units. However, in that battle its units went into line simultaneously, with well understood missions, after proper reconnaissance, and with all its posts of command and telephone and other liaison well established. In this case, some of the infantry units were in action before others had arrived by camion in the rear of the battlefield. The artillery for several successive days was given different missions in support of other divisions. Then the orders would be countermanded after reconnaissances had been made, battery positions picked, and in some cases a regiment on the march to them from its rendezvous positions in the woods to the rear of the battlefield.

The limits of the sector were changed a number of times and French as well as American troops relieved before the Division was finally able to determine just exactly what its job was and where it was to be done.

The result was that instead of going in with the four infantry regiments abreast of and parallel to each other, each backed up by a regiment of field artillery definitely assigned to it, the infantry went in at different times and in different directions. The artillery regiments, uncertain of the exact infantry objectives because the infantry had been unable to find them out themselves, had to do the best they could. The result was that in some instances they found themselves ready to fire on woods and farms which finally turned out to be in the sector of an infantry regiment other than the one they were supposed to support.

It was only when the four infantry regiments had bumped and bumped hard against the German resistance, which shows the enemy meant to make a determined stand on the Ourcq, that the Division was able to get itself coordinated into its usual battle order. This order then once more as had been true in the past, and was to be true in all future battles, proved its worth by its effectiveness.

Also in this battle the Division for the first time was to get an order for the infantry to make a night attack with the bayonet in which they were not to fire a shot.

Some blamed the American First Army Corps for this state of affairs. Others blamed the Sixth French Army in which the First U. S. Corps was then serving.

Probably the truth is that the same mistake was made as was made after the First Battle of the Marne. Then it was thought that the Germans having been beaten were retreating in long columns along every available road, only covered by rear guards which if vigorously pursued and assaulted, could be driven in and thus compel the columns to deploy and fight under unfavorable conditions. .

However, just as the French Armies and the small British Expeditionary Force then discovered this was not true when they bumped hard against the Germans in position and waiting for them along the Aisne River, so was it not true in the German retirement to the Ourcq.

In each case the enemy, instead of being in retreat, had only retired from one position to the next one in its rear, already picked and its defense carefully planned before the retirement took place.

In other words, it was not a case for pellmell determined pursuit of a defeated retreating enemy, but was one for careful reconnaissance and patroling followed by a first class plan of attack and a carefully arranged coordinated assault in accordance with that plan.

Nearly four months of trench warfare for the Rainbow had culminated in one of the greatest and most successful defensive battles in history, the Champagne Defensive. It was the battle which gave the Allies the opportunity to pass to the offensive for the first time since Russia’s dropping out of the war enabled

Germany to concentrate practically all of her armed forces for a decisive final offensive against the Allies in the west.

Now for the first time the Division was to fight in the open, the kind of fighting for which it had been primarily trained.

From now on except for the jump-off from the trenches in the Saint Mihiel fight; crossing the many lines of German trenches captured by the initial assault of the Americans in the Argonne, and the German trenches along the Kriemhilde Stellung in the Exermont region the Division was to see nothing more of fortification.

It however had done its last fighting from trenches. From now on officers and men were always to be in the open with no protection from the enemy's fire other than the foxhole dug by the individual man or the gun pit, dug by cannoneers for their own gun. This was to be true even in the fighting which finally carried them through the Kriemhilde Stellung. Such trenches and dugouts and wire entanglement as existed in this fight belonged to the Germans, our men being in the open in front of them.

In the forests woods and fields of the Ourcq region men and officers were to put in practice under an enemy's fire for the first time, the principles of open warfare on which American training has always been based. Here the rifle proved itself once more to be a deadly weapon and not primarily useful as a pole on which to put a bayonet, as so many Europeans seemed to think. The men and organizations trained in its use to the extent that they had confidence in its powers proved to the hilt that the individual rifleman is still a deadly enemy. Where results were not accomplished it was always in those places where the men with the least training in its use found themselves confronted with German machine guns.

This does not mean, of course, that the American Army despised entrenching. The American military tradition based on experience since the days when they fought as British colonial troops alongside British regulars fresh from Europe and with the European tradition and practice of head-on assaults in close order, has always favored the individual rifleman operating in open warfare. Yet, paradoxical as it may seem, the American soldier originated and made the first extensive use of hasty field entrenching in modern times.

Not only the regulars of the A. E. F. but also the civilian soldiers whose fathers and grandfathers had fought in the Civil War that first combination of the use of the rifle and hasty entrenching were well aware of this.

Equally they knew that hasty entrenching which protects riflemen and their support in the shape of heavier weapons does not interfere with the mobility necessary to carry on open warfare. That on the contrary it helps because preventing the heavy loss which is the quickest way to bring any movement to an end no matter how brave the men making it.

They knew very well the difference between the hasty entrenchments of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, Cold Harbor and the siege warfare around Richmond and Petersburg. They knew that just as the professional officers in both the Union and Confederate Armies had modified the siege warfare of Vauban's day to suit the more powerful weapons of the Civil War, so had the Germans and Allied Armies modified siege warfare to suit the still more powerful weapons of the War of 1914-18.

In other words, they knew that the talk in the newspapers and elsewhere of the trench warfare on the western front being something the world had never seen before, was not based on fact but on ignorance of military history. They knew that trench warfare was in reality siege warfare only modified from the past in the ways which the greater power of the weapons of today demand. And only upon a larger scale because nowhere in the world except between Switzerland and the North Sea can the man power of such thickly populated nations be concentrated on a relatively short line with both flanks protected by natural obstacles.

Those who had heard from their fathers and grandfathers of the siege of Petersburg and Richmond or who had studied these operations or who had visited the battlefields knew that the trench digging, the bomb proofs, the mining and counter-mining, and even the use of trench mortars, called "coehorns" in the Civil War which took place on the Western Front, was no different in principle. Only the scale on which these things were done was far greater than they were on the Richmond Petersburg line, but only in the proportion of armies of millions to armies of tens of thousands.

They were confident that just as the Civil War armies were forced out of their siege works around Richmond and Petersburg to a combat in the open which brought the final decision so the armies on the Western Front would have to be forced out into the open to bring a decision if there was to be one.

They had not missed the lesson of the German attack on the British in March and April and on the French in May, in which the enemy had forced the Allies out of their trenches into open combat.

Confident of this, and proud of General Pershing's insistence from the beginning of the A. E. F. that the American Army should be trained for open warfare along traditional American combat lines, the officers and men welcomed this opportunity to put siege warfare behind them and fight in the open as their ancestors had done.

In the ranks of the officers and men of the Rainbow were a considerable number who had fought in open warfare in Cuba, the Philippines and Mexico.

The Division on leaving the Champagne started off once more without knowing its destination. G. O. No. 48, July 19, stated in its first paragraph:

"It is expected that orders from the French Army will shortly be issued directing the 42nd Division to proceed from its regroupment stations in the Chalons Area overland to participate in the exploitation of the successful counter-attack carried out on July 18th, 1918. The definite destination of the Division is unknown."

This order of four pages typified the habit of the staff of the Division in trying to be ahead of time with information to the units of the Division so that they would have maximum opportunity to get ready for the next move. The next day, July 20th, a second part of the same G. O. was issued. This order severed the connections of the Division with the Fourth French Army in that it told the Division that it had been put at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Petain. In other words once more General Petain had the Division as part of his reserve to be used wherever he saw fit.

The order started the Division off for an unknown destination, by train and motor bus except for the motor transport, which

went overland. G. O. No. 49, the same date, started the motor transportation.

General MacArthur tells the following account of how the Rainbow went into the Ourcq battle:—

"When we left the Champagne it was not intended at first that we would relieve the 26th New England Division. I was ordered to see Colonel Preston Brown, the Chief of Staff of the Second Division. There was talk at First Corps Headquarters of our having probably two weeks' rest and training while making good the damage done by the Champagne battle. The First Corps Headquarters was at Meaux. Amongst other friends there I found Colonel DeWitt who had been our first G-1.

"Suddenly that afternoon the decision was made to have us relieve the 26th Division which had suffered approximately 5,000 casualties. The preliminary order was issued for this relief. The problem with which I was then confronted as Chief of Staff, was how to switch the Division then on the move from the destination to which it had been ordered to a region near Chateau Thierry from which it could enter the line and make the relief. The artillery being on the move by rail it was easy to handle them because of the system of 'regulating stations' through which all trains passed.

"The infantry, however, being on the move by truck was an entirely different question. The only way was to choose a point on each road which they had to pass and then send staff officers there to stop them and direct them to new destinations. I sent Grayson Murphy and Rumbough to do this. Incidentally, I sometimes wondered if the officers and men of the Division had any conception of the great variety of duties performed by Grayson Murphy, Judah and Rumbough which not only kept them up all night many nights, but in each of our combats took them on highly dangerous missions to all parts of our line. Sometimes we were so pressed that we even took our excellent Judge Advocate Major Ogden away from his duties. In this case, I used him as a 'regulating officer' and Judah as another at two regulating stations through which the artillery had to pass. This to see that they got their new orders.

"Having sent the staff off on these missions I hurried to the headquarters of the 26th Division. As the situation was chang-

ing the information as to the position of the enemy and of the American and French front lines was not exact. Therefore we simply drew a line across the map for the infantry of the Rainbow to approach in combat order take over from the 26th Division and then go ahead until actual contact with the enemy was gained; informing all troops of the 26th and the brigade of the 28th Pennsylvania Division which was under their command found beyond that line that they were relieved. I then went back to Corps Headquarters and saw Colonel Melin Craig,* the operation's officer, to whom I said: 'Craig, you know me, just give me the general mission for the division and let me write the order.' He did so.

"General Degoutte who commanded the Sixth French Army in which the First American Army Corps was serving, was determined to push the advance against the Germans whom his headquarters were apparently convinced were in full retreat. He had put in the 6th French Cavalry Corps to pursue them.

"In the meanwhile, Brigadier General Brown with his 84th Infantry Brigade had arrived by us. They were brought as closely as possible to the line without risking being caught by too much shell fire, debussed and pushed forward to the relief of Weigle's Brigade of the 28th Division and the infantry of the 26th then in line. This brought them face to face with the Germans strongly holding Croix Rouge Farm. General Lenihan's 83rd Infantry Brigade upon arrival were debussed and put in reserve in the woods in back of the French Divisions to the left of the 26th one of which incidentally was our old friend the 167th French Infantry Division with which we had served when we first went to the front in Lorraine.

"The artillery brigade had been detrained all over the Meaux region. Some of the batteries had a long day's march to their first concentration point in the woods not far east of the famous Belleau Woods. They then had to be marched to rendezvous positions in the woods just east of Epieds. Here, they received several different orders as the Corps tried to meet the rapidly changing situation.

"In the meanwhile the 167th Alabama assisted by the left of the 168th Iowa had stormed and captured the Croix Rouge Farm in a manner which for its gallantry I do not believe has been

---

* Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

surpassed in military history. It was one of the few occasions on which the bayonet was decisively used. It was one more occasion which proves the fallacy of trying to judge the bayonet by the number of bayonet wounds found in the hospitals. This, for the reason, that practically all of those bayoneted died where they fell.

"The night of the 26-27th of July the Staff and myself spent getting out General Orders No. 51, in which the Division was given the north bank of the Ourcq river from Meurcy Farm inclusive on the west to Hill 212 inclusive on the east as its objective.

"This order prescribed the relief of the 164th French Infantry Division by the 166th Ohio.

"We had hardly gotten it out before we had to modify it because we received orders for the 83rd Brigade to relieve not only the 164th French Infantry Division which had been on the left of the 26th New Yankee Division, but also to relieve the 167th French Infantry Division which was on the left of the 164th.

"This was the order which called for a surprise attack in which the infantry were not to fire a shot but only use the bayonet.

"The headquarters of the 42nd Division were not responsible for this.

"Thus, finally the whole Division was once more gathered into complete control of its own headquarters and given a definite single mission.

"However, as the 165th New York had gotten started for the Ourcq ahead of the 166th which had been held up by the necessity to relieve the 167th as well as the 164th French Infantry Division, we were not yet able to follow our customary practice of having the four infantry regiments abreast of and parallel to each other, make a simultaneous attack.

"Incidentally, it is worthy of note that we took over the front of the 26th Division including Weigle's Brigade of the 28th Pennsylvania and that of two French infantry divisions, the 164th and 167th.

Colonel William Hughes, Jr., Assistant Chief-of-Staff of the Division, who became Chief-of-Staff when General MacArthur was given command of the 84th Infantry Brigade, says:

"We came from the Champagne a little the worse for wear, in driblets, and without replacements. Then, for the one and only

time in the history of the Division, some of the units of the Division were put in action before the balance had arrived.

"However, as quickly as they did arrive, and as soon as the constant change in orders, particularly with respect to what French units were to be relieved, was over, we gathered them together again under our control.

"This meant, unfortunately, that Croix Rouge Farm had been taken by the Alabama regiment with the assistance of the Iowa one, and that the New York regiment had come under the enemy's fire on the Ourcq River before we were able to establish our habitual form of combat, the four infantry regiments abreast, each backed by a regiment of 75's.

"The Division Headquarters on being detrained was established at la Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 25th. That night I moved ahead, decided Epieds was not a good place for our post of command so went on to Trugny. I reached there shortly before daybreak the 26th. At 5 A. M. the infantry of the 84th Brigade began to unload nearby from camions driven by Senegales. They were unloading in a hurry, as they were being shelled.

"Four days later we moved to Bouvardes."

The Battle of the Ourcq in so far as the Rainbow was concerned was divided into three parts.

The first was that in which the various units of the Division were promptly upon arrival put into action disjointedly to follow out the idea of the 6th French Army that the enemy were really retreating. This with the consequence that pell mell pursuit to overtake him and take the fullest advantage of his desire to get away would bring the maximum victory. This period was from July 25th to 27th inclusive.

The second period began when it was discovered that the Germans far from being in full retreat had merely retired to an excellent natural position on the far bank of the Ourcq. It was made up of a general attack on the enemy, continued doggedly despite some local reverses until the strong points which were the backbone of the German position had been captured. This period was from July 28th to August 1st, inclusive.

The third period was the one in which the retreating Germans were followed by the infantry of the Division from three to seven

kilometers while the engineers pursued them still farther. This period was August 2nd for the Infantry and August 2nd and 3rd for the Engineers. It was terminated except the Artillery Brigade by the relief of the Division by the 4th Regular Division which passed through in pursuit of the Germans. The Artillery Brigade went on with the 4th Division.

The following is the purely military outline of events in each of these periods. The human interest side telling of the experiences of officers and men comes after it.

The first phase of the Battle of the Ourcq began with the retirement of the Germans the night of July 23-24 from their position near Epieds, to an intermediate line or line of strong points through Beuvardes-la-Croix Rouge Farm-le Charmel. The 56th Brigade of the 28th Pennsylvania Division, which had been sent to the 26th New England Division to reinforce it in the lead of that Division began the pursuit the morning of July 24. The French on the left and the French 39th Infantry Division on the right, with the 3rd Regular U. S. Division on its right, advanced at the same time.

It was in the midst of this situation that the units of the Rainbow began to arrive. The 84th Infantry Brigade arriving first, was placed at the disposal of the 26th Division, with orders to relieve its front lines by passing through at daybreak, July 25th. As soon as this was done, the Rainbow was to take over the Sector of the 26th Division.

The 1st Corps issued Field Order No. 24, directing the continuance of the pursuit during the night by the 26th Division, and that they should take Sergy not later than two hours, July 25th. However, the Germans while retiring to their previously picked position on the Ourcq, had left strong detachments in front of that position, particularly at Croix Rouge Farm, and at le Charmel in front of the 3rd Division. The consequence was that the American advance was checked along this line and it was on this line that the 84th Brigade found the leading elements of the Pennsylvania Brigade and the New England Division.

The problem which now confronted the 84th Infantry Brigade was an advance through thick woods in which somewhere lurked an enemy waiting to make the maximum use of his skill in using

machine guns and selecting strong points at least to take a heavy toll even if he could not stop the American advance.

The information they had received as they debussed was that the enemy was in retreat. Due to the rapid move forward, the preceding day of the 26th New England Division and General Wiegle's brigade of the 28th Pennsylvania Division, the men and officers of these two organizations could not furnish exact information as to the position of the Germans.

However, the 84th Brigade was not to be caught napping, so instead of taking it for granted that the Germans were in full retreat in route columns along the roads with each column covered by an advance guard, the Brigade deployed for combat. Thus it advanced ready for any emergency.

Thanks to the power of modern infantry weapons to practically instantly produce a tremendous volume of fire, and that for a long range, a battalion deployed for attack roughly in a square of approximately a thousand yards on a side, can take care of itself against surprise attack. It can do so even more successfully than did the squares of Pikemen in the Middle Ages, when suddenly confronted with charging enemy cavalry, or as well as did the infantry in the days of Napoleon and even as late as Kitchener's campaign in Egypt, in 1898, when all infantry was trained to quickly form squares of double or triple ranks facing outward on all four sides, which fired volleys into the ranks of their attacker.

The 84th Brigade went in, as usual, with the 168th Iowa on the right and the 167th Alabama on the left.

The 168th Iowa advanced with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions in assault, support and reserve, respectively. It found intermingled units of the 101st, and 102nd Infantries of the 26th New England Division, the 111th Pennsylvania and the 2nd Battalion of the 112th Pennsylvania, with the 38th French Infantry Division on their immediate right. About 21 hours they found a gap on their left, so the 2nd Battalion moved into the front line the morning of July 26 to fill this gap.

In the meanwhile, the 167th Alabama moving forward through the forest, relieved elements of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 111th Pennsylvania. They also found in their sector some French from the 164th French Infantry Division on their left. The Ala-

bama Regiment put its 1st and 3rd Battalions in line, completing the relief of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 111th Pennsylvania, about 21 hours.

As the men and officers could hear the Germans talk to their immediate front, they knew that they had not retired across the Ourcq. As a consequence of going ahead, deployed for action, and meeting the situation as they found it, the 168th Iowa, now occupied the southwest edge of the woods on the Croix Rouge Farm clearing, most of the southern side of that clearing, and thence along a line facing northeast, in general parallel to the Fereten-Tardenois-Croix Rouge Farm-le Charmel-Road.

The 167th Alabama occupied the western edge of the woods on the Croix Rouge Farm clearing from opposite the farm to the left of the Iowa regiment. The 38th French Division continued the line of the Iowa regiment to the right. Beyond them the 3rd Division was face to face with the Germans at le Charmel. The History of the Third Division says :*

"At 6:00 A. M., July 25th, the Third Battalion (4th Infantry) advanced on le Charmel, amid shelling and machine gull fire so heavy that the advance could only be made in small groups, and by the most skillful use of cover. The elements on our right had not advanced to keep pace with us, and we were, consequently, exposed to flanking fire. Nevertheless, our men continued to press forward, despite casualties, and succeeded in reaching the outskirts of le Charmel at noon. One company attacked the town proper and succeeded in occupying it, in its entirety, later that afternoon. The whole battalion then moved forward and remained in le Charmel the rest of the day. The Second Battalion had, in the meantime, moved forward to the morning position of the First Battalion, where it halted for the night. Shortly after nightfall it was subjected to severe gas and high explosive bombardments, and it was deemed advisable to move it also forward into le Charmel. Neither the units on the right nor left were abreast of the town, and the enemy, on three sides of us, so threatened our position, that it was necessary to have a strong force there. The streets of the town were swept by machine gun fire from le Charmel Chateau, which overhung the

---

* Page 60. History of the Third Division U. S. Army. Andernach-on-the-Rhine. 1919.

town, making it impossible to move on the streets during the day."

On the left, the 167th French Infantry Division, which was serving on the 1st American Army Corps, drove such German detachments as were in Beuvardes out of that town and into the Foret de Fere beyond.

Beuvardes, being in a valley, with high hills to its front and rear, was not a stronghold. The Croix Rouge Farm was as ideally located to break up and hold an attack advancing toward the Ourcq under modern conditions of warfare as were the famous farms in front of the British at Waterloo. Le Charmel was a similarly ideal strongpoint. In addition as it was only three kilometers north of the Marne River, the Germans had to hold it if their troops to its east who had been south of the Marne and were retiring north through the Foret de Riz were to have the time to retire to the Ourcq. This without being in danger of being cut off by the French and Americans from le Charmel west.

Thus the night of the 25th-26th of July the Third Regular Division in front of le Charmel and the 84th Brigade of the Rainbow in front of la Croix Rouge Farm were faced with the task for the next day, which, if carried out, would force the Germans at the apex of the Marne Salient to the east to hurry north, leaving accumulated supplies and ammunition or risk being cut off and captured.

July 26th the 84th Infantry Brigade, with the 2nd Battalion of the 168th Iowa on the right and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 167th Alabama on the left, made the assault on la Croix Rouge Farm and clearing. Despite the heaviest kind of enemy fire, particularly from machine guns placed in the farm and along the farther edges of the clearing in such a way as to enfilade the attacking troops, despite heavy and continuous losses, the Iowans drove the Germans out of and made their own their position along the Croix Rouge Farm-le Charmel Road, while the Alabamans took the farm and held it. The bayonet was freely used.

Too much credit cannot be given the troops who carried out this successful assault. After a long ride crowded in motor trucks they had been dumped out in the open, marched forward into thick woods under heavy shell and gas fire, with the position

of the enemy unknown. They had passed a night in the cold, wet woods, continuously under high explosive and gas shell fire, yet the next day their spirit burned so brightly that without any artillery preparation, and despite heavy losses they took a strong enemy's position and refused to yield any of it, despite the enemy's fire and threatened counter-attack. The attack began at 16:50 hours. By nightfall they had completed their job.

The capture of Croix Rouge Farm and clearing belongs in that list of military exploits which cannot fail to excite the admiration of those who hear the tale, because of the determination and gallantry displayed.

The practical result of this capture was that the only strong point left to the Germans was the le Charmel Chateau position, which by its dominance of le Charmel, despite gallant efforts on the part of the 3rd Division, remained in German hands. The history of the Third Division says :*

"Orders were received on the 26th for the Second and Third Battalions to hold le Charmel, while the First Battalion, supported by an artillery barrage, and guiding on French troops on the left, and the 7th Infantry on the right, passed through the town to attack in the direction of La Fosse Farm. Up to this time our supporting artillery had not been of much assistance to us, inasmuch as they were unable to cross the Marne River as fast as the Infantry, but they had a number of guns behind us now, which rendered valuable assistance in our attacks of the ensuing days. At four o'clock they laid down a barrage northeast of le Charmel, which lifted at 4:50 P. M., the hour for the attack. The First Battalion entering le Charmel was met by a very heavy German counter barrage, but nevertheless continued to advance. However, the guiding element of the movement—the French troops on the left—were unable to advance, which left our flank in the air and exposed us to heavy enfilading machine gun fire. Consequently, our advance was held up, and at 11:00 P. M. the First Battalion was ordered back to its position in reserve in the Foret de Fere."

During this same day of the 26th of July, the 165th New York, which had been debussed in the vicinity of Epieds, moved

---

* Page 61. History of the Third Division U. S. Army. Andernach-on-the-Rhine. 1919.

forward to relieve the 167th French Division. It completed this relief the night of July 26th-27th by placing the 1st Battalion in front line along the brook in the Foret de Fere.

The 166th Ohio was debussed in the woods in the rear of the 164th French Infantry Division.

The 67th Field Artillery Brigade which had been detrained all over the Meaux area and then concentrated in the woods to the northwest of Chateau Thierry, had been marched into the woods to the west of the Epied-Trugny region. They were given several different missions on July 25th and 26th, for which reconnaisances were made, and in some cases batteries moved out after dark, only to be returned to the woods as the orders in each case were countermanded.

The 51st Field Artillery Brigade of the 26th New England Division had upon the relief of its Division been assigned to the support of the Rainbow's 84th Infantry Brigade.

The night of July 26-27 the Germans withdrew the last of their elements to the Ourcq River position.

The capture of Croix Rouge Farm had made this necessary!

That the Germans had arranged a plan of withdrawal there can be no doubt. That this plan included definite dates of withdrawal is extremely doubtful, as nothing was to be gained by moving out of the Marne Salient before they could withdraw the immense quantity of supplies and ammunition they had in it unless and except when the pressure of their enemies through combat gave them the alternative of abandoning such supplies and ammunition or risking the loss of their troops as well.

The dates on which they did withdraw always coincide with the loss of one or more important positions as the result of successful French and American attacks.

The next day, July 27th, the Division established to its own satisfaction that the Germans were not in full retreat but were on the heights of the Ourcq, waiting with the expectancy of inflicting severe defeat on the Rainbow when it tried to cross that river and ascend the heights beyond.

However it was not until July 28th, that the Rainbow finally found its four infantry regiments in line in their customary order from right to left: 168th Iowa, 167th Alabama, 165th New York,

and 166th Ohio, in a sector definitely their own, and without any detachments to other divisions, French or American.

At 1:10 hours, July 27, the 1st U. S. Corps issued Field Order No. 26, ordering the since famous attack of the 42nd Division after dark with the object of crossing the Ourcq.

In this order the boundaries of the 1st U. S. Corps were changed to include besides its former front that of the 164th French Infantry Division holding the front of the 7th French Army Corps, and the 52nd French Infantry Division of the 2nd French Corps on the left of the 7th French Corps. The Rainbow was ordered to take over the whole fist U. S. Army Corps front. The relief of units on the left was to be made as the attack progressed.

G. O. 51, July 27, directed that the Division attack "under cover of darkness on the night of July 27-28 H hour to be communicated later." It then gave the north bank of the Ourcq River as the objective.

The famous bayonet attack order was given in the following paragraph:

"This attack will be in the nature of a surprise and consequently, troops in the attack will not fire during the assault but will confine themselves to the bayonet. The attack will be preceded by a violent artillery preparation, (in which the Divisional Artillery of both the 167th and 164th French Divisions respectively, will participate), of ten minutes duration, commencing at H-10. minutes, and will be accomplished under the directions of the Commanding General of the 67th and 51st Field Artillery Brigades, respectively. This artillery preparation and the supporting fire after the H hour will include interdiction fire and a powerful concentration on the enemy centers of resistance and strong points. When practicable, accompanying artillery barrage (delivered by 67th and 51st Field Artillery Brigades, and also by the Divisional Artillery of the 164th and 167th French Divisions) will be set down on such points, and at such a rate of progress as the respective infantry brigade commanders shall indicate.

"Artillery will follow closely the advance of the infantry, which it supports. Reciprocal liaison from artillery to infantry

and from infantry to artillery will be maintained for this purpose."

This order, which was issued from the advanced post of command of the Division, at 9:30 a. m., was followed by a secret memorandum at 10:45 a. m. postponing the attack and directing the 83rd Infantry Brigade to complete the relief of both the 157th and 164th French Divisions. The following paragraph of the order shows that the information received from higher authority with respect to the enemy's intentions was not correct:

"The statement of captured prisoners would seem to indicate that the enemy is withdrawing. Those elements of the division now on the line are directed to follow up his retirement with the greatest possible energy and to establish contact. As fast as the elements of the division take over the positions of the 167th and 164th French Divisions, respectively, those elements of the 42nd Division will do likewise."

What was the real problem which confronted the Rainbow?

It was not an attack on a retreating enemy which had been unwillingly forced to halt and make a stand. This with all the disadvantages which come from having to fight an action brought on by a confident pursuer whose overwhelming numbers and artillery have forced a rear guard action which develops into a defensive battle.

It was on the contrary an attack upon a carefully chosen position picked out far enough in advance to enable every advantage to be taken of its natural features and held by an enemy who knew that while he had retired he was still far in advance of the position from which he had started his highly successful May offensive.

Nature had made the Ourcq as if to order for a defensive position. The Germans with the keen eyes of well-trained soldiers had not failed to notice it, even before they found the necessity to use it.

"The northern end of the high ridge covered by the Forest of Ris merger into the high ground north of the Ourcq River. This high ground is the watershed between the Vesle River, to its north and the Marne to its south. The head-waters of the Ourcq begin where the Forest of Ris ridge runs into this high ground. First running north, the Ourcq makes a long, gentle

curve to the east until at the town of Fere-en-Tardenois it straightens out and runs due east.

"When the capture of the Croix Rouge Farm position broke the German line, the Germans abandoned the Forest of Ris ridge, and moved back to the water-shed. Here, on the high ground just north of the Ourcq, they organized their defense.

"Near the head-waters of the Ourcq, and where the Forest of Ris ridge joins the high ground of the watershed, is the village of Roncheres. It was strongly held by the Germans because of its position. More important yet, its garrison could fire not only on attackers approaching from its front, but also on the flank of troops crossing the Ourcq to attack the hills beyond it.

"From Roncheres along the seven miles of the high ground just north of the gently curving Ourcq, were similar natural strong points sticking out from the German main position. The garrison of each not only had a clear field to the front to fire on troops attacking them, but also could fire to the right and left into the flanks of troops attacking the German positions between.

"The names of these strong points, sanctified by the American blood freely shed to capture them, are enshrined on the battle honors of the regiments which took them, and indelibly imprinted in the minds of the men who struggled those five hot July and August days to break this last stand of the Germans in the second battle of the Marne.

"Here they are: Roncheres, Grimpettes Woods, Hill 188, Cierges, Les Jomblets Wood, Hill 212, Sergy, Hill 252, Meurcy Farm, Bois Broule, Bois Cola, Seringes-et-Nesle, and Hill 184.*

A glance at the map (see Ourcq map at end of chapter) shows what a splendid defensive position nature had provided on the German side of the Ourcq. The front of attack of the Rainbow was from Hill 212 on the right to 186 on the left. This front covered the curve of the Ourcq in which it changes its course from running practically due north to running practically due west as it does after it passes Fere-en-Tardenois. There were two consequences of having to attack this inward curving position.

They were both favorable to the Germans and unfavorable to the Rainbow. The first was that the German strong points be-

---

* Pages 282-283, America's Part, Farrar & Rhinehardt, New York.

sides firing to their immediate front and flanks, as is true in the ordinary defensive position, laid out more or less along a reasonably straight line; could fire in front of strong points some distance to their right and left. For instance, German machine guns on Hill 212 could fire not only in front of Sergy but also on the south side of the Ourcq in front of German positions well to their right or northwest of Sergy. Similarly, guns on Hill 152 could fire on the South Side of the Ourcq in front of Pt. Moulin or on the South bank of the Marne to the front of Sergy. Similarly, guns in Seringes-et-Nesles could fire on the slopes to the southeast of Hill 152 and those on Hill 186 could reach the forward slopes of 152.

The other result advantageous to the Germans and disadvantageous to the Rainbow was that the four infantry regiments of the division even had they attacked simultaneously could not have advanced parallel to each other in the normal form of attack, but had to advance in divergent directions as if starting from the hub of a wheel and going down four of its spokes.

In other words, the further they advanced, the more the divergence of their direction of attack increased with the result that each regiment received fire in its flanks from the Germans in the sectors of other regiments or in the sector of the French on the left of the division and that of first the 28th Pennsylvania Division, and then the 32d Red Arrow Division on the right.

The Germans with a skill in the use of machine guns resulting from almost four years of war took the fullest advantage of this situation.

This similarity to the Rainbow attack being made from the hub of a wheel down its spokes was heightened by the fact that the only cover on their side of the Ourcq was the Foret de Fere and the Ville Moyenne Wood which were close together on top of the crest on the south side of the Ourcq and at the approximate center of the curve of the Ourcq. The edges of these woods facing the Ourcq was thus in full view of practically all parts of the German position. From the edges of these woods the ground sloped down to the Ourcq at a distance of from two to two and a half kilometers. These slopes except for occasional small folds in the ground and windings of the four creeks which ran

down them into the Ourcq and occasional small groups of trees afforded no concealment from view or cover from the enemy's fire.

The attack over this open ground on this unusually excellent defensive position provided by nature and fully taken advantage of by a skillful enemy who had carefully studied the condition some time prior to its occupancy was the problem given the Rainbow to solve.

During the afternoon of July 27th the 168th Iowa advanced on the extreme right. It had the 3rd and 1st Battalions in line.

On reaching the Ourcq these Battalions came under heavy artillery and machine gun fire. Their leading elements retired, and the two battalions settled down for the night on the general line la Cense-Fabiere Farm.

The 2nd Battalion of the 167th Alabama passed through the 1st and 3rd Battalions and led the advance. By night it had reached a line across the Rau de la Taverne to the east of Villers-sur-Fere.

The 1st Battalion of the 165th New York had moved during the night in the same general direction as that in which the 167th French Division had been advancing when it relieved it. This brought it out on the hillside facing Sergy on the northeast edge of the Forest de Fere, or in other words across the front of the 167th Alabama. After advancing into the open, well towards the Ourcq, finding itself alone except for some French Cavalry which the enemy's machine gun fire and artillery fire drove off, the Battalion retired a short distance to get cover from a fold in the ground. In the meanwhile the 3rd Battalion plus D Company occupied Villers-sur-Fere, sending patrols to the banks of the Ourcq. The 2nd Battalion after moving forward to Villers-sur-Fere was ordered back to the Foret de Fere to prevent overcrowding of Villers-sur-Fere and vicinity.

The 1st Battalion of the 166th Ohio had been detailed to relieve the 164th French Infantry Division. This Division, however, had moved forward in pursuit of the Germans, and had reached Hill 228 above Beuvardes before the Ohioans could catch up with them. The Battalion spent the night in the northern edge of the Foret de Fere.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 166th Ohio had been ordered to relieve the 52nd French Infantry Division the night

of July 27th-28th. However, during the day of the 27th this Division had advanced in pursuit of the Germans, and the night of the 27th-28th was relieved by the 62nd French Infantry Division of the 2nd French Army corps. Therefore, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Ohio regiment also spent the night in the Foret de Fere in support and reserve of the 1st Battalion.

The 149th Illinois Field Artillery, which had first been ordered to go in line in support of the 26th Division and then the 164th French Infantry Division, had had its orders changed for the third time. This time it was ordered to support the left of the Rainbow. It was in position on the reverse slope of Hill 288 by late afternoon July 27. Its batteries had been given Villers-sur-Fere, Meurcy Farm, Bois Cola, Bois Bruille, La Fontaine sous Pierre, Seringes et Nesles and all sensitive points along the Ourcq River to its immediate front as targets.

With the firing data completed and ready to fire, no orders were received. This undoubtedly because of the order to attack with the bayonet. The regimental artillery liaison officer, Lieutenant Lombardy, was sent with the leading battalion of the 165th New York at that time the left of the Division. This was Donovan's 1st Battalion.

The 151st Minnesota Field Artillery which had gone into position behind the 84th Brigade, July 26th, but had received no orders to fire moved forward July 27th. It took them most of the night of July 27-28 to struggle through the Foret de Fere. By daylight the 28th they were in position on the northern edge of the wood.

Late the afternoon of July 27th the headquarters 67th Field Artillery Brigade issued Operation Order No. 10.

Under its provisions, the 151st Minnesota Field Artillery with the 3d Battalion of the 150th Indiana under command of Colonel George E. Weath was assigned to the support of the 165th New York Infantry and the 149th Illinois Field Artillery with the 1st Battalion of the 150th Indiana under command of Colonel Henry J. Reilly was assigned to the support of the 166th Ohio Infantry.

The 2d Battalion and remaining units of the 150th Indiana Field Artillery under command of Colonel Robert H. Tyndall

remained under the direct control of the Brigade Commander Brigadier General George Grant Gattey.

The 84th Infantry Brigade was still supported by the 51st Field Artillery Brigade commanded by Brigadier General D. C. Aultman. In this case the Brigade Commander kept his three regiments under his direct command and dealt with Brigadier General R. A. Brown commanding the 84th Infantry Brigade. The 51st Field Artillery Brigade was made up of the 101st Massachusetts, 102d Massachusetts and 103rd Connecticut Regiments of Field Artillery.

The 149th Pennsylvania Machine Gun Battalion was assigned to the 84th Infantry Brigade.

The 12th U. S. Aviation Squadron was attached to the Division.

There could now be no doubt that the enemy intended to fight on the Ourcq position.

Thus the early morning of Sunday, July 28th saw the beginning of the second phase of the battle; the phase in which the Rainbow made a successful attack on an enemy settled in a strong natural position and determined to hold it.

At 4:50 hours that morning the 3rd Battalion, 168th Infantry, attacked, crossed the Ourcq, and got to the crest of Hill 212. Unable to advance further, an outpost line was established while the remainder of the Battalion was put under cover in a sunken road at the foot of the hill. At 8 hours the 1st Battalion advanced and took up position on the right of the 3rd in order to protect their flank. This put the 1st Battalion north of Moulin Caranda. The 2nd Battalion during the morning crossed the Ourcq and took up its position to the left flank of the 3rd Battalion to protect it. Thus, the 168th Iowa occupied a salient, the point of which was on the crest of Hill 212, the right, running down to the Ourcq, was enfiladed from Hill 188 the left, from Sergy and the Hill above Sergy.

The 2nd Battalion of the 167th Alabama at 9 hours, advancing down the Rau La Taverne, fought its way across the Ourcq, and established itself in the sunken road beyond, with outposts well up the hill in front of it. The 1st Battalion was in support, except C Company, which was ordered to the left front

to establish and maintain contact with the 165th New York. Thus, like the Iowa regiment, the Alabama one was across the Ourcq, but had not conquered the enemy's position on the crest in front of it and was subject to a flanking fire front Sergy. This town was directly opposite a gap between the right of the Alabamas and the left of the Iowans.

This town of Sergy, with the hills around it, and the gap between the Alabama and the Iowa regiment, was to cause great trouble throughout the remainder of the battle. At 17 hours K & M Companies of the 166th Ohio were moved from the Foret de Fere to fill this gap. An hour later a platoon of a Company of the Alabama regiment was ordered into this gap. Sergy was captured, but the troops were withdrawn because of heavy German shelling. The two Ohio companies were withdrawn the next morning. That night patrols of the 168th Iowa went into Sergy and removed the few remaining civilians.

The 3rd Battalion of the 165th New York advanced at 3:45 hours from Villers-sur-Fere, with I, K and L Companies leading. The advance reached the ridge east of Meurcy Farm. M. Company in support, got to the sunken road north of the River. At 11 hours the heavy fire which had caused heavy losses led to the decision to call the remnants of the 3rd Battalion back from the ridge. This put the 1st Battalion, which had been in support, in the front line. In the meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion had advanced west of Villers-sur-Fere, forced the crossing of the Ourcq, and advanced to the top of the hill east of La Fontaine sous Pierre. About noon the remnants of this Battalion were forced back to the road at the foot of the hill on the north bank of the Ourcq River.

At 3:45 hours, the 1st Battalion of the 166th Ohio moved forward from the Foret de Fere in support of the 2nd Battalion of the 165th New York. However, instead of staying in support, this Battalion about 10:30 hours advanced to the left, crossed the Ourcq, its leading companies reaching la Fontaine sous Pierre. Here it held until 23 hours, when it was called back to the road where to its right was the 2nd Battalion of the New York regiment. On its left it was in contact with the 62nd French Infantry Division, whose leading elements had gotten into the southern part of Fere-en-Tardenois.

Thus the day closed with the assault battalion of each of the infantry regiments firmly established across the Ourcq River. Their dead and wounded strewn over the slopes to the front up to and even beyond the crests of the hills, in some cases, testified to two things: The first was that the Germans were not in retreat but were most determinedly resisting with every intention of holding the Ourcq position. The second was that no more determined assaults could have been made than those made by the four infantry regiments of the Division.

As night came on the Division realized the difficult task ahead of it and how nature, by the gentle curve of the Ourcq River, had provided in its hills and woods and man through his towns and farms, a position where each of the regiments in making an assault was not only subject to fire from the front but also from the right and left flank as well.

In the meanwhile, this same day a situation was developing on the right of the Rainbow, which was ultimately to have considerable effect in the final forcing of the Ourcq position and the movement forward side by side of the Rainbow and the 32nd Red Arrow Division, who two and a half months later were again to be faced with one of the most difficult tasks accomplished by the A. E. F., that of breaking through the Kriemenhilde Stellung.

The night of July 27-28, the 55th Infantry Brigade of the 28th Pennsylvania Division, relieved the 39th French Infantry Division in front of Fresnes-Courmont. During the day an advance to the Ourcq was made, that River being crossed by two Battalions of the 110th Pennsylvania, at 16 hours. The advance succeeded in taking some of the enemy's positions across the Ourcq, but was forced back to the line of that River where the night was spent. The left of the 28th Pennsylvania Division, and the 168th Iowa had liaison at Moulin Caranda. On the right of the 28th Division there was a gap between it and the left of the 3rd Regular Division which had crossed the head waters of the Ourcq and captured Roncheres.

Monday, July 29th, was the second day of the second phase of the Battle of the Ourcq. It was the phase of hard fighting to drive the enemy from their strong position. Doing so meant breaking through the center of their line in the Marne Salient and thus compelling their rapid withdrawal under threat of cut-

ing off and capturing their troops to their right and left of the Ourcq position.

On the right of the Rainbow the 2nd Battalion of the 168th Iowa made demonstrations against the Germans. They found that despite the information passed down from the higher echelons that he was in retreat he was not because they developed just as strong resistance as on the day before.

As a result of the gap between the left of the 168th Iowa and the right of the 167th Alabama the 47th Infantry of the 4th Regular Division had been put at the disposal of the 84th Infantry Brigade.

The 3rd Battalion of the 47th Infantry was assigned to the 168th Iowa. It moved forward in support from near la Cense Farm. I and L Companies were in front and K and M in support. Violent enemy fire stopped I Company in front of Sergy. Shortly after it withdrew into the woods north of la Motte Farm. L Company succeeded in driving the Germans in their immediate front from beyond Sergy and establishing itself on the ridge just north. However, about 17 hours unable to maintain itself it fell back to the western edge of the town. The 2nd Battalion of the 168th Iowa then succeeded in establishing an outpost in the creek just north of the town which their patrols had taken possession of the previous evening.

The 167th Alabama did not succeed in advancing during the day. Its 2nd Battalion was relieved during the night of July 29th-30th along its position in the sunken road north of the Ourcq by the 1st Battalion of the 47th Infantry, which had been placed at the disposal of the 167th Alabama.

The 47th Infantry had been placed at the disposal of the 84th Infantry Brigade not only because of the gap in its center in front of Sergy but also because the heavy losses sustained by this Brigade in the Croix Rouge Farm fight had materially reduced its strength.

About 9:30 hours the 1st Battalion of the 165th New York, supported by the 2nd Battalion, attacked and took Meurcy Farm and Bois Cola. After taking the Farm the buildings were left unoccupied because it was an excellent target for the German artillery. This success put the 1st Battalion in a very narrow salient sticking well to the front. The 2nd or support Battalion

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps

Rainbow and French wounded arriving at dressing station of 117th Sanitary Train at Epieds, during the Ourcq Battle July 27, 1918.

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps

117th Texas Supply Train dump near Epieds, July 28, 1918.

was echeloned from the right rear of the 1st to connect with the 167th Alabama. The flanks of the two regiments met at Moulin Very.

In the meanwhile the 1st Battalion of the 166th Ohio advanced until it reached the road north of la Fontaine sons Pierre running around Hill 184 into Seringes et Nesles. However, heavy fire from the front and enfilading fire from the right first stopped the Battalion and then forced those not killed and wounded back to la Fontaine sous Pierre, where it dug in.

About 16 hours the 2nd Battalion of the regiment passed through the 1st and continued until it had captured the southwestern part of Seringes et Nesles, and the eastern part of Hill 184. The left of the 165th New York joined in this advance. C Company, digging in on the slope between Seringes et Nesles and Bois Colas.

The 28th having put the 166th firmly across the Ourcq the 1st Battalion of the 149th Illinois Field Artillery was moved forward early the 29th to a position in front of Villemoyen.

This meant that the salient, established earlier in the day by the 165th New York, had now been pushed further forward and expanded to the left by the 166th Ohio.

Thus the day closed with the following strong points partially or wholly captured from the Germans: Seringes et Nesles, Meurcy Farm, Bois Colas, and Sergy. The 168th Iowa having hung onto its salient, reaching almost to the top of Hill 212, despite the enemy fire into it from both flanks on the right, and the 166th Ohio on the left having got a foothold on Hill 184, the Rainbow while still suffering from enemy's flanking fire over many parts of its line, had greatly improved its position over that held the night before.

On the left of the Rainbow the French captured the rest of Fere en Tardenois. This same day on the right of the Rainbow the 55th Brigade of the 28th Pennsylvania Division, which faced almost due East in continuation of the right of the line of the 168th Iowa, in conjunction with the 3rd Regular Division, which faced almost due North, made various attacks to capture Hill 188 and the Bois des Grimpettes, but without success. Both divisions gained some ground.

Thus the extreme left of the German position on the Ourcq anchored by the strong points in the Bois des Grimpettes and on Hill 188, remained in German hands.

The night of July 29th-30th the 127th Wisconsin Infantry of the 32nd Red Arrow Division, took over the front of the 3rd Division. This was the beginning of the appearance of the Wolverine Division in the Battle of the Ourcq, its first great battle. It had come from the Alsace trench sector, where it, like the Rainbow in the Luneville-Baccarat Sectors, had been undergoing its first active service at the front.

Tuesday, July 30th, Brigadier General Brown, commanding the 84th Brigade, issued verbal orders for an attack on the front of the Brigade with the Chateau de Nesles-Nesles-la Tuilerie Farm as the objective. The 3rd Battalion of the 47th Infantry was to lead the assault of the 168th Iowa and the 1st Battalion of the 47th Infantry the assault of the 167th Alabama. Division ordered the 165th New York to conform, taking the line Seringes et Nesles-Chateau de Nesles. The 1st Corps ordered the 28th Pennsylvania Division on the right to attack and take the high ground south of Cierges on which is Hill 188 and the Bois des Grimpettes.

In other words, the desire was to use the position held by the 166th Ohio on the left as a pivot about which to swing the Division forward along an east and west line and facing north. This while the 28th Pennsylvania took the strong point which anchored down the left of the German position on the Ourcq.

However, the fact was overlooked that Les Jomblets, de la Planchette and Pelger Woods on Hill 220, with several woods to their rear or eastern side, constituted a series of very strong, strong-points. The fire from them not only covered the ground to the south over which the 28th Pennsylvania must advance, after it took Hill 188 and the Bois des Grimpettes, but also covered the ground to the west which included the ridge between the position of the 167th Alabama and the Chateau de Nesles and Nesles; both sides of the ravine in which is Sergy, the eastern face of that town and Hill 212 as well.

In other words, these woods constituted the Keep or Citadel of the Ourcq position, because the outer defenses, all along the line of the Ourcq, could be captured, but until these woods were captured the Ourcq position could not be won.

Insofar as the Rainbow alone was concerned, this Citadel of these woods not only directly faced the 168th Iowa, but also were the anchor to the left or eastern end of that part of the Germans line which ran along the ridge from them in front of the 167th Alabama to just about Meurcy Farm and the Bois Bruille in the territory of the 165th New York.

It is important to understand the strength of this position, because it governed what happened on July 30th, thus causing it, importance to be fully recognized and leading to an entirely different plan for the attack of July 31st.

At 9 hours the 3rd Battalion of the 47th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion of the 168th Iowa in support, attacked from Sergy. Heavy German fire stopped the attack in the fields north of the town, with the exception of a few men who managed to get across the little creek running through them. The survivors retired during the afternoon to Sergy, the 168th Iowa again outposted the creek north of the town.

The 1st Battalion of the 47th Infantry, supported by the 167th Alabama, gained the ridge in front of it and advanced some distance towards Nesles-Seringe et Nesles Road. However, the fire from its right as well as from its front forced it back during the evening to just below the crest.

The 165th New York attacked, but could not make any material progress. It repulsed a German counter-attack on Meurcy Farm. The 166th Ohio on the pivot held its position, temporarily withdrawing from the part of Seringes et Nesles which it held to avoid a heavy German artillery concentration which preceded a counter-attack. This counter-attack succeeded in getting in this part of the town but was driven out by the Ohioans who again occupied it.

On the left the French, assisted by the fire of a number of expert riflemen from the Ohio regiment, captured Hill 184.

On the right the 55th Brigade of the 28th Pennsylvania Division with the 127th Wisconsin of the 32nd Red Arrow Division, made an attack on Hill 188 and the Bois des Grimpettes. The Bois des Grimpettes was taken, lost again, and finally retaken to be held. During the night of the 30th-31st the 125th Michigan Infantry relieved the 55th Brigade of Pennsylvanians. This put the left of the 32nd Division, which had now taken

over the former fronts of the 3rd Regular and 28th Pennsylvania Divisions in contact with the right of the Rainbow.

Thus the plan with which the day's fighting of the 30th began failed because the Germans not only had not been attacked seriously in their Citadel of woods on Hill 220 from the west but also because from the south the attack had been stopped by Hill 188 two kilometers to the south of the southern edge of these woods.

This situation was recognized in Field Orders No. 31, 1st U. S. Army Corps, issued at 0.30 hours, Wednesday, July 31st, in which the Rainbow was assigned the objectives Hill 177 (1000 meters east of Meurcy Farm) and Hill 207 (400 meters south 3 of Hill 200). The right sector limit of the Rainbow was changed to pass through the middle of Bois Pelger, thus leaving the top of 212 in the sector of the 32nd Division.

This Division, which now occupied the whole front of the 39th French Army Corps, was given Cierges and Hill 220 as its objectives.

In other words, it was recognized that Hill 220 and its group of woods, which constituted the German Citadel, had to fall before the Ourcq position could be wrested from the Germans.

The hour for the attack in the 84th Brigade was fixed by Field Order No. 13, as the time when the left of the 32nd Division passed the line of the 42nd Division. In order to permit the passage of troops of the 32nd Division, the outposts of the 168th Iowa were withdrawn from Hill 212.

As the emphasis of this attack was placed on the 32nd Division, it is logical to start with the fortunes of the day experienced by them.

The 125th Michigan on the left, facing almost due north, was in splendid condition to strike the machine guns on 212, which had been holding up the 168th Iowa, in the flank. This they did, with the left of their regiment, while the right got as far as the southern face of Bois Jomblets. However, the enemy's fire proved too strong with the result that the position finally dug in on was just short of the crest of Hill 212 and thence along the Sergy Road to Cierges. In the meanwhile, the 127th Wisconsin, to the right of the 32nd Division, advanced up the hill north of Cierges, against the new German position established

on it after the town of Roncheres had been taken by the Third Division two days before. However, the German fire was too strong with the result that the 127th Wisconsin was forced to dig in for the night along the northern edge of Cierges and the bed of the creek on which that town is located.

The result of this was that the 32nd not having passed the line of the 42nd, the 168th Iowa in accordance with Brigade order for the attack, stood fast. In the meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 47th, which had relieved the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment, during the night just passed, attempted to advance over the crest of its front. However, the enemy's fire from the front, coupled with that from the right from the Bois Pelger, stopped them. The 2nd Battalion of the 167th Alabama relieved this Battalion the night of July 31st-August 1st.

Company D, 165th New York, after a smoke and thermite preparation, got the Germans out of Bois Bruille which they occupied.

The 166th Ohio remained in its pivotal position.

The combat on the 31st having confirmed the situation discovered by the Iowa and Alabama regiments, the 29th, and recognized in the orders for the action of the 31st, the 6th French Army ordered the 32nd Division to attack at 4:15 hours, August 1st, while Field Order No. 32, 1st U. S. Army Corps, directed the right of the 42nd Division to conform.

Thus the burden of the attack was again thrown on the fresh 32nd Division while the right of the Rainbow was to keep the Germans facing them on the western side of the Citadel from reinforcing those on the southern side, whose mission it was to stop the Wolverine Division. The 125th and 126th Michigan attacked reaching the top of Hill 212, capturing les Jomblets, and the Bois Pelger. However, a strong German counter-attack forced the 126th back to its jump off line while the 125th Michigan captured les Jomblets and the Bois de la Planchette. However a second counter-attack forced them out of Bois de la Planchette and back into les Jomblets. On the right the 127th Wisconsin, reinforced by the 1st Battalion of the 128th Wisconsin, finally, after hard fighting, penetrated the main German division.

While this was going on, the 2nd Battalion of the 168th Iowa succeeded in advancing up the hillside to the north of Sergy where it dug in and thus held its gains. Other units of the regiment to its south and right kept in touch with the left of the 32nd Division.

Thus at nightfall, on the right the 32nd Division had broken well into the German Citadel of the four woods. The Iowa regiment on their immediate left, which was the extreme right of the Rainbow, held not only all of Hill 212, which was in the sector of the Rainbow, but also had firmly established itself north of Sergy despite the flank fire from the Bois Pelger and the Bois de la Planchette.

Thus on the night of August 1st the 42nd Division held all the strong point along its part of the front of the Ourcq. In addition, with the right of the New York regiment in a good position to assault the ridge north of Sergy on its western flank, and the Alabama and Iowa regiments in a good position to advance on it from the front, the Germans, in what they still held of their wooded Citadel, were in danger of being cut off; at the same time they would undoubtedly have to face a continuance from the south of the attack of the 32nd Red Arrow Division, which in its two days previous fighting had shown by its determination and courage that it might be held up from time to time but that it could not be stopped.

Thus, thanks to the determination and courage of the Rainbow in attack, and its tenacity in holding everything it gained, despite heavy losses, and enemy counter-attacks, and the fighting qualities of its sister, the 32nd Red Arrow Division, the German position on the Ourcq was no longer tenantable.

That night they withdrew to the Vesle River!

This ended the second phase of the Ourcq Battle.

Before it was discovered that the Germans had withdrawn to the Vesle, the 1st Corps had issued an order for the renewal of the attack at 4:15 hours Friday, August 2nd along the same general lines as that of August 1st; that is, for the 32nd Division to drive straight north while the right of the 42nd was to keep in touch and advance as the 32nd came along.

The one change in the disposition was that the 117th Eng-

neers, held as an Infantry reserve up to this time, was to pass through the Battalion of the 168th Iowa then on the line.

As soon as the first news began to come in, indicating that the Germans were retiring, Brig. Gen. Douglass MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the Rainbow, went to the right of the Rainbow line at Sergy and then went along the whole line ordering each unit in turn to take up the pursuit. By the time he got to the left of the line at la Fontaine sons Pierre, he found the 166th Ohio and 149th Field Artillery already north of the Ourcq, and in pursuit.

In the meanwhile the 117th Engineers, who for the preceding days of the battle were disgusted that there was no use for them as an Infantry reserve, were off to the attack like a shot. They were anxious to show the rest of the Division that engineers might build bridges and roads, but that they were also good infantry soldiers, and to show General MacArthur, who was also an engineer, that his constant insistence that engineer troops were combat troops were more than justified.

On the right the 117th Engineers reached Hill 142. The 2nd Battalion, leading the 168th Iowa, reached the northeastern edge of the Foret de Nesles. At Bons Hommes Farm they met German machine gun resistance which they promptly overcame. The Engineer scouts advanced well beyond the Farm. The 2nd Battalion of the 167th Alabama advanced well toward the north of the Foret de Nesles, keeping in touch with the 168th Iowa on its right. The 3rd Battalion of the 165th New York, leading that regiment, advanced until it reached the northwestern edge of the Foret de Nesles. The 2nd Battalion of the 166th Ohio met enemy resistance at Mareuil-en-Dole which they overcame. Patrols were sent through the town. Upon the order reaching the Battalion that they were to be relieved by the 4th Division, the patrols in the town were withdrawn to the high ground just south of it.

The 4th Regular U. S. Division had been ordered by Field Order No. 35, 1st U. S. Corps, to relieve the 42nd Division by a passage of the line when the pursuit halted. Advancing in two columns, the right one headed by the 59th Infantry and the left by the 39th, the Division passed through the 42nd Division, completing the relief about 4 hours, August 3rd. This except for

the 117th Engineers, which had kept on going and advanced on August 3rd with the 4th Division as far as Cherry Chartreuve. Here the regiment was assembled and turned over to the Corps to help construct a defensive position south of the Vesle, and marched back to the Division. Also the 67th Field Artillery Brigade kept on with the 4th Division, which it had been ordered to support.

The 51st Field Artillery Brigade of the 26th Division, which had been in support of the 84th Infantry Brigade, advanced its light regiments to positions north of the Ourcq, and the heavy regiments to one just south of it the night of August 2nd-3rd. Early the morning of the 3rd the entire Brigade started forward in support of the Infantry. Telephonic orders were received by this Brigade 14:15 hours, August 3rd, for it to occupy positions east and west of Cherry Chartrevue with its light regiments and in the vicinity of Chartreuve Farm for its heavy regiments. The Batteries were in these positions by nightfall of the 3rd.

While this was going on, the 32nd Division had attacked, as ordered, at 4:15 hours, August 2nd, on its whole divisional front. They rapidly overcame the machine guns left behind, as a rear guard, and advancing first parallel to the 42nd and then to the 4th Regular Division, they continued until they reached the Vesle River.

So much for the military outline of the events of the Battle.

Next comes the human interest side. The following quotations from officers and men who were the principal actors or in a position to be excellent eye witnesses of the chief events give a vivid picture of what the personnel of the Rainbow saw, suffered and did.

As the Croix Rouge fight was the first act of the drama of the Ourcq we will start with the account of Colonel William P. Screws commanding the 167th Alabama Infantry.

Here it is:

"On July 24th, sometime in the A. M., I was ordered to make a relief of the front line troops of the 26th Division in the woods south of Le Croix Rouge Farm at 4 P. M. This was unusual, and the Boche practically saw my troops going forward, as there was no chance to get to the front line without crossing a long open

space. I had made a reconnaisance in the woods in the place where I was to make the relief. I placed Major John Carroll's, the First, and Major Dallas B. Smith's Third Battalions in the line, with Major E. H. Jackson with the Second in reserve, and instructed the battalion commanders on the front line to send out strong patrols, and to keep going until they had gained contact with the enemy. I never did see the Colonel of the regiment I was relieving, but a Major Doctor of the regiment told me that the enemy was five kilometers to the north, and there was nothing in front. At about 6 o'clock P. M., I received at my PC, just south of the Chateau at the Lake de la Logette and at the southern end of the woods of Le Croix Rouge Farm, a report from the patrols that the enemy were about 400 to 500 meters in our front in the woods; that they were occupying a very strong position, and that the woods were sprinkled with enemy machine guns. I had two men wounded on these patrols. The information was sent in immediately to Brigade Headquarters. They told me afterwards they forwarded it the same night to Division Headquarters, and Division Headquarters said they had forwarded it back to Corps.

"On July 26th, at about 3 P. M., the Brigade Commander assembled Regimental Commanders of the 84th Brigade, and the 101st and 102nd Field Artillery of the 26th Division, who were supporting the Brigade. To my utter amazement he read orders that we were to attack, jumping off at 4:50 P. M., in broad daylight. I protested as far as a Colonel could and still save his head. In my protest I stated what was in my front, and that I had so reported, and if we were to attack it would be a good idea to let us fall back out of the woods, and bring as much artillery down on the enemy line as possible, as they had a strong position. I plead for some artillery preparation, but, alas, NO. I also inquired if the French at my left had received orders, and were going to jump off at the same time. The reply was that the French had no orders, but that if we jumped off, they would. This I was skittish about, and therefore placed a very strong patrol on my left flank. Finally the Brigade Commander said we would jump off as ordered. All watches were synchronized, and all Regimental Commanders left for their respective PC's. The 167th Infantry jumped off on time; the French did not go, but my regi-

ment was saved by the strong patrol, commanded by Lieut. Robert Espy, I had placed on the left. The 168th Infantry were somewhat late jumping off. The result was that my regiment had a hand-to-hand fight with the 4th Prussian Guards. Our burial party reported next day 283 Germans stabbed with bayonets in our sector. Our casualties were so heavy that the next day when I received orders to proceed to the second objective, which was the Ourcq River, I only had one full strength battalion, and two half battalions, making the 167th practically one battalion short all during the fight on the Ourcq.

"During the fight at LaCroix Rouge Farm, July 26th, after the Regimental Commander of the 101st Field Artillery could not bring down any preparation prior to attack because we was too close, he put down a box barrage. How often he fired during the night I do not know but I know the fire he put down on all roads and avenues of escape for the Germans must have been terrific as the next afternoon, on July 27th, when we started forward through these roads we picked up over two hundred (200) German prisoners. They came in saying that the fire of the artillery was too terrific during the night as they started back to Sergy and north of Sergy that their casualties were very heavy. Therefore they decided they would rather give up."

An amusing incident of which the irrepressible Colonel "Bill" Screws, of the "Alabama" was the center, illustrated the lack of definite information at this time. The Colonel of the Illinois artillery regiment had been making a personal reconnaisance northeast of Curpoil. He saw coming towards him a battalion of American infantry deployed for attack, so he stopped until it went by, particularly as he saw it belong to the "Alabam" regiment. He asked the Major where he was going. The Major said: "Perhaps Colonel Screws who is with the support battalion can tell you, I don't know until we bump."

The Illinois Colonel waited until the support battalion came along and then easily picked out Colonel Screws because of the large cigar fiercely burning, which he always had in his mouth.

He said, "Hello, Bill. Where are you going?" Screws replied, not even taking the cigar out of his mouth, "Damn if I know, but I am on my way."

The following is the story of Lieut. Colonel Walter E. Bare, of what he did and saw in the Croix Rouge Farm fight:

"The night of July 25th, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 167th Infantry relieved the 111th Infantry of the 28th Division which was at that time serving with the 26th Division. The 2nd Battalion was in support. Our regimental headquarters were established in a drain ditch by the side of the road just outside the Town of Corpoil.

"Early on the morning of the 26th every effort was made to locate the enemy. Our patrols were constantly fired upon by snipers in trees and in the La Croix Rouge Farm house, with intermittent bursts of machine gun fire together with considerable enemy artillery fire, all day long. This continuous firing prevented us from getting very definite information.

"The 39th Division was on our right and the 167th French Division was on our left.

"The 84th Brigade was ordered to attack at 4:50 P. M. The zone of action of the 84th Infantry Brigade was: northern boundary, northwest corner Bois de Bruvardes, La Croix Blanche Fme, Rue de la Croix Rouge Blanche, inclusive; southern boundary, Fary Fme, road bend 800 meters southeast of La Croix Rouge Farm; northeastern edge of wood Vente-Jean Guillaune and Rouge de la Goubre. Our objective was the northern and eastern edge of the La Ventellete woods and as much of the continuation of this line as was included in the Brigade sector. The zone of action of the 167th Infantry was the northern limit of the Brigade sector and the southern limit was the La Croix Rouge Farm, northwestern corner of La Ventellete wood, Bainchares inclusive.

"I was present when Colonel Screws received the order. He read it, issued verbal instructions to the staff officers present, handed it to me with instructions to deliver it to the two Battalions who were to make the attack. It was then only about ten or fifteen minutes before jumping off time and I had to go about 2 ½ or 3 miles to the Battalion headquarters. I jumped in a motorcycle sidecar, drove to Major Dallas B. Smith's Battalion headquarters, delivered the message to him. He made preparations to advance at once. I then proceeded along a road through the woods which was being heavily shelled and when within 1,000 yards of

Major Carroll's PC a big tree was blown down across the road just in front of my motorcycle. The woods were so dense that it was impossible to take the car around and we could not lift it over the tree. My motorcycle driver and I proceeded on to Major Carroll's headquarters very hurriedly on foot. We gave him the instructions and his battalion moved out about 10 or 15 minutes behind scheduled time.

"Col. Screws, in handing me the order, instructed me to remain at the front with the troops. I advanced with the 1st Battalion. From our jumping off place we went through a very dense thicket for about 100 yards but after reaching this distance we emerged into an open woods. Up until the time our troops had emerged from the underbrush there was no concentrated enemy firing from small caliber guns, with the exception of considerable sniping from the big trees in the woods. Just as soon as we had gone well into the woods, however, our men were literally mowed down by traversing machine gun fire from the edge of the field and from the Croix Rouge Farm house immediately in our front. Just in the edge of the woods to our front the Germans had massed 27 machine guns. On a great many of the trees they had painted on the side facing them aiming markers of white and red bands. These markers gave the machine gunners the aiming point for traversing machine gun fire. It was interesting to note, after reaching the machine gun emplacements, that these markers gave the machine gunners the exact military crest of the terrain and were so arranged that if the enemy was advancing standing up they would be shot in the lower limbs. There were also a number of machine guns in the Croix Rouge Farm house.

"So severe was the fire of the German artillery and machine guns that it is difficult to understand how the two Battalions ever reached their objective. The few men that were left out of the two Battalions finally reached the machine gun emplacements both around the edge of the woods and in the farm house and succeeded in killing over 200 Germans and capturing the 27 machine guns. Our two Battalions, in about four hours fighting, suffered very heavy casualties. We had expected artillery fire as the order provided that the 51st Field Artillery Brigade would support the attack of the 84th Infantry Brigade and the 101st Field Artillery

would support the 167th Infantry. Also, that the artillery preparation for the attack would begin at 2:50 P. M., and that the Infantry would be preceded by an accompanying barrage which would move 200 meters in advance of the Infantry, at the same rate of advance, and that it would be held stationary beyond the normal objective. Apparently the artillery never received their orders as there was no American artillery fired on the Croix Rouge Farm positions.

"Up until this time it can be truly stated that the fight at the Croix Rouge Farm was purely an Infantry action. It was Infantry against Infantry and to the Infantry alone goes the credit for the capture of one of the strongest enemy positions in the Chateau Thierry sector.

"On account of the fierce fire and stubborn resistance coming from the farm house and the machine gun nests, all of the platoon commanders were determined to capture these two strong positions. It is difficult to say just who reached the farm house first. Lieut. Ernest Bell of 'D' Company, and Lieut. Alan Smith of 'K' Company, Birmingham, both charged the Croix Rouge Farm at about the same time. Both platoons suffered severe casualties but reached their objective, killing all Germans in sight, capturing many machine guns and much ammunition. The platoon commanded by Lieut. Robert Espy of Abbeville, Ala., was largely responsible for breaking up all the 27 machine gun nests in the edge of the woods by advancing in double time on the position. Although suffering severe casualties, some of his men got through and killed Germans with rifle, pistol and bayonet.

"I personally had a rather interesting experience. While on my way down to where Lieut. Espy was mopping up the machine gun nests I heard single bullets whizzing by my head, most of the firing having died down at that time. These bullets would hit in the ground beyond me and I knew instantly that there was a sniper somewhere in a tree. In moving my head backwards and forwards, trying to locate where the shots were coming from, the right side of my face was close to a birch tree. One of the German's shots hit the tree about six inches from my right jaw and the birch bark, tearing into very fine fragments, nearly blistered the whole side of my face. In fact I thought for a few minutes

that half my face was gone. Just about that time Lieut. Espy said, "I see him Colonel." I asked him to wait and let me take a shot at him, but without saying another word he upped with his rifle, which he had been using instead of a pistol, fired one shot, and down came the German out a big oak tree about 100 yards from me. That German was a poor shot because he wasted no less than a half-dozen shells trying to hit me.

"The ground was literally covered with killed and wounded, both American and German. For some distance you could actually walk on dead men. The two Battalions in the attack suffered so heavily that it took a large proportion of those not killed and wounded to move the wounded back to the first aid station, which was established by the side of Lake de la Logette, some 2 ½ miles to our rear.

"Just about dusk I received information that on our left there was some movement on the part of enemy troops, which indicated that they might be forming for a counter attack. I sent out a patrol and they reported back in about an hour to the effect that they could discover no enemy troops, neither could they discover any French on our left who, according to the order, would keep in liaison with us during the attack. However, in a very short time, after the patrol had returned, although it was pitch dark, we could hear movement of troops which indicated that it was a counter attack. A great many of the men who had carried the wounded to the first aid station were at that time reporting back to me where I had taken up position at the cross roads. So I called for officers to form a provisional company with which to ward off the counter attack if possible.

"When I asked how many officers were present, it developed that Capt. Mortimer H. Jordan of Birmingham, and Lieut. Royal Little of Providence, R. I., were the only officers present. I instructed Lieut. Royal Little to take charge and organize a provisional company of all men who were able to immediately form a line to ward off the attack. This was accomplished with scarcely any loud talking and in a remarkably short period of time. The men moved forward as if they had been drilling together for months. I would estimate that they had proceeded about 100 yards when they could see moving objects in front, by looking over

the open spaces against the sky line. Our troops opened rifle fire and the enemy, who had formed for a counter attack, retreated in disorder towards the Ourcq River.

"The provisional company remained in position during the night, which was a terrible one. The ground was wet and soggy and the German artillery kept up a constant fire all night long. We later made connection with the French on our left. I requested the 2nd Battalion, which was in the reserve, to come forward to fill in the gap.

"Records will show that the 167th Infantry had a greater casualty list during the Croix Rouge farm engagement than in any other engagement during the war.

"In my opinion the orders for the attack on the Croix Rouge farm were prepared too hastily and apparently without definite knowledge of the location and strength of the enemy. A sufficient interval of time was not allowed between the issuing of the order until the time for the attack. Although the order called for artillery preparation, there was none. And the Infantry, desirous of carrying out the order to the letter, not knowing but what they would get some assistance from the artillery, advanced as near schedule time as possible. Had they secured the artillery support as provided for in the order no doubt the casualties would have been very materially lessened."

Major Dallas B. Smith, who commanded the 3rd Battalion of the Alabama, tells the following:

"The afternoon of July 25th the Third Battalion moved into position in the woods and immediately began to dig in not knowing, what flour we were to attack. The first Battalion, under Major John W. Carroll was on our left and the Second Battalion of the 168th, under Major Worthington, was on our right.

"It is difficult for me to comment on the Croix Rouge Farm for the reason that I have always felt and I know that our own Regimental Commander, as well as Colonel Bennett, who commanded the Iowa Regiment, felt that it would be a sacrifice of troops to make an attack through these woods without some artillery.

"With my Intelligence Officer, Lt. W. I. Cole, I reconnoitered our immediate front. We had gone but a short distance in the

woods before we observed the red bands around the trees. This, of course, was a guide for the German machine gunners in the elevation of their guns. I next went over to Major John W. Carroll, a friend and comrade of many years' standing. I asked Carroll what he thought of the situation. I told him in my opinion we were in for the loss of a lot of officers and men. Carroll said he ought to have a report in a few minutes from his Intelligence Section. About that time the Officer in command of his detachment and two men who were reconnoitering returned. The Officer had been wounded. Of course, there was no way to keep the Germans from knowing approximately just where we were as we moved up in broad daylight and as always they had the observation. On the night of the 25th there was considerable shelling of both Battalions

"The afternoon of the 26th, about 4:30 P. M., Lt. Col. Bare came hurriedly to my headquarters which were under what was probably the tallest beech tree in the forest. The only way we could locate it was by the height of the tree. He read the orders to me, that we should jump off at 4:50 P. M. I told Bare that this was going to result in a horrible sacrifice of men if we didn't have some artillery, waiting until morning would not affect the situation. Later I said to Carroll: 'John, there will be many of these Officers and men we will never see again.'

"I had perfect liaison on our left with Major Carroll. I had to establish liaison with the Second Battalion of the 168th commanded by Major Worthington. We advanced—Companies I and K—followed by Companies L and M, Company B, commended by Captain Boyce Miller, Georgia Machine Gun Company, and a Platoon of Stokes mortars. We felt sincere affection for the Georgia Machine Gun Company. They had been attached to us in the Champagne and in the trenches and we felt as if I they were part of the Battalion. I feel that Captain Miller and his officers and men had never been given proper credit due to the fact that they were away from their Commanding Officer and were rather an orphan outfit. However, our Regimental Commander and myself did what we could to secure them the proper recognition for the fine service they rendered.

"We hadn't advanced 100 yards toward the Croix Rouge Farm when it was a matter of hand to hand fighting. I am of the

opinion that Major Carroll's Battalion and my Battalion were the only troops that did have hand to hand fighting using both the bayonet as we had been taught during so many hours of instruction, and the butt of the rifle, the latter being more effective. The Germans we attacked were a fine body of men. We understood they were a part of the Fourth Prussian Guard.

"It was impossible for the Stokes people to advance due to the weight of their shells. The officer in command of this Platoon was ordered to fall in with our men in M Company. One platoon of the Machine Gun Company under Lt. Cohen and one Platoon of I Company reached the Croix Rouge Farm. The only way you could visualize this fight and terrain would have been to pass through it. Of course these seasoned and trained troops became intermingled with other companies of the Battalion.

"We reorganized our lines about dusk and again made contact with Major Carroll. It was about this time that we finally made contact with Major Worthington who had advanced his troops on our right. It will always seem to me that it was probably lack of information, but I feel that the higher command made a grave mistake when they threw our regiment into this fight, without any artillery.

"My Battalion suffered many casualties including Lt. Powell, commanding I Company killed, Captains Waldron and Esslinger wounded, this making three of my four Company Commanders. I reorganized the Battalion into two small companies."

Major Smith escaped injury only to be badly wounded the next day.

Here is the story of the wounding of Private Hernprode of "L" Co., 167th Alabama, one of the Croix Rouge Farm casualties.

He says:—

"Early the evening of July 25th we were relieving troops from Pennsylvania in the Chateau-Thierry sector. As darkness fell we were ordered to dig in for the night. The woods were being shelled by the retreating enemy who made every shot count, as they were familiar with every foot of the territory which they had just evacuated.

"It was well past midnight when my buddy and I had finished digging a fox hole large enough to conceal both of us. Just

as we finished we heard a shell coming through the air, which we knew by the sound of its whine would land close to us. I yelled for him to get down and at the same time jumped head first into the fox hole. I was only partly in the hole when the shell hit a tree. The force of the explosion lifted me up and smacked me down again. It left me bleeding from five different wounds caused by flying fragments.

"My buddy and five other members of Company L, 167th Infantry, paid the supreme sacrifice. Just before being carried to a first-aid station I gave my gold watch to Lieutenant Green asking him to return it when I rejoined my company.

"The Armistice having been signed while I was still at base hospital No. 9 at Chateauraux, France, I never rejoined my outfit. About a year later Lieutenant Mackay was visiting my office in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, having just returned from overseas. He told me Lieutenant Green came back on the same boat and was at Camp Grant, Illinois, for discharge, that he had made many attempts to locate me and thought I had died in a hospital. I wrote him a letter and received my watch after a year's absence."

The then Major Claud Stanley who commanded the Second Battalion of the 168th Iowa Infantry tells the following of the share of that regiment in the Croix Rouge Farm fight.

He says:

"As the sun was rising over the Foret De Ferre the 2nd Bn. of the 168th Inf. was ending its all night ride in the convoy of French Motor Trucks piloted by a lot of incorrigible Annamnites and commanded by more incorrigible French Transportation officers.

"The little village of Epieds, just in front of the de-bussing station, presented the usual appearance of a village through which fighting had been carried on. The other Bns. of the 168th Inf. had also de-bussed near this little town and each of the Bns. started its march to the east to get into contact with the enemy and to relieve elements of the 26th Division which were then holding our front line in the Foret De Ferre.

"It was bright sun-shiny morning and the men, as they marched along through the woods, realized that the time had arrived when they were to be assault troops; that they were to be used in an offensive. Each man recalled the time that he had

spent in the Lorraine Sector; first becoming acquainted with the trenches and the barbed wire in front of them and also remembering his first contact with the enemy. How he had wondered what he would do when he met the enemy. Then, day by day, the regiment had grown familiar with the trench warfare life and each man had soon learned to know that he was the equal of any man in the German Army. Then he knew he did not fear to meet and fight with him. All he asked was an equal chance. And the men also remembered that, in the trench warfare in Lorraine and in Champagne, that they were on the defensive and that they could choose the place from which they were to fight and could prepare a strong defensive position with wire in front of it and, in this protected place, all they had to do was to await the coming of the enemy.

"They realized now that the tables had turned, that they were aggressors. That they had to go forward and hunt the enemy in his lair and drive him out. But they were ready. They had had the training and they knew that they could do the work that was set before them. This was what was in the men's minds as they moved some 4 kilometers to the east over a little trail, first through woods, then through the open and then into the woods again.

"The march was soon made and the men were all resting in Bois De Fary before noon.

"About 4 o'clock in the afternoon, I received orders from Col. Bennet to proceed to the headquarters of Col. 'Gatling Gun' Parker.

"I remembered the Colonel as a lieutenant in the Regular Army at Ft. Riley, Kansas, in 1913. He was at the big maneuver in which that old 3d Iowa took part. He was demonstrating a rapid fire gun and a light gun mounted on wheels and I understand that he has been working on automatic weapons since that time. I met him again when we arrived at Langres, France. He was there in charge of the school of automatic weapons. I found him in the woods at his P. C., which was to the south of Lake Logette. He explained to me and showed me on the map his position. He said he was unable to hold it the way he would desire because of his lack of men. My Battalion numbered more

men than the entire 102nd Inf. when we relieved them in the evening.

"The arrangements were completed and, at 7:07 p. m. I sent Col. Bennett the following message: 'Will relieve support of 102nd Inf. at 9:00 p. m. My P. C. will be on road, 266.0-191.1. Will ammunitions and rations be sent up? Stanley.'

"The men moved forward, in half-platoon groups and, at 9:20 I sent the following message to Col. Bennet: 'Relief completed at 9:20. Stanley.'

"As the relief was made at dark, I instructed Col. Parker to place my men in the positions that were occupied by him. I would then make a reconnaissance of the position and make such changes as I deemed necessary. This was the answer to Col. Parker's explanation that he was not holding the line as it should be held but that he was doing the best he could with the men at his disposal.

"It was a tired and worn group of men that were relieved and sent to the rear and it was not many days until we realized just why it was that these brave men from the New England states presented such a worn appearance.

"At 10:00 p. m., I received the following message from Col. Bennett: 'C. O. 2nd Bn. Major Rumbough reports that, through error of guides, Worthington is occupying a position in sector at our right and, thereby, leaving a gap in line on our front. Investigate and, if true, fill in gap tonight with your Battalion. Get liaison with the 167th Inf. on left and French on right.'

"To this message I replied at 10:15, as follows: 'C. O. 168th Inf. My Bn. now occupies the following line: Companies E and F from 267.3-292.0 to 266.5-192.5, facing the northeast. Second line on trail 266.4-191.2 to 265.7-191.5, held by Companies G and H. My P. C. on road 266.2-191.2. I will investigate Major Worthington's position. Where is Brewer? Stanley.'

"Just prior to receiving the message from Col. Bennett, I had received a message from Captain Casey and also one from Captain Yates in which they informed me that they were in position and in liaison with Major Worthington's Bn., which was in front of them. It seemed to me that they were in position and lined up correctly.

"I took Lieut. Kirt Chapman, my intelligence officer, and, with guides, went to the position of Captains Casey and Yates, and front there, to the position of Major Worthington in their front. I then found that our regiment, instead of facing the northeast, was facing directly east and that my two leading companies were about 600 to 800 yards to the right of where they should have been and were directly in the rear of Major Worthington's Bn. The night was dark and the underbrush was heavy and there were few trails through these woods.

"I returned to my P. C. at 12:40 a. m. and sent the following message: 'C. O. 168th Inf. Have made investigation of front line. I find that Companies E and F are about 600 yards to the right of position I gave you. I also find that Major Worthington is to the right of where he should be. Am sending Companies E and F to fill the gap. Stanley.'

"I also sent the following message: '12:45 a. m., 26-July. To Captain Casey. I find you are about 800 yards to the right of the sector. That there are no troops in our front line. Regimental C. O. directs this Bn. to fill in gap connecting with 167 Inf. on left and French on right. You will, with Companies E and F do this. Your new position should be 267.4-192.5 to 267.1-193.3. Reconnoiter and move as soon as you can. Report. Stanley.'

"There was indiscriminate shelling during the night on our entire sector. The machine gun men had several casualties.

"With Lieut. Chapman, I made a reconnaissance of our position. It was impossible to move the two companies during the night but the position was outposted and, as soon as daylight, Companies E and F moved to their new position and, at 10:50 a.m., July 26th, I sent the following message: 'C. O. 168th Inf., Companies E and F in position on front line. Companies G and H and Machine Gun company in support on line about 800 yards in rear. My P. C. near .224. No activity reported in front. Liaison on right with 156th French and on left 409th French. 167th Inf. was not in front line one hour ago. Stanley.'

"I later received a message sent by Captain Casey, 11:25 a. m.: 'C. O. 2nd Bn. Find that it is impossible to cover front and leave anything in support. Could 167th be put in position. Need grenades and ammunition. Also need Doctor.'

"To this message, I directed Captain Casey to thin out his lines and that I would arrange to get into touch with the 167th.

"About 1 o'clock I received the first message with reference to the attack. It called for an advance at 2 p. m.

"At 1:20 p. m., I sent the following message: 'C. O 168th. Impossible to advance at 2:00 p. m. Cannot be in position. Troops on right do not advance until 7. Need auto rifle and machine gun ammunition. Stanley.'

"During all of this time the officers of the various companies in the Battalion were doing their utmost to establish a line across our sector connecting with the French on the right and the Alabama troops on the left. The support companies were just coming up to position. The machine gun company had not come up yet.

"At 3:15 I received the second order for attack.

"At 3 :15 I sent the following message: 'Captain Casey. Just received order from C. O. Regiment. Attack starts at 4:50. You will attack at that time. Company E on your right will guide on you. Keep position marked by panels. Stanley.'

"At this time we were gaining contact with the enemy and had begun to somewhat develop his position. At 3:25 I sent the following message: 'C. O. 168th Inf. Received information that we may meet considerable resistance. We are in contact. Very little enemy shells now. I will advance with my Battalion. Stanley.'

"The Battalion was now disposed for the attack. Companies E and F as the assaulting companies, E on the right and F on the left, each company to advance with two platoons in the attack; and two in support. Companies G and H in support. H on the right in support at 600 yards distance. The machine gun company with the support. I gave directions to the officers in command of the machine gun company, to get positions for his guns from which he could deliver fire to support the attack. The ground over which we had to advance, until we came to the opening surrounding La Croix Rouge Farm, was heavily wooded and the underbrush was very thick and there were no trails over which machine guns could be moved.

"At 3:00 I received message, Major Stanley. There is a big gap between Company on my right and your company on your

left. Will you not have one of the officers meet officers from Company M, my Battalion, so that they can arrange mixed post and establish liaison. D. B. Smith, Major 167th Inf.'

"I reported, as follows: 'Major Smith. Am sending an officer to arrange liaison between Bns. Stanley' ".

"I also sent: 'Lieut. Thrasher, Company F. Get in touch with Company M 167th on your left. Am sending guide. Establish liaison with them. Stanley.'

"Lieut. Chapman, with battalion scouts, was directed to establish and maintain liaison between our left and the Alabama right and he was there with his troops during the assault that came later. At 3 :40 the assaulting Co. had been put in position near the front edge of the wood, facing the Red Cross Farm. The commanders, Captains Casey and Yates, returned to my P. C. for final instructions. We were still waiting for the attack order to come. Captain Yates was informed by the French Troops on his right that they had received information to attack. That they were to advance to the road running southeast from La Croix Rouge Farm, then making turning movement to the left flank. Captain Yates informed them that we were to advance straight ahead past the La Croix Rouge Farm into the woods beyond. To this they replied to Captain Yates that it would be impossible; that their orders were that our troops were not to advance until later. When I received this information from Captain Yates, I personally went to the P. C. of the French Battalion on my right and this information was confirmed by the Battalion Commander.

I then sent the following message, "C. O. 168th Inf. Informed by French 168th Inf. on my right that they will make a turning movement with pivot on 193.3—267.2 which is on our right. This movement will bring their line facing north and enfilading our line. There must be some mistake here. He tells us that his information was that we would not move until later. Stanley".

"At this time I had no information as to what was contained in the attack order issued by the Brigade Commander. This order reached me at 5:12.

"Shortly after our artillery opened at 2:30, the enemy artillery returned the fire and our entire sector was heavily shelled

by the enemy artillery. There were many casualties while the men were getting into position. Lieut. Merle McCunn, Co. E, was wounded while getting his platoon into position for attack. The company commanders of the four companies were assembled for the time the attack order was received 5:12. And, after the order was read, all started to their positions. This was the first information that we had received as to what we were to attack and that there was a turning movement contemplated.

"With my staff and runners, I went forward to the front line then at the edge of the wood and saw the company advance to the attack on La Croix Rouge Farm. The advancing lines were under cover until they left the wood. The terraine over which they had to advance was a smooth field from the edge of the wood, going northeast the ground raised for about 50 yards, then began to slope down toward the farm. The raise was slight, only three or four feet. From the edge of the wood, I could see the farm and the entire field in front. The men, as they advanced from the wood, met a withering fire from the machine guns. Instantly they were on the ground, returning the fire. All their old training on the border and all that they had received in National Guard service, in open war-fare, was back to them. They advanced by rushes; keeping up a constant rifle fire.

"The left of Company F was joined by the right of Company M, 167th and, together, these two companies, which bore the brunt of the fighting, advanced on the farm. The platoon of Lieut. Fisher of Company F had been hard hit. He turned to the Lieut. on his left and said, 'Lieut., my men are about all gone, we will join you.' No sooner had this been done than a bursting shell made a casualty of the Lieutenant from Alabama. Then Fisher assumed command of all of the men of both platoons and they advanced on the farm.

"At 6:15, I sent the following message, 'C. O. 168th Inf. First objective taken. Men digging in. The enemy have machine guns in the edge of the woods. Only few casualties reported yet. Will hold position. Stanley.'

The fight went on. The farm house was taken, but the loss was terrific.

"Chaplain Robb, the day afterwards, in conjunction with the burying party from the Alabama regiment, found 100 bodies

near the farm. But the lines went on to the woods beyond and, as the shades of night came on, the fire died down. We did not know the success that we had attained. At that time we didn't know that the enemy were drawing to the northeast across the Ourcq River. But we did know how bravely the men had advanced under such a heavy fire and that every report that came in told of the greatness of the struggle and of the terrible loss that we had suffered.

"At 8:00 o'clock P. M., I sent the following message: 'C. O. 168th. French on the right were held up. No advance made. We cannot advance. Men are digging in. Company E reports 30% casualties. No report from Company F. Stanley.'

"Also, 'C. O. 168th Inf. Can use Stokes mortars on some close machine guns. Stanley'. At 8:40 sent the following message: 'C. O. 168th Inf. Objective reached at about 6 o'clock. No report from Casey. Information came from wounded man. Casualties of E, F, and G are quite heavy. Company H was not engaged. I think it impossible to hold the present position. Stanley'.

"At this time the French on the right had withdrawn their line to the rear about 500 yards, leaving our right flank open. It was getting dark and the line was held on the road running southeast from Red Cross Farm.

"With some elements farther advanced, the fire from the enemy machine guns was dying out. Artillery fire continued to fall over the whole area. The Alabama troops of the left were withdrawn to the edge of the wood. This left my line holding a salient about 500 yards in advance of the troops on the right and left and they were in the open. It would be alright as long as it was dark but, when the next day came on, it would be impossible to maintain this position if attacked.

"At 9:30, I sent the following message: 'C. O. 168th Inf. Captain Casey just here. Reports 50% casualties. Troops should be relieved or withdrawn. Let me know. Stanley.'

"The lines remained where they were during the night. There was a steady down pour of rain, causing much suffering. The men had had nothing to eat during the day and nothing was brought up. Col. Bennett sent, at 7:50 P. M. message which reached me at 11:30 P. M.

"Also received another message at 11:30 P. M., which states: 'Brigade directs that you dig in and stay where you are and inform the 167th of action and position. Bennett.'

"Just before dawn of the morning of the 27th, I withdrew all lines except the out post position to the woods so that they would be protected from the view of the enemy aeroplanes when daylight came. As soon as it was light, patrols were sent out and advanced and discovered the success of the night before. The enemy was gone. The loss of the French Battalion on our right was very light. They said they had five casualties. The loss of the Alabama troops on our left was equally as heavy as ours.

"At 10:30 on the 27th, I received a message from Col. Bennett, that the advance would be taken up.

"I sent the following message, July 27. 10:30 A. M. 'C. O., 168th Inf. Message for advance received. Company E has 110 men 3 officers. Company F 70 men 2 officers. Company G 70 men and 1 officer. And Company H had 3 casualties. Killed: about 50. Stanley.'

"About noon Col. Bennett came forward. I had a talk with him. Also with Major Worthington and Major Brewer. It was first ordered that the 2nd Battalion would lead the advance but, when Col. Bennett came forward, he said the order of advance would be: 1st, 3rd and 2nd Bns. The other Battalions advanced during the afternoon. My Battalion remained in the woods to the southwest of the Red Cross Farm until dusk.

"There is one thing that we had learned during the fight of the night before: That was, not to crowd the support troops too close on to the assaulting troops. During the fight of the night of July 26th, the 3d Battalion closed up so that their advance troops were not 300 yards from my support company. One platoon of Company D of the 1st Battalion was so eager to get into the fight that they kept on going forward and finally wound up in the fight along with Company F. We learned this lesson: That the brakes on the battlefield will not come very rapidly and that there is plenty of time to bring up your supporting troops; and, that the farther away they are kept, the better condition they will be in when the order comes that they are needed.

For the attack of the 168th Iowa on Hill 212, the leading company was commanded by Captain Percy A. Lanison, later

to command the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment. Here is his personal story:

He says: "The 26th of July, while our First and Second Battalions engaged the enemy in the Vicinity of Fresnes and the la Croix Blanche Farm, the Battalion to which I belonged, the 3rd, Major Brewer, was in support.

"The next morning, that of the 27th, we took over the attack and forced the enemy detachments in front of us across the Ourcq River. However, our patrols, which had succeeded in crossing the River, fell back at nightfall to our side of it. My company furnished the outposts for the night for the Battalion, all of which, with the exception of L Company was about a mile south of Feviere Farm and near Fresnes. L Company was at the Farm.

"At 4:30 A. M., July 28th, Major Brewer came to me with a message from the Brigade Commander, General Brown, which read: 'You will cross the Ourcq and take the heights beyond.' Brewer showed me Hill 212 on the map as my objective. He told me to start out with my company, sending word whenever I had crossed the Ourcq. This morning there was a heavy fog covering the whole river valley. I moved my company out in platoon columns, the 1st and 2nd platoons as assault and the 3rd and 4th in support. Before reaching the River we took up squad columns with scouts out in front. In that formation we crossed the river at 5:15 A. M. without being seen by the enemy. However, as we emerged from the tree-lined bank on their side of the River the fog lifted, they saw us, and subjected us to a heavy fire from Hill 212 to our front, the town of Sergy to our left, and from Moulin Caranada on our right.

"I, therefore, ordered Lieutenant James Bonham's 3rd Platoon to attack Sergy on our left, Lieutenant M. C. Wallace's 1st Platoon to advance straight to the front on Hill 212, Lieutenant George C. Noble's 2nd Platoon to flank the hill on Wallace's right, and Lieutenant Theodore E. Jones's 4th Platoon to attack the hill on our right flank. We succeeded in driving the enemy back and taking about fifty prisoners. I then consolidated our position.

"At this time I Company came up and took over some of the outlying buildings of Sergy on my left. Captain Briggs, M

Company, came up directly in my rear. He placed his platoons in the gaps which had opened up between my platoons due to the divergent attack which they had made. Company K under Lieutenant James Cotter, swung to the right and took up the position to the right of the hill. During this all companies suffered casualties amongst their officers and enlisted men.

"Up to this time we had received no artillery support, nor any fire from the enemy's artillery. As we reached the top of the hill, Lieutenant Olson of the 151st Georgia Machine Gun Battalion came up. However, as he had lost both men and equipment from the enemy's fire in crossing the River and mounting the hill, he took the enemy machine guns which we had captured, turned them around and used them against the Germans.

"Major Brewer ordered all companies to consolidate the positions they then held. I Company held the outskirts of Sergy, L and M held the fringe of the Bois de Planchette eastward to the Moulin K Company was east of the hill. That same afternoon the 1st Battalion took a position along the Ourcq on our right.

"By nightfall when I checked up my casualties I found I had lost from my company fifteen killed and fifty-five wounded.

"The prisoners we had captured were from the 4th Prussian Guard Division. Excellent troops.

"I have read many stories since the war about Sergy being captured and recaptured a number of times. However, the facts are that as soon as we were well established on Hill 212, the Germans no longer really held Sergy but had their main positions north of the town. Our patrols went into the town the night of the 28th, and brought out a few civilians still there. They found no Germans. The Germans heavily shelled Sergy a number of times, but as far as I know made no heavy infantry attack to recover it.

"About 4 o'clock the afternoon of the 28th, the Germans started a counter-attack on us. However, it was not pushed very hard, so we drove it off easily.

"About noon of this same day Lieutenant Colonel Tinley took command of the front line, establishing his P. C. alongside that of Major Brewer, at the foot of Hill 212.

"During the next few days we were repeatedly heavily shelled, and fired on with machine guns. However, we did not give up

any of the ground we had gained. As a matter of fact, I know of no occasion in the history of the regiment during which we ever gave up any ground we had gained.

"The then Colonel MacArthur, Chief-of-Staff of the Division, visited us on the 28th.

"As the 32nd Division, which had relieved the 28th and 3rd, on our right attacked due north their progress gradually eliminated the right part of the salient which we had been holding and of which Hill 212 was the apex.

"The Third Battalion of the 47th Infantry attacked through us towards the Hill north of Sergy. They had very hard going, gradually coming to a halt, and then slowly fell back through us.

"Lieutenant Colonel Tinley and several other officers, who watched our crossing of the Ourcq and assault on Hill 212 beyond, said that with the lifting of the fog caused by the sun coming up, it was a beautiful sight to watch the men, their bayonets flashing in the sun, going forward, regardless of the losses inflicted by the enemy's fire."

The capture of Sergy having been claimed by the Third Battalion of the 47th Regular Infantry of the Fourth Division the above statement by Captain Lanison shows the 168th Iowa to have been in possession first.

The following statement by the then Captain Lloyd D. Ross, Operations Officer, supports that of Captain Lanison.

Captain Ross says:—

"When the officer commanding the Third Battalion of the Infantry reported to Colonel Bennett I personally showed him where to place his men in reasonable security from shell fire and told him Colonel Bennett's orders were to wait until further orders were given him as the Battalion was not to be used for the present. Nevertheless this Battalion of the 47th Infantry was injected into the fight without the knowledge of the Commanding Officer of the 168th Infantry and it was not until the night was on when we were preparing for the action the next day that we discovered what had been done. They claimed to have captured Sergy when the fact is that town had been already captured by the 2nd Battalion of the 168th Infantry."

The then Major Stanley also brings out that the 168th Iowa captured Sergy in his account of the fight across the Ourcq and up the heights the other side.

He says:—

"The order of attack for July 28th was 3rd Battalion assault across the Ourcq and gain the high ground beyond and take Sergy, the 2nd Battalion (my Battalion) to support the 3rd Battalion and in compliance with this order I moved forward at about 6 o'clock to support the 3rd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion effected the crossing of the Ourcq River and advanced up the hill in a northeasterly direction towards Les Jomblets Woods. Most of the resistance to their advance was coming from that direction and there being no troops on the right it was necessary for them to face the enemy. This disposition of the 3rd Battalion extended their front far to the right of our axis of advance. I was able to observe from my position south of the Ourcq the advance made by the 3rd Battalion. At about 9 o'clock Major Brewer sent a runner to me for help.

"At that time the 3rd Battalion occupied a position with its right resting on the coordinate 272.2-198.2, and its left on 272.4-197.3. I sent in Company H, which was the company of my Battalion that had received the least punishment on the 26th. Later Brewer asked for more help and I went forward to his command post along the road running south from Sergy and there it was determined that Brewer should release Company H back to me and I would take care of the territory between Brewer's left and the right of the 167th Infantry. I accordingly ordered my battalion in to fill this gap and advance.

"During this day and the 29th, I maintained my P. C. at 272.3-196.9. Major Brewer had moved his further to the right. From this position on the morning of the 29th of July, I observed the Battalion of the 47th Infantry approached down the ridge leading from the La Croix Blanche Fme. down toward the Ourcq River. At that time the regimental command post was at the La Cense Fme., and this Battalion through its commander reported to Col. Bennett or Captain Ross (regimental operation officer) at that place between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning. They were halted there and dug in.

"This Battalion of the 47th Infantry moved up to a position along the railroad just south of the Ourcq and I went down to the Ourcq and met the Commander, a Captain. The Captain told me that the Battalion Commander, Major Heidt, had been wounded and had gone with the papers and orders, and he understood that the duties of his Battalion were to support the 168th Infantry. I asked him if he had reported the Battalion to Col. Bennett at the headquarters at the La Cense Fme. He told me that he had not, and I directed him that if he had not made the report, to do so at once, that we could not use his troops then. This was about 11:00 o'clock in the morning.

"I had not yet received information as to the success of our assault in taking the town of Sergy. I told him to put his men in the woods along the Ourcq. This he did and they remained there until about 2:30 or 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After we had taken the town of Sergy, which I reported to Col. Bennett at 12:00 o'clock at noon, the enemy started to shell the town and continued during the afternoon.

"About 1:00 o'clock, I went forward through the town of Sergy to inspect the front lines that had been posted about 200 yards north of Sergy. At 3:30 P. M., July 29th, I sent the following message: 'C. O. 2nd Bn. 168th Inf. Was just talking with an officer of 111th Infantry. He informs me that the 3rd Bn. of his regiment is to be on our right. They have not come into position. A Bn. of 47th Inf. moved up to Sergy.
Were heavily shelled. Co. E advanced ground and lost 6 men. Lieut. Wallace was wounded. What time will food be up? Can water carts come with water? Stanley.'

"This message indicated the time when the Battalion of the 47th Infantry went into the town of Sergy. I was in a position the entire day where I could observe the movements of this Battalion.

"At about 10:00 o'clock on the morning of July 29th, when I had received word from Lieut. Chapman that Sergy was being held by machine guns and their advance was being held up and

having no artillery officer with me, I called regimental headquarters by telephone (which happened to be working) and directed them to get artillery fire on the town of Sergy. Nothing came of it and about 11:00 o'clock I received another message from Lieut. Chapman that they had entered the town of Sergy. So you see I did not put any artillery on the town then. Our telephone communications were then dead.

"I called Sergeant Paul Clark of Company E and said to him: 'Sergeant, about an hour ago I called regimental headquarters to get artillery fire on Sergy. They have not started and we do not want them to. You find the artillery and tell them not to fire.' The Sergeant started back towards the woods. He must have been successful because we got no artillery fire on the town until it came along in the afternoon from the enemy's guns."

The Chaplain of the 168th, Iowa, the Reverend Roscoe Conklin Hatch, has the following to tell of his experience during the battle:

"After detraining, hiking, riding in camions (will you ever forget those smug Amonites who would not allow even a sick man to ride in front with them?), we got out in a place where the Boche had been a few hours before, somewhere back of Epieds, in the Aisne-Marne sector. The shells fell all around us. The brunt of the bombardment had been at night, but this seemed more ghastly as the early dawn showed the havoc caused to man and beast and equipment.

"After hiking and a sleep, with some burying to do, I went forward to an old farm on the side of a lake. This had become our advanced dressing station. My regiment had four horse-stalls and 'Alabam,' the 167th of beloved memory, which we felt were kith and kin, had the former carriage house. A Boche 'sausage' commanded the road leading to it and the sight of every ambulance, and even a man crossing the road, brought a salvo. There were several bodies to bury, and many incidents, humorous and serious, like all the war, took place.

"Toward evening the stretcher bearers began to come in with their loads, and all through the night, until the large courtyard was full of patiently waiting men. At first I stayed with them until I saw the need of someone directing them to their respective dressing stations, bringing the worst cases to the attention of the

doctors (we had four for the two regiments), and then getting them on the ambulances. The doctors were splendid in their coolness, sympathy and dispatch. I noted especially that big-hearted Captain Henry E. Bunch.

"One of the 'Alabam' stretcher-bearers, Wilcox, whom I have since corresponded with, won my admiration by his indefatigable work in bringing in the litters. He would come up to me saying, Chaplain, we can't leave our buddies out there. Won't you-all get me some more men? They gave the Boche hell for us.' So I would call for the men, 'Stretcher bearers this way!' I caught glimpses of Wilcox all through the night as he would come for my assistance to get more men. About four he came staggering like a drunken man, saying, 'Chaplain, I need—' 'What you need, boy, is sleep!' and I shoved him over six feet down in the mud where he was soon dead to the world. It had rained and this aggravated the condition of the patients, for I had difficulty getting blankets with which to protect them. Though many groaned, I never heard a fellow cry and not one complained."

Colonel William P. Screws commanding the 167th Alabama tells the following:

"The sector given my regiment was the wheat fields directly north of L'Esperance Farm, with my right resting 200 meters west of Sergy, on a land mark which was easily identified by my troops. The left of my line connected with the 165th Infantry, leaving the entire wheat field to my regiment to clear. It was about 3 o'clock P. M. July 27, 1918, while I was at Le Croix Rouge Farm House, straightening my lines, when General Brown, the Brigade Commander, came along. And after talking to me about five or ten minutes, a messenger brought him an order to go to the second objective which was the Ourcq River, and to move his brigade so that all troops of the brigade would be in position by daybreak of July 28th. And right here, let me say, I was a happy man, and so were all the officers and men of the 167th, when it was learned that the rest of the Rainbow Division were coming into the line also.

"On our first morning on the Ourcq our batteries located machine gun nests in the wheat fields. After we got a pretty good line on them the artillery started on the guns we had lo-

cated. Before nightfall of the 29th machine gun nests in the wheat fields in my immediate front had been cleared. All during our fight my regiment suffered most from artillery fire, especially whiz bangs. After repeated conferences with the artillerymen, Lt. Col. Bare at my advance P. C. and my Battalion Commanders, and with the help of a sound ranging device the Corps Artillery had sent up, we were convinced we had determined the area from which the enemy artillery was firing. I then begged to have the heavy artillery do counter battery work on this area. There was plenty of heavy artillery available but I met with no success, until on either, July 31 or August 1, we captured a German prisoner who told me that his regiment and much of the artillery had gotten back about 10 kilometers on their way to some other sector when they got orders to return to the Ourcq front. He also said their artillery had been reinforced since.

"After this prisoner had told me everything, while the Artillery Colonel with me listened, I immediately sent back a copy of the statement he had made urging that every heavy piece of artillery we could possibly spare be brought on this area, this to allow us to go forward and also to save many unnecessary casualties being inflicted on our troops. I followed this up with a special plea to our brigade commander, General Brown, who said he would make a personal trip to Corps Headquarters to see what he could do. I used every means I knew to get heavy artillery to do counter battery work on this area. When they did it we went forward like a shot.

"From my O. P. down on the main highway on the border line between my sector and 165th New York, occasionally, we could see the Germans on our front turn their machine guns to their left flank on the 168th Infantry and to their right flank on the 165th when one or the other of these regiments started forward. There were a number of attack orders issued and countermanded. On two occasions my regiment advanced a considerable distance when we received orders to come back. In coming back we suffered more casualties than in going forward.

"During our stay on the Ourcq River a custom grew up among the Division Staff while making their inspection at night, to make it convenient to get to my P. C. between two and three A. M. at which time we served lunch and coffee. Everything

ran smoothly until I began to miss my cigars. On inquiry I found my good friend Lt. Col. Grayson Murphy, G 3, was very fond of good cigars and had been working on mine. I was liberal with everything but my cigars as they were too hard to get.

"Next night I laid for my friend Murphy and when he came in at the usual food time I told him he was as welcome as the 'flowers in May' to the food but to go easy on the cigars as they were too hard to get. He rose to the occasion like 'an old time Southern gentleman' and said he did not realize the difficulty I encountered in getting good cigars up to the front and therefore he would send me up next day, a box of Coronas, but, alas, no Coronas ever arrived on the Ourcq. The next time I saw my good friend Murphy was up near Exermont and I passed him in a hurry as there were a lot of highbrows from G. H. Q.

"The Armistice was signed and we all came back home to different parts of the old beloved United States. I charged my cigars to profit and loss, but as I always believed in persevering, so I told the story quite frequently. One night at the Chicago Convention about 1:00 o'clock A. M., I was sitting in our headquarters at the Sherman Hotel, with my good friend and comrade, Father Francis P. Duffy, when in walked my friend Murphy accompanied by Major Arnold. They halted in front of me and Murphy said to Major Arnold, who had a package the size of a small trunk, 'Give those d_____ cigars to Bill Screws,' and then said to me, 'Don't ever tell that story again.' I am only telling it now in order to let my comrades know that Murphy made good as usual."

Lieut. Colonel Bare tells the following:

"At 2 P. M., July 27, 1918, orders were received that the Germans had retreated to the high ground beyond the Ourcq River, and that the 167th Infantry should take up the advance and occupy the position on the hill to the west of Sergy. French calvarymen and armored motor cars had reconnoitered the area in our front and we could proceed with comparative safety. We attempted to reach the Ourcq River before dark but on account of considerable artillery fire we were unable to reach our objective and stopped for the night on the high ground before reaching the river. On the morning of July 28th we continued our advance to a line along a sunken road just across the Ourcq

River between Sergy and Fere en Tardenois. About 100 yards south of the River was a spring and near the spring was a small German shelter mostly above ground where I established my advance P. C.

"The Germans knew that our men would be using the spring to get drinking water and constantly harassed us with artillery fire directed at the spring. Many of the shells contained gas, in fact sufficient to cover the entire valley along the Ourcq River and its tributaries. This small German dug-out was the only shelter I could find and being in command of the advance troops it was necessary for me to use the telephone a great deal. Although I wore my gas mask almost constantly I suffered considerable burns and nausea from the effects of the gas.

"On July 29, 1918, we attempted to advance across the wheat field directly in our front on Chateau Nestles and Sergy. We were held up, however, on account of the heavy artillery fire and machine gun fire from the town of Sergy.

"I was called back to regimental headquarters for a conference on the afternoon of July 29, 1918. Major J. W. Carroll came back to take charge of the advance P. C. during my absence. Just a few minutes after I left a high explosive shell burst just outside the entrance to the shelter and severely wounded Major Carroll in the arm and side. We were being fired on almost constantly from Sergy until it was taken by the 168th Infantry. Major Ravee Norris who was with him escaped unhurt.

"During this advance the artillery fire was extremely heavy and in addition to a great many of the men being killed many of us were knocked down several times by the concussion.

"While the men dug in along the sunken road the enemy aeroplanes flew over and with machine gun fire from the planes killed a great many of our men who were lying flat on the ground. One plane would fly low and fire on the troops until he was in danger and another plane, following, would take up where he left off. In fact on this occasion two American aviators flying a French plane came to drive the Germans off. The two German planes got the best of the American aviator and forced him to the ground. They were flying close together and on opposite sides of the circle and, without any warning, they both decided

to ascend at the same time. As they did they had a head-on collision, both planes coming to the ground; one falling on one side and the other on the other of the French plane flown by the American aviators. The occupants of both German planes were dead when I got to them a few minutes afterwards. Both the pilot and the machine gunner in the French plane, while badly shaken up, received only flesh wounds.

"We had great difficulty in getting food supplies to the men in the regiment during this engagement. On several occasions all of the animals pulling the wagons bringing food supplies were killed.

"This was a stubborn engagement all of the way from July 25th until July 30th when the gas fumes got the best of me and I was sent to the hospital late in the afternoon of that day."

Major Dallas Smith was only to see the first day of the real fighting on the Ourcq. Here is his story of how he was wounded:

"The night of the 27th I dropped my troops back in the woods to give them a little cover as we were in an open field. The morning of the 28th I moved up to the Ourcq River and began to dig in. During the afternoon while I was making an inspection of the men I noticed that Captain Mortimer H. Jordan, our Regimental Operation Officer, was approaching across the open. As the Germans had direct observation and fire I signaled Captain Jordan to take cover in a little clump of bushes. As I approached him he asked had we a map showing disposition of the troops. Just at that time a shell burst in our midst. The shock knocked us to the ground. I didn't think I was hurt until I asked Captain Jordan if he were hurt and attempted to get up and found I couldn't. Two of my runners were killed. The men got me into a small shelter where they gave me first aid, and I turned over to Major Ravee Norris."

This same day, July 28, Sidney E. Manning won his Medal of Honor. His citation is:

"When his platoon commander and platoon sergeant had both become casualties, soon after the beginning of an assault on strongly fortified heights overlooking the Ourcq River, Corporal planning took command of his platoon, which was near the center of the attacking line. Though himself severely wounded,

he led forward the 35 men remaining in the platoon and finally succeeded in gaining a foothold on the enemy's position, during which time he had received more wounds and all but seven of his men had fallen. Directing the consolidation of the position, he held off a large body of the enemy only 50 yards away by fire from his automatic rifle. He declined to take cover until the line had been entirely consolidated with the line of the platoon on the flank, when he dragged himself to shelter, suffering from nine wounds in all parts of the body."

The following letters to Captain F. L. Wyatt who commanded Co. F of the Alabama regiment and who was badly wounded July 28 give interesting details.

The following is from a letter to him written on the Rhine by First Lieutenant Warwick Potter who was also wounded:

"After the Hill 212 affair Lieut. Townsend was left in command of the company. Lieut. Campbell who was hit just as we left the woods, has not returned. Several people coming back from hospitals say they have seen him and that he is getting along all right but will probably not be back. Townsend says that Lieut. Curtis was probably killed instantly by a machine gun bullet, though a few days later when they took the hill he found his body badly torn up by a shell. I saw nothing of Lieut. Greet, though I have heard that he was sent back to the states some time ago still unable to walk. I was evacuated through Chateau-Thierry and Coulomniers. When I came out of the operating room in Coulomniers the nurse was leading me into the ward tent by the hand.

"As I rolled into bed, utterly exhausted, someone called out from about two beds down the line, 'Is that you Potter?' It was dark and I called out, 'Who in hell is it?' 'This is Campbell,' he called back; 'look what they took out of me,' and in the dim light I could just make out a piece of shell which they had taken out of his shoulder. I was so sleepy then that I thought I would wait till tomorrow and rolled over and went to sleep. The first thing I knew the next morning I was awakened by the nurse and rolled over into a stretcher. I only had time to say 'Good-bye' before two husky stretcher bearers stacked me into an ambulance and I was whisked off into the train.

"The train was a British hospital train and the first thing that happened when I got on was that a British orderly came up to me and said, 'Will you 'ave a little Scotch, sir?' I was so surprised that I almost missed out. The train landed me in Vichy some twenty-four hours later. Most of the hotels in Vichy, which is a watering place popular with American tourists in peace time had been turned into hospitals. I was only laid up in the hospital, that is in bed, for about three days, then only because they had taken my clothes away from me and would not give me any others. After that I was allowed to go out though I had my arm in a sling. I had a pretty good time while I was in Vichy and met some very nice French people. I returned to the regiment in the end of August going through Blois and that God-forsaken hole of St. Aignan."

The Lieutenant Greet mentioned in Potter's letter and who also was wounded, wrote to his Captain amongst other things:

"Last night was a cool rainy night. Today has been cloudy. Those were the weather conditions in the vicinity of Hill 212. The night you and I spent in the fox hole West dug for us was one of the most uncomfortable that I remember to have spent.

"As bad as the night was, however, the next day was still more uncomfortable—the only bright spot being Bullis and his ration cart about daylight. Do you remember how good the meal was?

"I don't believe there was ever a better infantry company than the one that jumped off that morning from the edge of the woods. I can see them now as they went down the hill under artillery fire. The waves were as well organized as if they were back in Leffonds on the drill field. When Campbell and his platoon sergeant were knocked out by the same shell his platoon hesitated only a fraction of a minute, and then came on in perfect order. After reforming on the other side of the river the company went up the hill in just as good order as they had approached it.

"You saw all of that. But you didn't see the thing that was the supreme test. You had been carried off the field. I had notified Curtis that he was in command. He came to the center and asked me what your plans were. I told him I thought that you intended to push on. He took his position three or four

paces in front of the first wave and gave the signal. What was left of the company followed him in perfect order. I say that it was the supreme test because there had been so many casualties already, and because the fire was getting heavier and heavier.

"I don't believe there was ever a gang that had more 'guts' to the pound than old Company 'F.' I only wish that all of them had come out alive and that we could get together for a reunion once more. I guess, though, we will have to wait until we have all crossed another river."

The following was written Captain Wyatt by Private Harry A. Roberg of the 165th New York when inspired by a St. Patrick's Day celebration after the war:

"St. Patrick's Day, a big day for New York's fighting Irish 69th (better known as 165th Infantry) during the good old days or 'what have you.' A day each year on which the boys get together to parade and revere that good old 'snake charmer.' Naturally at such a gathering 1917-1918 will be discussed and as in many times in the past my mind is refreshed as to he who in my youth formed a mental photograph of a modern chevalier.

"Many times have I approached writing to you hesitating only when it appeared that possibly you were much too busy a man for reminiscence.

"There is only one way in which I might apprise you of my identity and that is: On or about July 28th, 1918, I was attached to your company as liaison with the 165th Infantry or should I say, I was scheduled to attach myself to 167th Regimental Headquarters and upon inquiring directions of you was ordered to stay with your company which was prepared to attack that afternoon? Although I look back with pride on being with you I wonder whether I was justified in obeying your instructions.

"The following morning after crossing the Ourcq River I have maintained a vivid recollection of the gallant way in which you led the boys in face of our 'pals.' I have wondered often whether you remembered the prone figure from whom you took both rifle and bandoliers believing undoubtedly that he had cashed in or was next door to doing so. I was that figure.

"While convalescing in February, 1919, at Base, No. 20 Chatel Guyon, I learned that you had also been there and left. I would so liked to have said hello. Here it is now, 'Hello,' and

I hope this communication finds you enjoying everything that is the finest in life."

Sergeant Tom Whitworth tells the following of Lieut. Greet being wounded:

"After Captain Wyatt was carried off the field, Lieutenant Greet took command of the company. He was an officer that always had a kind word for everyone. He was very cool and deserves much praise for the way he handled the company.

"After we had established our lines, I went back where I had seen him fall with a wound in the leg. He was sitting up, calmly smoking a cigarette. I asked him did he need any help and he said for us to help some of the boys who were hurt worse than he. But we picked him up and carried him to a dressing station. He joked with us all the way down and asked us, 'Wonder what the Kaiser thinks of Alabama?' That was the kind of officers we had in F company and they are the kind the boys like to fight behind."

Corporal Harry Drysdale of E Company tells of his experience as follows:

"About 10 A. M., July 28, as our Company advanced over the Ourcq we were held up on the crest of Hill 212. I was ordered by my Captain, Everett Jackson, to go out with my squad on the left flank of Co. F to protect a machine gun detachment of two guns of the Georgia Machine Gun Battalion which was guarding the left flank of that company. We met a very stubborn fire from the enemy.

"The machine gunners were all killed. George Schwend and myself were the only two left. A very heavy patrol of the enemy was trying to get around our left to cut off Co. E and also to get us caught in an enfilade fire.

"Neither Schwend nor myself knew anything about a machine gun, but we happened to pull the right trigger. I am happy to say we drove back the heavy patrol of the enemy and saved Co. F from being wiped out. About this time a young chap of Co. F lay badly wounded about ten yards from me. As I looked at him he was pleading for a drink of water. I could not stand the pitiful look in his eyes. I did not have a canteen of water with me, but I noted that just beyond me lay a dead American soldier with his canteen on his side. I told Schwend

that I was going to get that canteen for the dying boy. He told me I was crazy, that a sniper would surely get me, but I did not stop. I got the canteen from the dead soldier, and luckily it was filled with water.

"I came back to this chap, and as I held up his head and gave him a drink he clasped my hand and said, 'Corporal, you're a regular guy.' He died a few minutes later, but with a dying buddy looking up and saying 'You're a regular guy,' I felt at that time that it was worth getting shot for.

"Just a few minutes later I was shot through the right leg. The bones were shattered, so I was helpless to move. George Schwend, seeing this, carried me about a half mile in his arms under heavy fire. We had at least three or four narrow escapes from shells and machine guns, but my buddy George Schwend would not leave me, though I begged him to go on and that I might be able to crawl to our line. He carried me to safety with no thought to his personal safety and am happy to say, we both returned to Alabama, and the incident will live forever in memory."

Here is the experience of Private E. Hood Wilkenson,* the youngest soldier in the Alabama regiment.

He says:

"At the battle of the Ourcq July 28, 1918, I was buried alive by a large shell exploding and tearing away the bank of a new road just as I ran up to it in the advance. I was dug out by some of our Engineers who were advancing in close contact with the Infantry."

Sergeant Sidney R. Blasingame of E Company tells the following amusing incident:

"My Platoon Commander, Lt. Markham, the night we arrived on the Ourcq River, told me to take five men and go straight towards the woods, pointing north through the wheat fields and reconnoiter, at least to edge of woods. After advancing near the edge of the woods we heard some fuss of movement and moved cautiously towards same and found about 15 men scattered round in shell holes, all of them asleep. We thought, of course, they were Germans. We were told to go after them and as we got near enough to one, I touched him and

---

* October 16, in front of the Cote-de-Chatillon, was shot in eleven places in two hours. Was in hospital fourteen months.

was surprised when he spoke English and also when they told us they belonged to the 26th Division and were lost. About that time all of them were up and scared, and I told them we had relieved their division two days ago at LaCroix Rouge Farm and they better get on back, and they lost no time in going straight back."

As the First Battalion of the 47th Infantry which was assigned to the Alabama regiment moved out, the then Major Grayson M. P. Murphy, on one of his missions to the Infantry from Division Headquarters, was near by just east of the Foret de Fere, out of which the Battalion was deploying to the attack. He says: "As an old regular infantryman, it did my heart good to see wave after wave come out of the woods and move steadily forward regardless of the losses they suffered from the enemy shell fire.

"The sun reflected from their bayonets, added to the stirring qualities of the sight, though at the time I remember thinking 'Why fix the bayonet when still so far from the enemy's infantry ?' After all, for open warfare, our former practice of never fixing the bayonet until just before the actual assault was one more of the practices which the needs of trench warfare had caused us to forget the value of.

"Yet it was a gallant and stirring sight!"

Here is the story of the then Colonel Frank R. McCoy, who commanded the 165th New York Infantry. Beginning with his receipt of the order for his regiment to relieve the 167th French Infantry Division, he says:

"I returned to my P. C. at Epieds and superintended the relief, which had hardly been finished, when some French soldiers rushed by and shouted that the Germans were retreating. I verified this and telephoned to the chief of staff who told me I was the senior officer in the Division, all general officers having gone to an Army conference. He was informed that the pursuit would be pressed with everything I could find at the front. Cavalry and armored cars were asked for to keep in touch with the Germans. All three battalions were ordered to move forward, two on the right and one on the left, and the 166th Infantry (Ohio) was advanced on our left.

"The dead dog Frenchmen after weeks in the front lines,

showed their best fighting spirit by turning around and joining in the pursuit. The French cavalry detachments and armored cars came up quietly to my surprise and were ordered to get in touch with the Germans and follow to the crossings of the Ourcq. One French field artillery battalion, on its way to the rear, reported to me and asked to be given targets. By all units in the vicinity, the pursuit was taken up with the greatest spirit and at nightfall the 1st and 3rd Battalions had reached the Ourcq where they found themselves checked from Sergy to Fere-en-Tardenois.

"After receiving reports from the French Cavalry detachments, I returned to Beuvardes and reported to General Lenihan, Brigade Commander, who sent my report to the Division and returned with me to the Chateau de la Forêt, where he remained during the evening while I brought up my rear echelons and got in touch with the scattered battalions and attached French troops, which were bivouacking on the hills above the Ourcq. The 1st Battalion, Donovan, was on the right; the 3rd Battalion. McKenna, in the Village of Villers-sur-Fère; and the 2nd Battalion, Anderson, between Villers-sur-Fère and Fère-en-Tardenois.

"About midnight, Colonel Blanton Winship, from the Headquarters of the I Corps, arrived with orders for a general Army attack across the Ourcq before daylight. There were specific orders to brigade commanders to attack during the night, regardless as to whether or not other troops were in support, and to seize the heights to the north of the Ourcq from Seringes-et-Nesles to the Tour-de-Nesle. As the 165th seemed to be the only regiment in hand, General Lenihan gave me orders to lead this attack with my regiment. I called attention to the fact that there were no troops on my right or left, but was told I must carry out my orders in view of the determination of the higher command to keep the Germans moving and thus prevent them from digging in on the heights above the river.

"I asked for artillery support, and that the 166th Infantry be directed to move up and support me closely on the left. I had seen Colonel Screws of the 167th Infantry (Alabama) in the woods to the east of us during the evening and the brigade commander informed me that he would endeavor to have that regiment support me on the right. Both the brigade commander

and Colonel Winship impressed upon me the importance of getting under way as quickly as possible. Since the 3rd Battalion was nearest the enemy and nearest to me I decided to attack with it, closely supported by the 2nd Battalion, leaving the 1st Battalion in reserve. I also ordered the supply units, medical detachment and Headquarters Company to the Chateau; later, however, the hospital and Headquarters Company were established in Villers-sur-Fère. Two artillery reconnaissance officers, who happened to be there, volunteered to carry orders to the 1st and 2nd Battalions while I, accompanied by Colonel Winship who was keener to get into the fight than return to Corps Headquarters, made our way to join the 3rd Battalion, which almost to a man was sound asleep in the Village of Villers-sur-Fère.

"After waking up Major McKenna, his captains and an attached French major, I gathered such information as they had been able to find during the evening, with particular reference to the Ourcq and its crossings. The French major assured me it was a considerable obstacle and not fordable. Captain Hurley, however, had made a reconnaissance of the river in the immediate front of the village the night before and he assured me that it could be crossed between the bridges. The pessimism of my French major was such that I was inclined to consider his knowledge of the conditions, and to agree with him, an opinion corroborated by the reports of the French cavalry that the crossings were strongly held, and that under the conditions it was only a forlorn hope without proper preparation and artillery support. I questioned Colonel Winship once more and he insisted that the French commander, General Degoutte, was determined to keep the Germans moving and that, if necessary, I must sacrifice my command in the effort.

"After going over the map with Major McKenna and the French battalion commander, dispositions were agreed upon and the latter arranged support, the Stokes mortars were to be brought into action at the bridge crossings as a signal for the attack. A wood road, generally following the foot of the hill on the other side of the river, was designated for assembly after the attack. The captains, in spite of being awakened and pushed into an affray in the middle of the night, gave me pride

in race, because of their fine spirit and quick arrangements. The attack was executed with such quickness and spirit that the Germans were entirely surprised, the crossings forced, and their machine gun company and defensive detachments captured with only a few casualties on our side.

"Feeling that it was the lull before the storm, I established my P. C. in the orchard, at the north edge of the village, where the Headquarters Company joined. Lawrence and his hospital were established in the cellars under nearby massive buildings; Captain Kenneth Sibert's machine gun company was brought up and put into position to cover the 3rd Battalion; and personal liaison was established with the support and reserve battalions.

"Colonel Winship acted in the meantime as a volunteer to report fully to the brigade commander and press for support on our right and left and for the much desired artillery. Of course, this was given us soon as it got up, about mid-day, and helped us repulse a counter-attack that afternoon.

"I shall not go into the details of the next four days and nights of terrific battle, which tried out the Regiment from colonel to private, but I shall say that the Regiment put up one of the great fights of the war against a Prussian Guard Division. Though in a salient on the north bank of the river, sometimes nearly surrounded, it gradually pushed forward to the Bois de Cola where Donovan, with his great 1st Battalion, holding on by its teeth, bore the brunt of battle. Gradually, by the use of cover, he pushed forward until at the end of four days' fierce fighting his lines were extended along the north edge of the Bois Brulé. In close support were Anderson's battalion and what was left of the 3rd Battalion, whose commander, Major McKenna, was killed, whose three front line captains were wounded, but whose survivors under Captain Martin Meaney went through to the bitter end. The losses of this one regiment in the battle of the Ourcq were about the same as the whole American Army's losses in the Santiago Campaign—222 killed and 1700 plus wounded. I should not state these losses with pride, were it not for the fact that the Regiment was made the spear-head of the entire army and pushed forward by a most explicit order as a forlorn hope, against a whole German division. Despite its great performance for four days and nights on the battlefield, the Regiment took

up the pursuit and followed the enemy toward the Vesle until it was relieved by Bolles' regiment of the 4th Regular Division, though a Division staff officer (Judah), at the time, had reported that the 165th Infantry was still able to continue the pursuit.

"On being withdrawn from the pursuit the Regiment was ordered to the woods between the Ferme de l'Esperance and the Croix Rouge Farm, where it stayed in bivouc for some days. Needless to say, it was a sad Regiment which realized the loss of friends, brothers and comrades, who were necessarily buried by their own comrades on the battlefield. Father Duffy, as always, stood us in good stead, encouraged the brave, and helped me to cheer and restir the Regiment for its next campaign. On the day the Regiment marched to the rear, Father Duffy set up his altar on a wagon and preached a fiery and stirring sermon to the whole Regiment, which was formed in a square around him.

"Several days later the Regiment marched into Chateau Thierry with colors flying and the band playing the 'Wearin' of the Green'. The Army Commander, General Degoutte, with his staff, reviewed the Regiment in the ancient square in front of Army Headquarters, and highly complimented it, not only on its splendid performance in battle, but on its fine appearance so soon thereafter.

"The battle on the Ourcq was full of incident and will always be the proudest remembrance of every man in the 165th Infantry who took part in it.

"In looking back over more than forty years of service in all parts of the world and in many different commands, in both our own and foreign armies, I can find no regiment quite like it. There are no soldiers more loyal and devoted and heart-warming in remembrance. There are no officers that stand out more vividly as happy warriors than those I served with in that Regiment; men like Donovan, the bravest of the brave—McKenna, Anderson, Merle-Smith, Hurley, Martin Meaney, Basil Elmer, Baker, Spencer, George McAdie, young Ollie Ames, Captain Mickey Walsh, Captain Henry Bootz, Wheeler, Kane, Joyce Kilmer and the shepard of them all, Father Duffy.

Here is the account of the assault of Major McKenna's Third Battalion. McKenna was killed July 28th, as experienced

by a company commander. It is the story of Captain Van S. Merle-Smith, who commanded "L" Company of the 165th New York.

He says: "Here are my impressions:—July 28, 1918, 12:30 A. M., dark as pitch, the Company after an all-day ride in camions was dumped out on a dark road somewhere in France. A general idea that we were somewhere north of Epied, the road littered with debris—a German machine gun and its dead defenders. Guns are going off intermittently around us. The trucks leave reporting they cannot carry us further. The road is blocked up and anyway the enemy is reported to be just ahead. Lost with nowhere to go—so we formed and plodded toward the north as in the general direction of the enemy. Detachments of the 26th Division warned us we were near the front lines. At last to the relief of the Commanding Officer—a regimental messenger found us and we were directed to a nearby wood for bivouac. We threw ourselves down. About thirty minutes of sleep and a battery of long 155's went off over our heads. We had bivouacked almost under their camouflaged muzzles. I hope they scared the Germans as much as they scared us. Thereafter sleep was impossible. The guns bounced us off the ground about every thirty seconds.

"Morning am ordered to report personally to regimental headquarters. We were to attack, Company 'L' the spearhead. A reconnaissance of the sector was suggested. Three of us, two being unenthusiastic sergeants, proceeded on our march. Tales from the advanced detachments of the 26th Division in the front line did not add to the prospects but Division Headquarters wanted to know whether, by any chance, the Germans had already retired.

"The three of us crawled about half way across an open field in a drainage ditch toward the reported German position. Being awkward crawlers, trouble came soon. A flock of shells not very dangerous until a couple of soft plops then gas in the ditch. Too late on gas masks, serious fire in the lungs and vomiting every ten feet on our way back. The two sergeants to the hospital but rapid and continuous nausea cured me by evening. The episode was taken to mean the Germans had retired and it seemed a reasonable conclusion because no rifles or machine guns fired on us when we left the gassed ditch for the open field.

"We pushed off in the early morning on the road west of

the Foret de Fere behind a screen of company patrols and a glittering squadron of French cavalry. Except for a few sniping shots from departing German rear-guard patrols we met no resistance so pushed on through a triangular wood in our front northwest of the Foret de Fere. No touch now with units either on our right or left. Evening came as we sent patrols around and through Villiers sur Fere. Then a march through the dark village. Even in the dark it presented a picture of indescribable confusion—telephone wires all over the streets, litter of all kinds everywhere. Apparently the evacuation had been rapid and carried out under shell fire. There was some German shelling but not much and so to the north end of the village where the Third Battalion, which now closed up, was disposed, 'K' Company on the south bank of the River Ourcq, exchanging shots in the dark across the stream. 'L' Company on the right, 'I' and 'M' in and about the village. Still no touch with any other units, either with the French supposed to be on our left or the First Battalion supposed to be on our right. Later a lost platoon detached from the First Battalion to keep in touch with us, reported. Our combat patrol to our front gets in touch with the enemy on the stream, much ineffective rifle fire. Another patrol to our right flank blunders into a German rear-guard unit in the dark, results negative.

"Still dark, word came that the Colonel had come up to Villers-Sur-Fere. A mile back to the village to report and told that an order had come for the whole line to attack at dark, our battalion alone in place, artillery on the move to new positions so could not support us but Corps Staff Officers, one of them later to be Secretary of State* says 'Orders are orders' and the battalion must go. Angry blessings from the Colonel and instructions to do the best we can. We collect some trench mortars and, amid dramatic flashes lighting up the countryside, bombs are sent bursting in the woods across the stream to our front. They are somehow encouraging.

"Dawn is approaching so after a spurt to the Company 'L' position comes a scurry to collect the platoons distributed in German shelters. The plan is for 'I' and 'L' to leapfrog 'K', cross the stream and attack and seize the heights on the other side, 'M' to be in reserve and the First Battalion platoon to protect our right flank. Dawn breaks. 'K' is too eager and goes ahead on 'I''s

---

* Colonel Stimpson.

left, pushing 'L' into the sector designated for the other brigade. The fourth platoon has not yet reported but as the firing starts, in the early light, we come down across the fields to the River Ourcq under scattering enemy fire. We come down just where the little stream has broadened out into a still water about 30 feet wide. It looks deep. The line hesitates; a couple of men drop. Awful thought—the Captain must lead and I never liked a cold bath in the morning; however, I jumped from the bank expecting to swim but my feet touched a muddy bottom and the water wasn't too cold. All the line in the water now. Up the other bank and through the bordering woods. A small German detachment overrun, two more Germans shot out of a tree and now on the side of the hill in front appears open wheat fields. One hundred yards ahead five machine guns in fox holes on the hillside; bravery must be granted to the German defenders, firing until our men were sometimes within 20 feet, then 'Kamerad', expecting no quarter and getting very little. Three Germans zigzagging race back over the open hillside at least 200 yards in the clear. They are fired at by at least ten excited men—no hits. Annoyed I seized a rifle and took a shot at the last one going over the top of the hill—a clean miss also. Quick decision that I wasn't much of a game shot after all. On up the hill now quite heavy enfilade machine gun fire from right and left both front and rear. No target to be seen, men now dropping fast but the line too excited to notice. An artillery barrage comes down. It seems wise to hurry the men up through and inside the German barrage. I get shot in the arm giving the double time signal which causes some amusement among the men near as they had suffered from that signal in the training area.

"Now we reach the top of the hill, our general objective, 'I' Company on our left. It is smoothly rounded, has no cover and ahead lies 1,500 to 2,000 yards of flat, open fields gently sloping down to the Foret de Nesle. On our right the ridge runs for a mile toward Sergy out of sight in a hollow. Target the edge of the Foret de Nesle but nothing to be seen. A couple of German heads over the horizon on the ridge towards Sergy. They are fired at and disappear. Way out on our left front behind Seringes two German machine guns the only ones visible are seen. Through the glasses one can make out two ammunition carriers continually carrying ammunition to the guns. What is left of

one platoon concentrates fire on them at 1,600 yards but to no apparent effect though we later found two dead Germans among a heap of empty cartridges. The damaging fire was coming from our left and right, the source completely invisible but yet a sheaf of bullets through the young wheat. A man crouches to run forward. He is shot through the legs, drops to hands and knees, is hit in the legs and arm; down flat and is again hit in the head. A bullet cuts my coat on the back of my shoulder but barely scratches. The men of my headquarters group are all hit but one, a terrible feeling of helplessness because there seems no one to fight against and it is the officers' responsibility to pick the targets and reduce the enemy fire by your own. 180 degrees of emptiness. We fired on every possible bit of cover but it seemed pretty futile there were so many. Fire is coming from our left rear the supposed French sector but they have not come up. The order is given to dig in but so many are hit rolling on their sides to use a spade that it is countermanded. Messages go back asking artillery fire on the hollows and woods north of Meurcy farm, the edge of the Bois de Nesle and other cover but we learn the artillery is not yet in position. There seems nothing to be done but stick it until troops on the right and left come up. German planes come over and then their artillery shell our position. This helps as shell holes make cover for those still able to use it, a couple of gas shells among the others and reaching for my gas mask, a French type, I find it has been drilled twice without touching me.

" 'I' Company on the left is getting it as badly as we are. I hear Captain Ryan has been hit twice but can see him shouting encouragement to his men. A machine gun is mounted and commences fire on the Germans guns behind Seringes. Five men are killed around it and the gun is deserted. We try to operate it but the gun is hit and disabled. It is abandoned for good. Its operation seemed pretty futile in any event.

"The men are very steady but there are only a pitifully few left. The first and second platoons have gotten the worst of it, the third on the right of the line has somewhat more cover, from the enfilade fire, in a little depression on the ridge. A message comes from the rear that we are way over in the 167th sector and will be relieved by their units which are now behind us. Also that the First Battalion has come up behind 'I' Company on the reverse slope of the hill.

"The fire slackens and Lieutenant William Spencer comes over very coolly and binds up my arm. We discuss how best to extricate and reorganize the Company when the 167th takes over and decide to move the men remaining of the first and second platoon, to a hollow behind the third platoon with the wounded they can carry. The thought of making a movement in force to our right flank toward Sergy along the ridge is abandoned because it would take us too deep into the 167th sector. I told him to do what he could with combat patrols in that direction as a protection to our flank. He then returned to his platoon and carried out these orders.

"When the time came to move back, I gave an arm signal to this effect to Lieutenant Spencer directing the withdrawal of his platoon about 30 yards to the same spot. I stayed with one or two men to ascertain whether all the wounded men had been moved, so saw Lieutenant Spencer turn his platoon over to Sergeant Malinka and go under heavy fire to collect his patrols and apparently to ascertain for the units of the 167th Infantry advancing behind us further information regarding the position of enemy guns on our flank. This action on the part of Lieutenant Spencer was taken under very heavy fire and was clearly beyond the normal course of duty. I was informed that in executing this mission on his own initiative, which was of considerable value to the advancing units of the 167th Infantry, he was wounded and taken to the rear."

Anderson's battalion on being unloaded July 27 from motor trucks went into the woods south of Epieds. The next day, July 28th, they marched through Beauvardes up to the woods between Villemoyenne and the Chateau de la Foret. Here they were in reserve. The order having been given to advance, Anderson deployed the battalion along the edge of the woods bounded by the national highway from the Chateau de la Foret up to the Bois Montaigu. He then advanced out into the open down the slopes in front of him and to the rear of the crest of the ridge just to the west of Villers-sur-Fere.

In this position he ran into various groups of French infantry who upon seeing our troops pulled off to the left to the west of the road running from Bois Montaigu to Fere-en-Tardenois.

Halting his battalion here as he was in reserve he went over to see McKenna, whose battalion had passed through Villers-sur-Fere and approached the Ourcq river. Anderson had expected McKenna's battalion to arrive there several hours before nightfall. However, McKenna had only gotten there after sunset. On being asked by Anderson if he was going to cross the Ourcq that night McKenna said the French had told him the river was unfordable so he was going to wait until morning when he could see what he was doing. Anderson replied, "Well, in that case, I will move my battalion back into the woods from which me lane just advanced." Returning to his battalion Anderson moved them back into the woods where they spent the night.

About four-thirty a. m. July 29th Lt. Colonel Mitchell arrived with the famous order to attack at four-forty-five a. m. with the bayonet alone. The order was received before daylight as Anderson had to light a candle under a blanket in order to read it.

Anderson immediately waked up his battalion, again deployed them along the road at the edge of the woods and again advanced over the same ground as that he had covered the day before. This time instead of stopping he kept on going towards the Ourcq. About six o'clock in the morning as he approached that river a messenger came from Colonel McCoy telling him to halt. The Battalion was then receiving machine gun as well as artillery fire from the enemy across the Ourcq. So Anderson told the messenger, "Hell, I can't stop now."

After his two leading companies had crossed the Ourcq suffering quite a little from the enemy's fire, he got another message to halt.

As he considered this no place to stop he told the messenger to tell the Colonel he was coming over himself to explain the situation. He immediately hurried over to the Colonel's post of command in Villers-sur-Fere which was being very heavily and continuously shelled. On reaching the P. C., Colonel Anderson explained the situation and said that the only thing to do was to go ahead. McCoy then told him "All right, use your own judgment." Anderson then returned to his battalion which had gotten across the Ourcq and was advancing toward the summit of Hill 156. Near its crest there is a very precipitous rise of four or

five feet. The leading elements of the battalion because of the severity of the enemy's fire had come to a halt at this rise.

Anderson said, "What the hell's the matter here ? Come on." He ordered Baker to take "E" Company to the attack to the northeast in the direction of the spur of Hill 156 which was then between Anderson's battalion and the Bois Colas. This because due to the fire from this ridge "E" had already drifted in this direction. Thus once more was illustrated the well-known military fact that men unconsciously face in the direction from which most of the enemy's fire is coming. As a matter of fact there was a gap here in the line because "F" Company had already faced even more to the northeast because of the fire coming from Meurcy Farm.

The ridge was gained but the advance was stopped upon reaching it. The battalion was not only getting fire from the front, that is from the machine guns between 156 and Seringes et Nesles but also from the Germans in front of the Foret de Nesles. From their left flank they were getting machine gun fire from around La Fontaine sons Pierre.

From their right flank they were getting fire from the Bois Colas and Meurcy Farm.

At four-thirty that morning Major Geran's First Battalion of the 166th Infantry which had been in support of Anderson swung to the left, crossed the Ourcq and driving the Germans from their front relieved the situation on Anderson's left flank.

The then Major William T. Donovan who commanded the First Battalion of the 165th New York got it across the Ourcq River late the afternoon of July 28th.

He gives the following account of. his experiences beginning with July 29th. He says:

"The next morning (July 29th) we were ordered to connect up with the Ohio Regiment on our left and advance to a new objective. The machine gunners had climbed in so close to us in the night that it was very difficult to move. I went back to the P. C. of the 167th myself to get some artillery assistance. I thought I should never get back as I had to go up a little draw that was just singing with machine gun fire and heavy artillery.

I had a liaison man from the 167th outfit and I shall never forget him. He knew the best course, the shortest routes and the quickest crossing across the river. He was calm and self-contained and cheerful. I would like to see him again. To get to our position we had to move up the flank and had to face a machine gun nest, with two machine guns in the nest and they put forth a burst of fire as each man crossed the open space. Before we got going, the first ten men crossing dropped, shot, and yet the next, without a flutter, went over. There were some fine examples of daring and courage.

"Finally we got back where the stream took a bend, and we were able to get under cover of a bank. I had found that most of our troops in advancing had taken the formation of the books. They had forgotten that these formations were made to advance with protection of artillery fire. I insisted that Company Commanders send their men forward as we used to do in the olden days, which is, one, two or three at a time, moving fast, and when they have advanced a few yards to flop. This gives the machine gunners a small target to fire at, and the smaller the target and the less time we could present it, the better we would be. Then, covering this advance, I had our own machine gunners open in the general direction of where I heard the Boche machine gun fire and then put with each machine gun, snipers to pick off the Boche personnel. With that system working, we went up the valley. It was more difficult on the hill slopes because there we had to charge machine gun nests with resultant losses. One sergeant took a platoon against a machine gun nest. He had 20 men when he started and when he reached the gun, he had four. But he took the gun and the seven men who were serving it. We took very few prisoners. The men, when they saw the Germans serving machine guns against us, firing until the last minute, then throwing up their hands and crying 'Kamerad,' became just lustful for German blood. I do not blame them. Several officers and men were wounded and killed, and when I heard that Captain Bootz who was just ahead of me was wounded, I ran forward to see that the line was steadied because he had only young second Lieutenants in charge. I met him as be was being carried out and I lay down by the side of a stream to talk with him.

"Ames came running up behind me to look out for me. I ordered him back, but he just smiled and said he was going to stay with me. He came up and lay beside me. A sniper began to play on us, and machine gun bullets whizzed over our heads.

I half turned and as I did, a sniper's bullet crossed my shoulder and struck Ames in the ear. He died instantly. I reached for him, and as I did, another bullet struck me in the hand. I rolled into the creek, worked my way up to a group of men, and with that fire playing over us, stayed there for three-quarters of an hour with mud and water above our waists. An aeroplane came over us, saw these troops advancing up the creek, gave its signal to its artillery and soon shells began to drop all around us and in the creek itself. I got the men out and into a wood Bois Colas which was in the very center of the position, and had them entrench in the hillside and on the farm, and dug in for the night. We had advanced some distance. We had done it with rifles, machine guns and bayonets and against artillery and machine guns—one machine gun to every four men.

"All that night we held on and all the next day, with no food, the machine guns which the Germans had placed sweeping us constantly. The next day just on a poker hunch I started a little attack myself against a trench the Germans had, and as luck would have it, found that they had a group of 25 men just ready to rush our machine gun position. Out of the 25 I was able to save only two prisoners. We had a hard time that afternoon. I had left my place to lead a skirmish line. By the way, I had been previously hit on the chest with a piece of stone or shell which ripped my gas mask and another piece of shell had hit me on the left heel tearing my shoe and throwing me off my balance, while somehow I got some shrapnel in my leg. I guess I have been born to be hanged. All my headquarters officers had been killed or wounded, except Weller. I had Joyce Kilmer, who was a Sergeant and a poet, acting as my Sergeant Major, my own Sergeant Major having been wounded. Kilmer got a bullet in his head; we have buried him beside Ames. Kayes would not stay back; he followed me all over, and of course, with his great height was a shining mark. He was finally hit four times. I bound him up and he was taken away making everyone he saw promise to look out for his Major. His being hit was not with-

out its humor. He is so tall and ungainly. He started to fall to the ground when I called to him under a heavy fire, and as his foot hit the ground he got one bullet in the foot, as his right knee hit the ground he got another through the right thigh and as his hand hit the ground he got one through his wrist and as his face hit the ground he got one through his cheek. None of them is serious and I think he will be back to me. He was a wonder. It just makes me shiver when I think of the devotion and loyalty of these men and young officers immediately about me who have given freely to me in spite of my strictness and sometimes irritability with them. We finally straightened out that night, and got some food to the men although the Germans were lashing the roads and the trees and the woods with shrapnel and high explosive. The next day the whole division was ordered to attack except our Battalion, which was to remain in place because in a salient. I saw an opportunity and sent a platoon of men into the woods which was three-quarters of a kilometer ahead of us (Bois Brule). I had worked into a position a little to the right rear of the Germans. We were in a very narrow and a very dangerous salient, but we had observation on them. I got on the edge of this wooded knoll with an extension telephone and a map. I had six machine guns, a Stokes-mortar and a 37 millimetre. From there I furnished information not only to our own regiment, but to those on the left and right. I would use the Stokes and the 37 Mm. to strike some of the shell holes where the Germans were hidden, and then as they would start to get away we would shoot them up with the machine gun. I divided a platoon into groups of five and made the non-coms take it down the field as a little team. I numbered all the men and had his chief call the number and the distance to go. By that process we took the woods.

"All this time, however, we were not without our discomfort. They would pour fire into the edge of that wood that would make us hug the ground. A few youngsters near me were potted, but on the whole we had a pretty successful night. The next day there was a constant heavy bombardment, as if they were going to make a counter-attack. All day long aeroplanes hovered over us, swooping down close to us and firing on us, and at night dropping aerial bombs, the shelling more and more getting on every-

one's nerves. It is surprising, however, how many shells it takes to get a man, and how much ammunition must be expended before a casualty list begins to mount.

"I had no more than 1 ½ or 2 hours sleep all the night. I had no one in command of the companies only 2d lieutenants and it was a real test to keep these youngsters, who were game, but nervous, up to their jobs and make everyone feel that no matter how bad everything looked, we were going to hold on. Then the word came that our 3rd Battalion would relieve us.

This relief was effected about 2:30 in the morning. At 3:00 o'clock I lay on the ground and slept a very refreshing sleep until 6:00 o'clock when the Lieutenant-Colonel awakened me and announced that the Germans had pulled out, and that he was sending forward patrols from the 3d Battalion. I hiked back to the town where my Battalion had been sent and awakened them, and then we started out again. We went over the field on which we had fought and while we found our own dead, we found five Germans for every one of us. There were many pictures that I will never forget. One figure should be done in bronze as typifying the spirit of these men here. He was a big husky middle westerner in full pack. He had evidently just started to make a rush. His left knee was on the ground and his left hand on the ground in front of him. He had been struck by a piece of shell, and his figure remained fixed in that crouching alert position facing the enemy. As we went over to the position the Germans had abandoned and looked about over the valley through which we had come, we wondered how we had done it.

"To those people who are inclined to write a general indictment of German-Americans, I would like to point out a little knoll where a certain machine gun platoon from a state in the middle west, was wiped out. And when you look at the identification tags of the men who lay dead about their guns all facing the front, you see nothing but names as German as those of the enemy who lay across from them. And here you can see one box of machine gun ammunition that it cost five men's lives to advance 20 yards, as one dropped it, the other without hesitation rushing forward and picking it up.

"And the drafted men; the morning we took camions for the front we received about 200 of them. Now, when you go

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps

German prisoners captured by the 167th Alabama on the Ourcq under guard of a Rainbow Virginia M. P. waiting to be questioned at Epieds, July 27, 1918.

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps

165th New York moving forward for first entry into line in the Ourcq Battle.

over the field burying your dead, you will find one with a long Polish name, or another with a number—1280306, and that is all you know.

"We went back into the woods which we ourselves took over a week ago, awaiting someone else to relieve us from this support position. As we came in the night of our last relief, the wagon train made for the grounds of the Chateau. It was dark, wet and disagreeable. A Major General named Cameron, and who is a father of one of Dave Dunbar's Lieutenants, who had just arrived and taken possession, ordered the train away. An Irishman named Gilhooley who did not know that this man was a General who was talking and perhaps would not have cared if he did know said, 'This is a hell of a note, we go and capture this place, and you guys come and live in it.' The General rated him roundly and said there were too damn many flies around there now without bringing a lot of animals in the yard, and Gilhooley answered, 'Flies is it? If it is flies you want, go up on the hillside and you will see thousands of them feasting on the blood of our men.' The General said nothing more. The train stayed in the Chateau yard that night."

Captain Reilley who commanded "B" Company of Donovan's (first) Battalion gives the following vivid description. He says:

"The night of the 27th of July, we relieved the French to the west of Beuvardes. The next morning there was a very heavy fire from the enemy's artillery. Under its cover the Germans withdrew through the Foret de Fere.

"We advanced to this very thick wood and entered it. We finally emerged at a position on its outskirts. My position was to the right of the main highway from Jaulgonne on the Marne to Fere en Tardenois. Some elements of the 167th had crossed to our left or rather we had turned towards the right. Thus they were nearer the road than we were. This caused some slight confusion. The next day Donovan ordering the advance, we went down the hill towards the Ourcq. We advanced through the open in squad columns under artillery fire. It was a beautiful sunny day. As there was a large amount of open country in front of us we could see everything happening in it. Is was the first time that the outfit had ever advanced against artillery fire

in the open. Everything previously had been trench warfare. "B" Company was the right front company. The shrapnel commenced to break overhead. The biggest kick I got out of the war was the fact that despite men being hit you would have thought these fellows were practicing on the hills around Percey the winter before when we rehearsed such advances again and again. Sergeants and corporals would order men to close up, keep moving. Except for the bursting shells and the men falling it seemed like a regular drill. At the foot of this slope there were little patches of woods. The Ourcq river was behind them."

Sergeant Richard W. O'Neill of "D" Company won a Medal of Honor July 30th. The citation is:

"In advance of an assaulting line, he attacked a detachment of about 25 of the enemy. In the ensuing hand-to-hand encounter he sustained pistol wounds, but heroically continued in the advance, during which he received additional wounds; but, with great physical effort, he remained in active command of his detachment. Being again wounded he was forced by weakness and loss of blood to be evacuated, but insisted upon being taken first to the battalion commander in order to transmit to him valuable information relative to enemy positions and the disposition of our men."

The capture of Meurcy Farm by the 165th New York, as was true of the seizure of Sergy by the 168th Iowa and the lower part of Seringes-et-Nesles by the 166th Ohio has given rise to considerable discussion.

This for the reason that the Rainbow Infantry to some extent in the Lorraine trench sectors but above all in the Champagne Battle had learned that any isolated group of buildings such as a farm or any small town or village inevitably was a splendid target for an enemy artillery concentration. They knew that the open fields around such a place, not being definitely located on a map were much harder targets for artillery and therefore the place to be.

Therefore just as the 167th Alabama having captured Croix Rouge Farm and driven the Germans from its immediate vicinity withdrew the victors from it and left it unoccupied so did the three sister infantry regiments with buildings occupied by the enemy along the Ourcq River.

Meurcy Farm was captured by the 165th New York almost immediately, recaptured by the Germans and then captured again by the New Yorkers. Its permanent possession was secured this time but it was not occupied.

The then Captain Merle Smith says: "The attack on Meurcy Farm was made by the Fourth Platoon of my company which was late in joining the attack and was shifted over by Major McKenna to the left flank of our Third Battalion line and a platoon of Co. K. Sergeant Arthur F. McKenney of my platoon played a prominent part in the capture of the Farm. His group made a very spirited attack on Meurcy Farm and captured it. Later the Germans made a counter-attack. Sergeant McKenney was wounded twice and lost a great many of the group under his command. In the end the Germans overwhelmed the Farm and held it for a while. Later other units of the regiment again drove the Germans out. In the meantime, however, the Germans had taken Sergeant McKenney and a few wounded men he had left, prisoners.

"He was in very bad shape from his wounds and remembered little of the first days. He remained in hospitals in Germany until sent out to Switzerland shortly before the end of the war. He was there taken in charge by the Red Cross and sent back to the United States. He lingered for a while in various hospitals in this country and died from his wounds in September, 1919, in the General Hospital at Rahway, New Jersey. He was operated on at the Rahway Hospital shortly before his death and died from the effects of the operation."

Corporal John J. Casey of K Company says: "The capture of the Meurcy Farm was the outstanding feat in this advance. It was a German strong point. We advanced against it, although we were outnumbered and that we knew that not many of us would return to tell of the deeds performed by those who we left behind us there. We captured the place, but at what a loss. We lost the cream of the company. Lieutenants Dowling, Arnold and Stott, Sergeants Crotty, Embrey, Ross, McAvoy and Downing and several privates paid with their lives for the capture of this place. The writer received a bullet through the right knee and crawled into a shell hole which had already been occupied by a wounded German. Deeds of valor were performed in the capture of this

farm of which nobody knows anything about because few of those engaged in it returned.

"Another case which needs mention is the case of Corporal Leddy. He had received three bullets in the right arm and could not be persuaded to return to the rear. He kept advancing with his men, directing them and instilling new spirit in them until an explosive bullet hit him in the other hand, blowing away part of same and forcing him to return to rear."

The then Major Donovan whose First Battalion relieved the Third and whose men recaptured the Farm July 31st, says: "My headquarters were on a little knoll west of the Farm known as Bois Colas. Bois Colas was directly opposite the sand-pit where the group of Germans which attacked out machine gun were hiding. I kept everyone out of the Farm building itself for fear of it being destroyed by shell fire, although we sent patrols into the building from time to time to be sure that no Germans were hidden in there. The little stream running through the Farm land was the point of division between the assaulting companies: A and C Companies being on the right of the advance, B and D on the left. Before we advanced, some of the regiment had been in the Farm and in the Farm house. As I was coming up I saw a German detachment creeping back into position. As we advanced against the Farm there were several members of our own regiment lying dead, which is proof to me that our outfit had already been there."

Sergeant Joyce Kilmer, the author of the poem "Trees" which made him well known to the civilian world and of "Rouge Boquet" which endeared him to his regiment was killed July 30th.

Private Edwin J. Stubbs, one of the snipers of A Company, gives the following eyewitness account of his death.

He says:

"For several days, the Command Post of the 1st Battalion, commanded by Major Donavan, was located within the edge of the Bois Brule on a slope in the ground which apparently afforded protection from enemy shells. The 1st Battalion snipers were attached thereto and remained at this post except from time to time when Major Donavan dispatched us to various points along the lines whereupon we would perform our mission and then report back to the Command Post. A group of snipers supposedly from

the Second and Third Battalions joined us during our stay. Conditions at the time, of course, did not suggest that we ask the whys and wherefores, Joyce Kilmer was among the newcomers.

"On the day, it was afternoon as I recall, that Kilmer met his death, there was very little activity or movement in our positions which had been held for some time until there burst forth a barrage of machine gun fire from the enemy positions. There was great excitement at the Command Post, and talk of a counter attack by the enemy. Kilmer evidently received orders from Major Donavan to reconnoiter along the edge of the woods toward the enemy lines and report the cause of the commotion. Kilmer selected Jack McDonald and myself to proceed with him. We then crawled three abreast in the open field in the face of the heavy machine gun fire, hugging the edge of the woods for protection as we moved forward, and taking refuge in the many fox holes and shell holes along the route. We maintained intervals of from five to ten paces, depending, of course, on the location of the various fox holes, etc. I was in the center, with Kilmer on my right, along the edge of the woods. Each movement forward was by signal from Kilmer and with difficulty we finally arrived at the crest of a gradual slope, perhaps a hundred yards distance from our starting point.

"We again awaited the signal to move forward and, not receiving it, I looked in the direction of Kilmer. In a fox hole, slightly to my rear, he lay slumped with his head and shoulders somewhat exposed. We called to him, but there was no response, so we crawled to him and saw that he was beyond the need of our aid. Due to our exposed position, it was only possible to perform a superficial examination. We determined he had been struck in the head and chest by bullets and that he had died instantly. There was hardly any evidence of bleeding. We then continued on our mission and, when accomplished, we returned under cover of the woods to the Post Command and here rendered our report. The intensity of the enemy fire had subsided.

"The following day, I was directed to take a detail and point out the position of Kilmer's body and have it returned to the Post Command. With several members of the 4th Division Engineers, units of which division had filtrated through our lines at the time and a member of Co. A, Private Lawrence J. Bur-

gund, Private Walter Collins, a sniper of B Company, and myself, set forth and easily picked our way through the woods, due to the lull in hostilities, to where Kilmer fell. We placed his remains in a shelter-half and carried them back to the Post Command. Shortly thereafter, a grave was dug by 4th Division Engineers, with several of our men assisting. I remember distinctly of finding a stout wooden stake and driving it into the ground at the head of the grave, then securely fastened one of Kilmer's identification tags thereto; later a wooden cross replaced the stake

"I recall very clearly that after I had driven the stake home, and when several of us paused to observe the work, a single '77' shell fell and exploded near our midst which caused us to scatter, and hit the ground. A most unusual occurrence at that spot, since we had been practically free from the ravages of shell fire due to the physical nature of the land, we were told."

Private Patrick Donahue of G Company says: The poem Kilmer dedicated to the first men of the regiment killed in action makes his best obituary:

Comrades true,
Born anew,
Peace to you.
Your souls
Will be
Where heroes are
And your memory shine
Like the morning star.
Brave and dear,
Shield us here,
Farewell.

A vivid picture of what officers and men went through is the following account of the devotion of Private William Heineman of I Company as told by a comrade:

"July 28th, at the command to lie down after the heights beyond the Ourcq had been reached, Private Bradley fell wounded. Private Heineman took his first aid pack and started to bandage Bradley's arm but while doing this a high explosive shell burst, blowing Bradley to pieces and wounding Heineman. Sometime after, Heineman came to and putting his hand up to his face

wiped off Bradley's blood and internal organs, which had been blown there. Heineman's own face and head were badly bleeding. The Company was ordered to advance 200 yards further.

"Heineman started up without rifle or bayonet which were blown to pieces by the shell, advanced about fifteen yards, when command was given 'Down.' It was there that Corporal John J. O'Rourke was hit in the left leg with an explosive bullet, breaking the leg and shattering the muscles. Heineman crawled to him and tried to get his first aid pack, but he had fallen in such a position that this was impossible, so Heineman took off his legging and tied O'Rourke's leg above the knee to keep him from bleeding to death. O'Rourke begged to be taken back but he tried to reason with him, telling him it meant instant death to rise. Private Jack Coultner was on the left and he called, 'Oh, Bill.' He looked over and saw him lying on his back, his bare head facing the fire.

"Heineman then went over to him and put his helmet on to protect him and learned that he was shot through the wrist. Heineman asked him for his first aid pack and bandaged his arm and told him to go back. Private Grinnell, shot through both knees, asked Heineman to help him so Heineman put him on his shoulder and started for the first aid station. He laid the wounded man down to rest on the way when a shell exploded and killed Grinnell and two others. Heineman then came back to O'Rourke and put him on his back and went several yards when a bullet hit O'Rourke in the lower part of the spine. Heineman laid him down, but he begged again, so Heineman started up to the top when another bullet hit O'Rourke, killing him. He then laid O'Rourke down for the last time. Private Goody called to Heineman for help and Heineman supported him to the dressing station. Upon returning halfway back toward the heights, he came upon Corporal Wharton who was shot in the leg and Heineman supported him to the dressing station—going back again, he met Major McKenna who sat Heineman down on a low stone wall and told him he had done enough—and showed Heineman his name written twice in a small memo book, saying it was for two citations.

"However, Heineman kept on helping the wounded until at dusk his own wounds compelled his evacuation."

Corporal Victor van York of K Company already wounded in the foot some hours before but who stayed with his company nevertheless gives the following account of how he got his second wound. He says:

"As we reached the top of the hill my gun had become so hot that the wood was actually smoldering and I could only load two shells at a time. As I reached around to get a fresh clip, I got it— wham! Right through the left arm just below the elbow. So I picked up my marbles, said good bye and good luck to the boys and went home. It was just about as bad getting back as it was getting up there but I had my fingers crossed and finally made it. As I crossed the river on my way back, I headed for the spot where we nearly had been ambushed the night before. And what a picture that was. There were our packs just as we had dropped them and crawled behind them. All lined up in a battle front behind the barbed wire fence that had been shot down. Picking up my musette bag which held my personal belongings I finally got back to where we had hopped off and from then on, it was the sheets!"

Sergeant Thomas J. Devine of the Regiment's Machine Gun Company was ordered to report with his two machine guns to Captain Bootz just as the First Battalion was getting ready to attack.

Here is his story of the first part of the attack:

"Captain Bootz in command of 'C' Company was preparing to attack from the embankment of the Ourcq, he ordered one machine gun on the right and one on the left flank of his first platoon. The order was complied with and a few minutes later he countermanded the order, sent the first platoon across and directed the machine guns to advance with his second platoon a few minutes later. The first platoon was immediately met with a heavy machine gun fire from the wheat field on the right of the farm house. It seemed the whole platoon was practically killed or wounded. The command was given for the second platoon to advance. The Captain had not gone more than fifty feet, when he was hit quite severely by a piece of high explosive shell, that was the last I saw of him until he returned from the hospital.

"There were no other officers present, so the platoon continued to advance. Elements on right and left were advancing. We continued until we were about one hundred yards in front of the

barn, a roadway running parallel to the left flank with a high embankment on opposite side of the road. We were held up at this point with heavy shell fire and machine gun fire which came from the barn and wheat field.

"My attention was attracted by the reports of rapid fire on the left flank. It was one of the 'C' Company boys with a French 'Chau-Chau' who had tumbled a German with a light Maxim, who was ready to go to work when seen by one of our boys. Later we looked him over, and found that he had not fired a shot.

"We advanced about fifty yards more and were met with machine gun fire. Just then, about twenty-five German soldiers jumped up from the wheat field, wearing Red Cross brassards and yelling comrade. Some of the boys escorted them to the rear, where they had abandoned seven machine guns. By this time there were just a handful of men left of the second platoon. Snipers had been quite successful. Harry Paul, the gunner of the gun on the right flank was seated upright on the seat of his tripod and what damage his gun did I could not state. He was yelling cuss words and refusing to get the gun in the prone position, in which everybody else was. He was in the plain open field and a perfect target.

"We remained in the present position for over three hours expecting the rest of the army to arrive. I finally ordered the gun dismounted. Paul, the gunner took the gun from the tripod Harry Martensen, the loader, reached to take the traversing head from the tripod, when he was hit by an explosive bullet. Paul slit his blouse and belt right through to the wound, in the center of the back. Paul used his own first aid. He put the dressing right into the wound just as it was. Martensen remained for an hour and like others was crying out in pain. The only place of concealment was where we jumped off, about five hundred yards from the Ourcq.

"I picked Martensen up and started to carry him back. He was apologizing to me for all the trouble that he was causing. We had only walked about fifty feet when I saw that he did not have his helmet on. I called to Paul and told him to bring same. We strapped it on him. I was carrying him on his side, trying to ease his pain. We reached a point about one hundred yards from the Ourcq, when Harry was hit again in the back, by a sniper.

His stomach pushed against mine, he gasped and passed away."

The wounded had a long road back to the Field Hospitals. Here is the story of Corporal Gerard A. Buckley, who was one of those swept away by a blast of enemy machine gunfire as they stopped the rise north of the Arcq. He says:

"On July 28 I participated as a member of 'K' Company in our attack at the Ourcq River.

"After leaving the road from which our advance started, not more than five minutes of actual fighting had elapsed before the greater number of the taller men in the company were either killed or badly wounded. This condition could be accounted for because of the rise in the ground from which the enemy was firing upon us. My participation in this battle was short-lived. I had only time enough to go down one side of the Ourcq River, up the other and advance probably 100 yards to a rise in the ground. At its top all of us who were there at the time came suddenly under enemy fire. Most of us promptly were shot down dead or wounded.

"For a few moments after I had been hit I did not realize that I had been wounded. The fact was brought home to me only when I tried to advance farther. I then realized that there was something wrong with my left leg. I immediately bandaged it with the bandage in the first-aid kit, then I rolled down the hill and kept on rolling until I was able to reach a stone house from which some husky son of Poland carried me off in a wheel-barrow to a first-aid station. After waiting until after sunset when the ambulances could get through, I was evacuated to the field hospital where a major operation was performed. Thanks to marvelous surgery I am still able to use my left pin."

Here is the then Colonel Benson W. Hough's personal story of the battle:

He says:

"The regiment with the division detrained at La Ferte on the 23rd of July, and marched to billeting areas along the Marne River. On the 25th, pursuant to orders, the regiment moved by truck and marching to bivouac areas in the rear of the battle lines. The next day, after a reconnaissance by regimental and battalion commanders, the regiment relieved the 170th French Infantry, which was in reserve. Regimental command

post was established first at Curoil for a few hours, and then in the early evening was moved forward to Beauvardes. The night of the same day orders were received to move the regiment to the front. The regimental commander issued verbal orders to the battalion commanders to move their battalions during the night to the Foret-de-Fere and await orders. The rear eschelon of the headquarters was left temporarily at Beauvardes, the regimental commander and orderly proceeding towards the front at about midnight and established the forward command post at the Chateau-de-Foret. The night was black, not dark, and the journey from Beauvardes to the Chateau-de-Foret was made with great trepidation and uncertainty. Inquiring the way to the Chateau-de-Foret at one point, I was directed to proceed on the road I was traveling until I arrived at a crossroads, where the identifying marks were said to be nine dead horses, and there turn to the left for two or three killometers, where I would find the chateau on the left. Following these directions I arrived in due time, about two o'clock A. M., as I remember it. The battalions came separately, for the most part across country, traveling by the stars and the compass. At the first sign of daylight, I was much relieved to find and identify all three battalions, although a considerable number of casualties were suffered by each in the movement. I met the brigade commander, General Lenihan, in the yard at the chateau just as the dawn was breaking, and he led me to the road in front of the grounds, informed me that the165th Infantry were directly in front of where we were standing, and with a wave of his left arm to the left, said,—"put your regiment in over there." I directed the first battalion to go in 'over there', and for the second battalion to follow at 500 meters in support. That was the sum total of the operations orders received by me and conveyed to the battalions of my regiment for the Aisne-Marne offensive, which involved nine days and nine nights of the hardest sort imaginable of battle service. That one little sentence, emphasized by a gesture, put in motion a regiment, which in the next few days called for the relief of a front line battalion, frequently, suffering casualties that were in the neighborhood of 1000 officers and men.

"I was impressed by the fact that the fighting was so severe

that it was necessary to relieve front line battalions so frequently. You will remember the stories of the battle; the one published in the Stars & Stripes I remember principally, stated that Seringes was captured and lost several times during the operation. This in reality was not true. That village extended lengthwise, north and south, and the northern part of the village, north of the public road, was within the limits of the ridge where the Germans had dug in and where they made their last stand before withdrawal to the Vesle. That part of the village was in German hands until the final withdrawal; but the larger part of the village extended south, and we captured it several days before we were relieved. The Germans attempted numerous counter-attacks, and preceded those attacks by shelling the village. I gave instructions that when the shelling begun to withdraw the men to the outskirts of the village—then, as soon as the shell fire ceased, to rush back in. This in order to save casualties. This program was carried out, and that procedure occurred several times. E Company (Doellinger), and F Company (Stevenson), had occasion to do this several times.

"The 'last stand ridge' of the Germans had been well fortified. Fox-holes to the depth of 3 ½ or 4 feet spotted the entire ridge, both east and west of Seringes. I haven't any doubt in the world, that if we had had present day air reconnaissance and photography, that our artillery would have been able to dislodge the Germans very much quicker, and with the saving of a great many casualties. This would also apply to the 165th, who were held up a long time at Meurcy Farm. Had the artillery known definitely of the targets represented by the fox-holes on the ridge, and compelled the Germans to evacuate two or three days earlier, the Germans would have been forced out of Meurcy Farm, and thus saved the infantry of the 165th hard fighting and loss of life.

"The telephone communication as we used it throughout the battle was another feature that was impressive. We utilized the communication net reduced to the utmost simplicity. In other words, one main telephone line was run from the regimental headquarters, straight up through the regiment, with a hookup to each battalion commander. That permitted the efforts of the signal platoon to be exerted on this one line, and

permitted the regimental commander to communicate with the battalion commander, or all three of them, at the same time.

The artillery liaison officers also used the line during the battle—Lombardi at one end and Gould at the other.

"Thus with Colonel Reilly's telephone line to Lombardi, with my assault battalion, and to Gould, his liaison officer at my P. C., the most excellent liaison between the 166th Ohio and 149th Field Artillery was had at all times.

"Brucker's platoon succeeded in keeping the line open in splendid manner. The longest time the telephones were out during the entire period of eight or nine days, was eighteen minutes, night or day.

"The system we used in handling the food supply was also an experiment of mine, which I believe worked out beneficially. I placed all the kitchens of the regiment, with their cooks, under the supervision of the supply officer, and back in the rear areas, where the kitchens could be sheltered and organized. The Supply Company delivered food to the troops in the battle area each night; hot stews in the marmite cans, hauled in wagons to meet the mess details, and the water carts filled with coffee moved in the same manner. This gave the troops one hot meal in 24 hours, eliminated visibility and the confusion of having the kitchens spotted around in the battle area—and furthermore gave something of a guarantee that the companies would have a kitchen intact after the battle.

"During the engagement, no patrols were sent out; in fact, none could be sent out to accomplish anything. There were no battle orders except as before stated, and the entire engagement was carried out by verbal orders of the regimental commander, which met all local tactical situations. The careful preliminary reconnaissance which the technicians teach to be absolutely imperative, was not had, nor could it have been had under the circumstances. Certainly the Ourcq was an illustration of a necessary exception to the reconnaissance rule, and another outstanding exception to the then proved method of the preparation long in advance of voluminous operation orders, with annexes, maps, etc.

"The policing of the battle area by the supply company during the days following our relief, wherein as I recall, more than 120

automatic rifles, and hundreds of rifles were picked up in the battle area, was conclusive evidence that there had been a fight. The infantry of the division experienced other evidences that there had been a fight, during the ten days it was held in the area in support. It seemed that all the flies in France had collected in that area, drawn there by the rapid decomposition of the bodies of horses and mules, Frenchmen, Germans, and Americans.

"Regimental headquarters was established during the night or early morning that we took over in the basement of the Chateau de Foret, and there is where we remained until the 31st of July, when headquarters was moved to La Fontaine-sous-Pierre, between Seringes and Fere en Tardinois, situated on the hillside beyond the Ourcq River. At the headquarters I had with me Col. Florence, Capt. Beightler, Capt. MacDavid (French), Lieut. Gould, liaison officer 149th F. A., and Sgt. Harry (Hank) Gowdy (gas). 83rd Brigade Headquarters were also in the same building until the Germans decided to shell it, when the Brigade Commander moved across the road. We decided to stay put.

"The upper part of the building was devoted to first aid, and was a busy place for many days. Major Jackson (then captain) was in charge of the first aid.

"I made several reconnaissances during that period. The first one, which I shall remember as long as I live, was made during the first or second day of the fight, when, accompanied by Brucker, I went out on the terrain to the left of the Ville de Fere, and struck that territory at a time when the Germans had opened up with large caliber (perhaps 210) with delayed fuse. Brucker and I dodged these shells for a long period of time, in fact during all the time the shelling took place, by jumping consecutively from one shell hole to another, as fast as the hole was made. Would estimate that those craters were 25 feet across, and 12 to 15 feet deep. It was a distinctly harrowing period, and in so far as reconnaissance was concerned, accomplished exactly nothing.

"We had very few visitors during that entire period. MacArthur came along the morning of the day we were relieved when Colonel Reilly and I had crossed the Ourcq and were at La Fountaine-sous-Pierre. Prior to that time we had no visitors except the divisional liaison officer, who appeared every morning. That

was Col. Jenkins (after the war Major Jenkins), a fine but very much discouraged cavalry officer. To his disgust, he had been assigned to the Division as inspector. He came up to my headquarters each morning, with no command, just as an observer, called upon to report, I suppose, how we were doing the job.

"I remember one morning when he came in, I said to him, 'Well, Colonel, how are you this morning?' His reply was, 'I feel more like a G—d damned fool each day.'

"The shelling throughout the entire regimental area was quite heavy and very much diversified as to type and caliber—considerable gas, and also a considerable percentage of duds. Heavy caliber with delayed fuse, down to 77's and Austrian 88's with instantaneous fuses, that exploded upon touching the ground and splattered uncomfortably. Another impression that remains with me is the fact that throughout the entire nine days and nights that we were engaged, there was no letting up or slack times; everything seemed to be at fever heat, and everybody fully engaged and busy all the time."

Colonel Reilly had been with Colonel Hough on numerous occasions prior to this battle when combat was going on, noticeably during the Champagne battle. However, the day the relief was ordered was the first occasion in which so little was going on that he had a chance to really observe Colonel Hough's reactions to the loss of his own people.

He knew that Colonel Hough was always quiet and in the possession of all his faculties during battle. He knew that he was personally courageous. He knew that no amount of time or care was too great for Hough to give to insure that his men were well fed, well clothed, spared as much hardship as possible and that the wounded were properly taken care of.

He knew that Hough while rigid in his insistence on the performance of duty looked after the comfort and welfare of his men and officers in a way that few colonels do and not even many captains whose primary business it is. However, it was not until this occasion while sitting quietly alongside of Hough in the shell-torn ruins of La Fontaine sons Pierre that he realized how deeply Hough felt the loss of the lives of men whom he had brought to the battlefields of France from their distant homes in Ohio

While they were waiting, news came of Geran's Battalion being surprised by the German artillery.

Outside of saying in a tone of bitter disappointment "And I had thought that the killing was done for this battle at least," Hough said little during the several hours more he and Colonel Reilly waited for their opposite numbers in the Fourth Division to show up. He was calm and collected as always. But tears were in his eyes and the few things he did say in a low tone of voice from time to time showed that he felt this loss as a personal one and was thinking of the friends, sweethearts and parents back in the farms, villages and towns of Ohio.

Mr. Herbert Corey, the well known war correspondent, himself an Ohioan, who had first met Colonel Hough in his football days tells the following:

"A Colonel who puts the welfare of his men ahead of the silent idolatry he owes anyone from H. Q. may be respected. The measure of the respect that H. Q. had for Ben Hough may be found in the list of the 166th's battles.

"He saw to it that his men had boots when there were boots to be had. Sometimes boots were not to be had. He got underwear for them if such a thing was to be found. He got them deloused when delousing was still possible, and when there were rations to be found he found them. Other men can tell Ben Hough's story as a leader of fighting men. The Ben Hough I bear in my memory is the good soldier who had not forgotten how to be a good neighbor. He watched his men and their feet and their throats and to the best of his ability got them what we were so damfoolish as to think of as comforts. And he was always kind and always good natured. Stern when he had to be. The officer who dodged his duty found no mercy in the Colonel. Every other man found a twinkle in the Colonel's eye no matter how tough the going. I visited him during the Ourcq battle.

" 'That's the Marysville company,' Ben said. 'I know lots of the people up there. It was hit hard this morning. Over there's the Circleville company?'

"Perhaps the town names are wrong. The fight took place on the Ourcq years ago. But I remember listening as he named man after man and mother after mother who would be sad when the news of that fight came home. His voice did not tremble as

he spoke of the losses. He sent his men on with that apparent ruthlessness the good soldier must sometimes practice. There was no sappy sentimentality in him. He merely told a part of the price we were paying.

" 'Johnson and Young and Carothers were killed—'

"When I said goodbye he shook hands.

" 'You know,' he said, 'I've been with the regiment a long time, I know all the men who were in it when war came.' "

Let Major George T. Geran tell the story in his own words of the assault of his battalion. Here it is:

"Late in the afternoon of July 25th, 1918, the Battalion Commanders of the 166th Inf. were called to Regimental Headquarters, and each was given verbal orders to proceed immediately after dark and take up positions to which we would be conducted by guides furnished by the French. This was done, and the 2nd Battalion of which I was in command, took up or was in process of taking a position somewhat southwest of Fere-in-Tardenois. We had not yet completed our dispositions, when we received verbal orders to abandon this position and move to the eastward until we arrived at the western or rather southwestern edge of the Foret-de-Fere and then proceed northward until we reached the road passing along the northern edge of this forest. We were told that we might expect to encounter interdiction fire before we arrived. Also we were instructed that we would receive further orders when we reached the road. When we arrived at the southwestern corner of the forest, we ran into a rather concentrated interdiction fire. After having some 10 or 12 men wounded, we turned eastward, passed to the south of the forest, and then turned north around its eastern edge. When we struck the road along the north edge we followed it westward.

"Just before daybreak, we met the Regimental Commander on this road. He personally gave us verbal orders for the attack which was scheduled to begin at daylight. They were that the 1st Battalion would lead, that we would be in support, and the 3rd Bn. in reserve. The objective was simply to the north. I deployed in the open ground to the north of the woods. We were ready just about daylight. The 1st Battalion was not yet in position, having encountered some difficulty in getting through the forest. They arrived about 6:30 or 7 o'clock A. M. and advanced

practically due north towards the Ourcq River and Seringes et Nesles. I followed at approximately 500 yards distance. The two leading companies were "E" on the right, and "F" on the left, with "G" and "H," respectively, in support. "E" and "F" were deployed each having two platoons in line, with the men at one yard intervals. The two support companies were in squad columns. We advanced across the open ground to the north of the Woods, and directly toward Seringes.

"When my leading elements had reached the ridge just to the south of the Ourcq River, I halted, as the 1st Battalion had encountered determined resistance in crossing that river. The Regimental Commander, at this time, concluding we were too close to the 1st Battalion, gave the verbal orders to retire until I was at least a kilometer to their rear. The battalion was retiring in perfect order, and had not yet reached the distance the Regimental Commander had indicated, when I was met by the Brigade Adjutant.

"Turn about at once and move forward," he demanded.

"Colonel Hough considered we were jammed up too close to the 1st Battalion and ordered me to retire until I had one kilometer distance,' I replied. 'Show me the order,' he shot back. 'The order was verbal,' I answered, glaring at him. He again insisted that I turn back. I refused, unless the order to do so was transmitted to me through the proper channels, that is, through my own Regimental Commander, or in an emergency from the Brigade Commander in person. When I had gotten my kilometer distance I halted. I learned one lesson right there, and that was to demand written orders. It saved me considerable trouble thereafter.

"I held my distance until I had again advanced to the south bank of the Ourcq River. As the 1st was still having a bitter fight just across the river, I had the battalion dig in. We were being subjected to heavy fire, but suffered little loss.

"Late in the afternoon, two German planes flying parallel to each other began straffing our line with machine gun fire, and also throwing, hand grenades at us.

"We did not have a man hit. From this experience, I have always thought the offensive importance of planes has been overrated. These two planes would parallel our line at an elevation

of not more than four or five hundred feet. We fired at them with both rifles and automatics.

"Suddenly, one of them tipped over sidewise, and then came together with the other for an appreciable time they hung together. Then they both crashed. Both aviators were killed.

"My battalion, of course, claimed the credit of shooting them down.* The 1st Battalion of our Regiment also claimed the credit, as did the 165th Inf. It was said that one of the two was a girl. I know that is not true, because I examined the bodies.

"I remained on the south ridge during that night, and the next day, July 27th, until about 4 P. M Then I was ordered to advance, cross the Ourcq River, leap frog the 1st Bn., and take Seringes et Nesles. That village was located on the ridge to the north of the River. We were given a half hour's artillery preparation, which we asked to be directed against the town for the first ten minutes, and then to be lifted to the top of the ridge to the north of the town, and to hold there. This fire was provided by the 149th F. A.

"The battalion advanced down the south bank, across the River, and up through the wheat field on the north bank. We met a heavy enemy machine gun fire. Their range was bad at first, so we suffered but little loss, until we reached the Fere-en-Tardenois-Nesle road which runs at the foot of the ridge north of the river. There we had to cross the road. It was an open level space about 80 feet wide. The Germans' machine gun fire raked this road from two directions: the ridge in front of Bois Colas to the northeast of Seringes-et-Nesles and from Hill 186 to its northwest.

"While crossing the river and the wheat field just beyond the German fire was high, being over our heads, except for occasional bullets. We were fortunate to have the fire over our heads, as it was extremely heavy. I crossed the River on a small wooden bridge, quite close to the mill race. I remember I stuck a willow cane I was carrying up in the air. It had the end shot off. An occasional bullet hit the floor of the bridge.

"I made the advance with the same formation I had used the day before: "E" Company on the right, "F" on the left, each

---

* Private Ralph W. Clark, "E" Co., 166th Ohio, says: "I am convinced the credit belongs to Private Arthur King of 'E' Co."

with two platoons in line and two in support. The lines were deployed, according to the old Book, with one man per yard. I don't remember the exact distance between lines, but I think about 5 yards. The two supporting companies, "G" and "H," following at 100 yards, in squad columns. Capt. Dollinger commanded "E" Company, Capt. Stephenson, "F", Capt. Caldwell "G" and Capt. Bailey "H." One platoon of "F" Company maintained liaison with the French on our left. They were attacking Fere-en-Tardenois, Lieut. Reece commanded this patrol. He successfully maintained junction with the French throughout the operation.

"It was my plan, that "E" Company should encircle the village from the southeast, and "F" from the southwest, and completely occupy the town. The support companies were to dig in along the south side of the Fere-en-Tardenois-Nesle road.

"The movement was carried out exactly according to plan and with entire success. The artillery fire lifted from the town, just as we reached the south side of the road. However, in advancing from the road with "E" and "F" Companies, I suffered heavy losses. It took the two companies about twenty minutes to cross the road and the open space to either side and to envelope the village.

"During that time these two companies suffered about 250 casualties. We discovered that this village consisted of an upper and lower town, connected by road almost at the top of the ridge. The main part of the town was nearest us, the smaller part was closer to the Germans in the Foret de Nesles than it was to the main part of the town in which was the church and the city hall. We occupied the main part while the Germans occupied, at least part of the time, the smaller part nearest the Foret-de-Nesle. We had to be pretty careful about exposing ourselves in daylight. "We completed the occupancy of our part of the town about five-thirty P. M. July 27th. We held there until the morning of August 1st.

"It was reported that we were counter-attacked and lost and recaptured this village three or four times. That is not true. We were attacked one night. This attack was preceded by a very heavy concentration of artillery fire laid down on the village. In order to avoid this fire we withdrew from the village until the

fire lifted. Then we quickly reoccupied it. There was some little fighting on the west side of the town when we went back into it, but no serious conflict.

"During our occupancy of the village, we were asked to assist the 165th in their attack on Meurcy Farm on the next knoll to the east. However, we were too far away to be of much help though we tried.

"We were able to enfilade a German trench to the west, and thus help the French take Hill 186 the next one in that direction. I sent some of our expert riflemen to do that job. After we were relieved by the 4th Div. the night of Aug. 1, or rather the early morning of Aug. 2, with my staff I looked over this section of the German position.

"We found about 75 dead Germans, nearly all shot through the left side of the head, as they lay in their fox holes.

"We felt rather proud of our marksmanship.

"There were numerous little skirmishes during the five day period of our occupancy, as we were dug in not over fifty yards from the German line. On the morning of Aug. 1, I was personally told by Col. Douglass MacArthur, then Divisional Chief of Staff, that they had information that the Germans had withdrawn during the night. He gave me a verbal order to advance immediately. It was the turn of Companies "G" and "H" to lead, but in the previous fighting, both Captains Caldwell of "G" and Bailey of "H" were wounded. Lt. Wm. Eyler was left in command of "G." Lt. Steele had been detached from Company "F" and placed in command of "H." Steele was only about 21 years of age. So I made the advance with "E" and "G," "F" and "H" being in support.

"We had learned one lesson. It was that one yard interval and ten yard distances are entirely too close for this kind of work. So I made this advance with five yard intervals, later increased to eight yards, and with 20 yard distances between lines, later increased to 50 yards. I decided and my officers agreed with me that this last advance showed that 8 yard intervals between men in line, and 50 yard distances between lines, was just as effective and caused much less loss. The support companies followed the assault companies at a distance of 500 yards.

"We advanced rapidly in this formation, so rapidly and with

so little opposition that toward the middle of the afternoon, I threw strong patrols ahead, and followed in squad columns. In this formation unfortunately we ran squarely into a heavy barrage. Lt. Eyler was killed. Lt. Flick of "E" Company was wounded eight times.

"All told during the eight days we were in this fight, our battalion lost 450 men in killed and wounded. This does not include the losses of other troops under my command. We had five officers killed and seven wounded, exactly 50 per cent loss in officers. This combat so far as the 2nd Battalion was concerned developed, from what at first was considered to be a relief by us of the 1st Battalion, into a real fight.

"It was the hardest fight we were in during the war. At one time as the result of reinforcements I had the entire 1st Bn., "K" Company from the 3rd Bn., the 166th Machine Gun Company, the one pounder section, the stokes section, and a machine gun company, "C," from the 151st Machine Gun Battalion, a total of about 2500 men.

"While occupying Seringes-et-Nesle, because of the heavy artillery fire, and a heavy concentration of gas laid down in the river bottoms, I decided it was better not to try to evacuate our wounded. I therefore had some 80 of them in a stone barn at the south edge of the village, which I used as a battalion headquarters. I kept them there and cared for them as best we could for three days.

"I have always read and heard much about the spectacular in battle. In my experience, I witnessed but one instance of that kind. That was on Aug. 1, in this Ourcq fight. A little after noon, a battalion of the 149th Field Artillery, in line in close order, came racing up to us, with their horses at the gallop. It was just like one used to see in the old school histories.

"The battalion commander brought his horse to a sudden halt when he reached me. I looked up at him and saw a giant of a man. He seemed vaguely familiar. I finally placed him. He was 'Curt' Redden. He and I had graduated a dozen years before in the same class at the University of Michigan. We had a class reunion right there, while his guns were unlimbering:—'Action! Front!'

"All orders given by me during the Ourcq River fight were

verbal. All orders I received were verbal. It was not a general advance in which a complete reconnaissance was just made, and then detailed orders written on the information gathered. So far as our participation in the various phases of this battle was concerned, they started from what at first appeared to be small skirmishes. Then all at once they developed in tough fighting. On the morning of July 26th, when we were in support of the 1st Batt. I simply called my company commanders together, and told them the formations for the attack, and the general outline of our objective. When we leap-frogged the fist on the afternoon of July 27th, I was able to go more into detail of a definite plan which I had adopted. I did the same on the 1st of August. In both those instances the company commanders only were assembled. I told them the formations, intervals, and distances. After the fighting actually began, it was mainly a matter of the unit commanders, clear down to squads, this because instantaneous decisions had to be made, and there was neither time nor opportunity to consult superior officers. The success of this fight was due almost wholly to the courage and resourcefulness of the officers and men under me. My own particular job was made much easier by Lt. Marsh, Battalion Adjutant; Lt. Sorge, in charge of the runners; and Sergeant Major Fred Kundts, who had charge of getting up our supplies. And all possible credit and praise should be given to Capt. Paden, our medical officer, and his assistants. They had a large number of wounded men to dress, and evacuate. They had to work under very adverse conditions.

"About 2 o'clock the morning of Aug. 2, we were relieved by elements of the 4th Division. We then rejoined the Regiment which was in reserve."

Private Albert Hoyt of the Medical Detachment of the Ohio Regiment gives a vivid picture in the following:

"Moving up to that Chateau-Thierry affair—marching all night and bandaging feet all day—no rest for the wicked, or pill rollers—we approach Epieds—Hough has to take over the sector of three French units at night without reconnaissance or liaison—it is done—down the hill into and through Epieds go the infantry, yelling like Comanches which the French civilians thought they were. Regimental dressing station party moves into Epieds for a short time and then on to the next village where we set up in a

house as casualties are arriving pretty thick. Midnight—they are coming thicker novel—some are Reilley's Bucks, some are New York Irish, some are French and most are our own Buckeyes. All through the night—our fourth without sleep—we work by ghostly candle light. Ambulance service is good—we keep our station cleared till about eight o'clock when the wounded begin to pile up on us. Some we tell to walk if they can—ambulances delayed—heavy shelling on the roads in the rear—an orderly arrives with message from the Colonel: 'Move up to Chateau-de-la-Foret at once'—where on earth is that?—we consult our one map and guess where it is—we send message to Director Ambulance Companies via ambulance driver requesting immediate relief—we cannot leave under the conditions, leaving wounded without aid. They bring in French soldier shot through temple—his bandage soaked in blood. I cut off dressing and bind on a packet reinforcing it with a skull cap. I know we cannot stop the hemorrhage—an ambulance arrives—we take him out and load him in the Ford, but before we are finished there is a trickle of blood running the length of the litter and off the tailgate. I bind on an additional dressing as he murmurs 'Pour France'—he's pretty white now—I tell the driver to go and fast—but I know he cannot last much longer. Two hours pass—we're swamped—another message from the Colonel: 'Move up to Chateau-de-la-Foret at once—second order'—Bob Hunter is sent to find the Colonel and report we will advance as soon as possible—we say good-bye to Bob.

"Officer and men from Michigan Ambulance Company arrive to relieve us—we take all dressings we can carry and pile in ambulance for the Chateau, wherever it is. We pass support battalion to side of road on way up—they're taking heavy shelling—but what are we doing up ahead of the support and still going?—it's not in the book—we don't belong here ahead of two battalion stations—they must need us pretty bad up there—a direct hit on our ambulance would be just too bad—for the poor devils waiting for us.

"We arrive at the Chateau—three story hunting lodge on a hill just off a crossroads—lovely target. Machine guns are chattering in the woods all around us—seems to be a dispute going on over whose woods they are. Our men take them but at what

cost! We relieve our battalion station which moves up—constant stream of wounded from many units—working at capacity every one of us—I become an expert with an anti-tetanus gun—bloody dressings are so thick on the floor we can hardly stand steady to do our work—I try to sweep them out but they are too heavy so I use a rake—Priests confessing the wounded—Polish boys with ikons—can't speak English—it doesn't matter, God understands. Say, when did we eat last—I can't remember, it's so long.

"Rifle and machine gun fire out in the yard—enemy plane coming over—he sees staff car (Brigade), mounted orderlies and our field wagon in yard. Our wagon has large red cross on top but we can expect no immunity—we don't belong on crossroads or in same building with post of command, according to the book—casualties piling up on us—about two hundred now—ambulance service almost nil—all back roads under heavy fire—the ambulance men are doing the best they can, but they are swamped too—and heroes every one. A big British ambulance van pulls in the yard with an American driver—'how come buddy?' 'A shell blew mine off the road, so I promoted this one' he replied. We load seriously wounded and start him back—we need litters very badly—he agrees to send some from Division Ambulance Station—Wham! a large shell lands in the yard. We know what's coming—that aviator told what he saw—here he comes again—spraying machine gun bullets through the windows on us as we dress the wounded—mean I calls it. An officer who has whiffed some gas demands immediate evacuation—on what Lieutenant?—if you're in a hurry start walking. Those shells are coming oftener now—Intelligence reports the enemy are ranging on our building with 210 millimeter guns made in America and captured from the Russians, the plane correcting range for them—now isn't that just ducky—and us with 200 wounded and no transport. They are bringing in that red-haired Signal Corps Sergeant. He left here less than ten minutes ago—now he is paralyzed from the waist up by concussion—can't even smile— just pleads with his eyes—but walking with help—that's what you call 'dead on his feet' isn't it? Brigade orders the building vacated and Brigade leaves via the fields—the staff car taking seven prisoners. How was it Rudy put that—'the tumult and

the shouting dies, the Captains and the Kings depart'—we are alone now—just us and our wounded—with the shells hitting the building regularly—'Lord God of Hosts be with us yet'!

"After consultation we tell all wounded that can navigate to start for rear—they file out helping each other—better take the fields—the roads are under fire. The seriously wounded are collected in the large banquet hall—the back-end wall facing the enemy has nearly all been blown out by shells—we try to comfort the wounded and cheer them up—rather difficult under such conditions—Paul Tway starts to play the piano—in the corner where the wall formerly was—shell shocked boys chattering and screaming—one under the table trying to cover himself up with a newspaper, shaking and murmuring shells, shells. Pardon me, the Army says there is no such thing as shellshock—it's hysteria according to the M. D. Wham! that shell hit the upstairs and shook the whole building—Paul plays on—I go back to the dressing room—put some more canned heat under the shock table—open some serum and lay out more dressings—Wham! another direct hit, luckily on top—hooray, an ambulance pulling in the yard—one, when we need a dozen—it's loaded with litters—ambulance crew unload them while we bring out wounded and load them—another shell—we complete the loading but the ambulance can't get out—litters on the ground—I stay outside and clear away litters—they get away—here comes a shell—I can't make the building so I hug a large tree. Shell cuts through top of tree and explodes in yard between tree and house—I'm on backside of tree and safe but I can't move—stunned—remember the Signal Sergeant? Bob Hunter calling from the door—I get loose from tree and start for house, but my parts don't coordinate—I'm so tired and the house is thirty feet away. Bob helps me in and asks if I'm hit. I tell him no, just shocked. What a mess—the shellburst came through the windows—nobody hit, but all stunned. Walt Williams leaning against the wall stunned—Capt. Jackson with a queer look on his face—vitality pretty low—all of us. Our wounded are safe but we can't stay here much longer—the plane again—maybe he'll tell them to stop firing when he sees only our red cross wagon in the yard. More ambulances arrive and are loaded—most of our wounded have been evacuated now and not coming in so fast—we move

our Station down cellar—it's about four o'clock—New York Regimental Station arrives and sets up in banquet hall—the shelling stops—we prepare to return to the village where Michigan relieved us, to spend the night—if we can walk that far—we stumble along dog tired—haven't had a bath in weeks—it's late July and hot—we are so filthy we can even smell ourselves—haven't had our clothes off for days."

Private Charles C. Flood tells of his capture and imprisonment as follows:

"I was captured July 31st and held in prison until Dec. 6th, 1918. The occasion of my capture is told in a diary which I kept during the months of my imprisonment, in which I tell casually and without much comment of rather blood curdling affairs that anyone but a soldier would rave about.

"When my Company was to move up to the front to join the platoon already in the village of Seringes, there were two men missing, Corporals Searls and Snyder.

"Sergeant Wise who was the sergeant of my platoon asked if anybody knew where they were. I told him I knew the way I saw them go. Then the sergeant sent me out to locate them. I had seen them go back to the Ourcq River.

"I went back to look for them. I searched up and down the river and everywhere I thought they might be. They could not be found and I returned to where my company had been when I left. A sergeant directed me to the village where my company would be found. I followed his directions I thought. I just kept on walking thinking I was on the right road. Pretty soon I saw a flare go up behind me; then I thought the village must be on my right; then I turned off to the right, not having my compass with me and the night was so dark that I could hardly tell the direction.

"All of a sudden about fifty men, rather shadows loomed up; I could hear them talking. As there were French on our left I could not tell if they were French or Boche. All at once I got into a shell hole and listened a while. The shells were dropping very close, both ours and those of the Boche. There was a lot of noise so I could not hear well enough to tell if they were French or Boche, but I knew they were not Americans.

"I determined to find out who they were, so I whistled twice. They did not hear me, so I waited a little and whistled again. They answered so I thought they must be French for if they were Boche they would have fired at me. Then I raised up from where I was laying and walked up to the bunch of men of which I could see the bunch of shadows, thinking they were French. Just as I saw who they were, they saw who I was. Two of them grabbed me and one grabbed my rifle. They called me Tommie and I said no I am an American; then they said, 'Kaput Alle Amerikanos, Gerfaugenen,' meaning in English that they kill all American prisoners of war.

"One of them started to take hold of me to kill me. Another German would not let him, so they had a little scrap over me; one wanted to kill me and the other one objected. I think the one who did not want to kill me was an American spy in the German Army.

"Following my capture I was taken to the officers of the regiment and questioned closely. However I pretended that I knew nothing, but what I did not know the Germans supplied. These Germans happened to be Prussian Guards, crack soldiers of Germany.

"They knew more about us than the average American soldier knew himself. After five days of questioning they took me to Laon, France, here I was held for about four weeks. We were compelled to get up at 3 A. M. in the morning and have breakfast of tea soup of weeds. After such a hearty meal the Americans, British, French and Italians would be sorted out like so many cattle and set to work building roads, railroads, cutting wood and repairing old buildings. Once a day we would be fed five hundred grams of bread and soup made from dried sugar beets, soaked in water for three or four days. Our supper would be hot water.

"Naturally the men failed to thrive on such a diet. When after the Armistice was signed nourishing food was given us, many of the men died from overeating. After four weeks at Laon, France, the American soldiers were taken to Herson, France, close to the Belgian border, where I was kept in jail for thirty days and fed bread and water and a small piece of saw-

dust bread once a day. All prisoners did not get put in jail. The reason I did was for telling a lie, anything to help stop the war. An officer asked me if our air service was very strong. I said I was not an aviator. He insisted that I tell him what I had heard our officers talk about in the way of air service. So I told him there were one hundred airplanes started for Berlin the other day and three got back O. K. At the end of my solitary confinement I was taken to Rasstatt, Baden, the headquarters for American prisoners, where we received food from the American Red Cross and new and clean uniforms. Here I was with other American soldiers. We remained for about two weeks, then five of us were sent to Scherzheim to work on a farm. On the same farm where we ate with the German family was another Ohio boy, A. J. Orwig from Bellevue. Just as soon as the Armistice was signed the prisoners were released from work and taken care of entirely by the American Red Cross; they gave us nourishing food. Many of the men were ill and had to be sent to a hospital on their release. I was fortunate enough to go through it all without any serious ill health. Two weeks of good food put me back to normal."

The following account, by Private John M. Shimp, Supply Company, 168th Ohio, gives a typical picture of the dangers experienced by the so-called non-combatants in regimental bands and supply companies. Here is his story:

"On the afternoon of July 27th in the Chateau Thierry sector my wagon was loaded at the Supply Company with hand grenades. I started for the front and reached the town of Brecy at dusk. I then drove around all night, dodging shells, trying to catch up with the 3rd Battalion. Morning found me in the Foret de Fere. There were a couple of band musicians with me. They were going up to act as stretcher bearers. One was a slide trombone player, and he lost an arm before the day was over. The Germans were shelling the woods heavily and I was expecting a shell to hit my wagon at any time but luck was with me and none did. However, the flying shrapnel struck one of my mules on the rump and cut a bad gash. About 10 A. M. I received orders to unload my wagon, and was that a relief! I then got out of there and went back to the Supply Company at about 2 P. M.,

about half-starved, as I hadn't eaten anything since noon on the previous day."

Private Emmett Madden, of E Company, 168th Ohio, tells the following story of how he was wounded:

"Early the morning of August 2nd, I was detailed to go out with a daylight patrol of twenty, which moved about four hundred yards ahead of our main advance. Our duty was to be sure there were no German machine guns waiting in ambush to hold up that advance. When we had gone some distance forward and were coming over a rise the German artillery spotted us. They brought down a pretty heavy fire. One shell which exploded just to the left of my patrol sent a piece through my left thigh. I fainted. When I came to I took off my equipment and put on my first aid bandage as quickly as I could, because I was growing weak very fast from loss of blood. I got it on but was so weak I could not pull up my trousers again. I slipped my arm through the sling of my rifle and started to crawl back. However, the first thing I knew I fell into a deep fox hole. I felt so sick and was so weak from loss of blood that after struggling for a while to get out I finally gave it up. After a while I heard footsteps approaching. As the man came closer I got a glimpse of two strap buckles at the top of high laced boots. He had a 45 in his hand. He said: 'Who's down in that hole?' I recognized his voice as that of our top kick, Orville Warden. I was so afraid he would not hear my answer and pass on that I summoned all my remaining strength and tried to yell. However, my voice was not much more than a whisper. I said 'Madden of E Company.' He replied that as soon as he could he would send help to get me out.

"After what seemed about a year three or four of my comrades finally arrived, got me out and carried me down a shell-torn road until we came to several ambulances in a patch of timber off to one side. The men who carried me were all slightly wounded or gassed. By this time it was long after dark and pitch black.

"Here I was given a shot to prevent lock-jaw, my wound was dressed, and I was put in an ambulance which finally took me to a field hospital from whence I was sent on to Base Hospital 34. I was there for six and a half months, and then was sent home."

Here is the story of Lieutenant Paul V. Jackson, B Company, 166th Ohio:

"July 27th Major Henry Graves, commanding our 1st Battalion, ordered me to take out a patrol of twenty men, with the duty of getting in contact with the enemy. The French, whom we relieved, had given us no maps with the position of the enemy marked on it. After leaving the Bois de Buescardelle, in which the Battalion was then stationed, we went along the Bois del Tousvelle, then along the Beuvardes Preaux Farm Road until we reached the River. Here we were fired on by German machine guns on the other side, in their usual Y and W formation, by which each gun protects the others. My orders were as soon as I gained contact to return to the Battalion. This we did. Coming back through the woods, we missed a German stationed in a tree, who signalled our presence to the enemy's guns before clearing out himself. The enemy's artillery shelled the woods all night with the result that we suffered a fair number of losses before we began our advance the next day to the Ourcq."

The then First Lieutenant Charles A. P. Bartlett gives the following account of the 149th Pennsylvania Machine Gun Battalion in the battle.

He says:

"The movements of 149th Machine Gun Battalion at the Ourcq were governed almost entirely by verbal orders.

"The morning of July 29th the Battalion was in reserve in Foret de Fere, near Le Four a Verre. Col. Dravo* appeared and ordered the Battalion forward. The entire command less only kitchen details thereupon formed, entrained in its own trucks and moved up the road. At a point some distance beyond La Croix Blanche the column halted at the side of the road, while Major Mills commanding went forward to La Cense Farm.

"Runners returning from La Cense summoned officers of both companies, and for 'A' Co. Capt. Godley and Lieut. Bartlett went forward; for 'B' Co. at least Lieut. Bossart and perhaps one other 'B' Co. was ordered to advance through Sergy and upon request for mission was ordered in these words 'shoot at the moon'. 'A' Co. was ordered to advance through Cirges, a French runner having just come in with word that the town had been

---

* Chas. A. Dravo, Division M. G. Officer.

taken. Reconnaissance developed that this village had not been taken. Capt. Godley on his own responsibility sent back word for the Company (A) to advance to Courmont.

"Meanwhile that fifty truck train of the Battalion was parked for what must have been at least two hours, on the open road beyond La Croix Blanche. Casualties resulted that might have been avoided had the train not moved from Le Four a Verre until after reconnaissance and proper orders.

"Courmont was held by troops of 110th Infantry, 28th Division. Col. Kemp, an old friend of Pennsylvania National Guard days, commanding the regiment was located, and the following dialog followed:

" 'Col. Kemp, what can we do to help?'

" 'What have you, Capt. Godley?'

" 'A machine gun company with 12 guns.'

" 'I will send an officer with you to locate your guns.'

"These guns were placed on a wood road and fired almost due east at the German line at the near edge of Bois Meuniere. But every round of fire called back from the same location, trench mortar shells, so that at the request of the infantry, the machine gun fire ceased.

"The guns were taken back to Courmont and at 4:50 P. M. Major Mills gave the company a written order to retire.

"On the morning of July 30, Major Mills issued an order by which platoons of both companies were posted on the crest of Hill 212. However, the position was so exposed and so pounded that but little was accomplished. One platoon of A Co. on the left of the line was active. This position was occupied also on July 31st until the battalion was drawn back to the sunken road southwest of the crest.

"On August 1st the battalion occupied this road, without action. At Capt. Godley's request I saw Lieut. Col. Tinley, 168th Inf., about dusk, and asked if the battalion could be relieved, to which Col. Tinley agreed with very profuse thanks.

"The battalion advanced again August 2nd, the guns going forward in their trucks until motorcycle runner brought word of divisional relief when the battalion retired to Le Four a Verre."

The then First Lieutenant Monroe A. Means who commanded Co. D of the 151st Machine Gun Battalion which was a

Pennsylvania Company originally having been M Company of the Fourth Pennsylvania gives the following account of their experiences:

"Shortly after 5 A. M. the 28th, a runner came back from Major Brewer seeking me, but in the darkness and fog he was unable to find me. He did find Lt. Parkinson, and gave him a verbal order directing that one platoon be sent to support the attack of the battalion, across the Ourcq river and on the heights beyond. Lt. Parkinson at once sent the order to me adding that as the time was so short, (the jump off was to be at 5:30 A. M.) he had gone with his platoon. The order also directed me to move forward in close support with one platoon and leave the other with the reserve. Lt. Olsen's platoon was directed to remain in reserve, Lt. Andres was directed to follow me with his platoon.

"The Germans had perfect observation from the crest of hills 212 and 288. The only thing in favor of the attacking force was the fog. Andres' platoon crossed the river on the stones of a ruined stone arch bridge which had been blown up by the Germans. As they crossed the fog seemed to lift and they were in plain sight of the Germans from the crest of hill 212. Andres' platoon took shelter behind a large pile of empty shell boxes (a German battery had been located at this point). It was easy to see that the infantry needed help, the thin infantry line was about half way up hill 212, except on the left, where they had been able to reach the crest, but they were pinned down by fire and could not advance. I saw Major Brewer with his adjutant in a ditch along side a narrow gauge railroad track about fifty yards away so I crawled up the ditch with machine gun bullets peppering the ground all around. The Major turned his head back, and said, 'For God's sake, Means, can you get some fire on that hill.' I crawled back and directed Lt. Andres to put one section in position from where he was, to fire direct over the heads of the Infantrymen. The other section I took over to the left flank of the battalion where it had reached the crest and put the two guns on the line with the rifle men. In a very few minutes after those four guns opened the infantry were able to advance. The ground was ideal for direct overhead supporting machine gun fire from the other side of the Ourcq, and that is

how the company should have been used as a whole in this attack. The work of Lt. Andres' platoon showed the value of machine guns when in the proper position to give the desired help.

"Shortly after this the battalion reserve was ordered forward. Lt. Olsen's platoon was badly shot up coming across the open ground down to the river for by that time the fog had entirely disappeared and the Germans had perfect observation. Olsen had but two guns left out of his four when he reported to me. But as there was plenty of German machine guns and ammunition, he took possession of two of them. He had studied the German guns and his men had had some instruction in their use. Thus he was able to put them in action at once. He did some very good work with these guns. His platoon was stationed on the hill to cover the left of the battalion sector.

"Holes were dug in the ground at the base of hill 212 for the Co. CP. close to the battalion CP. I then set out to find out what had become of Parkinson's platoon. I found that Major Brewer had directed one of his guns to support the left flank of the battalion and the other three guns the right flank as the Major deemed that the danger point.

"To my mind it is a mistake to send one gun on a mission of this kind. The fate of this single gun speaks for itself. The entire squad under Corporal Shafer was killed or wounded and the gun smashed by shell fire, leaving the left flank without machine gun protection, until Olsen's platoon got there. The other three guns of Parkinson's platoon covered a ravine between Hills 212 and 288. Though he had few casualties in this section of his platoon, his guns were in an effective position to stop a German counter attack that might come down the ravine on that flank of the Battalion. The section of Andres' platoon which had been firing from the shelter of the empty ammunition boxes was brought forward and put in position as break through guns about the center of the battalion sector where they had a field of fire either way across the rear of the battalion. The break through gun could also be used against low flying German planes.

"The left and center were the danger points. A number of German counter attacks were launched at the position during the day, but the Infantry assisted by Lt. Olsen's platoon and the

section from Lt. Andres' platoon in the Infantry line (this section was commanded by Sgt. Rodes) were able to repulse all of them. After the fighting was over, it was found that friendly machine guns from the sector on the left, came near cross firing into Olsen's platoon when they heard the firing from the two German guns he had put in action. When the last counter attack was over for that day, the guns on the left had less than 500 rounds of ammunition left. But fortunately under cover of darkness that night they were able to bring some more up to the company. Had the Germans made another counter attack that night the guns on the left could not have helped the Infantry very much. The right flank bent around the base of Hill 288, it was at this point Lt. Parkinson's three guns were in such a good position to stop a German counter attack.

"On the 29th and 30th a number of attacks were launched against the German positions, all assisted by D. Company's guns. In one of these attacks Lt. Olsen's platoon was directed to go forward with the Infantry, while Lt. Andres' platoon was giving overhead supporting fire, and Lt. Parkinson's platoon from its position was directed to drop a plunging fire over the right nose of Hill 212. In another attack Sgt. Staufer's section of Andres' platoon, was directed to go forward with the Infantry. The infantry were forced to fall back about 200 yards to their original position, all the men with the two guns dropped back with the infantry, (leaving the guns out there) except Corp. Deets and Pvt. Keagy. The Corporal fired the gun and Keagy shoved the clips in. That one gun with direct sweeping fire stopped a dangerous German counter attack. The two men crawled back, under cover of darkness. The two guns were recovered that night. It was the hardest fighting that D. Company had during the war. It was a key position which the Germans were holding, covering with fire a large stretch of ground to our left. They had been ordered to hold the ground at all costs.

"Finally on August 1st the enemy began to retreat, fresh troops were put in to take up the advance. The 3rd Bn. 168th Inf. with D. Co. 151st M. Gun Bn. (attached) followed more slowly. D. Company's last position was along a road at the northern edge of the town of Neseles, in reserve.

"From the night of July 27th, D. Company had but two scant meals. Dysentery was prevalent as the only water for drinking purposes came from the Ourcq river, poisoned by the bodies of dead American and German soldiers and animals that lay in it.

"Bringing up rations and ammunition during this period was a very trying and dangerous job. In this work Sgt. Demuth distinguished himself. One night as he and another man were bringing forward one of the scant meals, a shell burst under the horse that was pulling the ration cart and killed him. Sgt. Demuth and the soldier leading the horse were not hurt. They carried what they could up to the line. I sent men back with Demuth to get the rest, but most of it had been spilled. The kitchens were about four kilometers back in the woods."

The 151st Georgia Machine Gun Battalion started this battle by having to manhandle their carts, due to their animals having been marched while the men and guns were transported in camions.

But let their Commanding Officer, Major Winn, tell the story in his own words.

Here they are:—

"On very short notice orders were given on July 24th to prepare to load on camions. In this way most of the personnel, all of the machine guns and ammunition carts were transported to Epieds. All animals and the battalion train followed by road. As soon as the battalion unloaded their camions at Epieds, the companies were ordered to move immediately into reserve positions preparatory to relieving General Weigel's Brigade of the 28th Division. This required the movement of carts by hand drawn power for several miles. After having ridden the entire night, uncomfortably crowded in camions where sleep was impossible, this movement of the carts by hand was a severe task on the stamina of the men. However, the movement was executed with speed, as the spirit was willing despite the weakness of the flesh, so that the carts were soon hidden from observation in the Bois de Fere.

"On the 26th, Company 'C' operating with a Battalion of the 16th Infantry, and Company 'B' with a Battalion of the 167th Infantry, began to advance through the Bois de Fere

for the attack on Croix Rouge Ferme. This farm was that day's objective. This advance was made through swampy country covered with thick undergrowth and trees so that the guns and ammunition had to be removed from carts and carried by hand. It was extremely difficult for men loaded with machine gun equipment to get over this terrain with anything like the speed with which the Infantry with only nine-pound rifles to encumber them were able to advance. Although the companies were attached to infantry battalions, whose commanding officers were charged with their handling, I left Brigade Headquarters, which had been established at Courpoil, and went into the line to see if I could give the machine gun commanders any assistance. I found that it had been impossible to maintain the speed of the infantry over the swamp area, but that they had caught up when the infantry slowed up when they came under machine gun fire at the edge of the woods surrounding the open fields at La Croix Rouge Ferme.

"As usual when directly accompanying the infantry attack, the machine guns had been of no practical assistance during the time of the advance. In my opinion a splendid opportunity to effectively use machine guns was overlooked in the final attack on La Croix Rouge Ferme. An examination of this terrain on the map shows the open fields around La Croix Rouge Ferme to form practically a rectangle. Thus a clear field of fire on the farm itself and on the woods opposite our position could have been had from the two sides of the square which the 168th and 167th Infantry had been able to reach.

"Machine guns could have been grouped at a number of places along the edge of the woods so as to concentrate terrific fire, first on the farm buildings where the Germans had left a defending group, and second, on the woods from which the Germans were sweeping the open ground to either side of these buildings. This could have been done while still leaving sufficient open spaces between the groups of machine guns for our infantry to advance on the farm without coming within the zone of fire of our guns.

"Due to the distribution of the guns amongst the infantry, no concerted use was even attempted. Thus the possible use of

powerful concentration of fire was simply lost to our attacking force.

"In checking these machine guns at this time I marked the infantry positions on my map and was able to give General Brown the positions of the front line on my return to brigade headquarters.

"Because of this information as to these positions it fell to my lot almost immediately to return to the front line position with orders for the troops to press the advance.

"The advance from Croix Rouge Ferme brought our front lines to the hills just South of the Ourcq River. General Brown established his headquarters at Le Croix Blanch Ferme. Under General Brown's orders, I went personally on the right of General Weigle's Brigade of the 28th (Penn.) Division to establish contact with the 39th French Division, which was then on our right. I was to locate the actual position of our front line troops. I established contact with the French at La Motte Ferme and located the 168th Infantry in the wheat fields on the hill opposite Sergy.

"This was a very trying personal experience as the night was pitch dark. The Germans were firing continuously on the whole of this area. The wheat was so tall and heavy with grain that walking through the fields was almost like wading through water. I reported back to General Browns headquarters about 11:00 o'clock at night. I found that he had orders for his brigade to attack at daylight.

"Under his orders I immediately retraced my steps to give his orders to the infantry commanders, most of whom were scattered over the side of the hill.

"The next day we crossed the Ourcq River but were unable to advance beyond the foot of the hill on which the Germans had strong positions. They were just above the town of Sergy in the Bois Pelger and Bois Planchett, as well as in the open field on the top of Hill 218. The German machine gun position was so arranged that an enfilade fire could be applied by them on any direction on which we attempted to make an advance.

"In our attack on this hill above Sergy we overlooked again an ideal opportunity to effectively use concentrated ma-

chine gun fire. I had a fortunate opportunity to point out on the terrain itself, to General MacArthur, then Chief-of-Staff, and Colonel Blanton Winship, who was with him, my idea of what should be the use of the machine guns to effectively support infantry in such an attack as we were then engaged. A glance at the map shows that the hills on both sides of the Ourcq River are about equally high. My machine guns placed in camouflaged positions on the hillsides South of the Ourcq River, could have concentrated a terrific fire on the Bois Pelger and the Bois Planchett, as well as sweeping the open hilltop so as to beat down the Germans while our infantry was advancing up the hill above Sergy.

"Fire from our guns could have originated from a level much above the jump-off place of our infantry, while the ranges which we would have been firing would have made it safe for us to maintain our barrage until our infantry in their advance had practically arrived at the crest of the hill.

"As it was, during the five days we were fighting on the Ourcq River, the only use made of a machine gun was in the defense of the line against counter-attacks attempted by the Germans. As a consequence during this period we did not fire more than 20,000 rounds of ammunition from the guns of the entire battalion.

"In other words, our machine guns gave practically no help to our infantry when they were making an assault!

"In the attack of the 167th Infantry on this position a Platoon of "A" Company of the 151st Machine Gun Battalion advanced in line with the infantry. They set up their machine guns on the open hillside about half way up Hill 200. They attempted to establish themselves in this position, but were driven back into the woods alongside the river. One machine gun section, however, under Lieutenant Roberts, remained in position to cover withdrawal of the infantry. They were practically annihilated by machine gun fire from the hillside and from a low flying German plane which swooped down almost to the ground over their position. Lieutenant Roberts was severely wounded, machine gun fire from the plane completely shattering his left leg. He lay for two days and a night in a

shell hole between the lines in a position constantly bombarded by Germans and our own artillery. On the second night, at about 10 o'clock, two Germans patrolling this area found him and carried him to a dressing station in La Tulerie Ferme, in the village of Nesles. The next day he was evacuated, eventually reaching a German hospital where he remained during the balance of the war.

"It greatly aggravated me not to have been able to take advantage of such a perfect opportunity to employ machine guns with decisive effect. All the more so, as during this period when the guns of the battalion actually accomplished so little, we suffered a loss of 27 men killed, five died of wounds, 23 gassed, and 147 wounded by machine gun or shell fire.

"During this period on the Ourcq River, the difficulty of administrating and supplying detached companies came up again. The infantry supply officers made no provision for rations for the detached companies. My battalion supply officer had the greatest difficulty in obtaining and delivering the necessary issue of rations. Their distribution with the battalion scattered all over was frequently entirely impracticable. These difficulties are inescapable when machine gun companies are attached to infantry battalions. They are important because they hurt materially the morale of the outfit. The men felt that they were being made to suffer unnecessary hardships. Not knowing the real reasons for these difficulties, they were sure the battalion administration had fallen down either through indifference or incompetence.

"On August 6th Brigadier General MacArthur assumed command of the 84h Infantry Brigade. His first order directed the assembling of the 151st Machine Gun Battalion under its own command. From that time on we operated as a combat unit. So far as I have been able to learn no other brigade machine gun battalion in the A. E. F. was so employed.

"On August 13th the battalion was again moved to the vicinity of La Ferte Sous Jouarre, in the Valley of the Marne. Here the clothing of the battalion was deloused and the men were able to obtain a real bath with a swim in the Marne itself.

"Once more clean and with hunger satisfied we were ready for the next combat."

Here is the story of Lieut. Vivian Roberts of the 151st Machine Gun Battalion, who started forward with the Alabama regiment July 28th. He only recovered from his wound a few days before Christmas, 1922.

He says:

"At daylight, July 28th, we learn from a patrol which had been out, that the enemy had fallen back during the night. We leap frog the battalion then in line and advance by platoons in formation against heavy artillery fire. It was during this advance that a 'Whiz Bang' killed Corporal Enters and Private Paul Hearn Jr. and seriously wounded Private Anderson. We had advanced possibly three kilometers without any opposition other than artillery fire when we ran into what appeared to be about a half dozen machine gun nests on a hill. Captain Palmer, our captain, was with the Infantry Battalion commander and I was bringing our Company up behind Company E, 167th Infantry. I received a message to report forward with the 1st Platoon of our Company at the foot of the hill; I reached this point with only one man wounded.

"I was then ordered to take my platoon forward and drive back the machine guns that were holding up our advance. We realized that many of us would not return, so we stripped down as light as possible, leaving our packs and canteens and only carrying our gas masks, arms and ammunition. I then went forward with four guns with crews of three men each. I took the first two guns and crawled to the right front and sent Sgt. Grant to the left front with the other two guns. We crawled forward through the Infantry which had established its line in a wheat field at the foot of the hill, up past a patrol that was out. We found two nests in our front had fallen back. We crawled towards our right flank and caused another one to fall back. They escaped by running over the hill before we could get a gun into action. We then crawled forward again getting near the brow of the hill. About 200 yards away were five or six Germans who seemed to have a machine gun; several of them raised their rifles and took a pot shot at me. I ducked and heard the bullets singing over my head. I was standing near one of the nests they had previously occupied. It consisted of three square holes about three feet deep neatly camouflaged with wheat straw. I had a gun set up in it.

From here we tried to get a grazing fire at them over the brow of the hill. I stood up several times to line in our gun and to observe our fire. Each time I was fired upon and observed that our fire was going harmlessly over their heads.

"I realized that it would have been suicide to carry our heavy machine gun to the brow of the hill for we would have all been picked off before we could have gotten our gun in action. So I sent back, explaining the situation and asking for eight infantrymen with rifles to crawl up from different directions and draw their fire until we could get our machine gun in action. Instead of the eight infantrymen coming up, the whole infantry line advanced. I explained the situation to Captain Wyatt of the Infantry and he said he had orders to advance regardless. He ordered my guns to his right and left flanks and for me to accompany him. As we reached the crest of the hill, instead of the five or six Germans I had been firing upon, a solid line of Germans arose stretching all across the hill. Machine Guns opened up upon us from the woods on the right and from the Church steeple and buildings from the little village of La Ferte on our left, pouring a terrific fire into our ranks. Hearing a groan at my side, I turned and saw little F. H. Dent from Macon, his shirt on fire; a bullet had struck a clip of cartridges in his belt, exploding them, setting his shirt on fire, as well as badly wounding him. I put the fire out, gave him first aid and sending him to the rear, took his rifle. I tried to use the rifle but finding it badly jammed, squatted on my right heel to extricate the jammed cartridge when a German plane swooped down over our line strafing, mowing down, it seemed about every sixth man in our line. A bullet struck me in my right thigh breaking the bone and passing on through the leg and lodging in the lower leg. As I fell back, I could plainly see the observer in the rear cockpit with his machine gun over the side. He could not have been fifty feet high. About twenty feet further on I saw Captain Wyatt crumple up, badly wounded. The line then went out of view over the crest Soon the remnants of that line came straggling back over the crest. I asked two infantrymen to carry me back. They tried to do it but as my right leg was dangling giving me so much pain, and bullets were singing all around us, I asked them to put me in a shell hole and make their escape.

"All day long I lay there playing dead, Germans walking all around me. Late in the afternoon, I was in such pain and hearing footsteps on the edge of the-shell hole I looked up and found four Germans looking down at me. One of them spoke to me in French, asking me if I was badly wounded; he sat down on the edge of the shell hole and began to talk to me, the other three going on further down the hill to snipe on our boys, whom I could not see but knew must be in the valley for I soon heard return shots. I thought I would take a look around; raising myself on my elbows I could just see over the top of the shell hole. I had just gotten back down when a bullet hit the edge of the shell hole where my head had been, knocking dirt in my eyes and striking the other side of the shell hole just above my foot. I'll say that American sniper was some good shot; if I had been ten seconds longer in laying down I would not have lived to tell the tale. He must have been at least a kilometer away. As I was in the vicinity from which the Germans were firing, when I raised my head, he could not tell from that distance a German helmet from an American one, so he let go at me. Needless to say, I did not have any further curiosity.

"Just about dark it began to drizzle rain and the German who had been talking to me came back and taking his blanket from his pack, tucked it around me, telling me he would be back at ten o'clock that night to take me back. As I was now between two German lines it was impossible to crawl away even if I had been able to. All I could do was wait and hope for rescue. At ten o'clock he came back to me and told me something I don't think I fully understood, but seemed to be that at five o'clock the next morning my comrades were to attack and that his comrades were to fall back eine (one) kilometer. He left me in my shell hole and although I was badly in need of medical attention, my hopes rose for I felt sure our boys would be over at daylight, and I would be rescued, but daylight came, then morning and still no Americans. Then all of a sudden, one of the heaviest barrages I ever went through was put down on that hill. I thought my time had come; shells were bursting all around me, the air was full of flying splinters, the concussion was so great it had me bouncing around that shell hole like a rubber ball and a large shell splinter bounced in to keep me company, but luckily

ricocheted off my helmet. I still had hopes, thinking this barrage was being put down by our own troops.

"Suddenly, I saw a Very signal light go up between me and my own lines; the color was our signal for lengthening your fire. I propped myself up, sure I would see our boys following that barrage, but instead saw a German uniformed cuffed arm some twenty-five yards away sticking out of a shell hole holding a Very Pistol, so I knew it was all off and the artillery which had suddenly ceased was German and not American. Watching in the direction of our lines, I did not see four Germans who had approached me from the opposite direction, three Red Cross men and the non-commissioned officer who had talked to me the night before, who informed me they had come to take me back. By this time, I was in rather bad shape, having been in a shell hole for about thirty hours with three open wounds and three inches of fractured bone without any kind of dressing, food or water. All I had had to eat in the past three days was one light breakfast.

"I was carried in a German shelter half, a German at each corner, about a kilometer and a half to the German First Aid Station which was in the little village of Nesles behind the German lines. Here a German officer who spoke English said he would have to trouble me for my identification book, which I gave him; he did not search or question me. While in the shell hole, I had destroyed all papers, maps, etc. My wounds were then dressed and I was laid on a French mattress which was saturated in blood. Late in the afternoon, I was taken out on a stretcher to a horse drawn ambulance about a half kilometer away and loaded with three wounded Germans. American shells were bursting all around us and as one fell very near us the ambulance dashed away over one of the roughest roads I hope ever to ride upon.

"As my leg as yet had not been put into a splint you can imagine the condition I was in after about a two hours' ride. We arrived at what I took to be Fismes; here we were taken to a German Field Hospital in barracks and my leg was set and put in a splint. As the hospital was being evacuated that night, due to the advance of the Americans, I was soon put into an automobile ambulance with three wounded Germans. We traveled all night, arriving early in the morning at what I took to be Laon. At about 7 a. m., a Frenchman, fourteen wounded Germans and

myself are loaded in a freight railroad cattle car on little pallets of straw and covered with blood-soaked blankets. Here we lay all day without food or water, one of the Germans dying. Some time after dark, our train began its journey and about noon the next day, July 31st, we arrive at Formies, France, about six kilometers from the Belgian Frontier. We were taken out of the cars on stretchers and loaded on drays and farm wagons and hauled through the streets of Formies to a large factory building on the outskirts of the town. The machinery having been stripped a long ago, we were placed on the concrete floor on bags of straw.

"I was surprised to have a German nurse ask me, in perfect English, as I was taken by, when my wound was last dressed and when I told her night before last, she said you should be thankful. I soon discovered she was right, for by counting the number of rows and men in a row, I found there were between seven and eight hundred in this building alone. I could only see an English Captain, five Frenchmen and myself, making seven prisoners; the others were wounded Germans.

"There was only one doctor and two nurses to look after these eight hundred badly wounded men. The operating or dressing table was in the center of the building, in front of me, and they worked constantly night and day, but numbers died before they could even get to them to dress their wounds. I hope I never have to go through another night of horrors like that first night was. Picture if you can, eight hundred badly wounded men—numbers of amputation cases, all running high temperatures, numbers delirious, groaning and crying out in pain and you have some vague idea of what it was like.

"The next day, August 1st, they began evacuating to the regular hospitals in the vicinity, the most serious cases first. I seemed to get impartial treatment, for on the night of August 2nd I was moved, leaving about 300 less seriously wounded Germans there. I was taken to a very nice hospital on the other side of the town. It formerly had been a female college. Here I was given a good bed with pillow and sheets, in a ward with thirteen wounded Germans. We had a nurse, ward orderly and a very good doctor who spoke English and visited each patient twice daily. I remained here until August 13th, when I was moved to the 'Lazarett Civille' at Trelen, France. This was what you would

call a prisoners' concentration point; there were some ten or twelve hundred prisoners here of all nationalities, including civil prisoners. I was put in a ward with an English and three French officers and had an American ward orderly.

"On September 6th, with six French officers, I was moved to the Martinel Hospital on the other side of the town. Soon the French officers, one of whom spoke English, were sent to Germany. As there was no one left in this hospital who could speak English and I could not speak German, the German doctor took pity on me and transferred me on September 16th to another hospital nearby, where there were two wounded English officers. This hospital being evacuated on September 28th, I was returned again to the Martinel Hospital where I remained until October 4th and was then transferred back to the 'Lazarett Civille' for evacuation to Germany.

"On October 6th, I was put aboard a German hospital train and my long journey to Germany began. We passed through Belgium, Luxembourg and on across the Rhine into Germany, arriving at Langensalza, Saxony, on October 9th. I was put in hospital at the prison camp there. Here I remained until December 18th when another Lieutenant, two American doctors, six privates and myself were put aboard a train and sent to Rastatd, Baden. After a three day and night journey through revolution demoralized Germany, we arrive at Rastadt on the 21st of December, having passed through Gotha, Frankfort, Old Heidelberg and Karlsruhe. We had quite an eventful trip, passing through many experiences but I shudder to think of what would have happened to us had it not been for one of the doctors who spoke perfect German and knew Germany like a book.

"On our arrival at Rastadt, we were sent out to the prison hospital of the American prison camp located there. However, all American prisoners had been evacuated since December 12th except ten volunteers who had remained to look after any American prisoners who might come that way. As they had a lot of supplies on hand, I secured a pair of shoes, overcoat and hat; up to this time I had been bareheaded, barefooted and wrapped up in a blanket. This was the camp where all American prisoners had been concentrated and where Sergeant Halliburton became famous. Some way word was gotten through to some American ambulance company who plunged into Germany and arrived for

us on December 22nd. Then we started on our journey to freedom. It did not take them long to make the 52 kilometers to Strassbourg where we are placed in a French hospital, with a French doctor, an Alsatian nurse and a Morrocan orderly. On the night of December 23 we embark on a French hospital train for Toul, France. Arriving on the morning of December 24th we entered American Base Hospital No. 45. Our hopes and wishes are fulfilled—that we be out of prison by Christmas. Here I am examined and put in Class 'D' for evacuation to the States.

"On January 19th, I leave by hospital train for Savenay, France, arriving on January 21st and entering Base Hospital No. 119. On January 23rd, I receive my orders for the States and leave by hospital train for Brest, France, arriving on January 24th. I enter Base Hospital No. 65 to await transport. On February 7th, we embark on the Holland American Liner 'Rotterdam' for America. On the 8th we sail out of Brest into a fresh gale, the first day, and have very rough seas for six days, then two days of snow storms followed by two days of fog landing at Hoboken, N. J., February 17, 1919. We are taken to the Lafayette House, 112 West 59th St., convalescent home for officers, a branch of Debarkation Hospital No. 5. Here I receive my orders to report at General Hospital No. 6 at Ft. McPherson, Ga., where I arrive on February 25, 1919.

"On March 7th, I have quite a serious operation, and am trussed up in splints, braces, pulleys, etc., for about a year. For ten months I am not able to even turn on my side. In January, 1921, I am awakened one night and find the ward on fire and the roof falling in around me; the Officer of the Day rushes in and carries me out on his back, but I lose all my belongings. In March, 1921, I am transferred to Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., where I remain until December 22, 1922, when I am discharged from the service of the United States."

As was true of Winn's 151st Georgia Machine Gun Battalion already in action on the right in support of the 84th Infantry Brigade, Hall's 150th Wisconsin Machine Gun Battalion now had their first task of warfare in the open.

They came in, in support of the 83rd Infantry Brigade to which they belonged.

As there is nothing more interesting than the account of the men who actually had the experience, let the then Captain Graef who subsequently commanded the Battalion tell of the advance.

Here are his own words: "This battle for the first time brought to my attention forcibly the need for overwhelming artillery fire, with plenty of aviation to find its targets and adjust it if Infantry is to advance successfully in the open against a war-wise determined enemy.

"Trench systems can be photographed from the air and the sensitive enemy spots located from the photographs. A trench or a strong point or barbed wire cannot move.

"A war-wise enemy such as the Germans who confronted us on the Ourcq out in the open is another proposition. Besides being in the easily identified and fired-on places such as the edges of woods, villages and farm houses they were scattered throughout the wheat. These troops which included some of the Prussian Guard had learned long before that the old-fashioned way of bull-headedly assaulting or stubbornly holding until blown up in some small locality was not always the best method to secure victory.

"Therefore while stubbornly holding the position in general and strong points of primary tactical importance they did not hesitate to move around within the framework of their defense. This not only kept down their losses but made the job of the attackers, ourselves, much more difficult, because once we identified some group which had caused us considerable annoyance and loss, it frequently managed to move before we could badly damage or destroy it.

"In this battle we encountered for the first time enemy machine guns well in front of the main position, which after taking their toll retired into that position before they could be captured or destroyed.

"However, we learned in most cases to move around ourselves without abandoning our main purpose—to drive the Germans from their Ourcq position.

"After being relieved from the trenches in the Champagne, we moved by train and marching to the area south of Epieds. We reached Beauvardes July 27th. About 6:00 P. M. July 28th we received orders to join the Second Battalion (Anderson), 165th Infantry and go into position on the line just to the south of

Villiers sur Fere. The First Battalion (Donovan) which had led the advance had become deflected to the right in the Foret de Fere and had come out facing Sergy.

"The Third Battalion, McKenna's, therefore was assigned to advance on the Ourcq via Villers sur Fere.

"We had some difficulty finding our position in the dark. We moved forward by compass, being ordered to march on a line 3 degrees East of North. I was in command of Co. A. Two platoons of this company were assigned, one to McKenna's battalion and one to Anderson's. The other was held in support.

"McKenna's battalion moved forward down the open slope from the Foret de Fere. It halted in Villiers Sur Fere when they contacted French troops in that town. The platoon held in its support skirted Villiers sur Fere to the west to avoid heavy enemy artillery fire in the vicinity of the village.

"This platoon then moved forward to the bank of the Orcq. Here they were challenged by a French sentry. The sentry told us to keep absolutely quiet as the enemy was just across the river not more than 100 yards away.

"Asked whether he had seen any American troops pass that way, the sentry said he had seen no troops of any kind, American or French.

"When I heard this I decided something had gone wrong somewhere so I ordered the platoon back into the village of Villiers-sur-Fere.

"I then hunted for Major Anderson. When I found him he gave me orders to return to Foret-de-Fere and wait further orders.

"We retired therefore to these woods. I scattered my men around them as much as possible to prevent heavy loss from the artillery fire. The night before our infantry had suffered a good deal from such fire. Early in the morning of the 29th I was awakened by a runner who informed me that the attack would be resumed. I don't recall the hour but do know we had just 15 minutes to prepare, omitting breakfast. As we had not had much the evening before we noticed this omission decidedly.

"We managed, however, to get into position and moved forward with the infantry through a mist.

"This mist lifted just as we approached the Ourcq. Seeing us the Germans opened up a heavy machine gun and artillery fire. We had moved forward pretty fast, and without artillery support as the 151st Artillery had not been able to take up their position as yet.

"We took position promptly in a sunken road running between Villiers-sur-Fere and Fere en-Tardenois. Here we remained all day.

"From this position we had a perfect view of the terrain to the front. Just across the river in front of us the land sloped gently upwards for about three-quarters of a mile. There was no cover for our infantry. Enemy machine guns swept the entire slope, the banks of the river and the slope on our sides.

"Attempt after attempt of our infantry which had crossed the Ourcq to advance was stopped with considerable loss.

"We tried to locate some of the enemy machine gun nests in order to smother them with our own machine gun fire by concentrating it. Unfortunately, due to the enemy's skillful disposition of these nests we were unable to do so. There was but little if any artillery support to Anderson's Battalion in this position. Whether this was due to the famous order to attack with the bayonet and without artillery support I do not know.

"Perhaps it was because Anderson's position was to the left of the main attack of his regiment. This was due to the necessity to protect that flank where there was a considerable gap between the Americans and the French.

"Whatever the reason the consequence of the lack of artillery concentration to Anderson's front was that the Germans had the advantage. They were on higher ground with an excellent field of fire to their front and not being pounded by our artillery. We were on lower ground well exposed to their machine gun fire and being pounded by their artillery. Fortunately only one German shell made a direct hit in our road, taking its toll of dead and wounded both from the machine gunners and the infantry.

"What aggravated us was to be kept down when from time to time we could see Germans suddenly appear in the wheat as they stood up, walk to another position, stop and as suddenly disappear as they got down.

"The middle of the morning the leading Ohio battalion (Geran's first) which had been in reserve behind Anderson moved up passed to his left and crossed the Ourcq.

"It was a privilege to watch them advancing in battle formation under heavy enemy artillery fire. Bursting shells and duds were falling among them at a terrific rate throwing shell fragments and dirt about and killing and wounding them.

"But they never wavered nor stopped their advance!

"At the same time, the 149th F. A. which had been assigned to support them opened a heavy fire on the hill to their front and our own. It certainly was a satisfaction to see our shells seemingly blasting off the top of that hill where shortly before we had seen the Germans moving about.

"Under cover of the artillery fire which was never long silent and with the diversion created by the Ohio advance I decided the next day to cross the Ourcy as Anderson's battalion had moved to the right.

"After crossing I moved east along the north bank. I put my guns in position just north of and near the only bridge across the river from Villiers-sur-Fere. This was not a good position. With the configuration of the ground to my front I was too close to the infantry to have a good field of fire. Also the enemy artillery was constantly bringing down concentrations on the bridge and vicinity.

"I decided my casualties were out of proportion to my usefulness and moved back south of the river into a better position from every point of view.

"The next day, July 30th, while in this new position a battery of artillery galloped up, unlimbered, went into action opening up with direct fire. Then as quickly they limbered and galloped out of there. We were right alongside them so I decided to move my company to the right. I did so immediately! Sure enough, we just moved in time, for down came a powerful concentration of German artillery. They were too late as our artillery was gone, and so were we.

"Another incident occurred the 28th when I saw two enemy airplanes collide and fall just north of the Ourcq. One of the pilots evidently was hit by some of the thousands of rifle and

machine gun bullets fired at him. He lost control, collided with the other!

"They seemed to hang suspended, locked together!

"Then both planes fell to the ground in flames!

"The 31st of July was a repetition of the 30th.

"There were gradual but persistent and successful infantry advances supported by artillery and machine gun fire.

"The night of August 1-2, the night we were relieved.

"We camped in the Foret de Nesles. I found a very comfortable little hut which had been used by a German officer. On his table he had written, "Hello Yank," "Mahl Zeit" (meaning "Time to eat").

"During this Ourcq offensive the 150th Machine Gun Battalion did not have much opportunity to fire upon the enemy because they were so skillful in keeping from being much of a target even while inflicting considerable loss on our troops. We, however, did suffer many casualties from enemy machine gun and artillery fire, mostly from the latter. This largely because we were always in position to cover the attack of our infantry and to stop an enemy counter-attack whether we could or could not see the German machine guns.

"Probably we were too close to our own infantry to give them the most effective support fire. If we had been in position ready to fire sooner instead of moving forward with them as long as we did we could have done more damage to the Germans.

"It was during this battle that I was first impressed with the difference between French and American troops. The French were on our left, and I could see their soldiers advancing slowly forward with their overcoats on and their various mess kits hanging from their belts. Our troops on the other hand had dropped everything but their weapons and were all set to go and go fast."

Here is the story of one of the 150th Wisconsin Machine Gun Battalion men whose company was assigned to an infantry battalion. His name is Lloyd F. Kindness. He is a full blooded American Indian and one of the youngest men in the Division.

He says:

"I'm a Brothertown Indian, originally the Mohicans who roamed the New England states once. I enlisted on my 19th birthday. It was in the Aisne-Marne sector that was my big day.

Of course there's times on other fronts I could mention but it was on the morning of July 28th, 1918, we were advancing toward the Ourcq river. It was like a huge rehearsal, we could look down from the woods called Bois de Villemoyenne and see the infantry in waves 'going over'. I remember our company in formation of platoons entering a small town named Villers-sur-Fere. We have to run across a street so as not to be observed and draw fire from the enemy machine guns across the Ourcq. They were shelling quite lively as we set our guns up at the north end of the town in an orchard. I left my ammunition by the gun and went back to the woods for more. It was about a quarter of a mile to carry ammunition. I walked and ran through the town got my ammunition and returned to the gun squad, dug in and stayed there awhile. The wounded started to come in, mostly boys of the 165th Infantry. One boy passed nearby. I remember he was badly shot up in the leg, with some seventeen bullet holes. He was being carried by two buddies. He looked up at the apples on the trees in the orchard, and said he wanted one. They got him one. He ate it. He rested on one fellow's shoulder and asked for a cigarette and went on talking and joking with the boys who carried him.

"One of our boys came along with news of our company's first platoon who were up in the front line. He told us of some of the boys had been killed already. He was wounded in the shoulder and looked pale. I could look towards the Ourcq and hear and see the enemy machine gunners, getting in their deadly fire on the 165th boys and our battalion boys on the south slope of the Ourcq. I could see them fall in the wheat fields. It was growing hot on this Sunday morning in July. I lay quiet for awhile. Then after awhile I got orders to go after more ammunition to the woods. Another buddy was with me. We ran and walked through the town which they were still shelling. We got to the woods and got our ammunition O. K. A shell had nearly put our kitchen out of commission. It was in these same woods. I'm glad it didn't hit but just shook 'em up.

"We started back to the gun. I was behind my pal about 30 feet. There was camouflage along the road. We kept under that as near as could be so we would not be seen. But to our

surprise an enemy aviator had spotted us, and we were in for a run. There was a farm house about half way to the town.

"This plane dove down at us and opened up fire. Well we ran full speed to the farm and just made it. It was a very close call. We stood in there and could hear those bullets sing and whistle outside as he raked the place. Finally he gave it up and left. Then we left too and went towards the town. We left just in time as they started to shell that farm heavily. I was told afterwards that the German dead were stacked up like cordwood in that farmhouse. I never saw them though while I was in there. Only a few lying along the road. In town the shelling was heavy.

"I reached our gun O K with my ammunition. I was just going back to my foxhole when a big shell landed from our right flank. One of our officers came staggering out of the dust and gravel and smoke. He was badly shellshocked. I have never seen him since. I don't believe he was wounded though. That shell landed about 15 feet from me so I got up and changed my position. Going toward the front there was a crossroad. I just got on the road running east and west when another shell came over. It must have been very close to me. All I could hear was 'whizz-bang.' I looked to my left and back a little. It had burst in the ditch among some infantrymen. I could hear screams and groans. I looked around and seen them lying there. The dirt and concussion dazed me also. Then I reached this other road, and ran into a hedge next to the ditch. I no more than got out of sight when a shell broke right in the middle of the road next to me throwing stones, dirt and smoke all over me. My company commander came around the corner on the run and asked 'are you hurt, Kindness?' I said 'no' and started to run towards town again. There was a large barn near the orchard. I made for that, and not 15 feet behind me another shell burst, which caused me to pick up my speed. I made the barn in a hurry to keep out of sight and to my surprise it was crowded with soldiers. There were German prisoners and wounded. As I came in right at my feet lay a dead American with a large hole in his head. Several other dead was in there. The flies were thick. It was hot and they were shelling heavy. The shells seemed to all go over this particular barn and break in the town. If a shell had hit that barn we'd all been killed or wounded.

"I decided that barn an unhealthy place to be so I went back to my old foxhole in the orchard and remained until we were relieved late that afternoon. We went back in reserve to some woods and remained there till the next day. All day long we were shelled, and many of the boys went to the dressing stations as shell-shock cases, and were sent to the hospital. One lad was sleeping on the ground and got wounded in the stomach from an anti-aircraft shell fragment; queer wound I thought.

"When we went up again I was awakened one morning by an awful shelling. I thought we were being shelled, instead it was our Stokes Morters battery opening fire on the German positions. I was tired and hungry and worn out from the previous fighting. The Ourcq valley was one awful place to be in. But we held up. I recall how bad the atmosphere was, with dead lying all around, also horses and gas. I seen one dead German lying on the ground with a nice ring on his finger, but I chose to leave it on him rather than go near him. He was black already and smelled terribly."

The constant changes in orders which distinguished the entry into action and advance to the Ourcq is well illustrated by the experiences of Lieut. Cornelius Lombardi, the officer of the 149th Field Artillery who was the infantry liaison officer of that regiment.

Also the difficulties of maintaining such liaison, with the best will on both sides is brought out.

This is what Lombardi said while the division was resting and refitting after the Second Battle of the Marne:

"I reported to the C. O. 165th Infantry, (Col. McCoy) at Courpoil on the afternoon of July 24th. The C. O. then stated that the regiment was to put one battalion into a first line position that evening, relieving French Infantry, and also had orders for an advance the same night. Col. McCoy indicated for me on the map the line from which the advance was to start, the intermediate and final objectives, and the hours at which each was to be reached and the intermediate objectives departed from. This information I gave to Capt. Smith* who visited Col. McCoy's P. C. late in the afternoon. That evening the house in Courpoil in which Col. McCoy had his P. C. was bombarded with gas and

---

* Captain Dwight Smith Commanding Hdqrs. Co. 149 F. A.

H. E. shells and hit twice, and on account of the remaining gas, the Colonel moved to Moucheton Chateau. Just before he left he received orders cancelling his previous orders to take up front line positions that night, and to advance. The First Battalion was already on its way to the front line and had to be recalled. After he reached Moucheton Chateau, at, if I remember correctly, about 1:00 a. m. July 25th (tho I made no note of the exact hour) he received further orders to put a battalion into the first line and make a relief. He was at first in doubt as to whether this order re-established the old order for an advance, but found that it did not. The 1st Battalion, which had just returned to the rear and bivouacked, had to be waked up and sent forward again. At daybreak Col. McCoy moved his P. C. back to Courpoil. I go into this detail because it illustrates two things which have to be dealt with constantly in the work of liaison with the infantry: 1. Sudden changes in the orders affecting the infantry units which we support; and 2. Sudden changes in the location of their P. C.'s.

"On his return to Courpoil, Col. McCoy indicated to me on the map the position of his front line, support and reserve battalions. After sending this information back to my Commanding Officer by messenger, I started forward to check the position of the front line. On the way forward I passed the P. C. of the Commanding Officer of the forward battalion, Major Donovan. He had just returned from visiting his two front line companies and indicated to me their position on the map, which did not agree with the positions indicated by Col. McCoy. I then went forward and visited the first lines and endeavored to locate them on the map. Of course the exact methods of an orienting officer could not be used but there were visible certain landmarks, shown on the map, such as Beuvardes, le Four a Verre, the depression along the bed of the stream running westward from Beuvardes through the woods, and La Croix Rouge Fme., from which and from the position of roads and the configuration of the woods, I made the best estimate I could of the position of the first lines. The position indicated by Col. McCoy that morning appeared to be incorrect all along the line by from 700 to 300 meters, and that indicated by Major Donovan also inaccurate, tho to a less degree. This is one of two occasions on which I had an opportunity of personally checking the front line positions indicated to me by

the Infantry commander, and found them in substantial error. It seems that Infantry operations do not require the same accuracy in map-work which is required in the artillery. Moreover the Infantry in the front line is harassed by the enemy and often distracted by the immediate situation. Infantrymen therefore have a habit of indicating positions on the map from memory and by what might be called the free-hand method. Except where the first lines are along some unmistakable land-mark such as a river, a railroad or a well-identified road, I believe that the artillery should, when practicable, check up the position of the front lines by means of its own liaison personnel. Of course this will often be impracticable on account of the need of the Liaison Officer's remaining with the Infantry Commander and the fact that often the front lines cannot be visited and moved along without very great risk, except at night. If it should ever be deemed advisable in this regiment to select and train enlisted men especially for the work of a liaison detachment with the Infantry, I would respectfully recommend that the need of their assisting in such checking be borne in mind.

"When I joined the advance battalion of the 165th Infantry, its front line extended from the N. W. corner of the Bois de Beuvardes at 791.540-268.920, along a convexly curved line which kept from two to three hundred meters south of the brook flowing through the woods toward Beuvardes, to approximately 192.450-268.360. On the right the 167th Infantry occupied the border of the Foret de Fere to a point opposite La Croix Rouge Fme., and possible somewhat further south. This regiment had the evening before gone through sever fighting in taking the position of the woods then occupied by them and also a portion which the 165th had taken over. The ground between the American lines and the brook before mentioned East of about 23.88 contained German machine gun pits at frequent intervals, and in or near each pit that I saw were two dead German soldiers. Before these pits were many American dead, belonging to the 167th Infantry, as well as some French. I was told by an officer of the 165th Infantry in the front line that the last shots fired by the Germans in this region had been fired at about 3:00 a. m., and by another officer of the same regiment that the Colonel of the 167th Infantry had stated that patrols from his regiment had gone a mile

and a half northeast of La Croix Rouge Fme. without encountering the enemy. The 165th Infantry seemed to be absolutely out of contact with the enemy, either by its own means or through friendly units in liaison and to have been in this condition since 3 a. m. One of the noticeable features of our advance from the Bois de Beuvardes to the Vesle, from the point of view of one attached to the Infantry, was the promptness with which we lost contact with the enemy as soon as he made up his mind to withdraw and leave us, contact which was in each case regained only when the full American infantry force intended for the front line had arrived before the position where the enemy intended to make his next stand and come under his prepared artillery fire. This lack of contact, due perhaps in part to the absence of American cavalry, prevented the Infantry liaison service from sending back information which might have helped to guide the artillery in its advance and enabled it to keep continuously within supporting distance of the Infantry.

"I had just finished locating the front lines when a Platoon Commander with whom I was talking received an order to prepare his men to advance. I went back and took my post with Major Donovan. The advance began at 16:30 h. The direction of advance was slightly East of North through the Foret de Fere, the entire battalion passing East of Le Four a Verre, which point was visited by a patrol. From a point about 200 meters north of the main Beuvardes-Fresnes road, the advancing battalion bore more and more to the east and finally moved northeast, with its front extending from Ruisseau de la Croix Blanche to the summit of the ridge immediately northwest thereof. The formation was, I believe, what is called "line of groups," each group being in column of files, with two companies in the first line and one in support. When we came out of the Foret de Fere we could see American troops, afterwards reported to Major Donovan to be the 168th Infantry, on our right across the Ruisseau de la Croix Blanche, advancing to the northeast. It was afterwards reported to Major Donovan that the 167th Infantry had advanced in a northerly direction, passed behind us and come out on our left, and that one company of Major Donovan's battalion which had been sent out to get and remain in touch with the left of the 167th Infantry had actually remained in that posi-

tion and was now, therefore, on the other side of the 167th Infantry from us.

"Major Donovan and his battalion continued the advance northeast from the Foret de Fere avoiding Faviere Farm and finally halted and lay down in an open field part way down the slope at the end of the ridge along which they had been advancing, overlooking the Ourcq and the village of Sergy. A single piece of German artillery was apparently registering on a point a short distance south of Sergy. Major Donovan and some of his officers were at first of the opinion that this was some of our own artillery fire which they were in danger of running into if they advanced farther.

"The halt was for the purpose of sending patrols forward to reconnoiter the village of Sergy, but before this was done a patrol of French cavalry appeared on our right, coming northward on the main road from La Cense. The leading horsemen turned to the right at cross-roads 195.950-373.620. As they approached the bridge near La Grange au Pont Moulin, they drew machine gun fire from that point or from the town of Sergy or both. The first horseman fell and the others returned. Soon afterwards a rocket showing one green star was sent up from Sergy and a few minutes later German artillery fire, (H.E.) began playing along a line between us and the river. At the same time hostile machine gun fire opened on the battalion from the direction of Sergy. Another green rocket was sent up from Sergy—the hostile artillery fire was intensified. Then a rocket was sent up which burst into three white stars, after which the range of the hostile artillery fire was gradually lengthened and shells began dropping among the elements of the battalion. At about this time I noticed several shrapnel bursts over our heads. As the battalion was in an open field visible from Sergy and the terrain held by the Germans northeast of Ourcq, it seemed for the moment probable that it would be adjusted on with shrapnel and made to suffer very severe losses. However, for some reason, there were only six or seven shrapnel bursts, which were high and long and caused no casualties. The fire with H. E. shell went on, the range gradually increasing.

"The First Battalion of the 165th Infantry had advanced about 4 ½ kilometers without contact with the enemy, under

whose fire it had now come. It had no communication with its regimental headquarters or its supporting artillery except by runner. On my way back later that evening I found one of these runners carrying important messages who had gone absolutely astray and wandered for several hours for lack of information of the whereabouts of the regimental P. C. This P. C. had changed while the battalion was moving forward and the statement of the runner led me to believe that Maj. Donovan was himself uninformed as to its whereabouts. The battalion was therefore without means of calling for immediate support from either artillery or Infantry.

"It is questionable how this break-down of liaison could have been avoided under the circumstances. A telephone reel cart drawn by horses would probably have been impracticable on account of the terrain to be covered with the conspicuousness of horses and a carriage in an advance in which contact with the enemy is to be expected at any moment. Hand reels might have afforded a solution if enough wire could have been taken on them. Optical liaison would have been impracticable because of the woods to be passed through. A wireless sending set of the type which can be carried by dismounted men on their backs would perhaps have afforded a practical solution. In general, as a result of this and my later experiences with the Infantry, I have come to believe that a wireless sending set with the advance elements of the Infantry offers the most practical solution of the problem of communication with those elements during combat, as it is the only method which combines mobility with independence of the conformation of the terrain and the effects of shell fire on intermediate areas.

"As the hostile artillery fire advanced until it was falling in his battalion, Major Donovan withdrew his men until they were only slightly in advance of Faviers Farm and hidden by the conformation of the ground from Sergy and most points beyond the river, especially when they lay down. The artillery fire, however, followed and harassed him to a considerable extent.

"It was now 21:15 h. Major Donovan said that the situation was stabilized for the night, that he would have his men dig in, and perhaps send forward patrols after dark. I left to report the situation to my commanding officer, which I did at Beuvar-

delles at about midnight, having on my way in reported the situation of Major Donovan's battalion to Col. McCoy at Beuvardes. My commanding officer then sent me back to Col. McCoy with a message stating that we were now supporting the 166th Infantry and I was withdrawn. I found Col. McCoy at Chateau de la Foret, his P. C. having moved from Beuvardes. Col. McCoy asked me to take an order to Major Donovan, since I had come from him and knew exactly where he was to be found. I was, of course, glad to do so. Col. McCoy asked me to read the order before leaving and I did so. It was an order of the 83rd Infantry Brigade calling for an advance beginning at 3:45 a. m. from positions between Villers-sur-Fere and Sergy along the main road running east from the northern edge of Villers-sur-Fere, the main objective was a line from Seringes-et-Nesles at Nesles, upon the occupation of which patrols were to be sent forward to the line La Vraine Farm-Les-Bons Hommes Farm. The advance to be 'by infiltration' without artillery accompaniment or support, the greatest reliance to be placed on the bayonet. I did not make a copy of the order. The above is given from memory and therefore subject to inaccuracies, but I believe it to be substantially correct.

"I left Chateau de la Foret at about 3:00 a. m. mounted and went to the place where I had left Major Donovan which I reached by 3:30. It was still dark. He was not there and remembering what he had said about sending patrols forward and thinking he might have followed them with battalion, I went on in the direction of Sergy as far as I dared. Not finding him, I circled to the left, thinking that he might have received his orders by other means and taken his position for the start on the road indicated. I struck the road but found no one and then came back along the east bank of Ruisseau de la Taveme, was halted by an outpost of the 167th Infantry, and finally found Major Donovan with his battalion in dug-in positions just northeast of the northeast corner of Foret de Fere, where I delivered him the order at 4:30 h., or three quarters of an hour after the time indicated therein for the advance to commence. I have gone into detail on this point in case the question of the cause of this delay ever arise, and also as another example of the shortness of time allowed between the giving out of infantry orders and the time

set for their execution, which makes the maintenance of liaison and the information of the artillery difficult.

"I returned to P. C., 149th F. A., where I remained until 8:00 a. m. the next day (July 27th), when I was told to get the detail which had formerly been under Lt. Toland at P. C. 2, and with it join the commander of the advance battalion of the 166th Infantry. I took the detail and went with it first to Col. Hough's headquarters at Chateau de la Foret where I was told that the and Battalion was going into the front line and was advancing north of Villers sur Fere. During the pause at Chateau de la Foret two members of the detail, Boyer and Gaddis, were wounded by an aerial bomb. I left them in the care of a medical Captain who had an aid station at the Chateau.

"At Chateau de la Foret I left the reel cart and the horses and horse equipment of the detail in charge of Corporal Wright, Hq. Co., and his two reel cart drivers. This was because I did not believe that men could be taken further forward mounted without undue risk for which there would be no compensating advantages, as the road to Villers-sur-Fere was open to hostile observation and was getting some shells. For the same reason I did not think it advisable to take the reel cart further forward before dark. In addition to Corp. Wright and his drivers I left at the Chateau two men from the detail to take charge of the horses of the detail in case Corp. and the reel cart should go further forward, with instructions to join me later if Corp. Wright remained in the rear in charge of all the horses.

"When I arrived with the detail, dismounted, at the northern edge of Villers-sur-Fere, the 2nd Battalion, 166th Infantry, was crossing the Ourcq, going up the hill on the other side in combat formation, under artillery and machine gun fire and entering the village of Seringes-et-Nesles. This was at about 3:00 o'clock on a bright afternoon, and, I believe, without artillery preparation or accompaniment. I found the C. O., 2nd Battalion, and went with him to his P. C. at La Fontaine sons Pierre. Lt. Huske, who had come with me from P. C. 2, remained behind with the telephone men to establish a telephone line.

"During the days which followed, until the German withdrawal to the Vesle, the 2nd Battalion, 166th Infantry, held the village and salient of Seringes-et-Nesles. It did not attempt to

advance, because its position was already considerably in advance of that of the 165th Infantry on the right and of the French on its left. Enemy activity consisted in frequent—intense bombardments of the village; very frequently repeated zone fire over the terrain between the village and the Ourcq, which terrain was occupied by the support and reserve companies of the battalion; machine gun and sniping fire on the village from the grove of trees about 200 meters north of the main portion thereof and from the row of houses just southwest of the Foret de Nesles, (which houses we did not occupy with the rest of the town); and machine gun fire, direct and indirect, on terrain south of the village from the high ground east of Meurcy Farm. The position of the machine guns and snipers firing on the village seemed to be constantly changing, so that the Infantry had great difficulty in locating any of them. The casualties inflicted on the battalion by this artillery and machine gun fire were heavy.

"The enemy also succeeded in infiltrating into and organizing a line of shell holes or dug-in positions extending from the grove north of the town at about 194.420-275.950 to about 194.320-275.660. Near the southern end of these positions he kept two men in observation, one of whom seemed to be an officer. These positions were too close to those of our own infantry to be shelled with safety by our artillery. Because of the conformation of the ground, the Germans in observation could be seen from only one point in the village; the second story of a house used by our infantry as an observatory. Our infantry was unwilling to fire on them with rifles from this point for fear of drawing shell fire and having their observatory destroyed. Lt. Bundy, commanding the 37 mm guns of the 166th Infantry, stated that his dispersion was small enough to permit of his firing on these enemy positions and that he could shell them out by indirect fire from a piece situated near La Fountain sous Pierre, observing from the infantry observatory at Seringes to which the Infantry had a telephone line. He requested me to have a barrage laid behind the enemy positions at the hour when he expected to fire, and this was done I went with him to the observatory and he commenced adjusting, but before his adjustment was complete the enemy opened artillery fire in volleys on the

observatory, bracketing it between the first two volleys, and we immediately left. Lt. Bundy continued his fire without observation.

"On or about July 29th, 1918 (am sorry to say that I did not make a note at the time and am not absolutely certain of the date) at, to the best of my recollection, about 23:00 h., the enemy laid a particularly intense artillery fire on the village of Seringeset-Nesles. Capt. Stevenson, in command of the troops in the town, reported a German counter-attack. Our barrage was immediately called for and laid. Our troops were withdrawn from the village and formed on a line immediately south thereof, covering the sector occupied by the village. There were reports of advancing Germans having been seen, but none was to my knowledge, substantiated. I was afterwards told by the Lieutenant commanding the platoon which had been stationed at the northern end of the village that he did not believe the Germans advanced that night. The battalion was formed for counter-attack, and as soon as the hostile bombardment was suspended, it reentered and re-occupied the village.

The artillery support called for by the 2nd Battalion, 166th Infantry, during this period consisted in:

1 . The preparation and occasion laying of a wedge-shaped defensive barrage north and northeast of Seringes, at a minimum distance of 250 meters from the positions of our infantry.

2. Zone fire, especially at night, on the southwestern portion of the Foret de Nesles, extending about 600 meters east and 600 meters north of the corner,—also on the terrain west of the forest, extending about 600 meters west and 600 meters north of the corner (the map which I used at the time and on which I marked the location of this fire has been worn out and discarded and therefore the above is approximate).

3. On one occasion the infantry asked for fire on the Grove north of Seringes, shown on the map as extending from 194.260-276.000, to 194.620-276.000—on the row of houses extending from 194.700-275.900 to 195.000-275.680 and on the upper portion of the ravine which runs from about 47.59 to Meurcy Farm. The purpose for which the fire was requested was to "clean-out" the machine gunners and snipers by whom the places indicated were infested, and who were greatly harassing our Infantry. To

eliminate all danger from shorts, our infantry was withdrawn south of the village of Seringes during the execution of the fire. The fire was executed as requested, for about three quarters of an hour. I personally observed this fire from a position in Seringes just west of the house which is shown on the map as the first house north of the church and west of the main street of the town. Being unable to find a place from which I could observe the fire well on both sides of the town, I chose one where I could see the woods north of the town, because this was the place from which the infantry seemed to have been most harassed and which they seemed most anxious to have "cleaned up". I could see that these woods were thoroughly "combed" by our fire, most of which seemed to come from 155's. Although the objectives northeast and east of the town were hidden from me by houses I could see from the smoke and dust rising from the locality designated that a thorough "combing fire" was falling there.

"So far as I could ascertain however, after a few hours hostile fire was resumed from the points fired on. It may be that when fire is conducted on this plan the enemy moves out when it commenced, and returns when it is over, and that unless shelters are to be destroyed, short bursts of surprise fire irregularly distributed are more effective than continuous systematic 'combing', except of course in preparation for an immediate attack.

"In connection with the question of shorts and dispersion I noted at this time that:

1. Although the center of impact seemed to be well in the woods and about 350 meters away, fragments, probably quite spent, frequently fell around and behind me.

2. A number of rounds fell short of the woods and some seemed to me to fall at least 200 meters short thereof.

"As all the rounds seemed to be from 155's, these facts do not concern the 75 mm's of our regiment. However anything which throws light on the psychology of the Infantry in the matter of complaints about shorts is important. The Infantry is very sensitive to artillery fire from the rear. Probably some of the complaints about shorts were due to spent fragments from friendly heavy artillery bursts well in advance of our Infantry.

"The only complaint of short fire on Seringes which I was able to trace down and get concrete evidence of was that re-

ported to have fallen from 4:00 to 4:30 a. m., August 1st in and near the positions occupied by the most advanced platoon of the battalion. These positions were just east of the schoolhouse, which is shown on the map at 194.600-275.770. I went to this position and saw the Lieutenant commanding the platoon at about 10:30 the same morning. He stated that he had himself heard the shells come, that no other shells were falling in the vicinity at the time and that he was certain these came from the rear. He showed me the holes which he said were made by these shells I reported the exact number of these holes and the apparent caliber of the shells by which they were made immediately afterwards in writing to the commanding officer of this regiment. My present recollection is that there were three shell holes of the size made by 75's and four or five of the size made by 155's, from 5 to 30 meters from the dug-in positions occupied by the platoon. The Lieutenant seemed to be a reliable officer, who appreciated the value of artillery support, stated that he had rather take a few shorts than have the artillery fire too far in advance, and had made his report, not in a hysterical way but because he really believed that the shots were coming from the rear and it was one of the things which it was his duty to report.

"From 12:55 h. to 13:10 h. on the same day I personally witnessed allied artillery fire from 75's falling short on the French positions on the southern slopes of Hill 184, west of Seringes and on both sides of our own support positions along the Seringes-Cayenne Farm road between the southern edge of the village and the small grove and road fork shown on the map at 193.940-275.320. Caterpillar rockets were sent up as soon as the fire started and repeatedly afterwards but they apparently had no effect, as the range was never lengthened.

"I witnessed this fire from a point about 100 meters southwest of the southern edge of the village.

"The difficulties of obtaining information of the whereabouts of the friendly infantry on the flanks did not at this time result in the serious inconveniences which we later experienced from this cause on the Vesle. Because of the nearness of the P. C. of the French officer commanding the battalion on our left and the fact that our liaison with this organization was efficiently looked after by the French officer attached to the 166th Infantry (Capt.

Lorans) we were kept informed of the whereabouts of the troops on our left. As to the infantry on our right however, we were sometimes in the dark. A liaison officer from the 165th Infantry visited us occasionally but was often uninformed as to the exact location of his regiment. For some time we did not know whether Meurcy Farm was occupied by our own troops or by the Germans—nor did we know the exact location of friendly infantry on the high ground east of Meurcy Farm. This last fact caused us the inconvenience of not being able to request artillery fire on machine gun positions on this high ground from which we were harassed for fear of firing too near our own troops and interfering with their advance.

"Excellent observation of Meurcy Farm, Bois Brule and vicinity, the high ground east of these points, and most of the Fere-en-Tardenois-Nesle road east of a point north of Bois Brule could be obtained from a point just south of the southern edge of Seringes and from several points in the village. From these points could be clearly seen an organized, entrenched German position, behind barbed wire extending from the eastern edge of Bois Brule south-eastward until it disappeared over a crest at about 63.47. At about 11 :00 h. on the morning of August 1st from the schoolhouse at approximately 46.58, I could see allied artillery fire apparently intended for this line falling consistently 150 to 250 meters over it, possibly for want of observation.

"The greatest freedom was exercised by infantry battalion headquarters during this period in transmitting over the telephone information which would be of value to the enemy. Apparently all information which it was desired to transmit to infantry regimental headquarters or other stations in the rear was transmitted by telephone whenever possible and in plain English. Capt. Lorans expressed the opinion that listening-in sets could not be used during heavy artillery fire, such as was going on throughout the period. In view of the fact that all the information had already been spoken over the wire by the infantry, the urgent necessity of getting it back to the artillery, and the slowness and uncertainty of runner service, I also made reports by telephone out of code of the position of our infantry, the fires requested, etc. The situation in respect to 'phoned messages to the rear was substantially the same as above when we were supporting the infantry

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

Nine Germans captured with four machine guns by three soldiers of the 168th Iowa near Chateau le Foret, July 28, 1918.

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

The 117th Sanitary Train takes over German dressing station near Chateau la Foret, July 28, 1918. Notice German sign hanging across road.

of the 4th Division on the Vesle. I recommend that in future when liaison detachments are sent forward with the infantry such arrangements be made that they can make telephonic reports in some simple code, such as 'Playfair.'

"Telephone communication with 'La Fontaine sous Pierre' over our own line was frequently broken. Although linemen were out working on the line most of the time, the wire was cut again and again by shell fire. I made frequent use of the Infantry telephone line. I believe the entire telephone service of the Infantry regiment had only the one line from La Fontaine sons Pierre to Chateau de la Foret to keep open.

"On the morning of August 2nd the battalion received orders to advance. It moved northward along the western edge of the Foret de Nesles without contact with the enemy until the two advance companies passed over the crest southwest of Mareuil-en Dole between Foret de Nesle and Bois de la Porte d' Arcy, quite in the open and in line of groups standing erect. These elements were then met with accurate German artillery fire, apparently prepared in advance, which caused some casualties.

"In the early evening of August and German artillery was firing on Mareuil-en Dole and neighboring terrain, and ammunition dumps were being blown up at various points in the German lines. I went to a position, approximately 58.85 on the hillside south of Mareuil-en-Dole, from which there was a good view to the north and made the following notes:

"18:50 h. Ammunition dump blows up about 3 kilometers northeast of Mareuil.

"19:00-19:30. Germans shell Mareuil and woods immediately southwest thereof.

"19:43. Germans drop salvo of four rounds in field about 55.05.

"19:53. Ammunition dump blows up about 7 kilometers to north. Two more shells at 55 :05.

"19:55. Ammunition dump explodes in distance to north.

"20:00. Germans shell northern edge Bois de la Porte

"20:03. Light M. G. fire on left.

"20:07. Red wriggling rocket over east edge of Loupergne.

"20:10. Ammunition dump goes up in distance to northeast.

"On the night of August 2nd-3rd the 166th Infantry was relieved by the 39th Infantry. I was unable to find the commanding officer of the 39th Infantry (Col. Bolles) that night but found him and reported to him the next morning at Mottin Farm."

What the Artillery telephone men went through in stringing wires forward to the P. C. of the assault battalion of infantry which their regiment was supporting is exemplified in the following account of Private Charles E. Chandler, 149th F. A.

He says: "On a pleasant July morning, a group of us telephone men under Lieut. Heath were ordered to string a line from our telephone central, which was located in the wood to the right of Villemoyenne. This section was a very deep wood, and so it sheltered lots of American troops, waiting to go up to the line. As you stood on its edge you could look across the deep valley and see the Ourcq river, Fere-en-Tardenois in the distance to our left, Farm la Fontaine which was where we had to string our telephone line, as it was the infantry assault battalion headquarters. We left our large reel cart and horses sheltered in the wood taking only a small hand reel cart and a couple spare drums of wire. Besides Lieut. Heath and myself there were Maxon, Darius and Tevis. Darius and Tevis were to bring up the wire as Maxon and I strung it out, Lieut. Heath walking on ahead picking out the best route. We traveled across country and we had not progressed very far into this open valley when several shells landed near. We paid no attention to them as they were too far away to cause us any damage.

"However immediately afterward the air was filled with shrieking and bursting shells all around us. We flopped into an irrigation ditch. It shook us up some. Mud and water were thrown all over us. We were too low to get any fragments. We called to each other to see if we were all OK. We were, so as the shelling had subsided, we got up out of our watery resting place and tested our line. It was open. On going back to repair it we found it cut in two, in about fifteen places.

"Again we started to string wire but hadn't gone over two hundred yards when a second bunch of shells came over. They were certainly too close for comfort. By this time we were convinced that the Boche were after us. We never thought that

the enemy would waste twenty to thirty shells on four or five men. Again we had to repair our line. It was broken in eight or ten places. This time we were not molested until we reached a narrow gauge railroad, which ran parallel to the Ourcq river. This is where our doughboys had heavy fighting. There were fox holes dug in the bank of the railroad and signs of heavy shell fire. As we reached this railroad some more shells came over, along with some machine gun bullets and trench mortar shells. We discovered that there were aeroplanes over head, and that is how the Boche were getting our position. This last bombardment happened at about 5:00 P. M. and it had begun to rain. Maxon and I went back to repair our line, while Lieut. Heath and Darius and Tevis, who had just brought up the last spool of wire, were to complete it to Farm La Fontaine. We soon had it repaired and as we started toward the farm, to help the others out, we met them coming back, saying the line had been completed and was in use between our batteries and the infantry. We walked back carefully, for by this time it was pitch dark and raining a good bit.

"As we neared the hard stone road, which leads into Fere en Tardenois, we were cautioned to stay off of it, by some French troops who were going in the line, as there was a Boche airplane up. You could hear the drone of his engine and he was flying very low. We were walking parallel to the road when WHAM!!! all of a sudden the earth seemed to leap up and slap us in the face. This Boche aviator had dumped two of his large bombs right near us. We could hear him dropping a few more as he went along, over near the cross roads. Maxon and I were together pulling the small reel cart. Darius and Tevis were about one hundred feet in front of us and Lieut. Heath about fifty feet in front of Tevis and Darius. Bombs don't give you any chance to flop but these knocked us to the ground. We picked ourselves up, feeling to see if we were all OK. We hollered to each other to see if any were injured. Everybody said they were OK but we had not gone over fifteen feet when Darius exclaimed, 'My back is all wet!' and sure enough, upon examination, we found a large, jagged hole in his back, which was bleeding profusely. We carried him up to the reel cart, which was waiting in the wood, and took him to our dressing station. Darius was in the hospital

several months, completely missing the St. Mihiel drive and most of the Argonne affair. He was a good buddy and I hated to lose him."

The first thing the morning of August second Colonel Reilly made up his mind to cross the Ourcq with his own regiment and Carter's Second Battalion of Howitzers of the 150th Indiana. He telephoned Redden to move forward across the Ourcq and send an officer to La Fontaine sous Pierre where the Colonel would give him further instruction. He sent word to Hammond to meet him at the Y intersection of the roads just forward of Villemoyene. As he was about to move forward General Gateley called him on the telephone and told him not to take the howitzers across the river. He therefore ordered them to move close to the south bank of the river.

After meeting Hammond and giving him verbal instructions about crossing the river and keeping in touch with him at la Fontaine sous Pierre he crossed the Ourcq where shortly he met Colonel Hough who was temporarily establishing his P. C. at La Fontaine sous Pierre.

Some time later General MacArthur came along on the road from Nesle. The General explained that he was giving orders all along the line for an active pursuit of the enemy. He was told that the pursuit was already well under way.

Later, the orders came that the infantry would be relieved by the Infantry of the Fourth Division but that the Artillery Brigade would go on with the relieving division.

At about that time Colonel Hough received the news that Major Geran's battalion had been caught by surprise salvos of the German Artillery before it had time to deploy with some loss in killed and wounded, the last for the Ohio regiment during the Ourcq Battle.

Colonel George E. Leach commanding the 151st Minnesota Field Artillery says in his diary:

"At daylight went to Chateau de la Foret and made my advance P. C. there. This Chateau is being used as a dressing station and all its three floors are covered with wounded. They are being taken to the rear as fast as transportation can be supplied, but it is very crowded, and a very sad sight. The stretcher bearers are under continual fire, coming up the slope in front, as

are also the ambulances loading for evacuation to the rear.

"There are a pair of dead German horses in the yard and the odor is about all one can stand.

"About four o'clock this became such a bad spot for message runners and the necessary personnel attached to Headquarters, that I established a P. C. in the woods across the road with General Lenehan. Captain Jacobson secured the volunteer services of six French soldiers who dug us a shallow trench. We were shelled continually all night and to date this is the fiercest fighting day we have had.

"The aviators fly very low and at one time one of them deliberately chased Captain Bradley and me around a tree, so close that we had the opportunity to empty our automatics at him, but the necessity of dodging his machine gun bullets hindered our marksmanship.

"I have thrown myself on the ground, to avoid the fragments of bursting shells so much that I am completely covered with mud. No sleep, no water and little to eat, but we are glad of the chance to be in this big American offensive. The Germans have full control in the air and have bombed us and raked us with machine guns all day.

"We had been advised by the Commanding Officer of the 165th Infantry of intense machine gun fire from Bois Brulle which is just across the Ourcq River. It had seemed to me that we had exhausted every possible way to silence these machine guns, having fired many 'concentrations' on this small strip of woods which did not exceed 10 or 12 acres in size. Captain A. Jacobson, the French liaison officer, attached to my headquarters, volunteered to carry a telephone line beyond the advance of the Infantry, to the edge of these woods, and direct the fire from there. He accomplished this daring feat and delivered an effective fire, which greatly aided the Infantry."

Here is Captain Jacobson's own story. He gives considerably more detail, but entirely omits any mention of his having been present: *

"After our reconnaissances in Ville-sur-Fere, strewn with American bodies, and bombarded without relaxation by the Ger-

---

* Letter to Rainbow Historian under date of Paris, France, January 31st, 1936.

man heavy artillery, I had the good fortune to be able to admire the extreme courage of a small detachment of American Infantrymen and Artillerymen, who, after having crossed the Ourcq, carried through a very courageous operation in the little Colas Wood on the north bank of the river.

"The problem was to drive the Germans out of their strongly organized position in the Bois Brule to the north of the Bois Colas, from which they vigorously shot up the American troops with their machine guns.

"Because of the form of the terrain, the Bois Brule could not be seen from the artillery observatories. It was only possible to adjust the artillery fire from the Northern edge of the Bois Colas. A small group, including Lieutenant Corbett, decided to establish an observatory there, at a few dozen meters from the enemy. This was done with the help of infantry soldiers of the 165th New York, and under an extremely violent fire. Twice this group was on the point of being captured by the enemy who had commenced to encircle the Bois Colas. However, the New York Infantrymen stopped them. Thanks to the establishment of this post of observation, an accurate fire was brought down by our artillery on the Bois Brule. This fire so tore up that wood that the Germans left alive had to evacuate it and retreat to the Foret de Nesle."

In recognition of the support of the Minnesota Field Artillery to his regiment Colonel McCoy wrote the following letter:

Headquarters, 165th Infantry,
France, August 14th, 1918.

General Gatley,
Commanding 67th F. A. Brigade,

Dear General:

On behalf of my Regiment, I want to express the most enthusiastic appreciation of our Artillery support during the recent fighting on the Ourcq. It was quick and sympathetic and you have no doubt had the satisfaction of noticing how perfectly accurate it was on our front between the Bois Colas and Meurcy Farm. Colonel Leach, with his Regiment, was our particular support and has won our most hearty congratulations and has

given us this added pride in our Artillery. His liaison officers with my Regiment Lieutenant Weaver particularly at P. C., and Lieutenant McCoy with my advance battalion were of the utmost and intelligent service.

Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) Frank R. McCoy,
Colonel, U. S. A., 165th Inf.,
Commanding.

The 150th Indiana under the then Colonel Robert H. Tyndall experienced the greater difficulties which their much heavier howitzers and ammunition always imposed on them by comparison with the 75 m. m. light regiments. Necessarily moving more slowly than the light regiments they are unable to go quickly through shelled areas when en route to their positions. When in battery they are more easily picked out by enemy aviators than are the smaller pieces of the light regiments with the smaller amount of smoke and flame coming from their muzzles when fired.

The 51st F. A. Brigade of the 26th New England Division under Brigadier General Dwight E. Aultman not only fired on German machine guns in front of the 84th Infantry Brigade but had as particular targets the Bois de Pelger and the Bois de la Planchette, two of the group of three woods, the other being the Bois des Jouibletts, which, used as a citadel by the Germans, only fell under the combined attacks of the 42nd and 32nd Divisions.

The 101st F. A. was commanded by Col. Robert E. Goodwin, the 102nd by Colonel Morris F Locke and the 103rd (the howitzers) by Colonel Pelham Glassford.

Colonel Goodwin says:

“Just before the fighting in the Marne Salient began I was transferred to the 101st Field Artillery in anticipation of Colonel Sherburne’s promotion. He was commissioned a Brigadier-General and turned the regiment over to me on the afternoon of July 26th at Courpoil, that being the same day that the 42nd Division took over the sector. I immediately established direct liaison with Colonel Screws of the 167th Infantry. I shall always look back on the days with him as being the high spot of my experience as a field artillery officer because of the splendid cooperation which he made possible.

"We were proud of the gunnery of the 101st Field Artillery, due to the fact that because of the perfect conditions for observation, we were able to control the movements of our supported infantry by a telephone carried along with the assault battalion, to draw the infantry back when the machine gun nests and strong points were discovered in the wheat fields on the slopes above the Ourcq, and to destroy these nests by direct controlled fire, sending the infantry forward by telephone when the gruesome job had been done.

"If I had to again command a field artillery regiment in action, I would ask no greater privilege than to support any infantry unit commanded by Colonel Screws. I have always hoped that sometime or other our paths might cross again. He was in my eyes the ideal troop leader."

Colonel Everitte St. J. Chaffee tells the following of the experience of the 103rd Field Artillery (Howitzer):

"The 103rd (Howitzer) Regiment of the 51st F. A. Brigade was the outfit with which I served. This regiment was covering the front of the sector which the 42nd Division took over from the 28th Division in the latter part of July. I was a Lieutenant Colonel and had been assigned to the left of the sector. When the 28th was relieved I reported to General Brown commanding the infantry brigade of the 42nd on the left. General Brown's P. C. was in the village of Courpoil and the lines were between the village and Croix Rouge Farm. Our batteries located in the woods beyond the fields in front of Courpoil supported the attack on the farm by shelling the enemy guns and mortars in the woods in rear of it.

"On the last evening before the advance from Courpoil a German battery was particularly offensive while shooting up its remaining ammunition. Calls came from the infantry and the enemy fire on the village was only too effective. With nothing definite to go by our attempts to silence it were not effective. Just then a plane flew over Courpoil dropping a message with streamers. The message read "Enemy battery in action co-ordinates. . . . . ," giving the location. Eight 155 howitzers covered the target firing volleys and the affair was terminated.

"The next afternoon I called on Col. Screws at his P. C. and shortly thereafter on learning of enemy withdrawal went by

motorcycles with my commanding officer, Col. Glassford, forward through Beuvardes, Four a Verre, and the Foret de Fere to Croix Blanche Farm on a reconnaissance of artillery positions. In the Foret de Fere we met Rainbow infantry patrols and I remember a six foot lieutenant of infantry who was most polite and very much of a soldier. The men under his command were doing their work in a quiet and very business like manner.

"Our batteries moved forward that afternoon and night and occupied positions in support of your infantry for forcing the crossings of the Ourcq. I remember, in the dim light and mist of early dawn, seeing columns of French Cavalry and your 155s pressing forward up the grade through Four a Verre. It was very snappy looking cavalry. It was well turned out and efficient artillery. I remember that among other targets the next day we were shelling the enemy in woods northeast of Sergy.

"At Courpoil a German prisoner had been brought in to General Brown's P. C. He was a boy whose helmet and boots were much too large for him. He stated that he was the runner for a 155 howitzer battery, had been sent forward to Croix Rouge Farm and captured by your infantry. He showed us the location of his battery on the west side of Sergy and then asked for something to eat.

"When the first battalion of our regiment had moved forward and occupied positions north of Four a Verre it was taken under fire by an enemy 155 howitzer battery. Fire was observed by an enemy plane circling over the position. A bracket was established and things were pretty hot when our fire, based on the prisoner's information, stopped the show and the plane went home.

"I remember that our observation posts were directing our fire supporting the Rainbow's gallant and desperate fighting while capturing Sergy, and then our brigade was moving forward beyond the Ourcq in support of the 4th Division.

"Above everything, I know that during those days when we served in the Rainbow sector we learned to admire the fighting qualities of the Forty-second Division."

The then Major Wm. K. Herndon, who commanded the Motor Battalion of the 117th Kansas Ammunition Train, tells the following:

"The philosophy of fatalism, which contributed to the sangfroid of many of our troops, was not without some apparent justification. The death of Bernard Daly, of New Orleans, may be a case in point. Daly went into the service about the same time as the bulk of the men of the hand. Nearly all of his military life was spent in the training camps in the States, far removed from the hazards of battle. A day came when he was ordered to France, eight months after the first of the 42nd had embarked. After this long period at home, he was hurried with seeming impatience from point to point, ever nearer to the front. In late July he arrived in the area of the 42nd as a replacement. He was sent to the Ammunition Train where he was assigned to Company G. Here he was detailed for duty in a nearby Ammunition Dump. Along with the balance of his detail, he repaired to the Company kitchen for evening mess. He had scarcely arrived at the kitchen when a single shell from the enemy cannon shrieked its way into the midst of the waiting group. It was obvious that the burst must have done damage and a search was made for wounded. The veterans found their most recent addition fatally wounded, a shell fragment having entered his forehead. He died within minutes without regaining consciousness. He was the only casualty from that burst.

"To those who believed 'that the shell with your name on it would find you' it was clear that Bernard Daly had arrived for his rendezvous. Wrapped in his blanket he was buried by his companions in the Foret de Fere. Some of us may, and do, scoff at the idea of fatalism. But those familiar with the circumstances of Daly's death do not scoff.

"Roy Latham, with marked ability in wood carving, carved the name of Bernard Daly in the cross piece of the wooden cross placed on Daly's grave. I have often wished that Daly's survivors might have seen it and been comforted by the tenderness with which he was laid away, even though a newcomer to the organization."

On July 26th the 117th Kansas Ammunition Train moved to Verdilly Farm. Here is the story of their activities, taken from the Memoirs of Company A, 117th Ammunition Train:

"In this little town not a wall or tree was left standing.

Everything was blown to atoms and it was one mass of ruins. The American artillery fire was so heavy the ground looked like a sieve, and you could step from one shell hole to the other. The Germans evidently left Chateau Thierry in a hurry, as most of the buildings were not damaged beyond repair.

"At Verdilly Farm we were camped ahead of one battery of six inch long range rifles and they barked away most of the time, while to our right was the Verdilly Woods, which was blood stained and covered with ambulances blown to pieces, dead horses and all kinds of equipment; the result of hard fighting that had taken place here. On July 29th we moved to Courpoil, a distance of five miles, and camped here until August 4th. At this place we were again located among the long range artillery, who were feeding iron rations to the retreating boche at Soissons, Fismes and Rheims. We were visited about every night by boche bombing planes, but were protected by aerial machine guns.

"We were busy here all the time hauling ammunition day and night, and one of the other companies of the 117th Ammunition Train had the misfortune of losing four men and one truck, the result of a bomb dropped from a German plane. Several trucks going to the front with ammunition were attacked by boche planes and the men had to stop and protect themselves by getting under the trucks, behind trees and using their rifles.

"On our next move, which was August 4th, we went up to a woods north of Fere-en-Tardenois, a distance of ten miles. We were camped in the woods alongside of a place where the Germans had a large ammunition dump, but it had been destroyed by fire. In several places the ground was covered with dead Americans and German soldiers and it was necessary to bury several before we could pitch our tents.

"The boche were now returning some artillery fire and they would shell the road just above our camp every day and night at exactly the same time. To protect ourselves as much as possible in case they started shelling us, several of us 'dug in,' that is, we would dig a hole about a foot and a half deep and pitch our pup-tents over it. This would protect us from all shell fire except a direct hit and it also gave us more room in the tents. * * * After two weeks of hard fighting we were somewhat exhausted

and were glad to be relieved by the Fourth Division August 11th."

The Battle of the Ourcq brought even more excitement to the 117 Kansas Ammunition Train than did the Champagne Battle. Here is the story of it as told by Bert C. Osborne:

"On July 28th we camped at La Four A Vere at 7 A. M. The town had been captured from the enemy recently. The German dead still remained as they fell.

"We unharnessed our horses and camouflaged our carriages and were soon ready for mess. After which we hoped that we might get a little sleep.

"While we were taking care of our horses, we noticed but thought very little of an enemy airplane which flew over and got our location, as well as that of the artillery which was in position under some trees about 50 yards back of our little camp.

"Before we had gotten anything to eat, an order come to deliver a load of ammunition to a battery. We hurriedly hitched and made our way to the guns which were about three kilometers distant. We were in the open all the way. However we arrived at the battery without any trouble. The guns were located in a thicket alongside a road. They were firing. Unloading as quickly as possible we started back to camp.

"Four German airplanes which had been flying low in the distance, swooped down upon our column before we had gone very far and showered us with machine-gun bullets. We took to shelter under the caissons and behind a stone wall or whatever served as a protection from the flying bullets. After a short but exciting time they flew away so we pulled down into a sunken road nearer camp and halted.

"We were again attacked, this time by five enemy planes.

"The road was some protection so we returned their fire with our rifles. After a few minutes of heavy firing they withdrew. It was now about one o'clock in the afternoon.

"Those who had remained in camp had been having their share of the excitement. The airplane which had been over in the morning had evidently reported our location as the enemy had continually shelled our camp as well as the artillery back of us. Both had suffered a great deal from high explosive shells and machine-gun bullets. Several men, including Lieutenant Ragor and First Sergeant Bates had been wounded.

"Our Truck Companies during the morning had established a Dump at our camp. About two-thirty in the afternoon we began to load at this Dump. A half hour later the German planes came over again and showered us with machine-gun bullets. However the large piles of boxes afforded us ample protection.

"A dressing station was located here. The wounded were coming back in large numbers. The slightly wounded were walking. The more serious were being hauled in ambulances, trucks or whatever could be found to get them to the dressing station for first-aid treatment.

"By evening we were again loaded and ready for another delivery should it be needed. At 6 P. M. just as we had finished loading, another air-raid took place. Most of the men were around the kitchen trying to get something to eat. Our cooks had prepared a hot meal despite the fact that they had been run out of the kitchen many times during the day by enemy artillery fire and aviators.

"We ran from the kitchen, grabbed our horses and personal equipment and moved to a strip of woods on a hill out of the enemy's line of fire. We welcomed this chance to rest as we had been on the go for about thirty-six hours and the strain was beginning to tell on some of the men.

"Our kitchen was again machine-gunned from the air on July 29th.

"Our column while delivering ammunition was attacked again on August 1st.

"The same day about six o'clock in the evening we were loading at our Dump, when suddenly a shell which seemed to come from just over the hill fell in the town. This unexpected shell caused quite a little comment among the men as to just where it came from. Soon another came, and another. The fifth shell was a direct hit in our Dump where we were loading.

"The Dump began to burn furiously!

"Men, horses and caissons scattered in every direction. It was every man for his own safety and that of his equipment. Some of the carriages had only one driver to six horses. The traffic jam was terrible. However every piece of equipment was gotten away from the burning Dump before the fire had spread very far. Two Frenchmen were killed and one truck destroyed. The great pile of ammunition was a complete loss.

"It was soon said that the shell had not come from the enemy's lines, but from a battery left behind in their haste to retreat. Some of their men had hidden in a dugout and had not been discovered by our infantry as they passed over.

"A detail was sent out to hunt these men. Before morning a report came in that they had been found so our detail returned empty-handed."*

Private William T. Briggs whom Colonel Garrett took from the 41st Division because of his telephone and telegraph experience tells the following:

"While in the Chateau de la Foret doing Signal Corps work we were billeted in the cellar. It was full of wounded men. Someone called for volunteers to get some water to make coffee for the wounded. Another soldier and myself came forth and proceeded to get the water out of a spring, perhaps three blocks from the Chateau. This spring was shelled every two minutes by the Germans. It was quite a risky undertaking, although we pulled through all O. K. Made several trips between shelling. The other soldier was a member also of the 117th Field Signal Battalion."

Colonel J. Monroe Johnson says of the part played by the 117th California and South Carolina Engineers in this battle:

"Companies C and F were assigned the task of keeping the bridges over the Ourcq River in shape. They had numerous casualties, but nevertheless rebuilt these bridges as fast as they were shot away. All the other companies were on road work from Trugny up to the Ourcq River, except that on July 28th all the regiment except C, South Carolina, and F, California, were placed in Divisional Infantry Reserve. On the night of August 1st the regiment was ordered into line for an attack to follow at 4 A. M. the morning of August 2nd. The units which made this attack advanced to Cherry Chartreuve, where they were relieved,

---

* EDITOR'S NOTE: The dump was destroyed by a medium calibre enemy gun firing at long range. The story that the shells came from an enemy battery left behind probably arose from the word already going around the Division of the 77 left behind near Croix Rouge Farm which the 167th Alabama passed over and then sent back a patrol which killed the gun crew as they were in the act of firing towards the American rear.

at which time I believe they were further advanced than any other element of the American forces.

"When the regiment was relieved from this duty, it was assigned to the Army Corps Engineers, to help in the construction of a defensive position just in advance of Cherry Chartreuve. It spent a day in laying out this position, after which it was relieved by the Engineers of the 4th Division. It was then put on duty constructing a defensive position about four kilometers to the rear of Cherry Chartreuve. The position was laid out. A large part of the wire was erected. Many of the trenches were outlined by the time the 77th Division relieved the 4th Division. The regiment was relieved at this same time."

Lieut. Robert King of the 117th Engineers has the following interesting notes in his diary:

"Aug. 2, 1918. Morning. Yesterday we were switched back to Reserve Inf. again on the alert. Stayed on alert from about 11:00 A. M. till 1:00 A. M. today. About 12:00 midnight we were told fairly definitely that 'A' & 'B' Co.'s would go out. They got out about 1:30 A. M. today. The job is to fill a gap between two Infantry Regiments when they attack this morning. I was left with trains and kitchens of 'A' & 'B' Co.'s. Col. Johnson, Major Johnson and all other officers went out with the Co.'s. 'C' Co. was organizing a position yesterday. I hear that the Boche have retired again and our men are following them. Things are very quiet around here now except for some big guns firing. There were lots of bombs dropped near here last night by planes. It's raining here this morning."

Major W. F. R. Johnson tells the following of the experience of the 117th Engineers:

"There are many odd fancies existing in this world of ours. One of them is that engineer troops wield only shovels, picks, saws and hammers. This fancy is entertained only by those who do not know or understand the difference between Army Engineers, Corps Engineers and Division Engineers during time of war. Actually, Division Engineer troops, in war, are at all times infantry reserves. Division Engineer troops have to know their picks and shovels and their squads right and left as well. They have to know how to design and lay out a position for either offense or defense. They must need also know how to fight.

They must know how to accompany tanks in an attack—how to precede infantry (under fire the while) in order to cut barbed wire entanglements. And they must be men able to carry everything infantrymen carry in addition to their engineer equipment.

"Therefore, the 117th Engineer Regiment of the 42nd (Rainbow) Division participated as infantry during some phase of every battle in which the Division was concerned; detailing for this duty two squads or, a platoon or, a company or, two companies, as the occasion demanded.

"During the Aisne-Marne offensive of July and August, 1918, the 117th Engineer Regiment received orders to advance as infantry, using two of its Companies, on the left of and with the 32nd Division and on the right of and with the 168th Infantry of the 42nd Division.

"Orders were to push back the enemy and to maintain con tact with him.

"Companies 'A' and 'B' of the Regiment, commanded by Captains Joseph W. Barnwell and J. L. M. Irby, respectively, were detailed for the mission and moved forward to position during the night of August 1st. Zero hour was 4:15 A. M. August 2nd.

"The jump-off position was a short distance to the northeast of Sergy.

"The two Companies began advancing at zero hour and proceeded rapidly, due to the fact that the enemy had retired during the night. The advance continued to the village of Nesles where two German soldiers were taken prisoners. These men had either been left behind or had stayed behind.

"Still the advance continued nearly to a small forest, slightly northeast of the village of Nesles, where enemy machine gun fire was encountered. At this juncture, the engineer troops were in advance of infantry on both right and left. But while the engineers were planning the rout of the machine gunners, the right and left infantry caught up and another general advance began. Then the enemy machine gunners came out 'Kamarad' fashion. Some of them walked into the arms of the 32nd Division infantry, but one of them walked into the arms of the 117th Engineers. This latter prisoner was questioned carefully but no valuable information was obtained.

"The advance continued and again the engineers outstripped the right and left infantry. Shortly, the rear most engineer troops had to speed forward more rapidly because of the fact that they found themselves amidst shell fire from their own artillery. At the same time, the enemy's artillery fire was going completely over their heads. A summer day? Balmy and calm? Well, hardly. Although, the engineers were finally advanced to where they were beyond their own artillery fire and far underneath the enemy artillery fire.

"The advance continued rapidly into and through to the north edge of the woods slightly southwest of Chery-Chartreuve, where complete rainy-darkness compelled a stop.

"During the night, the 32nd Division Infantry on the right, which had almost caught up with the engineers, was shelled terrifically by the enemy. There were no troops at all to the left of the engineers during the night. Liaison was possible on the right only. A cold, miserable, but uneventful night was spent.

"At dawn on August 3rd, and after remaining in the woods until an enemy plane had finished reconnaisance, the engineer troops began advancing again, in deployed battle formation. This advance was toward Chery-Chartreuve but was interrupted by the 4th Division Infantry relieving the 42nd Division Engineers.

"The 117th South Carolina Engineer Train faithfully performed the unspectacular but always difficult and dangerous job of bringing up engineer material over the shelled roads."

Here is what Colonel David S. Fairchild, who had become Chief Surgeon of the Division, July 1 when Colonel J. W. Greissinger of the Medical Corps of the Regular Army became Chief Surgeon of the First Army Corps, has to say of the Battle of the Ourcq.

He says: "In my opinion the care of the wounded offered the most difficult problem of our entire war experience. Prompt evacuation was hampered by the sudden occurrence of 6,400 casualties whereas there were insufficient hospitals at the front or even as far back as Paris in some instances to relieve the neces-

sity of extra tong hauls. This condition became more complicated when our troops advanced beyond the Ourcq. We were taxed beyond human possibilities to meet the situation. No words can express my appreciation of the valuable and valiant service and the fortitude displayed by the officers and men of the entire ambulance battalion. In many cases officers of the ambulance battalion not only fulfilled their own duties but assumed duties of Regimental and Battalion surgeons who had become casualties, thereby performing dual functions. One of these ambulance commanding officers reported that his company consisted of but eleven ambulances and that with these he covered over 5,000 miles in that one engagement.

"The four motor ambulance companies of our ambulance section at this time had forty-four (44) ambulances all told, eleven to each company. Thirty-six (36) of these were from the train and eight (8) from the Sanitary Train. For the purpose of contact these companies were nominally assigned to corresponding numerical regiments, while the animal-drawn company was assigned by sections to the Artillery. During the engagement referred to, we had the aid of some S. S. U. ambulances from the Corps and a large number of division trucks returning to the rear, which rendered valuable service in evacuating certain classes of cases.

"Upon arrival at the Chateau Thierry Area, ready to go into position in the line, a reconnaisance was made and at 4:00 P. M. one hospital was placed in Jean-Mace Convent, Chateau Thierry, with a capacity of 300. Two hospitals were placed in Villiers Sur-Marne. Another was placed at Luzerne. At about 9:00 P. M., the first day the Chateau Thierry hospital was full and overflowing with wounded (many mortally wounded) and many cases were being sent to Villiers-Sur-Marne. At 10:00 P. M. one of the Villiers-Sur-Marne hospitals was sent to help the Chateau Thierry hospital.

"On the second day the hospitals of the 32nd Division came up on our right. They put up their four around us. On the third day the Luzerne hospital was moved forward to Bezu St. Germain where it occupied ground at the home of the 'Big Bertha.' It was used as a gas hospital. On the fourth day two hospitals were moved up to Epieds. For the remainder of the engagement these last stations were maintained as located.

"Our records show 6,400 casualties as passing through our hospitals. The one at Villiers-Sur-Marne reported the hospitalization of 2,000 of these.

"In this engagement the evacuation hospitals were so distant and the Division hospitals were so widely distributed over a line of evacuation of 25 miles, that it became necessary to do considerable emergency surgery in these forward hospitals on patients whose lives would otherwise have been lost. My highest praise and esteem is insufficient to commend the work done by every officer and man in these hospitals. This work could not have been excelled by any organization similarly constituted and under similar circumstances. It would be difficult to concede improvement as possible if the Sanitary train were to attempt the same operations again, using the tactics prescribed at that time."

The medical service of the Division had perfected their system for trench warfare by the time it reached the Champagne. The Ourcq Battle was its first test in open warfare. Therefore the following summation of how it worked is particularly interesting.

Colonel Fairchild says: "While it is not believed that the accepted principles of surgery were changed in any material way in the treatment of our wounded, still we added the improvement of a thoroughly organized system, coordinating and correlating
the services into one big medical machine seeking to economize the limited facilities for hospitalization and evacuation to the great number of casualties. This added much to our efficiency in a big way in combatting shock, hemorrhage and infection. While some of the zealous officers may have felt that they were deprived of some of their individuality and initiative in this system; still without such centralized action and unity of authority and action, disaster would have befallen us.

"Only the surgeon who has experienced a tour of duty with fighting troops will ever appreciate or understand the trying problems that can confront one or drive one to his wits' end in coping with such situations. Only such a one can understand the utter impossibility of collecting and retaining sufficient data and statistics with which to portray accurately the history of such occasions. However, such a relation of the tactics used would probably be little more than history anyway in as far as it would be

of benefit as a set plan for other engagements. Never were two engagements identical, consequently medical tactics must change to conform with military logistics. Therefore, it becomes very important for a medical officer to be well versed in military strategy if he is to be successful in operating his own command. It is just as important in this case as it is for the signal service officer, the engineer officer, and the officers of other noncombatant arms all of whom make it possible for the others to fight. This because it is the function of the medical department to salvage men, and thus maintain the fighting force in the greatest quantity and quality possible.

"I will set right the opinions of a certain class of surgeons of the Great War who assumed that all field surgeons were sort of first aid ambulance surgeons and did not need to be high grade professional men. Such an opinion is entirely erroneous, and as time progresses and as medical histories of the combat divisions come into their own, these uncharitable critics will find that these field surgeons many times displayed the same professional skill with the wounded as was provided in the larger hospitals (stable) and under far greater difficulties. I refer especially to the class of nontransportable wounded who required major surgery immediately but could not stand the shock of transportation. Many a life out of this great number was saved by the field surgeon. (The necessary hauls to stationary surgical hospitals was often from 30-100 kilometers.)

"Surgery actually commences at the time the soldier is wounded and not at the time of operation as is the popular belief. Asepsis is one of the most important surgical principles. It is upon the service of the field surgeons in preventing infection in the first eight hours after the wound is incurred that this depends. Anti-shock measures are not the least in the rank of importance in surgical measures. It is almost entirely on the shoulders of the field doctor that this responsibility rests. Furthermore the field medico does more in conserving the vitality of the wounded man through early attention to hemorrhage and through the administration of stimulants than any other group of officers whom the patient will strike in the course of his evacuation. In fact the operability of the case depends almost entirely upon the early professional care of the front line doctors. This statement is

not to belittle the great importance of the marvelous results obtained by the operating surgeons in the general hospitals but it is to impress on those who do not know, that every step of treatment along the route of evacuation of a patient is of equal importance as far as the ultimate result to his recovery is concerned.

"It is a well-founded principle in modern tactics that the ambulance battalion in combat should not be responsible for evacuation beyond its own field hospitals. It should never be sent farther to the rear for fear of being lost to its Division when its services may be of the greatest need at the front. Of course Division ambulances may be advisedly used for Corps or Army evacuation during a lull in the combat. The ambulance battalion in nearly every instance when used farther to the rear was compelled to haul to evacuation hospitals as far as 125 kilometers away. It even some times was requisitioned to peddle patients in the evacuation hospitals.

"The Battalion aid stations were where the wounded received their first aid treatment. Similar but more thorough treatment was given at the ambulance dressing station (now known as the Collecting Station) the next stop for the wounded in the route of evacuation, and the first point of treatment by personnel of the Medical regiment. It included: readjustment of splints and dressings and application of more elaborate dressings where necessary, checking of hemorrhage, nourishment, warmth, antishock, and antitetanus treatment. Particular attention was given to shock, and where the case was serious, it was held pending favorable reaction before further evacuation. It is at these dressing stations that the effects of shock begin to make themselves evident."

Captain Buck says of the experience in the Ourcq Battle of the Ambulance Section of the 117th Sanitary Train:

"Our first dressing station on the Chateau Thierry front was at Epieds established there July 28th. On the march into position and all during the engagement road congestion was one of our biggest problems. With the long lines of evacuation the service was materially slowed up by this difficulty. At times our ambulances made evacuations direct to hospitals in Paris consuming twenty-four hours in the trip due to traffic conditions.

"Because of this slow evacuation our station at Epieds became literally filled to overflowing. It became necessary to establish a second station a few kilometers nearer the front at Beauvardes if the situation was to be handled. While on this front we evacuated many French wounded as well as men from the 32nd and 4th American Divisions. Work here was particularly hazardous due to shelling of the roads and bombing by planes at night. Several ambulances were hit by shell fragments but no serious damage was done.

"At about this time Major Wilson was assigned to the Corps and I was assigned as acting Director of the section. August 27th I was made Director of Ambulance Companies by Division Order."

The Virginia M. Ps. besides having the difficult job of controlling traffic on muddy shelled roads crowded with troops and guns going forward, wounded coming back and ammunition, supply trains and ambulances going in both directions had their first experience in handling large numbers of recently captured Germans.

The then Major W. E. Talbot has the following to say concerning the services of the 117th Texas Supply Train:

"The difficulties the Texas supply train had to overcome in the Croix Rouge-Ourcq Battle were far greater than those faced in any of our trench experiences in Lorraine or in the Champagne.

"The distances were greater, the roads muddier and more crowded.

"It was our introduction to trying conditions which became a common place in the Argonne.

"Besides hauling supplies we helped evacuate the wounded. As usual the Texans uncomplainingly carried out a difficult and dangerous job without anyone pinning any bouquets upon them. However it was all right with them because they didn't expect anybody to do so.

"There is one amusing incident which happened as we were moving up to the front. We spent a night at La Ferte Sous Jouarre. The German bombers came over and tried to get a bridge across the Marne. A shell hit on the far side of the bank near the Supply Train Headquarters. Fortunately, no one was

injured, but fragments went across the river and killed two men in a park a few hundred yards away. A funny thing was the number of men who took refuge under the bridge that the Germans were trying to bomb."

The Division came out of its first fight in the open field with some of its ideas as to the best methods for such combats confirmed and with some of them altered.

Probably their greatest lesson was that in the open troops to successfully advance need much greater dispersion in breadth and above all in depth than trench warfare had taught them to use.

General Gouraud's talk to the generals and field officers of the Division the early morning of the eighteenth as they came out of the Champagne had made a great impression. However, the Ourcq showed them that in the open with modern artillery and machine gun fire eschelonment in depth cannot be taken up too soon nor maintained too long.

The bravest human being cannot move forward when stretched on the ground unable to move because of a wound or dead. Supports and reserves which suffer heavy loss before the time comes to use them cannot carry forward the attack, when the demand is made upon them. The suddenness with which modern weapons can concentrate a really terrible fire upon any small area makes such a concentration a surprise attack more dangerous than the old-fashioned one where suddenly enemy infantry with the bayonet or their cavalry with saber and lance hurled themselves in headlong attack from a distance of a hundred yards or so.

Such an attack ultimately resolves itself into the struggle of human beings against other human beings. The modern form of surprise attack has no defense except dispersion because human beings cannot combat fragments of shells and machine gun bullets suddenly raining upon them.

The Division found and realized to an extent far beyond anything they had experienced even in the Champagne that it is a misnomer to speak of lines today, as there are no lines but only areas in which troops are distributed. In fact, this is so true that the depth to which a division is deployed if properly handled to insure the maximum chance of success is far greater than the front which it occupies.

In other words, the “era of area” warfare had arrived.

The infantry learned that the mere fact that battalions were well back of their assault battalion and in reserve in some forest where they could not be seen, did not prevent them from suffering heavy loss unless they were widely dispersed. In other words, they had the lesson of trench warfare emphasized that due to the tremendous power of modern artillery to destroy and to switch its destruction suddenly from one place to another there are times when the rear areas of a battle field are more dangerous than the front ones.

In this battle notably in the capture of Seringes-et-Nesles by the 168th Infantry the principle of encircling a strong point from both flanks rather than bullheadedly assaulting it was found to be effective. It is true, that prior to leaving the Baccarat sector some instructions and minor maneuvers along these lines had been tried out. However, it is always one thing to do something on maneuver when not under fire and another to try it out on the battlefield.

The infantry came out of this battle determined that hereafter each battalion when deployed should cover more ground in depth. Also they had made up their minds that hereafter as soon as they came under heavy fire the standard attack formation would be abandoned for the advance of a few men at a time by crawling and in fact using infiltration wherever possible.

They came out convinced of the efficacy of the rifle as against men using hand grenades which necessarily have a short range and machine guns which with their crew around them furnish an excellent target for infantrymen lying down hidden from view.

The artillery came out firmly convinced that while the accompanying barrage has its usefulness the best fire consists of violent concentrations on the enemy’s strong points while their own infantry was attacking. They found this was above all true in open country where the exact features of the terraine cannot be known with the result that the average barrage fire is too scattered to give decisive results.

If any artillerymen went into the Ourcq battle with some lingering notions of his peace-time training that he must be careful of ammunition expenditure, he lost it by the time the battle was over. This because he could not fail to be convinced that it is

only by the violence of its fire that the artillery can remove from the infantry the enemy which obstructs its advance. Otherwise the enemy takes an unreasonable toll in dead and wounded even if the assault succeeds.

As a result of this battle, Major Winn, who commanded the machine gun battalion of the 84th Brigade, was able to convince the new brigade commander, Brig. General Douglass MacArthur, who had just been promoted from Colonel and Chief of Staff of the Division, that the machine guns of his battalion should remain concentrated under his hand for use as a fire unit. This instead of having their companies split up amongst the different assault battalions, only to have many of their men killed and wounded while carrying forward the guns which should have been in action with their fire helping the infantry forward. From then on the machine guns were handled in this fashion by the 84th Brigade with advantageous results which clearly proved the value of the method.

The Division came out of this battle with a better understanding of the fact already borne in on them by the Champagne defensive that the best way to defend a position is not to sit on top of the most prominent features which besides being on every map can easily be seen by the enemy but that the way to defend it is to so dispose its weapons of all categories that any enemy attack will first do the least damage to the defenders by its fire and second have to advance over ground well swept by the fire of the defender.

The withdrawal of the 166th Infantry from Seringes-et-Nesles and of the 165th from Meurcy Farm when the Germans brought down artillery concentrations on them, while they at the same time maintained troops on the flanks which could fire across the approaches, are two outstanding examples of this.

The signal battalion proved Major Garrett's assertion that with the proper organization and enough wire liaison can be established and kept open in a division moving to the attack in the open.

The 149th Field Artillery and the 166th Infantry proved the contention of their Colonels that with enough wire and personnel field artillery can keep continuous telephonic liaison with the major commanding the assault battalion which it is supporting.

In this battle the 149th Field Artillery put to the test in the open the organization which its Colonel had previously tried out in trench warfare and which after the war became in general the organization of our field artillery regiments. The band and all administrative elements of the headquarters company were attached to the Supply Company. The Headquarters Company became in reality a liaison company plus a detachment under a lieutenant of two draftsmen with their drawing boards, one stenographer with his typewriter and one telephone operator. This detachment was always with the Colonel in combat even if they were out in the open or in fox holes.

In this regiment the prescribed system of telephonic liaison had been reversed. This because the regimental detail laid the wires to the battalions and the battalions to the batteries instead of exactly the opposite being done.

All the caissons of each battalion were assembled and put under the command of a single officer who reported directly to the battalion commander. The battalion commander was made responsible for the ammunition supply of his battalion. The regimental ordnance officer was responsible for finding out where ammunition could be gotten and seeing the caissons actually got it when they reached the place designated by him. The food supply and all administration questions were during combat taken care of by the Lt. Colonel who was in command of the rear eschelon of the regiment.

Thus the Colonel was free to make reconnaissances to mark the regimental fires on his map and have them immediately copied by the draftsmen, dictate his orders and then have copies of both maps and orders promptly sent to the officers concerned. He was at all times in touch by telephone with his liaison officer alongside of the major in command of the infantry assault battalion, the Colonel of infantry whose regiment he supported, his two Majors and six battery commanders besides having communication with the rear eschelon as well.

By this system the battery commanders were freed of all responsibility except making reconnaissances, picking good positions and personally firing their batteries from observatories well to the front of their guns.

The principle upon which all movements of the 149th Illinois Field Artillery were governed was to have the maximum number of pieces unlimbered, ready to fire, and adjusted whenever the infantry was deployed. As the Infantry advanced and made movement of the regiment forward necessary, one battalion was moved when the infantry had reached mid-range so that it could be ready to fire in support of the infantry before the rear battalion would be out of range. Then the rear battalion was moved forward.

By this method there was no time during which the infantry did not have artillery support of at least half the guns of the regiment.

The Rainbow had successfully solved its problem of carrying the heights of the Ourcq all along the curve of the Marne. It was thankful for the help given it by the French on its left the 47th Infantry from the 4th Regular Division in its center and above all for that of the 32nd Wolverine Division on its right. The Red Arrow attack on the front of les Jomblets, de la Planchette and Pelger, Woods had materially aided the Rainbow in the capture of Hill 212, Sergy and the high ground to the north of Sergy, this because the German machine guns on the eastern edge of these three woods had played a most important part in the German defense of these three strong points.

What was the result of this victory on the Ourcq?

Was it simply part of a general victory along the whole line of the salient then held by the Germans or were its results so far reaching as to be decisive at least in this part of the long battle line on which the Allies and the Americans faced the Germans?

It was decisive as far as what was left of the Marne salient was concerned!

Along with the general attack on the salient which began July 18th from Soissons to Chateau Thierry and gradually spread to include the whole front as far as Rheims there were two blows which because of the strategical value to the Germans of the localities in which they were struck were of decisive importance in bringing about the complete withdrawal of the Germans from the Marne salient.

The first of these was the blow struck at the western terminus of the salient by the 1st and 2nd, Regular, American Divisions and the French Morrocan Division. Unless the drive forward of these three Divisions was stopped the salient was irreparably broken at its western base with all the troops and material to the south of this point in the greatest danger of being cut off and captured.

From the time of the relief of these three divisions the Germans who were constantly rushing fresh divisions to this danger point succeeded in stopping and holding the advance. Thus as they were driven back in the southern part of the salient, their troops had a chance to withdraw and even to remove some of the material without great risk of being cut off and captured.

The Ourcq River was the next position chosen by the Germans on which to make a determined stand and perhaps save the upper half of the salient which they had so quickly made the latter part of May. As long as they were successful in holding the two bases of the salient, one south of Soissons and the other near Rheims their troops and material in it were in no danger if they succeeded in holding the Ourcq position.

When they were driven from that position and the center of their salient forced to retire to the next good defensive one, which was the north bank of the Vesle, their troops on both bases of the salient were in danger of being cut off so had to voluntarily retire.

Thus the victory of the 42nd Rainbow Division on the Ourcq and its sister the 32nd Red Arrow Division was decisive in wiping out the last of the Marne salient. This just as the break through the Kriemhilde Stellung by these two divisions in the Argonne the middle of October was later to so decisively affect the situation in the Argonne that the attack of November 1st met but little resistance and began a German retreat which only ended when they were across the Meuse River.

The then Major Noble B. Judah says:—

“The system of intelligence established in the Rainbow, is entitled to the credit for what was perhaps the first news gotten that the counter-attack begun by the French and Americans on

July 18th, was compelling the Germans to take away some of the reserves of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, whose army faced the British.

"Until this news came the British, and undoubtedly Marshal Foch's headquarters, had reason to believe that the attack on the British planned to come after the Champagne one of July 15th-16th would still take place.

"News that the Crown Prince of Bavaria's reserves were being sent south to help the German Crown Prince's army would show that the Germans were on the defensive, and thus unable to make the planned attack on the British.—See map at end of Chapter 17.

"Sometime before the Ourcq battle, my assistant, Lieutenant Elmer, had suggested to me that we station at each of the regimental dressing stations men who could cross-question wounded German prisoners, as these stations would be the first place they would be gathered. This was done.

"The last day of the Ourcq one of our sergeants who spoke German stationed at the dressing station of the 168th Iowa, reported that they had captured a wounded German whose division had arrived the night before, from the Army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. The prisoner said his regiment had been put in early in the evening at about where the right of the 168th Iowa and the left of the 32nd Divisions met. He said that at the time he was wounded and captured the orders had just been received to withdraw the regiment.

"Realizing the significance of this I sent the information immediately to the American 1st Army Corps Headquarters. They immediately passed it on with the result that it soon reached Foch's headquarters. I was told afterwards that this was the first definite news they had received confirming reports that the Crown Prince of Germany's troops were being so hard pressed by the fighting in the Marne salient that divisions had to be taken from the Crown Prince of Bavaria and therefore his contemplated attack on the British called off."

This is one more piece of evidence that the Second Battle of the Marne was the turning point of the War, because it so put the Germans on the defensive that even before it was over they had lost the power, that is the reserves, necessary to attack again.

During the Battle of the Ourcq the Rainbow fought the following German Divisions—the 10th Landwehr, the 201st, the 6th Bavarian and the 4th Guard Divisions.

The exact casualties for the Croix Rouge Farm fight cannot be separated from those suffered by all four regiments of infantry during the same period. These were for the infantry alone 231 killed and 580 wounded. As the 83d Brigade was not in action during this time its casualties were fairly light as only due to shells landing in the woods which they occupied.

Therefore most of these casualties were in the 84th Brigade as a result of its capture of the Croix Rouge Farm.

The total casualties of the Rainbow for the Ourcq Battle were 945 killed in action, 269 dead of wounds and 4315 wounded, a total of 5529.

The total number of prisoners lost by the Division in the Champagne and the Ourcq, the defensive and offensive stages of the Second Battle of the Marne was 51 or half the total of 102 lost by the Rainbow during the war. A considerable proportion of this loss was due to those captured by the Germans in the "Sacrifice Positions" in front of the main line of defense in the Champagne Battle.

The losses in killed in action and wounded in the Ourcq Battle added to the 1569 killed and wounded in the Champagne made a total of 7198 killed and wounded of approximately 27000, the sacrifice of the Rainbow in playing its part in the Second Battle of the Marne one of the decisive battles of history; the one in which the hitherto mounting tide of German Victory in 1918 was turned to the ebbing tide which culminated in defeat in the Armistice of November 11, 1918.

That the Second Battle of the Marne was decisive is shown following commendatory order:

G. H. Q.
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 143

FRANCE, AUGUST 28, 1918.

It fills me with pride to record in General Orders a tribute to the service and achievement of the First and Third Corps, comprising the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd, and 42nd Divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces.

You come to the battlefield at the crucial hour of the Allied cause. For almost four years the most formidable army the world had as yet seen had pressed its invasion of France and stood threatening its capital. At no time had that army been more powerful or menacing than when on July 15th, it struck again to destroy in one great battle the brave men opposed to it and to enforce its brutal will upon the world and civilization.

Three days later in conjunction with our Allies, you counterattacked. The Allied Armies gained a brilliant victory that marks the turning point of the war. You did more than give our brave Allies the support to which as a nation our faith was pledged. You proved that our altruism, our pacific spirit, our sense of justice have not blunted our courage or virility. You have shown that American initiative and energy are as justly won the unstinted praise of our Allies and the eternal gratitude of our countrymen.

We have paid for our success in the lives of many of our brave comrades. We shall cherish their memory always, and claim for our history and literature, their bravery, achievement and sacrifice.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, Commanding in Chief.

OFFICIAL:
ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

.

CHAPTER XVII

THE RAINBOW ARTILLERY GOES ON TO THE VESLE.

The Artillery Brigade of the Division was now to have its first service away from its own infantry and in support of the infantry of another division.

It is true, that from time to time, in the Lorraine trench service different battalions had been detached for short periods of service in support of French infantry. Also in the Champagne some of the artillery fires were in front of French infantry as well as American.

But this was the first occasion on which the whole 67th Field Artillery Brigade was entirely detached from the command of its own division and put under command of another.

The Artillery Brigade was to realize for the first time how there was more esprit de corps in some cases between the artillery and infantry, which comes from the friendships, many of them deep and lasting, which spring up between these two branches of the service when the same artillery again and again in combat supports the same infantry. By this time in the 42nd Division there was more esprit de corps in some cases between the artillery-infantry team of one regiment of infantry and the artillery regiment which supported it than there was within the infantry as a whole or the artillery as a whole.

Colonels together in battle facing the same problems; support or reserve or both infantry battalions near the battery positions watching them fire and then going forward under this fire when the turn of each came to relieve the front line battalion; artillery liaison officers and telephone enlisted men with the infantry assault battalion—all establish bonds which forged in the fatigue, stress and danger of battle grow stronger and stronger and thus incapable of being lightly broken or broken at all.

Their service with the 4th Division an excellent regular army one, was to bring home to the Rainbow Artillery a realization of their relationship with their own infantry. This had

grown so gradually and naturally that the artillery had not realized its strength before. It was not because there was any intention on the part of either the 4th Division or the 67th Field Artillery Brigade to get along together. Each did everything humanly possible to insure the maximum team work. It was simply that they did not know each other and therefore had to face the difficulties which always confront strangers when trying to act with unity of purpose in a difficult and dangerous situation. It was all the more emphasized by the discovery of some of the regular officers and former regular army officers in the 67th Field Artillery Brigade of old friends in the 4th Division. The natural delight of meeting them under such circumstances was greatly increased by the feeling: "At last, here is someone I can talk to frankly and in terms which he will not misinterpret."

The problem which now confronted the Rainbow artillery was the support of a division which in pursuit formation was not to overtake a beaten enemy and force it to reluctantly fight, but which was instead to bump hard against the strong resistance which an unbeaten enemy inevitably puts up in a carefully chosen previously picked position in which he is waiting to be attacked.

In other words, the same mistake in the estimate of the situation which was made when the Germans retired to the Ourcq was being repeated when they retired to the Vesle river. In each case they had quietly and quickly picked up at night and retired over many carefully chosen trails and wagon roads as well as the main routes to another position a short distance to the rear. In neither case did they concentrate their troops in long march columns covered by rear guards and start north with no intention of stopping to fight unless compelled to by their pursuers overtaking them. In each case their French and American pursuers made the mistake of thinking this was what they had done.

The result was that the 4th Division made its first attacks on the Vesle in the disjointed fashion which always results from advance guards of columns on different roads bumping up unexpectedly against determined resistance from an enemy waiting in a carefully chosen position.

The service of the 67th F. A. Brigade of the Rainbow with the 4th (Regular Division) was from August 3 to August 11 on the night of which date the 4th Division was relieved by the 77th New York Division. It had come from the Baccarat Sector where it had been since relieving the Rainbow.

This service falls into three parts. The first was the pursuit of the Germans to the Vesle River. The second consisted of attempts to cross the Vesle under the assumption that the Germans were still retreating. The third was the one in which it was realized that the Germans had no intention of retreating further, but intended to make a stand on the Vesle similar to the one they made on the Ourcq. In this period divisional attacks were made to oust him.

Under the assumption that the Germans would continue to retire the 4th Division advanced the afternoon of August 3d in two columns;—the 7th Infantry Brigade on the left, the 8th Infantry Brigade on the right. Each was ordered covered by a strong advance guard made up of all arms including French Cavalry. The 149th Illinois F. A. was ordered to furnish two batteries to the left column, and the 151st (Minnesota) F. A. two batteries to the advance guard of the right column.

The Colonel of the Illinois Regiment requested that this order be countermanded. This because some of his Batteries were already in position ready to fire to cover any attempted crossing of the Vesle and because such reconnaisance as had already been made indicated that the Germans intended strongly to resist any such crossing. After some discussion with the Commanding General of the 7th Brigade and the Chief of Staff of the Division the order was countermanded and the Batteries left in position ready to fire.

The advance guard of the right column did not reach the slope leading over the crest just south of the Vesle until dark. In the dark it made a mistake as to roads with the result that instead of crossing the crest and thus coming under German observation and fire it marched during the night on the South side of the crest.

Until August 5th the 4th Division was without its own Field Artillery Brigade. Besides the Rainbow Artillery Brigade it had in its support during August 3 and 4 the 51st F. A. Brigade of

the 26th New England Division. This Brigade though under orders for relief had continued to advance to the Vesle after the 84h Infantry Brigade which it had supported during the battle of the Ourcq had been relieved. The next night that of August 5-6 the 4th F. A. (Regular) Brigade went into position. As it was its first experience at the front it was ordered to "take up filial positions with the indicated elements of the 67th F. A. Brigade, Battery by Battery, Battalion P. C. with Battalion P. C., and Regimental P. C. with Regimental P. C. The 13th F. A. which was the Howitzer Regiment was placed with the 150th Indiana, the 16th F. A. with the 151st Minnesota, and the 77th F. A. with the 149th Illinois. The 77th F. A. was a regular Cavalry regiment which had been converted into a field artillery one.

An interesting statement in the Rainbow bulletin of information for August 5th is that 39,100 rounds of German artillery ammunition were captured in the Foret de Nesles. Another interesting one was the statement in a letter found on the body of a German Lieutenant. In it he tells of the head-long persistent attacks of the Americans and how they could not stop them. In the final paragraph he says "summing it all up I think we have under-estimated Foch and his reserves and especially the Americans."

Various attempts supported by Artillery fire were made by the two Infantry Brigades of the 4th Division to cross the Vesle, the 7th at Bazoches and the 8th in front of Villesavoye. They were partially successful in that some of the Infantry despite heavy losses gallantly pushed across and established themselves on the Northern bank. Plans were then made for a general attack of the whole Division.

Though the Infantry courageously advanced under the protection of an artillery barrage they were unable to drive the Germans from their position North of the river. The Infantry of the 4th Division suffered heavily during these attacks.

Along with the Rainbow Engineer Regiment the then Major Stanley Rumbough, one of General Brown's aide-de-camps, was another element of the Rainbow which kept on going until Cherry Chatreuve was reached. He says:

"A battalion of infantry moved up and took position to the

left of Cherry Chartreuve. I was delighted to find an old friend in command, Major Don Lockett. He, like myself, had been brought up in the Army where our fathers had on one occasion been stationed for years at the same Army post. By the time the battalion had dug their fox holes, the Germans started shelling. I was impressed by the difference between new troops and troops that had been under fire before. Although the battalion held its position, the men would drop into their fox holes whenever they heard the whistle of a shell, this though it was easy to tell that the whistle came from a shell that would hit nowhere near the scene."

"Late that afternoon General Booth requested me to take him with his aides to visit this battalion. We moved through Cherry Chartreuve, stayed a short time with the battalion, and then started back to the P. C. As we did so the Germans put down a heavy barrage between ourselves and the P. C. and dropped gas and Austrian 88's in Cherry Chartreuve. It was reported that there were German observers still left in the church steeple in Cherry Chartreuve. It was growing dark at this time. Finally we succeeded in skirting the barrage. From there I returned to the Rainbow Division headquarters where I found General MacArthur had been assigned to command the 84th Infantry Brigade, Colonel Hughes had been made Chief of Staff in his place, Grayson Murphy G-3 in Hughes place and I had been assigned as assistant to Murphy. Incidentally on the way back I was chased by a German aviator who threw hand grenades at me."

One of the interesting sidelights of the service of the Rainbow Artillery with the 4th Division was one which provoked many humorous incidents and would have led to a fist fight between a major of artillery of the Rainbow and a major of artillery of the 4th Division, had matters not been peremptorily settled by a colonel, was the rivalry between these two artillery brigades.

It was amusing to "old timers" in both divisions to see how three different rivalries stirred things up. First of course, the Regulars did not enjoy receiving any advice from National Guardsmen, while the National Guardsmen who considered themselves veterans and the regulars as anything but, correspondingly enjoyed giving advice.

On top of that the old rivalry between the Field Artillery and the Cavalry broke out because one of the Field Artillery Regiments of the 4th Division was a Cavalry Regiment which had been changed over into field artillery. The cavalrymen have always challenged the horsemanship of the field artillerymen while the field artillerymen have always stoutly maintained that they had more difficult horse problems to meet than any cavalrymen conceived of and that by meeting them they proved their superior horsemanship.

Nothing is more important and more difficult if the Artillery is to adequately support the infantry than the maintenance of liaison between them. To have it the infantry must do their share. The following accounts of First Lieutenant S. K. McLanahan of the 150th Indiana and of Lieutenant Lombardi of the 149th Illinois are important because showing some of the difficulties met with. Lieut. McLanahan says:

"At ten P. M. on August 5th, 1918, Colonel Tyndall (150th F. A.) sent for me and said that he wanted an O. P. telephone line run from Mont St. Martin to the crest of the hill south of St. Thibaut. Lieut. Grunewald was to show us where the old O. P. was located on Mont St. Martin and act as observer at the new one. It was an unusually disagreeable night with a steady misting rain falling. We left regimental headquarters at Chartreuve Farm at about eleven o'clock with our reel cart full of wire. Everyone walked. On the way to Mont St. Martin we ran into some mustard gas and had to put our masks on. The Germans were dropping gas shells here and there intermittently, hoping, no doubt, to keep everyone awake and lower the morale of the men. The shells could do no more damage unless they happened to land almost directly upon a group. When we were nearing the vicinity of Mont St. Martin one of the chains of the reel cart became fouled by a rock which was dragged in with the mud. We lost a precious hour getting the chain off and back in the dark. We were anxious to get started as the wire had to be run across country which would be in direct observation of the Germans after daylight. We were now in thick woods. The old O. P. was on the crest of the hill to our right. Lt. Grunewald started out on a path leading in that direction and we followed him with the wire.

"The undergrowth was so thick that one could hardly plow through it. After consulting and after Grunewald's assurance that the O. P. was in a certain direction, I got out my radial dial compass and we plowed through the underbrush taking ditches, rocks, and embankments as they came. We soon came to a steep hill where we literally had to pull ourselves up from tree to tree. On top of the hill was a clearing. Here we ran onto a sentry belonging to the 59th Infantry, 4th Division, who were in reserve. We were asking him about the O. P. when a gas alarm sounded and he immediately ran to tell his officer, putting on his mask as he ran. As there were no signs of gas, no shells coming in, and the wind was toward the German lines, combined with the fact that we were on the top of a hill, we stood by to watch the performance. A whistle blew, a claxon screeched, and everyone was awakened and told to put on their mask. We walked over and found the officer in charge of the company. We told him why there could not be any gas present. We had had our experience months ago on a quiet front. They were getting theirs on a more active one.

"We found our O. P. a quarter of a mile away. Could not drag our wire to it. Borrowed some and spliced our lines together just as it began to grow daylight. Our mission was just starting. It was now impossible to run the line down the crest of the ridge as we had planned as it was under close scrutiny by the Germans. We decided to run the line behind the crest and then cross it at right angles. When we reached the place where we had to cross the hill I found some infantry in support. They were living in fox holes covered with elephant iron and camouflaged. They pointed out the German lines across the river and we could see a few Boche moving around. I chose the best route across and started with the wire, having made a loop to put over my shoulder. A man followed every two hundred meters. It took an hour's hard dragging by hand to reach the O. P. but we were very fortunate in not being shelled. The phone was installed and we got immediate communication with the headquarters switchboard at 7:00 a. m. The Germans held Bazoches at the time, which was scarcely over 1000 meters from the O. P. Later the O. P. was shelled heavily and one night our line was cut in

21 places. Several men were gassed and suffered mustard gas burns while keeping the line up."

In the last chapter we left Lieutenant Lombardi, the infantry liaison officer of the 149th Field Artillery just reporting to Colonel Bolles of the 39th Infantry, whom he had found at Mottin Farm.

Here is the continuation of his story from the point where the Infantry of the Fourth Division relieved that of the 42nd:—

"Colonel Bolles told me that his patrols and advance elements were then in the Bois de Dole, 'a little' northeast of the farm. Shortly after noon he again took up the advance, moved his P. C. to Ferme des Dames and indicated to me on the map that his two advanced battalions occupied a line just northeast of the Mont Notre Dame-Chery-Chartreuve road, extending approximately from the point where this road enters the Bois de Bazoches from the northwest to the sharp curve at 200.150-283.260.

"He then went out to look at these two battalions in position. I accompanied him. After some topographical discussion on the ground it developed that although the Colonel had ordered the two Majors to take the positions indicated, and they thought they had done so, both battalions were in fact somewhere south east of the road fork at 200.050-283.350, and most of the regiment was out of the regimental sector. This was the second instance of checking information coming from the infantry as to the location of their front lines and finding it inaccurate. The only solution is for the artillery to check such information whenever practicable by means of its own personnel.

"The Colonel at this time made an urgent request for artillery fire on same enemy machine guns which he said were holding him up. Several officers had been under the fire of these guns. Their statements as to their location on the map did not agree. I transmitted this request and stated these facts to Major Hammond when he arrived at Ferme des Dames. I also stated that the information which seemed to me most reliable was that given by the 37mm. gun officers. He seemed more familiar with map work than the others.

Late the same afternoon (August 2nd), Colonel Bolles received an order to proceed with two battalions of his regiment as an advance guard, cross the Vesle, hold the bridge-head and send reconnaissance parties forward to an indicated line which, as I remember it, was about 2 ½ kilometers north of the river. The order stated that two batteries of the 149th Field Artillery should form part of the advance guard, under Colonel Bolles, but I was told by Major Hammond that Colonel Bolles stated to him that he wished these two batteries to give their support from the positions they were taking up near Ferme des Dames and not march forward with the advance guard.

"Colonel Bolles left his P. C. at about 22:00 h., had his battalions formed in the Bois de Bazoches along the Mont Notre-Dame-Chery-Chartreuve road, and then commenced advancing in the northeasterly direction along the western edge of the Bois de Bazoches. He very soon met with rather severe artillery fire which caused him to turn back and march to Chery-Chartreuve, thence east to the road branch at 200,900.040, thence north to St. Thibaut. It was daylight when he passed through Chery-Chartreuve. The two battalions marched on the road in the formation of an advance guard. They were out of contact with the enemy. From about 200.283.000 north the road led along a narrow valley between wooded hills, which I do not believe had been previously or were at that time reconnoitered.

"No resistance was encountered until the advance elements of the command were immediately south of St. Thibaut. Just south of the southern edge of that village the road passes over a slight rise which is entirely open to observation from high ground north of the Vesle. When our infantry had reached this point and a few men had passed it, the enemy opened an accurate artillery fire thereon which inflicted some casualties. I should estimate the caliber of the guns which executed this fire as 150. This caused most of the soldiers at and near this spot to come running back down the road in poor order, but they were stopped and reformed by their officers.

"At this moment I was told by one of the Majors of the 39th Infantry that I could find an officer in St. Thibaut who had been through the town and beyond it and could indicate

artillery targets on the other side. I found this officer at the southern edge of town. He said that with a few men he had been through the town and a little way down the slope toward the Vesle on the other side; that the town of Bazoches was held by the Germans with machine guns and trench mortars and would hold up the advance of the infantry unless fired on by the artillery. I started back to find Colonel Bolles and if he confirmed the request for fire, transmit it to the artillery. When I reached Ferme des Filles, where the regimental headquarters was, I found that the report about Bazoches had already reached there, and Lieutenant Potter of our regiment had started back, mounted, with the request for fire. I stated that I would go to a position at the point of the ridge southwest of Thibaut (Monte de Fourche) to observe the fire, and I started to do so. At the edge of the woods at about 200.100-285.140 I met a French commandant, who came out of the woods at this point followed by a column of men. I asked him whether there was danger of any French entering Bazoches in the next few hours, stating that our artillery was going to fire on the village. He said that he believed that part of his regiment was already in or near the western edge of the town, and that our fire, to be safe, should be so arranged that shots would not fall west of the road which runs from St. Thibaut across the Vesle and northward to the national road. I immediately returned to Ferme des Filles, got a horse and rode back as fast as I could to the batteries and stopped their fire on Bazoches. It, however, had been almost completed.

"On returning to Ferme des Filles, I was told by Lieutenant Potter and by the Captain of Headquarters Company, 39th Infantry, that Colonel Bolles, with a few men, was in St. Thibaut and cut off by artillery fire from communication. As I could get no information at Ferme des Filles, I went on to a point on the edge of the ridge southwest of St. Thibaut to observe. On the way I met the French commandant, who that morning had given me the information which caused me to ride back to stop the fire on Bazoches, and he stated that no French had been injured by that fire. From this point I was unable to locate any hostile targets, although I heard some heavy machine gun fire from the

direction of Bazoches. I saw two ammunition dumps blow up, one at approximately 19.77, the other at a point which I estimated to be in or near Fismette. These and some explosions north of Vesle that I saw on subsequent days now seems remarkable in view of the fact that the Germans did not retreat further.

"I returned at about dusk to Ferme des Filles. The road to St. Thibaut was still being shelled but communication was reestablished. At this time a reel cart and detail, sent forward by Lieutenant Manson of our regiment, arrived and laid a telephone line to a point about 500 meters south of St. Thibaut, where their wire gave out. I found Colonel Bolles in St. Thibaut, and got from him the location of his troops and where he wanted his defensive barrage for the night, which I telephoned in from the end of our line, and then returned to Colonel Bolles. All elements of the 39th Infantry were then south of the Vesle.

"Colonel Bolles attempted to advance at an early hour the next morning (August 5th). His men started forward at about 5:00 a. m. but were immediately stopped by a heavy enemy barrage laid along a line south of the Vesle. The river was not crossed.

"Colonel Bolles then expressed the intention of sending patrols across the river, following them up with small groups, then sending the patrols forward again and so on until definite enemy positions were developed. He said he preferred to feel his way in this manner and find out definitely what he wished the artillery to fire on, rather than to arrange for a rolling barrage at once. He was without definite information as to the position and intentions of the French on his left and the 58th Infantry on his right. As he was about to send messengers to both these units I requested him to ask the C. O. of each to designate a line on the map within which we might fire with safety in support of Colonel Bolles advance. Colonel Bolles said he would not do this, as he 'did not want to bother them that way' and 'it would take too long.' I then wrote messages of my own to the same effect, and sent them with Colonel Bolles' permission, by his messengers. I received a prompt, polite and definite reply from the French Colonel (the information contained in which I,

of course, reported to the C. O. of my regiment)—but no reply from the Colonel of the 58th Infantry.

"All attempts by the 39th Infantry to advance on August 5th were met by such prompt and effective German artillery fire that they were unsuccessful and losses were very heavy. That evening Colonel Bolles stated that he was going to move his P. C. 'further back.' By the time I had gotten my detail together he had disappeared. No one could tell me where he had gone. By inquiry along the road I traced him as far as Chery Chartreuve, but there lost all track of him. I was afterwards told that he spent the night with General Poor. The next morning at about 8:30 h. I found him in a house just outside Chery Chartreuve. He then stated that all elements of his command were south of the Vesle, that his outposts and patrols were as far north as its southern bank, that his first line of resistance was about one kilometer south of the river, that his first battalion which had not been used the day before was now in line while the other two battalions were in the rear, reorganizing. He requested that throughout the day we execute intermittent harassing fire on the enemy territory opposite his sector, especially on woods, houses, ravines and roads and paths not exposed to our rifle and machine gun fire. He said that he did not then know what the further plan of action of the infantry would be; that he was going to Brigade Headquarters and upon his return he would know.

"Colonel Bolles did not return. I was told by members of the enlisted personnel of his regimental headquarters that they had heard that he had again gone forward in the direction of St. Thibaut. At about 13:00 h. I set out to find him, which I did at Ferme des Filles. He there showed me the Field Order regulating the advance scheduled for that evening. I saw elements of the infantry going forward to the attack..

"The attack of August 6th did not go through as planned. The infantry moved in accordance with the time table of the order. I heard Colonel Bolles make the statement that the infantry was an hour and a half late in crossing the river. I believe that a part of the infantry crossed the river and established itself along the railroad track which skirts its northern bank, but that no further progress was made.

"The night of August 6th-7th, the 39th Infantry was relieved by the 47th Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck commanding. The activity of this regiment consisted in several futile attempts to advance the line from the railroad embankment just north of the Vesle. All of these attempts broke down under hostile artillery, M. G. and sniper fire, and finally, under aerial bombing. The great stumbling block was the village of Bazoches, which, though frequently shelled by us, seemed always to remain full of very efficient German snipers and machine gunners. I believe the shelters in this village were largely proof against 75s and that the place could have been thoroughly reduced only by severe heavy artillery fire.

"On one occasion Colonel Peck asked for a rolling barrage to accompany an advance through Bazoches. A schedule for the advance and accompanying fire was accordingly prepared, agreed upon by infantry and artillery and fired by the artillery, but the infantry did not get started in time. The advance failed. I expected this result when I communicated the schedule to the Major of the first line infantry battalion as he did not seem to think that he could get his men ready and start them by the hour designated. Colonel Peck, however, said he wished the fire executed at the hour set and thought the time allowed ample for the infantry.

"On the afternoon of August 9th the 47th Infantry did advance east of Bazoches by 'infiltration.' It had almost reached the National Road when the elements across the river were heavily bombed by six hostile airplanes. They retired across the river. From conversation among the infantry officers I gathered that the morale of this advance battalion had been severely tried by three days and two nights in exposed position under severe artillery fire, with exposure to effective machine gun and rifle as well as artillery fire at every attempt to advance. The airplane bombs were the 'last straw.'

"A fresh battalion was now put into the front line, which was organized along the sunken road east of St. Thibaut and in the hollow and sunken road just west of the main portion of the town, with strong outposts on the railroad south of the river.

These continued to be the positions of the 47th Infantry until it was relieved. Colonel Peck stated that he had recommended to his Brigade Commander that the infantry either remain well south of the river, or advance by a single determined effort in the night or at dawn as far as the National Road. Partial advances by daylight he considered costly and unprofitable.

"Hostile activity during the occupation of the sector by the 47th Infantry consisted in the artillery and small arms fire and aeroplane bombing already referred to, and in addition, almost constant harassing artillery fire on St. Thibaut and adjoining terrain and often on the road to the south thereof. During one particularly heavy period of fire the enemy was reported to be advancing and dispositions were taken accordingly, but the report was not confirmed. I do not believe that there was any advance.

"Blindness as to the situation of the friendly infantry on our flanks was extremely troublesome during the occupation of the sector by the 39th and 47th Infantry. Reports as to the whereabouts of the infantry on our right were vague, infrequent and contradictory. Requests for artillery fire on known machine gun positions in the sector to the right from which our sector was being fired on were sometimes held up because of uncertainty as to the position of this friendly infantry and its intentions. Information as to the French on the left was definite but came infrequently. Throughout the period there was an ungarrisoned gap of more than a kilometer in the front line between the advance elements of the 47th Infantry which did not extend farther west than about 15.67 and the French on the left who did not extend east of 02.67. This until the last day when they were said to be about to occupy the point where the St. Thibaut-Bazoches road crosses the railroad just north of the river and south of Bazoches. During the last part of the period a company of the 47th Infantry was detached, made a detour south of the river and attached itself to the French southwest of Bazoches—but this did not fill up the gap.

"This absence of lateral liaison might have resulted disastrously on one occasion when the Captain commanding the 37 mm. guns of the regiment designated to me as a hostile machine gun emplacement the point where the St. Thibaut

Bazoches road crosses the railroad just north of the river and south of Bazoches. Colonel Peck afterwards received a report that the French were about to occupy that particular place. I had already transmitted the request for fire but immediately telephoned and cancelled it before the fire had been executed.

"Several complaints about short artillery were made by the 47th Infantry but in each case investigation proved that our regiment was not firing at the time at which the shorts were reported to have fallen.

"The 47th Infantry and attached machine gun units were very active in locating targets such as hostile machine gun emplacements and woods, fields and houses frequented by the enemy. The commander of the advance battalion several times asked for an artillery officer to work in personal liaison with his observers and conduct fire from his forward positions.

"I believe that an artillery observing officer with the forward elements of the infantry, working in liaison with the infantry observers and conducting fire direct from their advance positions could perform services of great value. Under the present system targets are discovered by the infantry, their coordinates calculated and sent back to the artillery and then the points designated fired on by the artillery often, perhaps, from the map without direct observation. If an artillery observing officer could be where the infantry observers could point out these objectives to him directly on the ground, and could conduct fire on them from the forward positions where they could be seen, chances of error in the designation and transmission of coordinates and uncertainty as to the result of fire would be eliminated as well as much delay. In case it is felt that the liaison officer should not detach himself from the infantry colonel long enough to perform this service and no other officer available therefor, the liaison officer should be enabled to answer infantry criticism of alleged delay and ineffectiveness of artillery fire, and to inform the infantry of artillery activity by being furnished with the following information in regard to the fire on each target transmitted by him from the infantry to the artillery:

1. Hour and minutes at which the target was fired on.

2. Whether or not the fire was conducted by direct observation.
3. What result of the fire was observed.

"The liaison officer should, of course, himself keep a record of the hour and minute at which fire on the target was asked for. One of the difficulties experienced in the infantry liaison during the fighting between the Marne and the Vesle, was a tendency on the part of some of the men in the detail to break down nervously. Perhaps better results could be obtained if details of this kind were made up of volunteers with good nerves who understand what their work will be like; have some taste for that kind of thing and are ready to put up with its bad features. If this personnel could be trained in advance to observe carefully and to be able to locate accurately on the map positions seen on the ground they could perform very useful services in checking the location of targets, infantry first line positions, etc. I do not intend this as a criticism of all the men who were in the detail during the recent work. Several showed excellent pluck, notably Corporal James Moorehouse, Headquarters Company, and Private Robert Minuciano, Battery B. The latter I have recommended for gallantry as I believe he went beyond his duty. He was wounded by a shell fragment at St. Thibaut.

"It often happened during the fighting between the Marne and the Vesle that the liaison officer was asked or had opportunities to suggest the kinds of fire to be requested. If he could have been kept in touch with the ammunition situation in the artillery he would have been guided thereby. It would perhaps be advantageous to keep the liaison officer informed on this point, the information being, of course, sent in code, if telephoned.

"The problem of locating the friendly infantry on the flanks is one of the most serious encountered in infantry liaison because (1) infantry units advancing do not confine themselves to the zones previously laid out for them, but continually stray into one anothers zones. (2) The hostile elements which by their fire are holding up the infantry we support are often located in the zone of advance of adjoining friendly infantry. Unless the location of this infantry is known, it is impossible

at any particular time to know whether or not they will be dangerously close to any given target by the time fire on it can be executed.

"A condition which is very striking to one engaged in infantry liaison work is the apparently total lack of liaison between the infantry and the corps artillery and aeroplanes. If the infantry is being shelled and needs counter-battery work or runs into obstacles which can be affected only by heavy artillery, it always appeals to the light field artillery and seems to have no idea of where to go or what to do when told that the work required cannot be done by 75's. Moreover, the infantry has no direct means other than rockets of notifying the heavy artillery of short fire. It is regrettable that of the vast structure which is back of the infantry and exists for the purpose of assisting to gain and hold its objectives, so little is in touch with the needs of the infantry or directly accessible to its appeals.

"It was apparent throughout the liaison work described in this report that men cannot accompany the forward elements of the infantry mounted. It is therefore suggested that men assigned to infantry liaison duty should be sent forward dismounted, with infantry packs. They cannot take horses, yet they should not be without blankets, slickers and reserve rations.

Several days before relief Redden's battalion of the 149th was put in position over the crest on the forward slope leading to the Vesle. It was in front of the Bois de Mont St. Martin. This was done so that if the infantry succeeded in driving the Germans from their position north of the Vesle this battalion could fire in their support while Hammond's battalion was moving forward.

Both battalion commanders of the 151st, Major McDonald and Captain Pantot had the satisfaction of being in an observation post at a time when they could see the German infantry preparing for a local attack, and of breaking these attacks up with the fire of their battalions.

With the caves in which were the Germans north of the Vesle, a number of villages, a main highway and a railroad, Majors Wainwright, Spence and Cureton who commanded the

three battalions of Tyndall's Indiana "heavies" had far more satisfactory targets than had been true on the Ourcq where such a large part of the German position consisted of fields and woods.

As there were reports from the Infantry that their own Artillery was firing short General Gatley commanding the Rainbow Artillery Brigade and General Cameron commanding the 4th Division conducted a thorough investigation.

General Gatley reported through his Adjutant Major C. H. Nance August 9th:—"Short firing was reported about 2 P. M. yesterday afternoon. All batteries were checked immediately. All artillery fire was being observed shot for shot. At the time of the reported short firing the artillery were firing on points well in advance of our own infantry. The setting of sights for all guns were found to be correct. At the time of the report the enemy's artillery was very active. It was found that the artillery on our right and on our left were firing well over and in their own sectors. * * *

"At one time last night, about 9 o'clock I think, short firing was reported. After checking it up it was found that no gun had fired in two hours and five minutes."

During this period on the Vesle the enemy's artillery fire both day and night was continuous and strong enough to indicate every intention to hang on to his Vesle position. This nine days of action following without intermission on the Battle of the Ourcq and that only separated from the Champagne Battle by the time necessary to move from one front to the other made the Rainbow Artillery welcome the order for their relief. Officers and men were tired, their clothing badly worn, the horses were in bad shape, and the equipment needed a thorough going-over.

The Brigade marched back to the Valley of the Marne not far from La Ferte-sous-Juarre where Division Headquarters had been established when the remainder of the Division had marched after passing eight uncomfortable days in the Foret de Fere

burying their own and the German dead, salvaging equipment, while at the same time being in reserve ready for use should they be needed. After a few days the Division entrained at Triport, Chateau Thierry, La Ferte-sous-Juarre and Lizy-sur-Ourcq for the Bourmont area where they arrived between August 17 and 19.

Captain Heigh Montgomery the Adjutant of the 149th F. A. reported 60,804 rounds as the ammunition expenditure for that regiment. Captain Louis C. Coleman the Adjutant of the 151st F. A. reported 54,709 rounds as the expenditure of his regiment.

Thus these two 75 mm. regiments expended on the Ourcq and Vesle 115,513 rounds in support of the infantry of the Rainbow and 4th Divisions.

CHAPTER XVIII.

A REST AT LAST.

As the French railway trains carrying the Rainbow ran farther and farther south and east, leaving every sign of war more and more behind and penetrating the beautiful wooded country with ancient towns and villages, many of them dating back to the days of Rome, the Division knew that this time they were to have a rest.

They were ready for it!

Since landing in France nearly nine months before, they had never really had a breathing spell in which they could sit down and take stock of things physically, mentally and spiritually. In other words, they needed that period of tranquillity which all human being must have from time to time and above all if for a long time they have had the feeling of being pressed for the time necessary to accomplish unusual and dangerous jobs.

Scattered in pleasant French towns and villages in one of the most picturesque parts of France, they settled down gradually to really getting clean again, getting new clothes, repairing their equipment and armament and putting it into first-class shape, eating, sleeping, wandering around in the nearby country, and being entertained by the French inhabitants with such limited means as were at their disposal.

The Bourmont Area in which the Rainbow rested has as its center Bourmont on the road from Langres to Neufchateau. Here replacements and new equipment were received. The latter part of the period drills and attack exercises were had.

Though the division did not get the month's rest that it had understood it was to have, but only ten days, this breathing spell was long enough for it to take stock of itself.

For the first time since it went to the front in February it was out of sound of the enemy's guns and out of reach of the enemy's bombers. For the first time it was in a territory in which there were no signs of the ravages of war.

For the first time it wasn't being crowded morning, noon and night to get ready for some movement or combat or else actually marching or fighting.

For the first time officers and men were able to be reasonably comfortable physically while having sufficient leisure to deal with each other on a social basis and when alone to calmly think over what they had been through and quietly adjust their mental and spiritual reactions.

During this rest period the Division had a chance to take stock of itself as a combat unit. It was now experienced both in trench and open warfare. In the Champagne Defensive it had shown its ability to withstand the hardest kind of modern attack by its conduct. In the Ourcq Battle it had shown its power to successfully attack across the open and drive a skillful enemy from his position. Its officers and men were conscious of their mistakes made in combat. They carefully thought out ways to correct them. In future combats they were to show the result of this because they no longer repeated their old errors.

One of the best proofs of this was to be the secret report sent by Major Corbabon, the Chief of the French Mission with the Rainbow.* It is for the period of the 11th to 16th of October the time at which the Rainbow was having its difficulties in the Battle of Landres-St. Georges.

He says: "The analogy between the position which we now attack and that which we attacked on the Ourcq in July is striking * * * the terraine, however, is much more difficult, the position stronger than that on the Ourcq, organized a long time ahead and very energetically defended.

"This analogy permits an accounting of the progress realized. This progress is striking. * * * The idea of manoeuvre (rather than rigid adherence to attack formation) * * * exists. The Infantry no longer attacks alone but does so in close liaison with its Artillery and making fullest use of its machine guns. It has become less rash and more skillful. The Artillery on its side shows more suppleness in changing its objectives. Liaison is good.

---

* Sent to the Rainbow Historian from Paris, December, 1935.

“"The tangible result of this progress is a noticeable diminution in the losses. During three days of hard attack the losses have been around 2,000. Under analagous condition on the Ourcq they were around 5,000.”

During this rest period the Rainbow learned that the Infantry of other Divisions had not always had their own Artillery with them as was true of the Rainbow. They found out from the stories told them that this resulted in many difficulties despite the intention of both the Infantry and Artillery to work together. This had been their own experience when supported by Artillery of another division. In other words they now were thoroughly convinced that the friendships and mutual understanding growing out of a constant association of the same groups of Infantry and Artillery brings the best team work in battle.

The then Major Lloyd D. Ross* whose career in the Rainbow proved him a first class combat infantry leader sums up some of the lessons learned by the Rainbow as follows. He says :**

“In making frank comments on the tactical instruction and methods of our troops I feel that perhaps the situation was a little different in our regiment than in the others for the reason we did not arrive in France until the 15th of December, 1917, having made one trip on the President Grant and returned to New York. Then we were separated as a regiment after we did arrive with two battalions at Rimaucourt and one battalion at Langres candidate school as labor troops. This condition continued until in February, 1918, just before entering the Luneville sector.

“We arrived in France at a time when all the French soldiers and civilians could talk about and think was defensive action. It was quite natural for them to stress training for defensive action. I am convinced the American soldiers and officers gave just as good an account of themselves and accomplished the desired results in such defensive action just as well as did the French who were our instructors. It was in offensive action that

---

* Now Brig.-General commanding 67th Infantry Bridge, 34th Division Iowa N.Y.

** Letter to Rainbow Historian November, 1935.

our defects in leadership and training showed up so prominently. However, we blundered through the early months of the 1918 fighting—losing more men than we should have and won our part of the war in spite of our delinquencies.

"The orders for the 42nd Division to take up a definite defensive sector to relieve trained French troops to assist the British in stopping the March, 1918, drive of the Germans, was the thing more than anything else which made us a great combat Division. We learned to depend on ourselves within the Division. By that I mean we learned the chain of command; we learned how to get artillery support; the infantry learned to depend upon and respect the work of the artillery and the artillery learned to have confidence in the infantry being able to keep the Germans from reaching them. The Engineers, the Signal Battalion, the Machine Gun Battalions, the Medical and Supply units all learned their place and to cooperate for the general good of the Division. Thus it was welded into a dependable and powerful war machine. We outguessed the Germans in their efforts to smash us and gloried in our confidence and ability. All this obtained under French instruction and observation. *All defensive action.*

"Offensive action was another story; our defects were glaring and many. Courage was not one of them as that quality was what generally pulled us through. Training in offensive action was limited as far as the 168th Infantry was concerned. Hastily assembled in Camp Mills with companies of 250 men which had been increased by 100 new men only a couple of weeks before our arrival, it took time to even organize and equip with necessities. The training attempted was more along the line of close action and personal defense. Not until we arrived in the Baccarat area did we receive gas masks, pistols, steel helmets and machine guns.

"I therefore set down as our first defect (and it never was remedied until we reached Germany) lack of sufficient offensive training for all grades. General Pershing was more than right in always hammering at the necessity for training for offensive action in the open.

"Next to that for the infantry I set down the lack of sufficient training in rifle firing. My company (after I left it right after the March 9th raid) had a Lieutenant who was a shooting

fool. He used every opportunity to use ammunition on improvised targets. *Result*, the wonderful work that company did under the cover of fog at the Ourcq. They literally shot the Germans off the saddles of their machine guns.

"Platoon commanders (the officers directly in contact with the men) were generally untrained in handling men and particularly untrained in offensive action. These officers generally came to us in groups from some training school in the United States. They were college graduates with good minds but untrained. There were many trained sergeants who were held back from promotions who could have done a better job of leading than these Lieutenants. This was proven by the way they handled platoons when the lieutenants were killed or wounded.

"There also existed all through the chain of command an ever present tendency to rush troops forward and keep pushing them against enemy machine guns without adequate support from machine guns, howitzers, and artillery. General officers and field officers were the guilty ones in this respect. They generally, had never commanded troops in large bodies and against a first class well armed enemy. Many of them employed the same driving tactics they used in smaller commands in the Philippine Islands and in other similar campaigns.

"They would not take the word of the officer in the front lines as to the opposing forces and weapons but kept driving troops forward inadequately supported by artillery. Along the Ourcq there were outstanding examples of this sort of thing. The artillery of the 26th Division was there but was not used to its full capacity. Men were constantly driven against machine guns well placed with ample ammunition and with orders to hold the Yankees back. Finally it dawned upon the General Officers they were sacrificing their infantry. Then they massed enough artillery to blow the machine guns loose and the way was cleared.

"Had artillery been turned loose on those positions the first day our infantry would have just walked over Hill 212 and the Germans would never have been able to organize along their next line.

"The same mistake was made in the Argonne, except the infantry had become wise to the game. We officers in command had determined that when stubborn resistance was met we would

not sacrifice men against material but take our time and gain our ends in other ways. We moved more slowly perhaps but more surely and had more men alive at the end of the action. We attained our objectives but without enough artillery in support.

"Then a halt was called from October 18th until November 2nd. During that time there was brought in all of the available artillery. Large quantities of artillery ammunition was placed at the guns. All of it was turned loose on November 1st. *Result*, the Germans abandoned the positions leaving their artillery in position and retired to the Meuse. Of course the 2nd Division and the 89th Division had a walk through.

"In spite of all I have said about the training and methods used by the Division I feel we did just as good a job of what was assigned us as did the 1st and 2nd Divisions."

Colonel Hughes, who upon General MacArthur's assignment to command the 84th Infantry Brigade became Chief of Staff of the Rainbow summing up the Staff at this time, says:

"The Division Staff worked in perfect harmony. No one officer amongst the Staff tried to advance himself at the sacrifice of any other. Judah, Grayson-Murphy, Rumbough, Gill, Ogden and the younger men like Elmer, and Wulsin made a staff such as few Chiefs of Staff are fortunate enough to have working under them.

"They were really interested in the success of the Division above every other consideration. They knew that that success could only come if the staff did everything possible to help the fighting men of the Division.

"While MacArthur, my predecessor and myself were both trained staff officers, we had served a great deal with troops. Therefore, we knew that they were human beings subject to all the emotions and physical fatigue inherent in human beings. We knew perfectly well that as a consequence a unit was not always the same one day as it might be another, nor two units such as say two infantry regiments or two artillery regiments, the same, simply because consisting of the same number of officers and men and the same amount of armament and equipment.

"We knew, not only as Napoleon I did, that an army traveled on its stomach but also that it travels much better if it is made as comfortable as the circumstances will permit.

"Therefore, we made every effort to put the personnel under shelter when we could, in fact, we originated the idea of billeting officers. We struggled constantly to get the Division plenty of food, clothing, ammunition and, yes, even their mail from home.

"We did the best we could to get them all the decorations they had earned. This not only because it was the just thing to do but also because of the benefit to morale. Many a night I sat up rewriting recommendations in order to better present the deed for which the recommendation was being made, than was done in the original.

"Both in the Champagne Battle and that of the Ourcq River, the question arose whether or not to send the rolling kitchens up to the front line at night. In each case we decided that hot food for the men was more important than a loss of a few of the kitchens, so we sent them forward.

"Every order to the Division was checked by Headquarters through the personal visits of Staff Officers. They were sent out not only to see that the orders were understood and being carried out, but also so as to get first hand information of what the fighting troops needed, to help them carry out their always difficult and dangerous missions.

"We concerned ourselves with much more than our daily supply, administrative and operations tasks. We tried to look into the future and make preparations for it. We did everything we could through old regular army friendships with officers on the staffs of Army Corps, the Army and even the A. E. F., G. H. Q., to find out even as long as a month ahead what they were planning. This, in order to be well prepared ahead of time. When under the French we always had some one who could speak French at the French Corps and French Army Headquarters in which we were serving. The French liaison officers with the Division were of material aid in this.

"As soon as we got any information we passed it on to the Brigades so they could think it over and prepare. As soon as an order was received we gave it immediately to the Divisional Signal Officer and the Artillery Brigade commander as they had much more to think and work out than did the infantry. Not that we delayed giving it to the infantry, as promptly as we could

work out their orders, but we gave it to these two before we had worked out their part of the divisional order.

"Our two New England representatives, Major Hugh W. Ogden and Major Davis G. Arnold, in non spectacular ways did a great deal to help the Division. Ogden as Judge Advocate of the Division while a strong believer in discipline brought an equitable viewpoint to bear which took into consideration the human side of the man at war as well as stern justice.

"Arnold originally in the 26th Division, came to us after recovery from an injury which had kept him incapacitated for active service for a considerable period. When the Division originated the idea of a billeting detachment he was ordered to organize and take command of it. He did a difficult, frequently dangerous and never spectacular job well."

"Another detachment which the Rainbow as a whole knew little of but which played an important part in its record was the Divisional Field Laboratory.

"The detachment was organized at Camp Mills. It consisted of three officers and four enlisted men under command of Capt. H. C. Knapp. Later one man in each company and corresponding unit of the division was assigned as supplementary personnel to look after the water supply of his company. During the Champagne battle Captain Knapp was promoted and was succeeded by Lieut. Lucius A. Fritze.

"Lieut. Fritze was one of the authors of the water manual used by the Army during the war.

"The protection which this detachment gave the Rainbow by looking after its water supply was one of the seasons our sick report was as small as it was.

By the time the Rainbow reached this rest area, two of its brigade commanders with it when it left the Baccarat Sector had gone. General McKinstry commanding the 67th F. A. Brigade had been succeeded by General G. G. Gatley just as the Champagne Battle began. General Brown who had been succeeded after the Battle of the Ourcq by Brig. General Douglass MacArthur.

The habit of indicating the strength of different Armies and parts thereof by the number of divisions, rather than by the actual strength in combat infantry soldiers (rifles), machine guns

and field guns became so customary that few realized how much more powerful an American Infantry division was than the French, average British or German ones.

The full strength of the American Infantry division varied between 27,000 and 28,256 officers and men depending upon various changes made from time to time in the Table of Organization. Due to casualties and the failure to send sufficient replacements promptly to the Divisions at the front the average strength of these American Infantry Divisions from the beginning of the July 15 attack to the armistice was 23,709 men and officers. For this same period the average strength of the French Division was 10,300, the average British Division, except some of the Colonial ones which were maintained at a greater strength, was 10,500, while the average German one was 10,000. Towards the last, German divisions had to be broken up to maintain this strength in the remaining divisions. Even then in the last stage of the war some of them fell well below this figure.

The American division had 12 Infantry Rifle Battalions, the French 9, the average British 9 and the German 9. The American had 3 Machine Gun Battalions plus 4 Regimental Machine Gun Companies, the French 9 Machine Gun Companies, the average British 1 Machine Gun Battalion, and the German 9 Machine Gun Companies. The American had 48-75 mm. guns, the French 36, the average British 36-18 pounders, and the Germans 24-77 mm. The American had 24-155 mm., the French 12, the average British 12-4.5 inch, and the German 12-105 mm.

The American Infantry Armament included 960 automatic rifles, as against 400 for the division of each of the other countries.

The division had been accused of killing prisoners. Major Ravee Norris of the 167th Alabama has the following to say about it:

"After the Battle of the Ourcq while we were resting in the Valley of the Marne waiting to be taken south by trains, an inspector came to the regiment one day. Those senior to me having taken advantage of General Pershing's permission, had gone to Paris. Therefore I was temporarily in command.

"The Inspector said, 'I have a very serious situation to investigate. The Germans have put in a communique that the 42d

Division does not take prisoners; that in the Battle of the Ourcq they killed Germans who tried to surrender in some cases and in others after their surrender had been accepted. You must tell me with the greatest frankness what you know about this very serious charge.'

"After thinking the matter over for awhile I replied: 'Well, I will tell you four incidences in the last battle just as they occurred and let you judge as to the justness of the charge. The first two have to do with the Croix Rouge farm fight.

"After we had captured the farm and moved forward we heard a field piece firing in our rear from the vicinity of the woods just north of the farm. The shell did not travel over our heads but went in the other direction far to our rear. We therefore sent a patrol back to investigate. They found a German field gun with three men firing to our rear. They shot them without any question arising as to whether or not they wanted to surrender. In other words, they shot them as they were in the act of firing the gun. Had they succeeded in firing that piece the shell would have killed or wounded Americans.

"In the first part of the Croix Rouge Farm fight as our front line reached the edge of the clearing a German our men had passed lying beside a machine gun and whom our men thought was dead, suddenly got up and began firing the machine gun into the backs of the front line. Naturally, when the men in support saw what he was doing he didn't last long.

"The second day on the Ourcq I sent a corporal back with seven or eight prisoners, who had just been captured. Some time later he came back saying that the prisoners had tried to jump him when he was alone with them going to the rear, and that to save himself and prevent their escape he had to shoot them all.

"This same day at various times nine wounded German prisoners were brought to my post of command. They received the same attention as our own wounded men, were put on stretchers and carried to the rear, where they were evacuated to a field hospital.

"I finished by saying: 'Now Colonel those are all the facts as I know them. You will have to judge for yourself as to the correctness of the charge."

Brig. General George Grant Gatley, the new commander of the Rainbow Artillery, was a graduate of West Point class of 1890. All his service since had been in the Artillery with the exception of a four-year tour in the Ordnance Department. As a young Captain of a battery of mountain Artillery in the Southern Philippines he had made a name for himself during the campaigns against the Moros.

During this period of rest the Rainbow Artillery Brigade became both thoroughly acquainted with and devoted to him. They soon found from his inspections and other official contacts that he not only know all about Ordnance and Artillery but also was a good combat artilleryman.

When he met officers off duty he was always so good natured and full of excellent stories that the different Officers messes vied with each other to get him to come for dinner.

Even Captain Joseph M. Patterson who was noted for his insistence on serving with a line regiment and for his peculiarities used to invite him. Though Vice-President of the Chicago Tribune and the father of a family of children, Patterson had gone to the Mexican border as a private. The following winter, he worked his way by study through the different grades until when his regiment was called out for service in the Great War he was a First Lieutenant. Throughout his service in France though repeatedly offered staff jobs well to the rear he insisted on remaining with his regiment. One of his peculiarities was always when out of the line to try to have his battery billeted as far away as possible so as to make it difficult for his Major, his Colonel and his General to come to see him.

General Gatley's language on occasions was so lurid and picturesque that it was the envy and dispair of Officers and men who up to then had thought well of their ability along these lines.

Some say that many of the ideas Charles Gordon McArthur subsequently used in the movie scenarios which have made him famous he got from listening to General Gatley. This because from time to time he was caught hanging around behind trees and in bushes where he could listen to what the General said. Being a second class private and strenuously resisting all efforts

to promote him he was not invited to the Officers' parties at which the General held forth freely.

Branch Spalding, one of the Virginia M. P's, tells the following:

"Speaking of the 'Alabama', who by the way were always to me the most interesting regiment in the division, on one occasion we arrested one drunk who had carefully tucked away in a little envelop, a batch of short stiff hair. Upon inquiry, he informed us that it was the mustache which he had cut from a German whom he had killed, and he expressed great pride in his intention to send it home to his sweetheart back in 'Alabam.'

"We always got one or two answers from an 'Alabam' when we inquired where he was from, or what outfit he belonged to. If he was sober, the answer was 'Alabam'. If he had been courting Bacchus, the answer was 'Alagoddambam.' "

By this time the reserve and training camp Officers who had come to the Division at various times had become so thoroughly absorbed that they were ready to tell of their first impressions and difficulties.

The division learned that many of these men had had considerable previous military training and service. Some had served in the National Guard before going to the training camps, others were graduates of schools like the Virginia Military Institute, the Citadel of South Carolina, and the Culver Military Academy. Others had military training in various universities, such as, those of the state of Illinois and Minnesota and Purdue, Indiana. Each of which had incidentally supplied a whole battery to the Rainbow regiment of field artillery coming from their state.

There were 37 men and Officers in the Rainbow who were members of the military fraternity "Scabbard and Blade."

Here is the account of one of the new officers to arrive at this time, where he came from and how he happened to join the Division. Lieutenant Raymond Turner says:—

"I arrived in France as a Casual Officer, with about three hundred other Casual Officers on January 21st, 1918. I spent the winter at Langres at Officer's Specialty School taking courses in intelligence work, scouting, patrolling, trench mortars, etc. In May, I was ordered to the British front for the purpose of training newly arrived troops while their Officers took short specialty

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

A platoon of B Company, 149th Pennsylvania Machine Gun Battalion, going into action in training. Chattenois Sept. 2, 1918.

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

Billets of 117th Maryland Trench Mortar Battery, and 67th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters, Courtiles, June 30, 1918.

courses. I was at this work until August 5th, when I received orders to report to the 42nd Division on August 12th, at La Ferte. The Division was just out of Chateau Thierry.

"Lieutenant MacKay, who was in charge of the First Battalion Scouts, was badly wounded at Chateau Thierry and never returned to the Battalion. I was placed in charge of the First Battalion Scouts, 168th Infantry. I found the scouts had been badly shot up on the Ourcq and it was necessary for me to almost entirely reorganize them. There was a nucleus of eight or ten of the old scouts left, including Sergeant Bill Fleming. The scout section was then filled up by volunteer replacements from the various companies."

When at Camp Coetquidan in Brittany the Artillery Brigade received its first batch of Training Camp Officers. They consisted of men who had been selected for the field artillery in the first camps held in the United States and then sent to France for the course at the French Field Artillery Schools at Saumur and Fontainbleau.

As some of these officers had seen cavalry service before going to the First Training Camp it is interesting to note that Saumur had for many years been the French Cavalry School just as Fort Riley, Kansas, is the American one. As the war progressed and the western front settled down to siege warfare, or as it had come to be called trench warfare, more and more French cavalry officers transferred into aviation and field artillery. As a consequence Fontainbleau, the regular field artillery school, was unable to handle the situation. So the Cavalry school at Saumur was turned into a field artillery one.

Here is the story of one of these officers who had as keen a sense of humor as his sense of duty was adamant, who went home a Captain with a recommendation for a Medal of Honor. Captain William W. Bodine says:

"Why did I go to Battery 'A', 149th F. A.? I went because I was sent. I had no more desire to go to Battery 'A', or the 149th F. A., or the 42d Division, than they had to receive me or any of the other Training Camp 'tin officers.' The Colonel tolerated me because I was an ex-National Guard enlisted man. He had been an officer in the Regular Cavalry. The regiment was a National Guard one.

"It all came about this way: In 1912 I enlisted in the City Troop of Philadelphia Cavalry Pennsylvania National Guard, served with them through four inefficient eight-day summer encampments during which the Regiment was never together as such. We went to the border in June, 1916, where in seven months' time a real bang-up regiment was developed, only to be disbanded in late January, 1917. Then came Training Camp, Fort Niagara, May to August (practically one hundred per cent of our troop enlisted there). There, in order to become efficient Field Artillerymen, we practiced various thrusts and maneuvers with the bayonet, the while jumping in and out of trenches. We did pull apart and try to reassemble an old three-inch gun, never to be seen again during the war, the only part of which that I recall went under the euphonious name of 'counter-recoil buffer set screw.'

"August 13, 1917, we were advised that a limited number of the bright boys would have the opportunity of sailing to 'Sunny' France on August 29th, to be shown by the French how to win the war. There were so many bright boys in my battery, including myself, that it was necessary to draw lots. I pulled a lucky number; I set sail, leaving behind me one wife and one youngster. Parenthetically, when I came back, there were two of the latter, the second young man having struggled through the world for a year without seeing his father.

"The 'bright boys' consisted of some twenty Infantry and forty Field Artillery Officers. I do not know whether any of the Infantrymen reached the 42d Division, but many of the Field Artillerymen did, including Richard H. R. Toland, Albert Nalle, and myself, 1st Lieutenants, and Henry D. Maxwell, Charles S. Neff, 2d Lieutenants, to the 149th Field Artillery. As to the other Field Artillery Regiments, I remember 1st Lt. Thomas G. Hirst, later killed, to the 151st and 1st Lt. Kinley J. Tener, 2d Lts. David C. Spooner, Jr., and Robert M. McCague to the 150th. Nalle, Toland and I, who originally came from the same National Guard Cavalry Troop, stuck close together, were in the same section at Saumur. Here we interchanged work so successfully that we graduated 1, 2 and 4 in the Section, Clarence E. Skinner, who also went to the 149th, breaking into our magic 3.

"After many false starts, we set sail from New York September 17, 1917. On the way over, some twenty days, including eight sitting in Halifax Harbor waiting for the next convoy, we read 'Danforth and Moretti' all day and practiced the buzzer all night, two aids to the budding Field Artilleryman which were of little subsequent value. Incidentally, Nalle and his buzzer were arrested one evening by an officer Master at Arms and dragged to the Captain's cabin for attempting to communicate with enemy submarines. The Navy is efficient! Anyway, we arrived at Liverpool, then by train to Southampton and a rough night-crossing to Havre on a crowded British troop ship.

"There promptly at seven A. M. the 'bright boys,' sick, weak, and wet, their nice new officers' uniforms a mess, set foot on French soil and 'lined-up.' Incidentally, whenever we had nothing else to do we 'lined-up.' I always tried to get on the right of the line, long practice in which caused me to be appointed Chief of Section at Saumur—the French had great respect for the 'Right of the Line.'

"After quite a bit of 'lining-up' to get the feel of French soil under our feet and to shake down our quite empty stomachs, we set out for Rest Camp No. 1. It was undoubtedly so called because the rest of the world passed it by, leaving the Army to select the highest, windiest and coldest spot in the vicinity of Havre at which to welcome the newly appointed, newly arrived Reserve Officers. I was going to say newly instructed, but that came later and was left to the French.

"Toland, Nalle and I, as old-time enlisted men, felt entitled to more consideration and more heat, internal and external. So we went to the nearby village, applied the heat in the local cafe and with the aid of a new-found friend, a very dilapidated French Civil Officer—probably a postman—billeted ourselves chez Madame Dindedault, the town's 'Sage-femme.' Toland and Nalle occupied the good mid-wife's bed, she going elsewhere—and caused some local scandal being so found by a messenger who rushed in during the night with a hurry call for the good lady.

"The sleeping results were so satisfactory that we returned the second night, only to be turned out at three A. M. to report at the railroad station at Havre. Being a little late as a result of our billeting ex-Rest Camp, we found it wise to commandeer a

perfectly good automobile with a perfectly good driver. It turned out to be General Glassford's (I do not recall his then rank, but, anyway, thanks, General—hope you were not inconvenienced.)

"Right here, at the Gare Maritime at Havre, came my first introduction to Battery 'A', 149th F. A., an omen of good times to come. While waiting for our train I looked over the stables of a British outfit about to sail for Mesopotamia—except, of course, B. E. F., not A. E. F. I had good reason to remember it twice later, New Year's Day, 1918, when I was assigned to our Battery 'A', and again in June, 1918, whereby hangs a tale. Here it is:

"In Liverpool I ordered a pair of boots, Britain's best made to order. Along in January I received a polite note from the boot builder to the effect that my 'valued order' had been shipped in two parcels, 'trusting that both duly arrive, we remain your obedient servants, etc.' In due course, namely the month of March, No. 1 arrived. It was quite useless for two reasons; one, because there was no No. 2, and two, because feet were so enlarged by that time that boots measured in September were impossible to get on them. So No. 1 passed around the Battalion for various considerations on the probability of due arrival of No. 2. Finally in June, out of sentiment and having nothing else to do in the Baccarat Sector, I bought back No. 1 from the then owner. Good omen again, within two weeks No. 2 arrived in a badly wounded condition, having travelled to Mesopotomia to Battery 'A', 149th F. A., B. E. F. It was returned with a notation 'try the same, A. E. F.'

"And so off to Saumur and our French Instructors. We arrived there eight P. M., October 8th. Toland, Nalle and myself, thanks to our National Guard enlisted training, let the rest of the 'bright boys' attend an examination to which all were 'urged' to go. We rustled a room together with the aid of a French 'Ordnance' who was likewise aided by the jingle of silver (poor boy, he did not know till too late that they were only coppers). We had our room and the others their examination. Rumor says questions had to do with Algebra, Geometry, Trigonometry and Calculus—had we known that we would have gone if only to join in the stamping of feet. Some attributed the manifestation to 'cold toes,' others, less generous, to a desire to break up the exam-

ination, and still others, perhaps more truthfully, to ignorance. If so, it must have been ignorance of manners, because, said the French, we were officers duly commissioned, and must have learned our Trigonometry and Calculus at our own Ecoles Polytecnique. Anyway, the examination did not take and the French made up for their surprise at our ignorance by setting us to work the next day with a vengeance.

"After three months' intensive training under excellent French officers, the following eighteen out of the original twenty in our section went to the 67th F. A. Brigade at Coetquidan:

1st Lts. W. W. Bodine, T. G. Hirst, D. M. Lake, A. Nalle, D. H. Pace, C. O. Skinner, R. H. R. Toland.

2d Lts. E. J. Brush, A. Dixon, A. W. DuBois, K. D. Harrison, E. F. McCoy, M. B. Moran, W. A. Radford, S. R. Sayles, A. W. Terrell, E. V. Thatcher, W. D. Wilson.

"We arrived at Coetquidan New Year's Eve, the weather cold, the welcome frigid. Both improved in the course of time. The three musketeers, Nalle, Toland and myself, having worked hard at Saumur to master the technique of field artillery firing, with the unworthy ambition of becoming Battery Commanders, were assigned as Horse Officers—our reputation as cavalrymen must have preceded us. Unfortunately, we had had no training in what we chose to call parade-ground bunkum (the French were entirely satisfied to move their guns like normal human beings into their gun positions). I was, therefore, entirely stumped by my first assignment, 'Take the Battery out for limber drill.' Knowing not one command, I was in the humiliating position of having to tell the 1st Sergeant to ride beside me, give me the commands which I then appropriated as my own, with indifferent results. You can fool the officers, but you can't fool the enlisted men. However, they were very indulgent, being satisfied with the remark that U. S. R. on our uniforms stood for Useless, Senseless Reserves. And so we struggled through January and part of February, criticizing our superiors for not making proper use of our extraordinary talents.

"However after we got to the front we found they knew their business and they found we were of some small value after all."

Just as the training camp Officers were so absorbed by the Division that the fact was forgotten that they were not amongst its original members so were the replacements. The first of these had come in February, from then on they came in increasing numbers. The total number is not available. In June the Division received 507, in July 4,151, in August 5,614. Thus in these three months the Rainbow got 10,272 men from the replacement divisions. This meant they came from the 41st Division, made up of men from Washington, Oregon, Montana, Idaho and Wyoming, the 39th Division from Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, and the 40th Division from California, Colorado, Utah, Arizona and New Mexico, and others from various Divisions still in the United States which had furnished groups of replacements shipped directly to Europe.

Thus besides its original groups from 26 States and the District of Columbia the Division was accumulating so many men from other parts of the Union as to become more and more a truly national one.

August 30th orders came assigning the Rainbow to the 4th American Army Corps commanded by Major-General Joseph Dickman, and moving the 42d by marching to the neighborhood of Toul. A pause of several days, in this march of 100 kilometers, was made in the Neufchateau region. The marches all made at night were six in number. The march finished during the first days of September in the Foret de la Reine. The 1st Division was also assembled in this wood. To the front holding the center of the southern line of the St. Mihiel Salient was the 89th U. S. Infantry Division. Other divisions were nearby. The attack on the salient which had successfully resisted various strong French attempts to suppress it was now in the immediate future.

CHAPTER XIX

WILL ALLIES USE NEW ADVANTAGE OF NUMBERS OVER GERMANS TO STRIKE FOR DECISIVE VICTORY ?

Now that the Allies had seized the initiative from the Germans and had the advantage of numbers once more a question of the greatest importance in winning the war and in the maintenance of peace for years to come after the war had to be settled.

It was whether the Allies would decide upon and use a strategy which would bring decisive victory such that no matter how unwillingly, the Germans at the time and for years to come would admit that they had been beaten.

Or was a strategy to be adopted which would bring peace without a decisive victory with the inevitable result that the Germans would increasingly feel that they had been denied victory rather than been compelled to accept defeat.

To produce the first that is decisive victory, the German line had to be pierced or driven back so fast at a vital part that the remainder of the German Army could only escape disaster by surrender.

The second could be obtained by a less ambitious strategy while attempting to cut off some of the German troops in general would consist of forcing the Germans out of France and Belgium and back into their own territory.

A glance at any map showing the railroads will show that the German Army in France depended upon three main groups of lines running from the Rhine to the French and Belgian borders and then spreading out in a network in rear of their western front. The northernmost group consisted of two main lines from Dusseldorf and Cologne running to Brussels and Namur.

The center system consisted of a main line from Coblentz up the valley of the Moselle to Treves where it spread out in a net work of lines towards Verdun into Metz and towards Nancy.

The third group consisted of a main line from Mayence to

the Sarre Valley and two main lines running up both sides of the Rhine to Strassbourg. These three lines were joined by a network which supplied the Lorraine front. Connecting these three groups and running roughly parallel to the front were two main lines, the first ran from Bruges, Belgium through Hirson, Mezieres, Sedan, Longuyon to Metz and thence to Strassbourg.

The second of these lines in the rear of the first ran from Brussels to Namur, Luxembourg, Thionville, the Sarre region and thence to the Rhine at Strassbourg.

Between the first group from the Rhine to the front and the line along the Moselle Valley lay the Ardennes. These low mountains are frequently referred to as a military obstacle. While more difficult to cross than the plains and hills of France and Belgium with their excellent network of roads, the Ardennes are not a military obstacle from the point of view of being insurmountable if railway communications are cut and troops and supplies are forced to cross them. They are not high. They have a considerable net work of roads, usable by motor transport.

The German Army found no difficulty in advancing over them in 1914 nor in retreating over them to the Rhine after the Armistice. The American Army found no difficulty in marching over them after the Germans. It is true many of the grades were steep and the roads narrow. However, compared to the country the American Army is used to operating over almost anywhere in the United States the Ardennes are far from being a military obstacle such that if an Army was forced back on them disaster would be a certainty.

It is readily seen from looking at the map that a continuation of the St. Mihiel drive to Metz and Thionville and thence down the Valley of the Moselle and on over the country on its right bank, that is to the southeast of the general course of the Moselle river, would do two things, first, it would cut the German lateral railways running in general parallel to their line. Second, it would more and more threaten to cut the line of retreat to the Rhine of all the German troops to the left of the American Army and in front of the French, British, and even the Belgians.

Such an advance would have given the best chances for a really decisive victory.

General Pershing when planning the St. Mihiel Battle wanted after suppressing the St. Mihiel salient to continue in this direction.

This was one of the main reasons why since shortly after arrival in France in July, 1917, General Pershing wanted the St. Mihiel Sector as the field of operations of the American Army.

In a conference with General Foch at Foch's Headquarters July 10th, five days before the last great German attack of the War, General Pershing emphasized this, while at the same time insisting on the necessity for the early formation of an American Army.

While insisting on this at this time General Pershing emphasized his willingness to have American troops used anywhere that might be desirable as the result of German attacks. In other words as long as the Germans had the initiative he was willing to have American troops used wherever they could give the most help to keep the Germans from succeeding.

On the other hand if and when the Allies got the initiative he wanted the American troops assembled in an American Army and used at the strategic point which would do the most damage to the German Army and therefore give the greatest chance for decisive victory.

In this interview General Pershing says of General Foch: *

"He talked a great deal that day and went on to say that in order to bring victory to the Allies it would be necessary for them to have an incontestable numerical superiority. He laid particular stress on the view that the strength of the British and French divisions should be maintained and the number of American divisions increased as rapidly as possible."

In other words the main question effecting the strategy to be followed by the Allies was to have the man-power necessary to carry out any strategical plans made. Prior to the Second Battle of the Marne, General Foch, General Petain and Marshall Haig made numerous plans to counter attack the Germans. However, they never had the man-power necessary until the increasing strength of the American reinforcements gave the means to make the first counter attack, that of July, 1918.

---

* Page 145 Vol. II. My Experiences in the World War, by John J. Pershing, Frederick A. Stokes Co., New York.

Throughout the Battle of the Marne the American reinforcement continued to increase thus adding to the means as the disposal of General Foch.

During the counter attacks made by the French and British throughout August this increase kept up. By the end of August the total strength of the A. E. F. had risen to 61,061 officers and 1,354,067 enlisted men.**

There could be no doubt that September would show another large increase in the strength of the A. E. F. and the following months as well.

Information of the enemy showed definitely that the German reserves had been so diminished by the course of the Second Battle of the Marne that they had had to draw reserves from other parts of the line (see map insert at page 513 at end of Chapter 17) to fight in this battle. This to such an extent that they had had to abandon the attack on the British which they planned to make after the one begun July 15th in the Champagne.

Thus by the middle of September it was more than certain that the Allies would have large superiority in numbers over the Germans and that this superiority would steadily increase.

As since the Second Battle of the Marne, beginning with the British Colonial and French attack of August 8 the British and the French had made a series of successful local attacks without the Germans counter attacking, there could be no doubt that the Second Battle of the Marne had definitely given the Allies the initiative held by the Germans prior to this Battle.

General Pershing therefore had every reason to believe he could proceed with his plan. He says * "On August 16th, preliminary instructions had been issued by me and these had been supplemented from time to time by verbal directions, and now everything was moving smoothly toward readiness for the attack, with Marieulles-Mars-la-Tour-Etain as the objective. In my conversation with Foch as late as August 25th, he had even suggested the extension of our front on the west of the salient. Two French corps in the sector had been assigned to my command and

---

** Page 146 same.

* Page 243 My Experiences in the World War, by John J. Pershing. Frederick A. Stokes, New York.

arrangements for the transfer to the area of auxiliary troops and services had been agreed upon with no hint that he was not in full accord with our plans.

"On August 30th, the day when I assumed command of the sector, Marshal Foch, accompanied by Weygand, his Chief of Staff, came to my residence at Ligny-en-Barrois and after the usual exchange of greetings, he presented an entirely new plan for the employment of the American Army. He began by saying that the German armies were in more or less disorder from recent attacks by the Allies and that we must not allow them to reorganize, that the British would continue their attack in the direction of Cambrai and St. Quentin and the French toward Mesnil. Then, much to my surprise, he proposed that the objective in the St. Mihiel operation should be restricted and the attack be made on the southern face only, and that upon its completion two other operations be undertaken by combined Americans and French, a number of our divisions going under French command."

This proposal not only vitally changed General Pershing's strategical plans but also split up the American Army only just formed after a struggle of many weary months to get it organized.

The steps by which General Foch came to this proposal are briefly as follows: *

July 24th he had assembled Marshal Haig, General Petain and General Pershing at his headquarters to decide what steps should be taken to exploit the victory of the Second Battle of the Marne of which there could no longer be any doubt. At that time victory was only looked forward to in 1919. The attacks decided upon were considered to be primarily for the purpose of putting the Allies in a good position to later on initiate a general attack which would bring victory.

---

* All the details can be found in General Pershing's Memoirs, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, Doubleday & Doran; Field Marshal Earl Haig, by Charteris, Scribner, etc., etc.

The success of the British and French attacks in August convinced Marshal Haig that more could be accomplished than had been outlined at this meeting. Therefore, on August 27th, he proposed to Marshal Foch that while he attacked the Hindenburg line to his front the French and Americans attack toward the Mezieres Region and that to insure this being carried out the direction of the American attack be changed.

An attack towards Mezieres would threaten the left flank and rear of the Germans in front of the British and the network of railways branching out from the Cologne Namur line which supplied this part of the German front.

Such a blow if successful would, of course, compel the Germans to retreat on the part of the front, in front of the British and Belgians under penalty of being cut off and compelled to surrender. However, with the maximum success possible it could not offer the chance for a decisive victory such as that offered by a blow via the Metz region towards the Rhine. The balance of the war was to prove this.

Marshal Foch accepted Marshal Haig's plan.

After a number of conferences in which the discussion between Marshal Foch and General Pershing became acrimonious it was agreed: that the American Army would not be split up, that the attack on the St. Mihiel salient would be limited to wiping out the salient and would be immediately followed by an American attack through the Argonne towards Sedan which is in the Mezieres Region.

As a consequence on the 13th of September when the Rainbow had gone beyond the Army Objective and was eager to go on toward Metz, it with the divisions to its right and left had to settle down on the line across the St. Mihiel salient which on October 12th, when General Pershing formed the Second American Army under command of General Robert L. Bullard, became the front of that Army.

CHAPTER XX

THE RAINBOW IN THE FIRST ATTACK OF THE FIRST ARMY

The Division was now to have the battle experience every soldier hopes for and seldom sees. They were to have a quick success where they had expected a hard bitter fight.

They knew the reputation of the San Mihiel salient. They knew that for four years it had again and again been the scene of bitter fighting without its positions being altered in any great detail. They knew that throughout four years the Germans had steadily added to its defenses.

During their four months in the Lorraine Trench Sectors and during their service with Gouraud's Fourth French Army they had met French officers and men who had fought at different times in different places in this salient and who had told them of its great strength.

The preliminary reconnaissances made by the generals and colonels while their organizations were still on the march to their concentration points, had confirmed these stories as to the strength of the salient.

As these high ranking officers stood in the high points of the first position and carefully examined the ground held by the enemy to their front, two things confirmed these tales. First, the enemy's position was naturally strong. Second, the Germans had given it the maximum additional strength by means of elaborate trench systems, battery positions and observatories. Mount Sec dominated every part of the American front of attack except the auxiliary attack which was to be made on the Heights of the Meuse and then down into the plain of the Woevre to join hands with the main attack coming from the south.

These officers knew of course that the attack was intended to be a surprise one. However, they doubted if the Germans would be caught napping. The long columns of troops which had been on the march for days at a time converging towards the salient could not be entirely hidden though they only marched at night and hid in deep French woods still untouched by war during

the day. There were bound to be German spies who would have observed and reported this movement. These commanding officers remembered very well the elaborate efforts made to keep secret the relief of the Rainbow by the 77th Division in Lorraine. They almost had to laugh when they thought of how, despite the precautions taken, the Germans heavily shelled all trenches, battery positions and roads during both nights of the relief and on the day between sent over little balloons carrying the message "Goodbye 42nd Division, welcome 77th."

They also remembered how despite the precaution taken by the Germans prior to their last great attack of the war, that of July 15th, the defenders were prepared for them. Furthermore, they recalled what was even worse for the attacker, the defenders had prepared a surprise which so largely contributed to the failure of the German assault. In other words, it was not the French and Americans on the defensive who were surprised as the Germans had intended but the German attacker. Would the German defender of the San Mihiel Salient spring some similar disagreeable surprise?

Another thing the generals and colonels did not like was the plan to have no preliminary artillery fire but only an accompanying one; that is, no fire until just as the infantry assault started.

If the attack was to be made in open country as was that south of Soissons July 18 or on the Ourcq from July 25th on, they were perfectly willing to make this type of surprise attack. Or, if they were to be accompanied by the same large number of tanks as were the Australians and Canadians in their highly successful attack of August 8th, they would have been satisfied to have no artillery fire.

Some of the infantry and field artillery colonels after talking this over decided with the support of their own brigade commanders to ask the Division headquarters to ask for a preliminary fire. This was done with the result that after the reasons had been gone into the army command decided to put in the attack order the preparatory fire which actually took place.

Fortunately, while the commanding officers of the division were right in thinking that the Germans would not be surprised by an attack on the San Mihiel salient, the Germans expected the attack to come several days later than it actually did. Thus they

were caught just as they were beginning to evacuate their first positions with the intention of occupying a shorter line across the base of the salient.

The problem which now faced the Rainbow was a simple one in outline, but as the War had shown during four long years, the most difficult of execution with which a Division can be faced.

It was simply a head-on attack on a well entrenched position, covered by many bands of barb-wired entanglements. From the last ten days of September, 1914, when the Army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria had made this salient, the Germans had successfully resisted all attempts of the French to eliminate or even to reduce it at some of its most important spots. Instead, in the attack on Verdun, which began in February, 1916, and continued well into the late summer of that year, the Germans had within the first few days driven in the northern base of the salient. This with the result, that its western side had been considerably flattened, thus making the salient less deep, less narrow, at its base, and therefore more difficult to nip off.

This broadening of the base had greatly strengthened the German hold on the high ground running north from the towns of St. Mihiel and Apremont to beyond Vigneulles. This high ground, known as the "Heights of the Meuse," from the foot of which the plain of the Woevre runs east almost to the Moselle river, gave the Germans excellent observation into all parts of the salient. This in addition to that given by Mt. Sec.

The French had only one good point for observation. It was in the neighborhood of Fort de Liouville on that part of the Heights of the Meuse south of the tip of the salient. It was from this one and only point of vantage that General Pershing watched the attack.

Along the American line, on the south side of the salient, there were a few fairly good points for observation on a number of relatively low rises in the ground. There was nothing, however, which began to give the view obtainable from all the German observatories.

That part of the western face of the salient, from which the Twenty-sixth Division attacked, was so far west of the crest of the Heights of the Meuse that this division could not look

down into the Plain of the Woevre until the very last stages of their attack, that is when they reached the crest at Hattonchattel just above Vigneulles.

The Rainbow Division order for the attack was Field Order No. 17, September 9th. It began with: "The First Army will attack and reduce the St. Mihiel Salient." The Division was then part of the Fourth American Army Corps under command of Major General Dickman. The other two Divisions of this Corps were the 89th on the night of the 42nd, and the 1st on the left of the 42nd. The Fourth Corps was to attack the center of the south side of the Salient. The First American Army Corps, made up of the 2nd, 5th, 90th and 82nd Divisions, was on its right. The 39th French Infantry Division was on its left. The Fifth American Army Corps, made up of the 4th and 26th American Divisions, and the French 15th Colonial Division, were posted on the northern part of the west side of the Salient. The 26th Division had the mission of driving forward to the edge of the Heights of the Meuse, thence down into the plain of the Woevre in the neighborhood of Vigneulles, where it was to meet the attack of the Fourth Corps coming from the south.

These two attacks would thus pinch off the point of the Salient and allow the four French Divisions distributed along its two sides to gather in any Germans who had failed to get out prior to the meeting of the two American attacking Corps.

The Rainbow was to attack in its usual formation of the four infantry regiments abreast, with one battalion of each in the assault line, and one battalion of each in support. In this case the two interior regiments had one battalion each in the third line while the two exterior regiments had one each in the fourth line, placed directly behind the third.

Battery F, 149th Illinois F. A., was assigned to the 83rd Infantry Brigade as an accompanying battery and Battery B of the 151st Minnesota F. A. was given the same mission with the 84th Infantry Brigade. The 149th F. A., two battalions of the 10th (Regular) F. A. and one battalion of the 150th Indiana Howitzer Regiment under command of Colonel Reilly, were designated as the artillery support of the 83rd Infantry Brigade.

The 151st F. A., three battalions of the 228th French F. A., one battalion of the 18th (Regular) Howitzer F. A. and the

3rd (Regular) Trench Mortar Battery under command of Colonel Leatch, were assigned to support the 84th Infantry Brigade. The balance of the 150th F. A. and 18th F. A., both Howitzer Regiments, and 117th Virginia M. P. Battery, were given the mission of supporting the whole Division.

The 1st Battalion less Company C and the and Battalion less Company F of the 117th Engineers were assigned to the 83rd and 84th Infantry Brigade, respectively, with the missions "to peg out the jumping-off line, the routes of approach to the jumping-off line, and the sector limits along and in rear of the jumping-off line, at least two nights before the attack," and "with making provisions for cutting passages through our own wire before the attack, for the cutting of enemy wire, and for the crossing of streams and trenches by tanks and accompanying artillery; with supervision and assistance in the consolidation of positions taken, and inspection of captured dugouts and other points for enemy traps and the disarmament of same when found."

Companies C and F with the 1st Battalion 51st Pioneer Infantry (attached to Division) were given the mission under command of Colonel Johnson were charged with: "Moving forward engineering material and with the preparation of roads and other means of advance."

This Order, with its annexes, covered fifty pages. At the time and since,* it has been considered to be a model order for such an attack. As such it was widely circulated in the A. E. F. after the St. Mihiel attack had taken place.

Colonel Hughes, then Chief of Staff of the Division, gives Colonel Grayson Murphy, then Operations Officer of the Division, the credit. Colonel Murphy generously credits the Staff as a whole, General Gatley and Major Vance, his Adjutant, Colonel Garrett, the Chief Signal Officer, and Colonel Johnson, Chief Engineer, each of whom wrote up their part.

---

* Since war has been used as a model order in the army higher schools.

Besides the main part of the order giving details of how the attack is to be made, and the troops assigned to each part of it, there are ten annexes, as follows:

1. Plan for Use of the Artillery.
2. Plan for the Use of the Engineers.
3. Plan for the Employment of Tanks.
4. Plan for the Use of Heavy Machine Guns.
5. Plan for the Use of Gas and Flame Troops.
6. Plan for the Organization of Conquered Ground.
7. Action in Case of Withdrawal of the Enemy.
8. Communications, Supply and Evacuation.
9. Plan for Liaison.
10. Plan for the Use of the Air Service.

In the days preceding the attack the Artillery had quietly dug and camouflaged new battery positions and gotten their firing data after sneaking the guns into these positions at night, all other parts of the regiment remaining in the Foret de la Reine.

The night preceding the attack, that of September 11th-12th, the routes leading to the jumping-off positions in the trenches swarmed with the Infantry.

The 89th Division, which had been holding the center of the south side of the St. Mihiel Salient, with the distribution of troops habitual in a quiet center, had all of its front except that assigned to it for the attack, taken over on its right by the Second Division, and on its left by the 42nd and 1st in that order from right to left.

The passing of the command for that portion taken over by the Rainbow, took place at 9 A. M., September 11th. The Rainbow went in in its usual formation of the four infantry regiments abreast, one battalion of each in assault, one in support and one in reserve.

In its sector the line of the second phase ran along the German barbed-wire entanglement northeast of Nonsard, south of Lamarche, and north of Thiaucourt.

The army objective for the Rainbow ran from the middle of the Bois de Dampvitoux, west across the St. Benoit-Haumont Road, north of St. Benoit through the Bois de Vignette to the western limits of the Division sector.

The orders were to reach the second phase line on the first day. Then local conditions were to determine whether the Corps Commanders would push the attack toward this Army Objective.

The infantry progressed steadily from the 5:00 A. M., September 12, when it jumped off.

The 168th Iowa led with its 3rd Battalion. This Battalion was passed by the 2nd coming out of the Bois de la Sonnard and reforming in the open beyond. With G and H Company in the front line, it continued the attack until at 15:30 hours it was abreast of Panne. Here it refused its right in order to connect with the 89th Division. The 1st Battalion was in support while the 3rd passed into Brigade reserve.

About an hour later the 167th Alabama came up on the left continuing the line of the 168th Iowa, and taking over line to the right so that the 168th Iowa could be moved to the east of Pannes. The Alabama regiment then put its 1st Battalion into the front line with an outpost line of C and D Companies about half a kilometer northeast of Pannes.

The 167th Alabama had its 1st Battalion in line with A and B Companies on outpost, the 2nd Battalion in support, and the 3rd in reserve, on the south edge of the Bois de Thiaucourt.

The 165th New York, with the 1st Battalion in the lead, reached the edge of the Bois de Thiaucourt about 13.55 hours. The 2nd Battalion in support dug in near Pannes. The 3rd was kept in reserve.

The 166th Ohio, with the 3rd Battalion in the lead, reached the second phase line at 13 hours. It remained on this line that night with the 1st Battalion in support. The 2nd Battalion was in Division reserve.

About dusk the 166th Ohio was ordered to put two of its battalions at the disposition of the 1st Division, which was reaching to its left front to gain contact with the 26th New England Division coming down over the Heights of the Meuse in the Vigneulles region. This to cut off the Germans in the point of the Salient. They were preceded by Troops “D”, “F” and “H” of the Second (Regular) Cavalry under command of Colonel O. M. P. (Happy) Hazzard who ran away from home to enlist in

the 1st Washington Volunteer Infantry and later was one of the Funston party which captured Aguinaldo.

In addition to the two battalions of the 166th Ohio, the 38th (Regular) Infantry and later the whole 6th Infantry Brigade of the 3rd (Regular) Division, then in reserve, were ordered to report to the First Division.

As the 1st Division reached farther and farther into the Bois de Vigneulles overcoming German resistance where met and capturing more and more German prisoners but finding no organized resistance the two battalions of the 166th were returned to the Rainbow.

The History of the First Division* says: "The enemy's confusion was shown by the appearance of the officers and enlisted men of a battalion staff who sought within the American lines the rendezvous designated for the battalion."

A scout platoon of the 28th Infantry which had gotten entirely through the woods at 6:20 A. M. the morning of the 13th entered and captured prisoners in Hattouville. It met elements of the 26th (New England) Division in Hattauchatel at 7:15 A. M.

Thus the Germans left in the nose of the Salient were cut off and made prisoners by the Americans and the French whose advance had been limited in order to keep the Germans on their front from retreating before the Americans had closed the Salient.

The attack was resumed at 6:00 A. M., September 13th. The Division pushed rapidly forward on its whole front. As the Division to its right had swung to the right and as the Germans retreated towards Metz which was to the right point the 84th Infantry Brigade was drawn to the right. As the First Division on the Rainbow's left had swung somewhat to the left and as the Germans to its immediate front had retreated north on and alongside the highway which ran to Woel the 83rd Brigade continued north.

The two brigades however kept contact with each other. The result was that by night the front elements of the Rainbow occupied a Salient.

---

* Page 167. Compiled and published by the Society of the First Division. The John C. Winston Co., Philadelphia, Pa.

As on the night of the 12th there was no contact the night of the 13th with the Divisions on the flanks. However as the Rainbow had long since learned that modern weapons give the infantry battalion the power to quickly produce a violent and sustained fire in any direction, there was no worry on this account. Above all when supported by artillery. Practically all the light field artillery supporting the Rainbow had moved forward and taken up new positions before dark September 12th.

While some extensions and advances were made on September 14th in general this was the line on which the Rainbow reluctantly settled down because Foch had limited the American advance despite Pershing's desire to go on. In connection with this General MacArthur says: "The morning of the second day's attack we not only reached but passed the army objective. I am sorry to say we just missed capturing the headquarters of the 19th German Army Corps in the St. Benoit Chateau. Amongst nearly other evidences of their hasty departure we found a fully-set dining room table, and a prepared meal.

"From the cupola of the chateau which until the Germans destroyed the chateau by shell fire was a favorite observation post, for the higher ranking officers of the division, to say nothing of visitors from corps headquarters, I could see the dust of the German trains retreating down the roads toward Metz. Prisoners captured insisted that there was only a small garrison in Metz;—nothing like the large numbers needed to really garrison and hold its defenses. I personally reconnoitered in the direction of Mars-la-Tour, one of the battles the loss of which by Bazain led to his being shut up in Metz by the Germans in 1870.

"I could only come to one conclusion;—it was no time to stop!

"What a wonderful thing it would have been for the division to go ahead even though the outer defenses of Metz might have held it up!

"What a wonderful thing it would have been for those of us who in the past had worked out so many map problems on all this famous territory never dreaming that one day we would fight on it, if on the ground of the German victories of 1870 covered with the monuments of their regiments, the Rainbow and other

divisions of the First American Army, in its first great battle could have defeated the Germans!

"I sent back word to Division Headquarters pressing for permission to continue the advance. Hughes, however, said that the orders were definite and came from the highest authority so there was nothing to do but to halt where we were."

Colonel Stanley Rumbough, Assistant G-3 (Operatives) gives the following account of some of the activities around Rainbow Headquarters. He says:

"From Bourmont the Division Headquarters moved to Toul. It was at this point that we received the Corps Order for the attack. Col. Murphy was G.-3 of the Division at that time. I was assistant. We immediately set to work to draft the order for the attack. We would get portions of this order completed and then world receive a change as to the elements assigned to us from the Corps. Col. Murphy and I, the Field Clerks, Sergeants Major, orderlies, in fact all attached to the G.-3 section of Division Headquarters worked on this order and preparing for it for eighty-nine hours, with practically no sleep. This order was finally sent down to Regimental Headquarters, such a short time before H hour that when it reached the Battalion Commanders they did not have time to thoroughly digest it.

"Perhaps the fault lay still higher but as far as we knew, the Corps Headquarters was the place where there was insufficient realization of the time it takes for orders to get down to the infantry battalion commanders and the artillery commanders. This is particularly true in the artillery where such a mass of detail must be painstakenly worked out if they are to deliver accurate fire which the infantry wants and must have.

"I have been advised since the War that this order was taken as a model for study at the War College.

"Following our practice many annexes to the order, such as Artillery, Communications, were drawn up by the headquarters of these elements. It was with reference to the Corps troops that most delay was caused. Colonel Hughes, our Chief of Staff, had complete liaison with four headquarters above ours. Probably the changes in assignment of troops through the Corps to the Division was due to changes given the Corps by the Army.

"As soon as this order was sent out, Division Headquarters moved to Menil au Quatre Tours, where it remained during the first phases of the attack and until it moved forward to Essey. The schedule of fire for the artillery was beautifully made out by General Gatley and Nance his Adjutant. There was only one drawback: there was far from sufficient ammunition. The French had dumps in the vicinity, but our Division had not trucks to move the ammunition up. Colonel Bob Gill, G.-1, succeeded in obtaining some trucks. He stepped into General Gatley's P. C. and found General Gatley * sitting in the front room with his head on his hands.

"He said, 'General, how would you like to have six Pierce Arrow trucks?'

'General Gatley said nothing, but jumped up, and catching Gill by the arm, led him in to the back room where Major Nance vas sitting, and called out:

" 'Nance, jump up and shake hands with J. C.' "

"Once more the Rainbow proved its efficiency by collecting information at the front and getting it back. As usual, Lieut. Elmer was with the forward infantry elements collecting information for Division Headquarters. His hundred or more messages to us were the only information Corps Headquarters had for some time during the attack.

At Essey, as we occupied German dugouts, the openings were faced in the wrong direction. There was a big naval gun firing from Metz. It struck particular awe in such troops as were stationed in Essey, as it went through one of the military police tents and made a hole which no one could find and no one particularly cared to probe. This was not conducive to work in G.-3 office. Amongst other damages done this gun knocked down the military police kitchen and exploded a shell in the dugout of the French mission.

"General Pershing visited us at Essey.

"It was during this visit that Colonel Hughes did something which I would rather be in a heavily shelled position than do. When General Pershing had emphasized that soldiers never get tired but can always go on; that it is only the higher ranking

---

* Anne Harding, the well known moving picture actress, is his daughter.

officers who sometimes get tired. Without a second's hesitation Hughes said 'General, that is only true provided they are adequately fed and their clothing and shoes kept in good condition. This Division has not been receiving the supplies of all kinds which are necessary.'

"The General turned a cold icy stare on Hughes, moved a step nearer him and stuck his head out!

"We all sighed and thought: Poor Hughes, this is the end of him; will the General only send him to Blois, commonly called 'blooey' where he has already sent so many high ranking Officers after relieving them from their command, or will he ship him to the United States and perhaps even Alaska or the Philippines?

"In low level cold tones, like air from the arctic region the General said 'Hughes', and we could see the axe descending upon Hughes' neck—'I repeat that the soldiers never get tired it is only the high ranking Officers who sometimes get tired.'

"Much to our surprise he stopped there!

"After talking to General Menoher for awhile about the progress of the operations the General started for the door which was being held open for him by his aide Major Quackmeyer. Just as he reached it he turned around saying 'Hughes, come out here I want to talk to you.'

"We could see Hughes turn white and again we could see the axe descending. Undoubtedly all the General had waited for was to stage the execution out of doors so as not to spill any blood on the floor of the Rainbow Headquarters.

" 'Well, what happened,' we all said in chorus as Hughes reappeared at the door.

"Hughes replied, 'He asked me if this was the only occasion on which the Division had not received the supplies to which it was entitled, or if it had happened on other occasions as well. When I told him it had happened on other occasions, he told Quackmeyer to make a note for him to check up on the responsibility for this and to take the necessary steps to see that from now on each Division at the front received the supplies to which it was entitled. After which he told me he was glad to see I was taking such good care of the 42nd Division, and drove out.' "

In a secret report * to his own superiors Major Corbabon, Chief of the French Mission, with the Rainbow in reporting on the St. Mihiel attack says, "The employment of arms was much better than on the Ourcq; the Stokes mortars and the 37 mm guns as always had difficulty in keeping up but on the other hand the automatic rifles and the machine guns were well utilized.

"As the result of their experiences on the Ourcq the Division has given up assigning a company of machine guns to each Battalion of Infantry. Instead they have adopted the following method: dividing the regimental machine gun companies between the battalions, each battalion thus having one platoon of these guns at its disposal. The machine gun battalions of the Brigades remain under the command of their Majors and operate by companies in rear and in support of the attacking battalions. Excellent liaison is maintained between the Major of each assault battalion and the machine guns supporting them as well as between the Majors commanding the machine gun battalions and the Generals commanding the Brigades. This system has given good results. * * * While the 42nd Division had only a few days instruction between the Battle of the Ourcq and that of St. Mihiel the profit which they had drawn from them is remarkable. Orders are studied more, they are more precise, they go more into details; the Infantry formations are less dense; combat discipline is better. The organizations of the ground at the end of the attack is foreseen and pushed with energy. The supply of food and ammunition is much better. The progress realized is very striking."

Here is the story of the Cavalry, told by Colonel O. P. M. Hazzard, whose father, incidentally, during the Civil War was color sergeant of the 38th Volunteers of Indiana, the home state of the 150th F. A. He says:

"Troop 'B' was detached from the Provisional Squadron of the 2nd Cavalry and operating from Menil-la-Tour and later St. Benoit performed courier and liaison duty with the 1st, 42nd and 89th Divisions during the St. Mihiel operation. At Thiacourt it was subjected to heavy artillery fire. On September 14th the troop marched to Pannes and continued on this duty until September 19th when it moved to the Argonne.

---

* Gotten from Paris by Rainbow Historian, 1935.

"Troops D, F and H, acting as a provisional squadron were attached to the 1st Division. At 2:15 P. M. this squadron was ordered to Nonsard and at 4:00 P. M. was given the mission of reconnoitering toward Vigneulles and to cut the Heudicourt-Vigneulles railroad. A patrol from this squadron encountered enemy resistance near Heudicourt and was driven in.

"Troops D, F, and H, with Troop F as advance guard and Troops D and H as main body advanced on their mission along the Nonsard-Vigneulles road. Upon entering the Bois Nonsard and the Bois de Pannes a German convoy column was encountered on the branch road leading northeast towards St. Benoit. It was attacked by the automatic rifles of the leading troop. The other troops began to deploy for the attack. At this time an enemy M. G. at the road junction in the Bois de Nonsard, and M. Gs. (which had obviously been passed over) near the road opened fire on the squadron from the right and left rear. The provisional squadron fell back along the Nonsard-Vigneulles road. In this fighting two of the enemy's M. Gs. were put out of action by mounted troopers.

"At 4:00 A. M., September 13th, Troop 'D' was given the mission to proceed to Creue and to destroy the railroad running south from Vigneulles and to fall back with delaying actions. Troop 'D' reached Creuse and found that the track had already been destroyed by troops of the 26th Division.

"Troops F and H marched to Vigneulles the morning of September 13th and were joined near here by Troop 'D'. Troops D and H spent the remainder of the day scouring the country west and south of Vigneulles for Germans.

"Troop 'F' was ordered to proceed north along the main line of the St. Mihiel-Metz railroad and to gain contact with the enemy and to effect liaison with the French to the west. Troop 'F' passed through Hattonville and overcoming small resistance here proceeded to Vieville and continued on to St. Maurice. In St. Maurice a number of Germans were encountered and driven from the town. Operating from St. Maurice Troop 'F' sent out patrols to Champlen, Woel and Doncourt and in the direction of Jonville. These patrols definitely located the enemy's line and information was reported to the 1st A. C. by Troop 'F'. After

holding St. Maurice until dusk Troop 'F' was withdrawn and rejoined the provisional squadron near Vigneulles.

Mr. Frederick Smith, the city editor of the Chicago Tribune, who gave up that job because he wanted to go to the front as a correspondent, says:

"The fortunes of war made it necessary for me to contact the Rainbow more often than any other outfit. My good fortune. I would not for a basket of Hennessey's reflect upon any other division encountered over there, but I just mean to say that when I got into a Rainbow P. C. I always felt like a hunter, home from the hills.

"If there was a bean or a bed left, they were mine. If, in the amber bottle behind the Colonel's messroom door, there was a spot of something to wash away the Champagne chalk, or to drive off the chill of a Lorraine evening—they even trusted me to pour my own. I still have two shirts, of olive drab color and imperishable texture that a roadside Rainbow haberdasher gave me without asking for a receipt.

"The gentlemen of the Forty-second probably will remember the night of September 11, 1918. I mean that night when the guns let go at 11 o'clock and the barrage started two hours later. I was standing on a hill with General Dennis E. Nolan watching the star shells drench the cold mists with gorgeous color and listening to the rumble and crash of the guns. I left the show after a few hours and went back to Nancy to send off a cable telling the folks back on Madison street that the great American offensive at St. Mehiel had started and that everybody was doing well except the enemy. I was back next morning for more details. There had been romance, thrill, excitement, awesome noise and majesty the night before, but on the morning after there were merely miles of French mud and tangled traffic.

"Later in the day I asked General Gatley if he thought I could get up the line. He looked my car over and, speaking like an artilleryman, which the General most surely was, he said, 'Better park the car and walk. Even if you walk you will get in mud up to your withers.' I walked north past Mont Sec and found a Major at a crossroad pinch hitting for a M. P. who had had a nervous breakdown as a result of trying to answer questions.

"Hours later I was still walking. It was dark and cold and I was hungry. A light gleamed hospitably in a little house by the roadside. I knocked on the door. A doughboy who resembled Jess Willard in size and build, opened the door and looked me over. 'Who are you,' he asked, and 'what do you want?' Alabama! One of the boys in the outfit of Col. William Screws. You couldn't mistake that Bumminham drawl.

" 'I'm a newspaper correspondent,' I explained, 'and I thought I might hold you up for a cup of coffee.'

"The Alabaman turned to his buddies. 'Says he's a newspaper reporter," he explained. The entire squad came to the door. 'If you are a newspaper reporter,' one of them said, 'Tell me if you know Fuzzy Woodruff.' Mr. Woodruff was the best known newspaper man south of the Mason-Dixon line.

" 'Yes,' I said, 'I know Fuzzy.'

" 'What do you know about him?' (Very stern and openly suspicious.)

" 'He can play a tune by squeezing his hands together.' "

Major Stanley says:

"My Battalion was designated as the support Battalion in the attack made at 5:00 A. M. on September 12th. During the day I made personal reconnaissance of Bois du Jury. At dark on the night of the 11th September moved the Battalion forward to the 'take off' position. Companies G and H (less one platoon each) formed the first line, each Company in two waves. Company E in support at 200 yards. Company F was designated to maintain liaison between the 42nd Division and the 89th Division on our right. One platoon of G and one platoon of H were designated as moppers up and were placed 200 yards in rear of the rear elements of the 3rd Battalion, their position being in Bois du Jury. Company F took its position along the right line of the sector occupied by our Division, with its leading elements abreast the support companies of the 3rd Battalion. I personally saw that the moppers up and Company F were in position and returned to the take-off position of my Battalion arriving there at 3:00 A. M., September 12th.

"At 5:00 A. M. the 'H' hour, the Battalion moved forward in line of combat groups. The passage through Bois de la Hazelle and to the edge of Bois de Jury was made in column of

file along the trails. The jump off position of the 3rd Battalion was reached at 6:30 A. M. Lines of combat groups were formed at this point and we followed the support companies of the 3rd Battalion at 500 yards. At 7:00 A. M., Major Brewer came by my post, going toward the rear wounded. He notified me that Captain Lainson was command of my Battalion. At about 7:20 I received a message from Captain Lainson saying that he had put his support companies in line. The Battalion passed through Bois de la Sonnard and Bois des Ramparts along the trails in column of files and was reformed in line of combat groups along coordinate 235 within the Regimental sector limits. At this point I was unable to find any of the 3rd Battalion in front of my Battalion. The 356th Infantry on our right had changed direction and moved along the Flirey-Essay road and had overlapped our sector Company G was deployed and placed in front line and moved forward to coordinate 237 near Essey where the line was halted, having reached the first phase first day.

"At this point lines were readjusted. The 356th Infantry withdrew to the right to the limits of their sector. At 11:00 the lines again advanced with Company G and Company H deployed on first line and Company E in support. Near coordinate line 239 three prisoners were captured and at the right of the sector at a depot of material much material was taken. The 356th Infantry had failed to advance after the right had passed Essey and I was compelled to protect my right flank. Moved forward with the right along the coordinate 360 near parallel 240. One battery of 105's and four prisoners were captured there, also a large quantity of ammunition and a quantity of other material. The Battalion advanced and second phase first day reached where it was halted and bivouaced for the night.

"At 6:00 A. M., September 13th, the Battalion advanced with Company E and Company F on the front line, G and H in support. The battalion scouts under command of Lieut. Pigeon proceeded in line 1000 yards, his platoon turned to mop up Beney and reported he found it occupied by troops of the 356th Infantry. The Battalion advanced through Bois de Beney, Bois de Dampvitoux along the trails in column file. As we were entering the woods I received information from the Battalion Scouts and also from the Commanding General of the Brigade

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

Patrol of 165th New York mopping up village in St. Mihiel Battle.

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

Buried where they fell. Graves of Pvt. George Cooper and Pvt. Earl Warner, Co. K, 166th Infantry, 42nd Division. This picture shows the battle field, German rifles, parts of equipment, German helmet with several holes in it, and machine gun which felled these soldiers. Northeast of Essey, France, September 19, 1918.

that a large column of enemy troops were passing along the St. Benoit-Dampvitoux road. With a platoon of Company E and a platoon of Company G, I immediately proceeded along the standard gauge railroad track to a point 223.7, thence by a road through the woods to the northwest to the St. Benoit-Dampvitoux road where I attacked about forty enemy moving northeast along the road. At the same time Company G, under Captain Younkin, at point 225.5 also opened fire on the withdrawing troops. I captured eighteen prisoners at this point, one being killed and the remaining escaped. The Battalion was reformed along this road and received orders from the Brigade Commander to advance at 11:00 to the railroad south of Haumont. After patrols had been sent out ahead of the line I received orders not to advance but to prepare my present position along the road for defense. One patrol under command of Lieut. Todd advanced to the railroad and returned reporting that the enemy were returning to the town of Haumont. The line was established along the road and in advance of the road from Etang de-Afrique to the cross roads point 233.1 Company E, on the right Company with outposts at Farm de Champfountain and in the edge of the woods 359.0-246.6. The 356th Infantry having failed to come up on our right, established outposts from G and H Companies along the line leading from cross roads at 223.1 to the junction of railroad and Bois de Charle. A great quantity of lumber and building material was taken along the front of these woods and at the farm de Champfountain. Also three wagons along the road St. Benoit-Dampvitoux.

"The Battalion Scouts under command of Lieut. Pigeon on this day proceeded the Battalion at about 1000 yards. Near the Depot of material at Etang de la Carpiere they encountered a combat patrol of the enemy and after a battle of fifteen or twenty minutes routed the enemy and proceeded on their march. Near 221.4 sighted about a Battalion of enemy infantry moving northwest along the St. Benoit-Dampvitoux road. Message was at once sent to Battalion Commander. Our own artillery was firing on us which prevented my advance toward the road. They moved from there to the Louisville Farm. There were two five

ton trucks, wagons and a quantity of building material. Eighteen prisoners were taken on this trip. Near the railroad the patrols captured a great quantity of building material, coal and some ammunition."

Typical of what the Battalion Scouts of the infantry went through is the story of Lieut. Raymond Turner of the First Battalion of the 168th Iowa. Here are his own words:

"The Third Battalion was in the front line on this attack and the First Battalion was in reserve. In the first day's attack, the scouts section therefore did not do any patrol work except to keep liaison with the support. That night, about midnight, the First Battalion received orders to pass through the Third Battalion and take up the support position. On the afternoon of the second day the attack had reached its objective, and in fact, had gone somewhat beyond it. The scout section of the First Battalion patrolled through the woods to the west of Louisville Farm and came through into the cleared portion of the farm, just in time to see the last of the German supply train pass out of sight along the St. Benoit-Damportonix Road. Machine gun fire was also met at this point, coming from a few German machine guns left along the road for the purpose of protecting the rear of the retreating German units. We picked up four or five German prisoners at this point. As we had been advancing rapidly and had little, if anything to eat all day, we robbed the prisoners of their black bread and sent them on their way to the rear."

Major Ross tells the following:

"The 3rd Battalion under Major Brewer was the leading element. Major Brewer was severely wounded.* My battalion was in Brigade Reserve the first day of this action. I however did pass over the ground of the 3rd Battalion later in the morning and was able to reconstruct in my mind about what happened.

"The Battalion left the edge of the Bois de Jury in assault formation promptly at H hour. A smoke screen had been put down by the chemical section to cover the signs of their advance. Our artillery had done an excellent job of silencing the German artillery and prevented the sending forward of reserves. However they had not silenced all of the machine guns in Bois Son-

---

* Since deceased.

nard. As our barrage lifted these machine guns were brought out of the dugouts and put into action. They were well placed and well served and as a result caused a great deal of damage to the advancing echelons. Company 'M' was on the right of the sector and directly in front of Bois Sonnard so suffered severely.

"Several platoon commanders and sergeants were killed as they exposed themselves trying to keep the new recruits, received as refills after Chateau Thierry and the Ourcq, in order.

"This was another instance of faulty administration—sending untrained men to combat units without any chance of giving instruction.

"As a side issue to the San Mihiel, the front of the 42nd Division was covered by German artillery fire from Mount Sec. My Battalion received some fire from that location as we passed the front line positions."

The History of the Alabama Regiment says * when the Alabamaians 'went over' that morning near Seicheprey they had to crawl their way through the barbed wire into 'No Man's Land.' Then they took up perfect formation and, falling in behind the barrage and pressing close to it, they advanced at the prescribed rate of 100 yards in three minute.

"Though the eastern horizon betokened the approach of day, it was still dark; and, as the thin lines moved down the slope and up the next one, toward the enemy, the display of pyrotechnics was very fine. For illuminating purposes our own men fired star shell rockets high in the air toward the enemy's position. And the 'Boches', always equipped with good fireworks, that morning set off everything they had. Ordinary flares in great numbers lighted up for them the American approach, and enabled them to play their machine guns; caterpillars and all the different kinds of star rockets in all the colors signaled back from front to rear the alarming message that the Americans were out after them in force, and called upon their artillery to 'cut loose' with everything it had in stock.

"Detachments with wire cutters and bangalore torpedoes, to destroy the enemy's barbed wire entanglements, had preceded the oncoming infantry. Immediately occurred the first agreeable

---

* Alabama's Own in France, by William H. Amerine. Eaton & Getfinger, New York.

surprise, for the wire was in very poor condition, rusty or broken. Little difficulty was experienced in passing the successive belts, some troops even going through without having them cut. Only scattered infantry fire was met with; and, as the Americans arrived at the enemy trenches, surrendering with the utmost meekness. There was some artillery fire from the enemy's side, but otherwise, especially at the beginning, the Germans appeared dumbfounded and utterly weak."

Captain Vandervort of the Alabama Regiment says:

"During the St. Mihiel drive, which in the latter stages developed into a rather rapid advance, the Regimental M. G. Co. of the 167th Infantry experienced some difficulty in keeping up with the Infantry, due to the weight of the machine guns, tripods and boxes of ammunition that they carried. The enemy was retreating rapidly, but in many instances some of them were overtaken in towns and in farm buildings along the route.

"During this advance one M. G. squad which was following the first wave of Infantry had stopped for a breathing spell. The gun was not mounted for action, but was set on the tripod to keep it out of the dirt. The gunner was sitting on the seat of the tripod and holding on to the gun which was the most comfortable position for a rest. The other men were stretched out on the ground around the gun, which happened to be pointed toward a group of farm buildings about three hundred yards distant.

"Suddenly the gunner saw a white flag waving out of the window of one of the buildings. The next minute out came six or eight German soldiers with their hands in the air. The corporal took charge of his prisoners which he had captured without firing a shot, and even without knowing they were in the building. He detailed a man to take them back to the rear."

The then Lieut. Colonel Donovan wrote the following shortly after the attack:

"I had been made a Lieutenant Colonel, but they decided to let me remain in command of the Battalion until after the fight. At Etang Rome it was a remarkable sight. Supplies, munitions, dumps, artillery parks, all in one vast jumble. This Etang Rome, as you judge, is a lake situated in a great wood. It is near the town of Boucq. All kinds and sorts of military stores and fight-

ing and supply troops had been placed there. We arrived in the morning after an all night march. The road beds had been built high leaving huge ditches on each side. Slithered across the highway or crushed in these ditches were the great carrying Pierce and Packard as well as the little Ford. On the march that night we encountered an entire train of trucks which had become jammed. I had charge of the regiment on the march so sent the troops through but had to turn the wagons on the narrow road and take them miles around to get them through. My Post of Command at the new place was the foot of a tree. Across the road was a palatial residence. A piece of canvas on four poles. An artillery officer was there who invited me to breakfast—steak and coffee. Then two hours sleep on the ground and it was 8:30 and I was ready for the day.

"When all day constant running to and fro arranging for ammunition, conference with tank commanders, and summoned brigade headquarters. Then orders to march again. It was the night of the 9th. We moved up to the edge of the woods near a road junction not far from the town of Mandres. I rolled into a ditch beside the road under some bushes and the teeming rain did not disturb my slumbers. When the train came in at 3:00 P. M., I crawled into an automobile belonging to a balloon officer and slept until 8:00 A. M. Then up to the front lines near Seicheprey where we made reconnaissance of our position with the engineers, determined on our disposition and spent all day getting up supplies. You can have no appreciation of the infinite detailed preparation needed for an attack. Food, ammunition, forage, etc., and the transportation. When you move the roads are burdened with one welter of men and material. That night our orders for the attack came. There was set forth in careful detail every element that was considered necessary to success. You know in open and trench warfare the orders are quite different. In the former few and general; in the latter specific and particular. Study of orders until 2:00 A. M., then up at 6:00 the morning of the 11th. No word as to Zero or H hour but every aspect of going in the night of the 11th. Again final conferences, last minute changes, taxing the patience, the coolness and the resourcefulness of all subordinate commanders. We were to pass over troops already in trenches. A great mass of move-

ment constantly steamed towards the front. Luckily the rain and overcast skies kept down enemy observation. So it was all day, but then at 6:00 P. M. the night of the 11th the skies cleared and enemy planes appeared finding us in all our nakedness of preparation, troops moving, trucks and wagons and animals, towns jammed. At 7:00 P. M. we were ordered forward. We were to move nine kilometers to a position in readiness and from there dependent upon Zero hour go out to No Man's Land where we would take up our position on the line of departure. It was a terrible night—dark, impenetrably dark—a soul seeking rain. Other divisions, other brigades, other regiments on the road seeking the right place, the correct turn. I rode with Rohan to Jury Woods where I sent him back with the horses. Then I found shelter for my headquarters where I could study the maps, interpret the orders, and prepare my own. Grenades had not come up, flares could not be had. I had to visit my neighboring Battalions and Colonels. It was almost impossible to see. I had a guide, a newly drafted man who was scared. We fell from shell hole to shell hole seeking our various places. Then the Boche shells began to drop in and around us adding to our discomfort. Finally, company commanders reported the safe arrival of their units and by eleven all were in the preliminary position. How I shall never know. Then orders. Day fixed September 12th. Zero hour 5:00 A. M. Artillery preparation, Zero hour 4:00.

"So, at 2:30 A. M. on the morning of the 12th we moved into position. The artillery had started at 1:00 A. M. It was as if we were set in one vast circle of flashing skies. So light was it that we could find our way. Our position was in No Man's Land directly behind the Mois de Remieres, the place where the 26th Division had been licked by the Germans, and which since that time has never been. It truly was No Man's Land. At 3:30 I took position beside a little stone house and there received reports that all was ready. Who was with me but old Colonel Hine who had heard I was going over and who had come to go with me. I didn't have the heart to refuse so he tagged along.

"I felt that if the Germans were ready for us and had organized the position as they were able to that we would have a terrible time. With 65 per cent. new men and 75 per cent. new officers it would be a terrific task to keep things going. I knew

my job was cut out for me and frankly I never expected to come through.

"But as I lay on the ground that night and saw our tremendous artillery—1700 guns—with not an answering German shot I said to the men beside me, 'The Germans are pulling out.' The time passed quickly. Our watches showed 5:00 A. M. A sudden access of fire, all descending on the German front line. We moved out without a signal. Over our heads were flashing the bombs from our smoke guns. Dawn had not yet come up and the figures could be dimly seen. Forty minutes the barrage played on this first position during which time we slowly moved forward. Not yet a German shell. An advance of 100 yards, the barrage lifting and moving at the rate of 100 meters every four minutes. But then machine gun fire opened. And the fight was on.

"The first real fight took place near St. Baussant but our tanks came up and in conjunction with them are broke up the resistance and pressed on. At Marzerais there was stronger opposition. The town lay in a little valley. We were on the heights. One platoon drifted near the town. They were separated from the village by the Rup de Mad, a thin stream usually, but now eight feet wide and in places six feet deep. I took an engineer captain with me and leaving my headquarters ran to these men. They had no officer with them so I assumed the function of a platoon leader. I knew the character of the enemy opposing—eager to surrender under a little pressure. So, I made them swim the river, myself with them, and swept up to the town. We captured there a lieutenant and 40 men, one minenwerfer and four machine guns. Prisoners began to come back in droves. We had to press forward so fast we could not keep track of them but gave them a kick in the back and sent them on their way. They went willingly and gladly. Then began some German artillery but very little.

"At Marzerais the real line of defense had been broken and from there on it was just encounters with few isolated parties. The difficult thing was the maintenance of order and organization. In many ways it is more difficult in easy victory than when stiff resistance is encountered. Men would gather about prisoners, they would seek out Boche property, curiously gaze about, and

the attack would lose momentum. Other units would drift over in our sector. I was the ranking officer of the entire Division on the front line and I went cursing up and down the line getting men into positions. One tried to assert his rights as an American citizen but I physically convinced him that his only right was to keep up forward. When I looked back over the way we had come I did not wonder at the Boche quitting. There for miles coming over the hills one could see the troops approaching in small columns. From where we were our entire corps could be seen as well as the one on our right. Thousands of men.

"Many funny sights—these prisoners when captured would turn over cigars and cigarettes and our men would resume their march puffing away, holding perhaps in one hand a hunk of German bread which they liked.

"Many Germans came rushing out, all their clothes in a bundle and a happy light in their eyes, waiting to be captured.

"In the villages we saw the poor people who for four years had been with Germans. One I ate with the night of the 12th. She had not been out of sight of a German for four years. Every night after she prepared the meals for her officer guests she had to retire to her cellar. This night after she fed us she put on her best waist and skirt and went out to visit her neighbors.

"One German officer came riding into the ranks of the Battalion on our left. The Major that night was riding the horse, a fine big animal with beautiful equipment.

"The day of the 13th we continued the advance to St. Benoit right on the heels of the Germans. My headquarters were established in the chateau which was a real one. In the courtyard had been gathered valuable paintings, porcelains and furniture they had been unable to carry away with them. A shell hit the place while we were there shattering every window in the place.

"Our Battalion was again moved forward to a line of outposts from where we made our reconnaisance. One German surrendered to two officers and was brought to me. After questioning him I sent him back to the Company Commander and had him used as a decoy to catch the rest of his patrol. This was done, the lieutenant being killed. He lay there on the road a victim of his own men.

"On the 14th I sent a patrol to Woel—an officer and six men. They met three tanks of the 1st Division and all of these crazy youngsters went on a gay party of their own towards Jonsville where they routed an outpost and then retired."

The then Captain and Regimental Operations Officer Merle Smith gives the following account of the advance of the New York regiments. He says:

"The Regiment with the 165th Infantry on its left, commenced its attack at 5:00 A. M. on the 12th with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions in the order named. The 1st Battalion was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel William J. Donovan. The advance was rapid, the 1st Battalion only encountering material resistance from the enemy near St. Baussant, Maizerais and Essey. The visibility being excellent, it was possible from Regimental Headquarters to spot the centres of enemy resistance and reduce them with artillery within two or three minutes after we could see our forward lines hesitate. With the aid of the French tanks, enemy resistance at Essey, which, for a few moments looked serious, was quickly reduced. The 2nd phase line was reached at 1:55 P. M. Shortly thereafter, Regimental Headquarters was moved to Pannes. Colonel Donovan, Commander of the 1st battalion, asked permission to proceed forward through the Bois de Thiaucourt. We were refused such permission by Division Headquarters, and Colonel Donovan was instructed to send patrols deep into the woods to discover if it was yet held by the enemy. If my recollection is correct, a patrol to the west skirted to beyond Bois Millet, and other patrols penetrated through the woods to the vicinity of the Depot of Materials north of the woods. Small, isolated groups of the enemy were seen, but retired on the approach of our patrols. My recollection is that between 3:00 and 4:00 P. M. of the 12th, I rode around on horseback to ascertain for myself the position of the various units. There was a Battalion of the 166th Infantry in the position described in the Summary of Operations on page 4, west of the Pannes and south of Palmes-Nonsard road. I then rode toward Lamarche and again encountered small units of the 166th Infantry, and later if my recollection is correct, a liaison patrol group from the First Division, which reported that they expected a German counterattack, and asked us to be ready to support them during the

night in the event of a serious attack. I rode to Lamarche and found it unoccupied, and then along the northeast road to 222.9, where I found the First Battalion organized in a position just south of the Bois de Thiaucourt. The 2nd Battalion were about 1000 yards in their rear, and the 3rd Battalion in the vicinity of Hill 225.7, northwest of Pannes.

"The next morning, at about 6:00 A. M., Companies B and C of the 1st Battalion moved north through the Bois de Thiaucourt and the Bois de Benney without encountering any material resistance, past the Farm de Sebastopol. Companies A and D followed in support. By 9:00 A. M. they had occupied the Chateau St. Benoit. The 2nd Battalion followed in support, and the 3rd Battalion, I believe, was detached on a special mission as division reserve for awhile, but, later, rejoined the Regiment and was placed in reserve near the Farm of Sebastopol. Shortly after my arrival at Chateau St. Benoit with the advance section of Regimental Headquarters, orders were received from Brigade Headquarters to establish a position north of St. Benoit and push patrols forward in order to make contact with the 26th Division and along the road to the Hassavant Farm. Orders were sent to the 1st Battalion to establish a defense position along the Bois de la Grande Souche with outposts along the ridge running through Hassavant Farm. Patrols were to be pushed on northwest through the Bois des Haudronvilles Bas. Patrols from the 2nd Battalion were ordered to patrol to the westward and along the roads west and north, to pick up small parties of Germans who were retreating to the eastward through the woods. Prisoners were taken. The 3rd Battalion were given the mission to protect our left flank which was believed in the air. Sometime during the afternoon or evening I think, I received a report that contact was established with a unit of the 26th Division at some point on the St. Benoit-Woel road. I believe a patrol of the 1st Division made contact with some unit of the 1st Battalion near the road junction in the Bois de la Grande Souche at coordinants or near coordinants 246.2-256.8. It was reported from the rear on the afternoon or evening of the 13th, that French troops were on our left, and advancing. On the 14h a French Regiment marched out of the Bois to Chaufour and northwest along the St. Benoit-Woel road, and took a position near the northern edge

of the Boise de la Grande Souche in the vicinity of coordinants 246.9-357.1. It was these troops who later, on orders, relieved the 1st Battalion.

"During the morning or early afternoon of the 13th, General MacArthur commanding the 84h Brigade, came to St. Benoit Chateau and was surprised that we had been permitted to advance beyond St. Benoit on account of Division or Corps orders to the contrary. I reported to him our dispositions made on orders from our Brigade Commander, and either that night or the next morning, we withdrew the right flank units of our 1st Battalion which were occupying positions in the 84th Brigade sector, on being relieved by units of that Brigade. I do not recollect the exact position held by Company C on the night of the 13th, but I believe it was in the vicinity reported. I doubt very much whether it was a patrol of the 167th Infantry which, during the night of September 13-14, surrounded an enemy outpost near Hassavant Farm. A patrol of the 165th Infantry captured an enemy group containing an officer who was killed near that position. A prisoner from this group was brought into Regimental Headquarters about 9:00 o'clock on the evening of the 13th. I think the capture was made shortly after dark, and occurred when the outpost groups were being placed in position. I think the outpost line was established shortly after dark. I believe also, that enemy individuals or groups escaped through the Bois de la Grande Souche during that night. During the afternoon two troops of the 2nd Cavalry reported themselves to me and I requested them to help in patrolling the road running north of St. Benoit through Hassavant Farm. They stated, however, their orders were only for police work, and declined to carry out this mission. Hadonville was not occupied, but a patrol or patrols were ordered to skirt the woods to the north of Etang de Lachaussee, and reported back early in the morning of the 14h that they had found no organized enemy resistance but had been fired upon near Hadonville. I do not believe that this patrol actually entered the towns either of Hadonville or Lachaussee, but approached close to their outskirts. I believe that a patrol during this night or early in the morning, entered the outskirts of the town of Haumont, and coming upon a strong group of enemy troops assembling for some formation, retired. I do not believe,

however, that at that time these positions were strongly occupied by the Germans. Conversation with the prisoners taken indicated that all of the German units were disorganized and bewildered. I believe that not until the next day were their forces reorganized and placed in position along the Michel line."

The History of the Ohio Regiment * "So rapid had the enemy evacuated his positions that no effective resistance was encountered until the village of St. Baussant was reached. Here machine guns held up the advance of Company I, and Captain Grave called on the Stokes Mortars. The infantry took cover and waited while a few well directed shots from the mortars silenced the opposition. St. Baussant was then stormed and taken with few casualties. * * *

"There were resistance at isolated places, formed by Officers who tried to hold back the American rush until supplies and artillery could be moved out of the sector. At each point of resistance the infantry played safe, called for tanks, 37 m.m. guns or Stokes Mortars, which silenced the enemy guns. Then the infantry swept forward and usually captured the gun crews. * * *

"Orders were received at noon to continue the pursuit of the enemy and without pause the regiment continued its measured advance. In touch with the 165th on the right, the regiment took the town of Essey, with but little opposition, receiving into its army several hundred prisoners and countless stores. There was no time to rejoice with the liberated French villagers, the first the Rainbow had seen, for it was 'on to Pannes' with the same speed that had regulated the advance of the morning. * * *

"At Pannes the Brigade again met with some resistance but Lieut. Colonel Donovan, 165th, on the right with his fightin' Irish, and Major Haubrich on the left were not to be stopped. Calling for artillery and tanks, the men of both battalions filtered up the road and into the town while the 167th staged a flanking movement to the right. It took but a short time to occupy the town and again swell the bag of prisoners and stores."

---

* "Ohio In the Rainbow," by Captain R. M. Cheseldine, State of Ohio. The F. J. Heer Printing Co., Columbus, Ohio.

Sergeant Albert Hoyt of the Medical Detachment of the 166th Ohio, says:

"On September 13, 1918, the 166th Infantry advanced northward from the Lamarche area in the St. Mihiel offensive. Private George A. Dennis, M. D., was that day driving the Battalion medical cart and was ordered by the Battalion Surgeon to follow the Battalion and bring the supplies up to the dressing station as soon as practicable. This was quite an assignment. There were no roads running north and it was impossible to drive the heavy and clumsy cart across the fields. Such obstacles did not deter George Dennis, however. He started westward from Lamarche and then found a road running in a northwesterly direction which he took and proceeded onward. Of course he knew he was far out of the regimental area but it could not be helped so he kept on until he found a road running eastward. He turned down this road hoping to find his Battalion which he figured would have advanced that far by the time he arrived. He then ran into heavy woods. As enemy artillery shells were falling pretty thick along the road he whipped his heavy horse into a trot. He soon found infantry taking shelter along the south side of the road. The infantry waved and beckoned to him as he passed but tile shelling was so lively he could not hear and there was no place for shelter for his precious medical supplies so he kept gong until he came to a town. Finding the town empty, he set up a dressing station in a wine cellar and stabled his horse. Then he took a trench stove from the cart and building a fire warmed up some corned Willie. Enemy shell fire chased him into the wine cellar and almost destroyed the cart. He was wondering where the dressing station party were, how far beyond the infantry had advanced and why there were no wounded in the town when he noticed infantry filtering through the buildings. Upon approaching them he recognized Lieutenant Frank Radcliff and part of the 166th M. G. Company. They informed him that they were taking the town! To his amazement he learned the road down which he had passed had been the front line and that for thirty minutes he had been first, alone and unarmed in the town of St. Benoit! Let the record therefore show that St. Benoit was taken by George Dennis of the Medical Detachment 166th Infantry."

It was during this battle that Colonel Hough gave the nearest exhibition to rage seen during the war. A detail which had been sent to the rear with prisoners taken by the Ohio regiment came back much sooner than was expected. On being asked why, the Corporal in charge said he had turned the prisoners over to some M. P.'s who said they would take them back. Questioning as to where this happened proved them to be the 1st Division's M. P's.

Colonel Winn in the St. Mihiel Battle and the sector occupancy which followed was able for the first time to use his machine gun battalion as he had always been convinced it should be used in battle; that is, as a unit instead of being distributed amongst the battalions of the 84th Infantry Brigade.

Here is his story of the consequence of this, told in his own words. He says:

"At Gironcourt on the road to St. Mihiel the night of September 3, 1918, the battalion received 200 replacements. Most of these men had been drafted during the summer of 1918 and had just arrived in France. When they were delivered to my battalion, they had no equipment except the clothing on their backs and gas masks. Most of them knew very little about how to use the latter. Having no time before the St. Mihiel battle to train these men in the technical use of machine guns, which none of them had ever seen, it was necessary to use them as ammunition carriers, or mule drivers. It was in these capacities that some of them were killed and others wounded in that battle.

"During a terrific night of September 11th, and downpour of rain, the battalion entered the line. It took position along the front edge of the Bois de Jury from which position, just prior to the jump off of our attack, the guns fired a 15 minute barrage on the Germans' wire and trenches in the Bois de la Sonnard. The battalion then advanced as a unit just behind the supporting line of the infantry assault wave of the 84th Infantry Brigade. We maintained continuous liaison with infantry. On several occasions when stubborn resistance was encountered at different points I put groups of machine guns in action so as to concentrate sufficient fire on these points to stop their fire.

"The machine gun ammunition carts were organized to follow this attack very closely. When we halted the first night we were able to replenish the ammunition supply which had been exhausted or lost during the day. While this replenishment was not needed the next day, still it was extremely comforting to know that we had ample ammunition to resist any counter-attack which the Germans might attempt. I know the battalion could not have been as useful either during the day advance nor as support to the possible defense of the night position had not all the guns been under unified control."

Here is Private J. Herbert Ambler's (Co. D, 150th M. G. Batt.) account of a battlefield incident. He says:

"The day the battle of St. Mihiel started, our division was advancing, very rapidly. On the advance we passed thousands of prisoners, many of them wounded and gassed. One of the Germans was crawling toward us with his heel shot off when a doughboy rushed at him with a fixed bayonet. He was about to run it through him when I yelled at the top of my voice, 'You damn fool, give him a chance, he's wounded.' The young fellow then felt ashamed of himself and walked away. I stopped and gave the Hun a drink of water and a few 'hard tacks.' He certainly had appreciated what I had done for him, for he said a lot but his German was all Greek to me."

Capt. Dwight Smith, Commanding the Headquarters Co. of the 149th Illinois, says:

"In the St. Mihiel attack of 12 September 1918 (Maps 1/20000: Pont-a-Mousson; Chambley 5-6) the advance on the front of the regiment was from about 1 Km north of Seicheprey to Lamarche, a total of about 7 Km. To provide for direct communication between the regiment and its liaison detachment with the advance elements up to the limit of its range, a liaison line was run with the advance from Seicheprey to Essey, a distance of about 6 Km. This line was carefully planned in advance and was run entirely by hand by relays of linemen using hand reels, one lot of wire being carried not far behind the advance elements of the infantry but was not carried beyond this point at that time because this was the limit of range and the batteries had begun to displace forward.

"The line was however connected in to the Signal Corps system at Seicheprey and was left in place, and up until late the night of the 12th, this line run as a forward liaison line by the 149th Field Artillery, was the only telephone communication in service from Essey to the rear and was commandeered and used by the 83rd Infantry Brigade (Brig. Gen. Michael Lenihan) whose headquarters were at Essey."

Colonel George Leach, Commanding the 150th Minn. F. A., gives the following account. He says:

"At one A. M., we commenced our Artillery preparation and continued it until five A. M. when the Infantry went over the top. When the Infantry started, they were followed by the largest number of tanks I have ever seen. They came out of the woods behind us in battle formation and in the early morning light, it was a very impressive sight. These tanks were not only to assist the Infantry but to make passages through the wire and across the trenches so that we could follow with our guns. The Infantry and the tanks were across 'No Man's Land' at noon and orders were given for the Batteries to come forward. I went ahead on foot over the worst roads and in the deepest mud I have ever seen, but succeeded in getting into Essey with the first line of the Infantry advance.

"I saw a picture I shall never forget as long as I live. The advance so far is a success. The Germans left the town of Essey apparently in a great hurry. In one of the barns I found a German officer's horse, completely saddled and it was very welcome after the long walk. We captured a whole battery complete and the instrumentation and music of a German band, which was a great prize for our band. The town was still occupied by the civilians, mostly old men, women and children. They had been there four years and when we came into the town we had great difficulty in getting them to come out of their cellars and abris. They did not know that the American soldiers were in the war and it was necessary for us to explain to them that we were Americans. They told us that they could not stand our Artillery fire and that the Germans had evacuated in great haste. These civilians were started at once on the road to the rear. Men, women and children plodded along in the mud up to their knees, carrying what little household effects they could, and they pre-

sented the most forlorn sight I have ever seen. To date we have taken ten thousand prisoners. Our losses in enlisted men are light, but heavy in officers.

"I selected for my P. C. the ruins of an old church, the frame work of which in the tower was still burning. After it got dark it gave the Germans a good objective for their Artillery which they used with too good effect, so that some members of my telephone detail, under Sergeant Lindell, climbed to the top of the old tower and knocked the burning timbers down."

Private R. G. Sebrell, of the Maryland T. M. Battery, tells the following funny story. He says:

"It happened one night while the Division was up in the St. Mihiel Sector. Our Company, after a hard day's hike, pulled in beside a little town named Essey and were ordered to pitch pup tents. Pretty close thereby, we noticed a half torn down mill building of brick, and upon inspection we found two small rooms rudely fitted out with bunks. This old mill had been occupied by the Germans not long before and the side that had been formerly exposed to the Allies, was reinforced with sand bags including the roof. Now that the Huns had been driven back, the reinforced side now behind us served no good purpose as the side now facing the Germans was unprotected. However, we found great satisfaction therein as there still remained some protection against airplanes on account of the partially bomb proof constructed roof.

"Bill Hitt, Jock Trimmer and I were fortunate enough to make the discovery, and it wasn't long before all bunks were well occupied. Bill Hitt and I were bunking together, using one blanket on the hard boards and the other one as cover. Hitt probably a little more brave than I, decided to take off his leggins and breeches. We hadn't been used to taking off many clothes so I felt just natural to take off my tin hat which served as a pillow.

"Just as we were cuddled up for a good night's sleep, we were disturbed by the drone of several German planes. The others in the Company having found out our safe quarters, soon filled up the standing room left, and others less fortunate were standing outside the door begging for just room enough inside to stick their heads. Due to our supposedly bomb proof roof, we inside left as safe as the S O S down at Rolampont, and the drone of planes was deadened more or less by the laughter and fun poked at those still outside begging for admittance.

"The night was damp and still and soon thereafter a German gun probably from Metz in Germany opened up, and after the boom which we could hear distinctly, we could count the seconds before it landed in Essey, a few hundred yards away from us, with a thundering roar. The laughter still continued, but lessened with each crash as we seemed to notice that each shell dropped just a little closer. Everything was completely silent when a shell struck just outside of the building, and the once treasured bunk house was soon emptied. Three men tried to bust through a doorway big enough for only one and nobody would give away. I jumped up to grab the blanket that Hitt and I had been using over us, as it was pretty cold out and I knew it might be a long night sleeping in some ditch for the balance of the night. Hitt was in the act of pulling on his breeches, and in my handful of blanket, I evidently had hold of the bottom of his breeches. As he pulled them on I would pull them off again. I gave a terrible jerk and freed my blanket which I took on my dash to the wide open spaces. As I rounded the corner of the old mill, I ran into Jock Trimmer who reminded me of a dog running with his tail tucked under when hit at with a broom.

"Later I was informed by Hitt that he remained in the shack, and though I didn't find his breeches in my blanket, I am forced to believe that I dropped them on the way."

Field Orders No. 24, Headquarters 42nd Division, 14th September, 1918, stated in its first paragraph: "Pursuant to orders

from the 4th Army Corps this Division will promptly organize its sector for defense."

This meant the attack was over and the occupancy of a defensive sector begun.

The two days attack cost the Division 171 killed, 63 died of wounds, and 667 wounded, or a total of 901. No prisoners were lost.

The President of the United States sent the following telegram to General Pershing: "General John T. Pershing, American Expeditionary Forces, France.

"Accept my warmest congratulations on the brilliant achievements of the army under your command. The boys have done what we expected of them and done it in the way we most admire. We are deeply proud of them and their Chief. Please convey to all concerned my grateful and affectionate thanks."

(Signed) WOODROW WILSON.

CHAPTER XXI

BUILDING A TRENCH SECTOR AT SAN BENOIT

It was with a feeling of profound disappointment that the Division settled down to merely holding the line which they then occupied.

The Division was eager to go on. The rapidity of their advance, also the prisoners who easily surrendered and in many cases openly expressed pleasure at having been captured, convinced them they had struck the poorer class of German troops.

Why stop while the going was so good?

Every officer and man knew Metz was so near that it would not take much more of an advance to bring them in sight of the hills which are the eastern boundary of the Woevre Plain and on which are the outer defenses of that famous fortress.

Just as later they were eager to reach Sedan because of its historical significance, so now they were eager to cross the Woevre Plain, the scene of historic battles since the ancient Gaul and the ancient Germans fertilized it with their battle dead.

They wanted at least to exchange shots with the garrison of Metz which until surrendered with his whole army by Marshal Bazaine in 1870 had given the French an open door to the historic Moselle route of invasion between Germany and France.

Since that surrender the Germans by holding Metz had kept that door closed for the French while opening it for the eruption of their armies into France in 1914.

Perhaps the Rainbow if it had kept on could at least have seized and held a position from which the key to that door could once more have been wrested from the Germans.

This is General MacArthur's story. He says: "The morning of the second day's attack we not only reached but passed the Army Objective. I am sorry to say we just missed capturing the Headquarters of the 19th German Army Corps in the St. Benoit Chateau. Amongst many other evidences of their hasty departure we found a fully set dining room table, and a prepared meal.

"From the cupola of the chateau which until the Germans destroyed the Chateau by shell fire was a favorite observation post, for the higher ranking officers of the division, to say nothing of visitors from Corps Headquarters, I could see the dust of the German trains retreating down the roads toward Metz. Prisoners captured insisted that there was only a small garrison in Metz—nothing like the large numbers needed to really garrison and hold its defenses. I personally reconnoitered in the direction of Mars-la-Tour, one of the battles the loss of which by Bazaine led to his being shut up in Metz by the Germans in 1870.

"I could only come to one conclusion: it was no time to stop!

"What a wonderful thing it would have been for the Division to go ahead even though the outer defenses of Metz might have held it up. What a wonderful thing it would have been for those of us who in the past had worked out so many map problems on all this famous territory never dreaming that one day we would fight on it, if on the ground of the German victories of 1870 covered with the monuments of their regiments, the Rainbow and other divisions of the First American Army, in its first great battle could have defeated the Germans!

"I sent back word to Division Headquarters pressing for permission to continue the advance. Hughes, however, said that the orders were definite and came from the highest authority, so there was nothing to do but to halt where we were."

The Rainbow did not know then that General Pershing had wanted to go on, that he had only stopped after strenuous argument with Marshal Foch who had yielded to Marshal Haig's insistence that the advance of all the armies on the western front should be toward the Mezieres-Sedan region.

They did not know then that Marshal Foch was later to return to General Pershing's strategy of an offensive in the general direction of the Moselle valley and the country between it and the Rhine. In other words, a blow to open up the route by which the German invaded France in 1870 and the scene of one of the two great "Battles of the Frontier" in 1914 which began the heavy fighting of the war.

Foch had ordered such an offensive for November 14th. Many of the preparations had been made. The American and

French Divisions for the first attack had been designated and were en route when the Armistice was signed. The 42nd and the 1st Divisions then marching south through the Argonne were undoubtedly bound to take part in this offensive.

However, orders are orders, so instead of following up their advantage the Division reluctantly settled down to sector warfare.

It had one new experience, that was, to start with a line of foxholes in the open and to first plan, then lay out, and then begin the construction of a complete defensive trench system. In other words, it had the experience which the French and Germans had when after the First Battle of the Marne they settled down opposite each other and dug themselves in, and which the French, British and Germans had in the fall of 1914 when neither side being strong enough to outflank the other, they settled down and dug themselves in from the Oise River to the North Sea.

Field Order No. 24, September 14th, ordered the organization of the sector for defense. Field Order No. 26, September 29th, was the "Plan of Defense of the Sector of Pannes."

This was another model order. It covered twenty-one pages, and had in addition three sketches showing the telephone communications, visual (projector) communications, and the radio communications respectively. Annex 1 was "Information Concerning the Enemy." 2 was "Plan for Organization of the Ground," "Plans for Defense Against Gas", "Plan for Defensive Use of Air Service," "Plan of Defense Against Tanks", and "Plan of Liaison".

The whole Division worked on this, once the 117 Engineers had outlined the trace of the new works.

The 84th Infantry Brigade took over the whole front of the Division, September 16, the 83d Brigade being put in reserve and thus getting a period of semi-rest.

The nights of September 26-27 and 27-28, these two brigades changed places.

The principal activity outside of constructing this defensive position constantly annoyed by German artillery fire, was raiding the Germans.

The American High Command did everything possible to make the Germans think the next attack would be either way to the south on the Alsace front or perhaps a renewal of the St.

Mihiel attack this to keep secret the preparations for the surprise attack in the Argonne begun September 26th.

Allowing German spies to steal plans for an attack on the Alsatian front was one of the tricks played to carry out this deception.

Raids on the Germans by the troops on the St. Mihiel front was another part of it.

This naturally made the Germans nervous and anxious to get information.

The then Major Claude M. Stanley who commanded the front line battalion (the second) 168th Iowa gives the following account of what happened as a result of this state of affairs.

He says:—

"During each night except September 18th, patrols were made in front of our lines to keep contact with the enemy. On the night of September 26th, assisted by an artillery barrage, the Battalion Scouts with a platoon from Company 'E' under Lt. Reid made a raid on Marimbois Farm. This raid was very successful, five prisoners were brought in and from twenty to thirty of the enemy were killed and many wounded. Our casualties were two wounded. This raid was made at 8:00 p. m. at night and was completed at 9:00 p. m. On the morning of September 20th at 5:00 o'clock a. m., the enemy undertook to raid G. C's 7 and 8, the severest portion of the raid being directed against G. C. 8. It was occupied by a platoon of Company 'H' under Lt. Harris. This raid was preceded by a fifteen minute barrage which was quite heavy but fell slightly in rear of these G. C.'s At 5:10 our barrage was called for and responded instantly. At 5:12 I received reports indicating the direction of attack and immediately ordered the green concentration barrage. The barrage was assisted by our machine guns and Stokes Mortar which were in position. Although no wire had yet been constructed in front of these positions the enemy failed to reach our lines. We captured three prisoners and inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy. Our casualties were one enlisted man from Stokes Mortar wounded and Lt. Cox slightly wounded."

The following account by Lieut. Turner, 167th Alabama, is

an example of the kind of work done by Battalion scouts during the occupancy of the St. Bennoit Sector.

He says:—

On September 14th orders were received to send a patrol out to see if the enemy held the front in force and to proceed until we met serious resistance. The daylight patrol consisted of one company. The 1st Battalion Scouts preceded it feeling the way. We had not gone far before we met heavy machine gun fire and were subjected to a heavy enemy barrage. Our mission accomplished, we withdrew. The company lost two men killed and eight wounded.

"The First Battalion occupied the front lines in the St. Benoit Sector from September 13th to September 28th. The First Battalion Scouts patrolled our front practically every night. At times we worked as a protective screen while the companies consolidated front line trenches. At other times we penetrated to the enemies' front line positions for the purpose of gaining information of enemy activities. These patrols usually left our lines at 9 P. M. and returned between 1 and 2 A. M. During the nightly patrolling of this sector there was constant heavy shell fire. The enemy was nervous and would open up with machine gun fire at intervals. However, no enemy patrols were met during the patrolling of this sector. These patrols gained much valuable information of enemy positions and activities during our stay here. No casualties were suffered by our scouts."

One interesting fact resulting from questioning prisoners taken is shown by the following in Col. Judah's Summary of Intelligence for September 17:

"Twelve prisoners were examined the night of September 16-17 and all were unanimous in attesting the excellent fighting qualities of the American troops with whom they had come in contact. They regard Americans as fresh and vigorous fighters of high courage and stamina. The Americans now, they say, are like the Germans in 1914. * * * People in Germany no longer minimize the value of the American as an individual fighter, nor of the American Army as a fighting unit. They see in the presence of American troops in France the downfall of Germany.

This shows that just as the Allies had discovered in the spring that the American reinforcement consisted of first class fighting men, so had the Germans by the end of the summer.

As part of the plan to deceive the Germans with respect to the coming attack in the Argonne the Division executed a double raid early the morning of September 22. The 167th Infantry was assigned Haumont-les-Lachaussees as their objective. The 168th Infantry was assigned Marimbois Farm which they had previously raided on September 16 as their objective. The most careful preparations were made to insure this double raid being a successful surprise attack which would yield the maximum number of prisoners with the minimum losses to the raiders.

For this double raid Col. Henry J. Reilly was ordered to prepare the artillery fire. Besides the three regiments of the Rainbow he was given two Batteries of 120 mm. This made 48-75's, 24-155's, 8-120's, totaling 80 guns.

He determined to use these guns to their maximum capacity to do three things. The first was to so smash the German positions in Haumont and Marimbois Farm that the Rainbow raiding Infantry would meet no resistance. The second was to so box-in the ground to be covered by each raid, that no German counter attack could reach it while the raid was going on. The third was to smother every machine gun nest and battery which could fire on the raiders.

As both raiding detachments came from the 84th Infantry Brigade, Col. Reilly was ordered to report to Brig. Gen. MacArthur who commanded that brigade.

General MacArthur approved the plans for the artillery with one exception. In them he found no direct fire provided. He said he wanted at least two 75's put in the point of Bois-de-la Grande Souche nearest Haumont and at least two in the edge of the Bois de Dampvitoux at the point closest to Marimbois Farm.

Colonel Reilly argued that this would simply decrease the number of guns delivering effective fire by four. This for two reasons. The first was that guns so placed would not be available for the fire ordered when the guns firing on the two points to be raided lifted their fire to permit our Infantry to enter these points. The second was that in the dark the gunners looking through open sights would not be able to clearly distinguish their

targets because once fire began, the shells bursting on and around the targets would obscure their view.

However, Gen. MacArthur insisted so Col. Reilly ordered Captain Bodine of A Battery and Captain Stone of F Battery both of the 149th Illinois to pick out a platoon each, thoroughly reconnoitre the positions to be occupied and the best routes leading to them and also to determine the firing data ahead of time. It was characteristic of the two Captains that instead of having lieutenants command the platoons chosen each went with the guns and personally commanded. The lieutenants were also present.

Prior to the raid Colonel Reilly talked to the Infantry regimental commanders, the battalion commanders and the leaders of the raiding parties to insure that the men who made the raid got the protection of artillery fire which they wanted. Artillery projectiles are cheaper than the lives and limbs of infantrymen to say nothing of the success of their missions.

This double raid afforded Major Winn an opportunity to prove the value of over-head machine gun fire from guns carefully placed prior to the action. He carefully reconnoitered the position for his guns and determined all the firing data ahead of time.

The result was that the German positions to be raided were swept with a torrent of machine gun bullets along with the crushing artillery fire both prior to the beginning of the raid and during it when all position from which help could come to the Germans being raided were smothered with machine gun and artillery fire.

The double raid was an excellent example of how the artillery and machine guns, both, can enable the infantry, human beings, to accomplish a result with the minimum loss of life and the maximum success.

Captain Maurice W. Howe commanding “M” Company commanded the 167th Alabama raiding party. Under his leadership the raiders crept forward to a point just east of and within three hundred yards of the town.

"Here is the account as given in "Alabama's Own in France";—"At 4:30 o'clock in the morning the attack started. Each of the four platoons had a section of the town to cover, and, after clearing it, reported to Captain Howe at his post in the churchyard.

"The town was thoroughly 'mopped up', and all the troops back in their own lines at 5:30 a. m. At least fifteen or twenty Germans, including one officer, were killed and sixteen captured. Two light machine guns were also brought in by our men, who suffered casualties to the extent of one killed, two slightly wounded, and two wounded seriously.

"In this highly successful raid, valuable information as to the town's defenses were obtained. Great credit was given the raiders for the thoroughness and speed with which they worked, and Captain Howe was later awarded the 'Distinguished Service Cross' for his brilliant leadership in action.

"The prisoners from this raid were taken to the Chateau to be examined and questioned.

"The prisoners stated that a big gun was being brought up to be trained on the Chateau St. Benoit and destroy it. Even as they spoke a "77" shell from the German side crashed into the courtyard."

This information undoubtedly saved General MacArthur and his staff who were quartered in the Chateau, because acting on it, they moved out.

On the 24th the Germans destroyed the Chateau with 280 mm. shells.

Here is the story of Sergeant V. D. Fleckenstein, Co. M, 167th Infantry:—

"I had a squad on outpost duty end was relieved about four o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st. I then went up to the P. C. and Lt. Banks told us we were going to take Haumont. He showed us the location on the map, the position the platoons were to take and how we were to go through the town. There were to be four platoons each consisting of thirty men, each corporal having 5 men. A corporal from each of the platoons was to report to Lt.

---

* Page 180. By William H. Amrine, published by Eaton & Gettinger, N.Y., N.Y.

Hemphill at 7 o'clock to go out and get an idea of the position. I was selected. I do not recall the names of the other three nor the three from headquarters.

"We left at about 7:30 p. m. and in about half an hour were in some old trenches where some of our men were on out-post duty. By that time it was dark and we went out into no man's land and started wandering about. We were on the side of a hill which sloped down to a road, which run east and west, and then sloped up to the town which was about 200 yards from the crossroads. The other road went through the town running north and south. We had almost reached the crossroads before we were fired upon.

"Luckily no one was hit, and we scattered and crawled back up the hill. A part of this hill was covered with small pine trees and every one seemed to be alive or moving. The moon would come from behind a cloud and the place would be very bright. We would then have to stop and lie still. We came across several large concrete gun placements. Several times we asked the Lieutenant to go slower, inasmuch as we were positive that we saw someone. He however, would not listen. We finally got back to the trench. There was quite an interval between us. It so happened that I was last and in a few minutes came to a place where one trench ran into another. I did not know which way the others had gone and stopped, thinking I might be able to hear them. I looked down the trench to my right and about fifteen feet away on the edge of the top of the trench there was a cross.

"Just then the moon came out and in the bright light I saw a head, with a German helmet being slowly drawn down. There I stood like a statue, with my gun strapped on my shoulder and no pistol. I slowly pulled back in the shadow, letting on I did not see him. At the same time I realized he would hardly take a chance and shoot. Just about the time the head disappeared, I heard voices to my left and going down the trench a few feet found the men on guard and told them to be on their guard.

"We got back to the company about 11 o'clock. I laid down for an hour. We got hot coffee at 12. I rested another hour. We were then assembled. It took quite some time to get back to the trench. On account of the bright moonlight we decided

that we could not advance to the crossroads and take up our position, but must wait and advance with the barrage.

"The barrage started about four o'clock. It was quite some distance to the crossroads and we had to crawl all the way. The noise was terrific and it actually seemed to be raining machine gun bullets.

"We finally got into our position, the barrage lifted, and we made a dash for the town. Our platoon was on the left side of the crossroads, and when we got into the town we were to clean up half of the left side.

"When we got up to the town we found it was surrounded by a high, heavy wire fence. We could see the machine gunners on the other side, who appeared to be out of ammunition and were not firing. I heard someone shouting on our right, and saw that the other platoons were going in on the road. I called to Captain Howe, and we also made a dash over to the road.

"There was plenty of confusion, most of our platoon went down the left side inside the fence. The barracks were on this side. This left nobody to go down the main street. I got hold of one man and Lt. Roberts. We were just turning the corner when a hand grenade landed at our feet. Lt. Roberts gave a swift kick and kicked it several yards away.

"We then went down the center of the street and threw incendiary bombs and hand grenades in all the buildings. When we reached the end of the street the other fellows were coming from the barracks with 14 prisoners which I took charge of. The other platoons had gone over their section of the town and in a short time joined us. We marched on out the other end of the town. Day was beginning to break as we left the town.

"We got 18 prisoners and 2 machine guns. We had only 1 man killed. When we got back they served hot coffee and at 8 o'clock a good breakfast. Col. Screws then had a meeting and congratulated us.

"The Story of the 168th Infantry" * gives the following account of the raid on Marimbois Farm:

"This second operation against Marimbois Farm was to be under the general supervision of Lieutenant Wallace, who by

---

* Page 139 et seq. By John H. Taber, published by the State Historical Society of Iowa.

frequent reconnaissance had become thoroughly familiar with the terrain. The actual work, however, was to be done by Lieutenants Spaulding of 'D', Todd of 'G', and Lucas of 'I' who were to command the three detachments of fifty men each, chosen from the three battalions.

"These three officers, on their part, made careful reconnaissances of the ground over which the raid was to be conducted. For a thousand yards it rolled away flat as a table, with little dead space in between. On the level field our men would offer a perfect target, and in the attack they must beat the Boche to his guns. If we succeeded, it would be a picnic; if not, a slaughter.

"Lieutenant Todd, on the left flank, was given the mission of mopping up the dugouts at the northern edge of the Farm; Lieutenant Lucas was to take the center and clean up the main group of farm buildings; and Lieutenant Spaulding's group on the right, composed entirely of 'D' Company men, was to ransack a line of pill boxes and the support group of thirty men, was to keep the regimental commander informed of the progress by phone.

"Shortly before four o'clock on the morning of the 22nd the attacking party formed up and noiselessly worked forward two hundred yards beyond our lines, half-way to the enemy position. The check revealed the unauthorized presence of Cook Giles of 'I' Company who was out in search of excitement. He felt that his work was entirely too tame, and had often before volunteered for patrol duty but was always refused on the ground that he was needed at the kitchen. He pleaded earnestly with his captain to be permitted to go on this raid. Receiving a decisive 'No' for an answer, he took matters in his own hands and in the darkness joined the column anyhow. Now that he was actually in No Man's Land, Lieutenant Lucas did not have the heart to send him back.

"It was a beautiful night, clear and crisp, and every star in the heavens was shining brightly. Over in the direction of Metz the raiders could see flashes of bursting anti-aircraft shells, trying to protect the military works of the city from the Allied bombers. Search-lights, like the giant fingers of the aurora borealis, were streaking the sky. Soon came the droning of pow-

erful motors born swiftly on the sharp wind as the air raiders winged homeward. In the dim first light of breaking day the bulky shadow of the Farm took form on the sky line. The men shivered with cold during the few minutes they anxiously waited for our barrage to open.

"At the stroke of four the heavy and light guns taking part in the bombardment dropped their torrent of steel and explosives on the ten buildings of the Farm, which before the drive had been a Boche aviation center. Bursting out in the silence of the night, the volume of fire seemed tremendous to the raiders, and they feared that there would be nothing left to capture. Two 75's had been moved up into our very front line, and they were firing point-blank into the Farm, battering down walls and un-roofing buildings. In the first five minutes, before the smoke obscured the flat, our men could see that our artillery had the exact range and they knew that none of the enemy would dare stay above ground during so violent a bombardment. Numerous machine guns had joined in the fire, rattling and sputtering away at the Boche line.

"But the enemy artillery was not silent. His batteries were responding to the first signals sent up by the outposts, and as had been anticipated he began to shell out front line and to rake the field in front. Twice the men in their pancaked positions were forced to move rapidly forward to escape destruction. German shells were falling everywhere now. Our barrage, which had been thundering for twenty-seven minutes, had but three minutes more to go.

"Then came the simple command, 'All together, let's go', and over the field they tore, fast as their legs would carry them. They reached the Boche wire, old, rusty, broken down. They trampled it under foot, fell in it, and scrambled through. Our barrage had lifted. Now or never! With a wild cry, they raced for his guns, each group toward its own objective. In a fraction of a minute the cluster of buildings was surrounded and penetrated by exultant Americans hurling grenades down dugout mouths, firing at the few who had already emerged and were offering resistance.



—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

Marimbois Farm first taken by the 168th Iowa in the raid of September 22, 1918, as it finally looked at the Armistice.

—Courtesy of U. S. Signal Corps.

167th Alabama support line on final position at St. Mihiel on which trenches were dug

"Lieutenant Lucas rounded a corner near the center of the Farm in time to see Corporal Brine kill a Boche who had sprung on Private Martin and was about to get the best of him. In a desperate struggle Private Smith overpowered his man and took him prisoner; then Sergeant Stephens appeared with his prize; and Cook Giles not only got himself a live Boche but took with him a far more desirable souvenir, a Luger automatic.

"Spaulding's men were working fast and furious. Sergeant Bills of 'D' Company had gathered in three prisoners in a few moments, and Private Hoskins had one to his credit.

"Lieutenant Todd and the Second Battalion detachment had cleaned up the dugouts assigned them, and in the brisk encounter had done away with all the Boches who put up a fight. In this group Private Vernon W. Saylor was killed, and Sergeant Arthur W. Menge, Corporals Charles E. Hopkins, Carl W. Smithers, Carl M. Gustafson, and Private Alfred L. George all of Company 'G', were wounded. The right group had but two casualties, men from Company 'D' slightly wounded; and one man from the Third Battalion, Private Ernest G. Johnson of 'K', a stretcher-bearer, was killed.

"The eastern horizon was, growing bright, and now the signal for the return shot up in the sky. Sergeant Kosek of 'D' Company had made good use of his time, as his seven prisoners attested. But when he lined them up to come back it seemed that they were unwilling to leave, and as there was no time for argument he had to shoot four of them down before the others changed their minds. Some months later this incident was the cause of an investigation, based on the story of one of the prisoners, but the Sergeant was completely exonerated of any guilt. It was an unpleasant job to kill the men, but he had no alternative.

"In the dull morning light the watchful men in the line saw the raiders hurrying back, some staggering with the burden of the dead and wounded, for none were left behind; others with German machine guns and other trophies on their shoulders; and before them marched nine Germans, hands held high. Following the signal of a caterpillar rocket the enemy let fall a barrage of heavy minen on the Farm, and then tried to cut off the raiding party. But the withdrawal was rapid and they all escaped."

From time to time regimental commanders would receive complaints and warnings from higher authority than Division Headquarters that men of the Division who had been wounded or ill upon recovery instead of going to some other Division as ordered would walk off without permission and rejoin the Rainbow.

Here is the story of one such group as told by Edwin F. Heilman, one of them. He says:—

"On September 13, 1918, the Supply Company, 166th Infantry, moved into Nonsard Woods. Wagoner Joe Maher and I were detailed to get some firewood.

"Out toward the lines, I left the wagon and crossed into a field where I saw some good pieces of wood. As I stepped into a ravine, I got a faint feeling and began to get sick at my stomach. Dizzily, I staggered back to the wagon and told Joe I thought I had sucked in a mess of gas. By the time we arrived at the Company CP, I was feverish and was put to bed. During the night, I am informed, I became delirious and thought I was freezing. The boys covered me with their extra blankets, but I kept calling for the next shell to hit the damn barracks and end it all.

"The next morning I was loaded into an ambulance and started for the hospital. Along the way, I commenced to come out of the fog I was in, and noticed that we had stopped to pick up an engineer who had just been hit with shrapnel. During the ride which was terribly bumpy, he started to bleed and as the blood gushed from the several wounds in his arm, we called to the driver to stop and do something for the poor guy. There was nothing he could do, as he didn't even have a tourniquet on the ambulance. He tied up the arm as best he could with a towel, but by the time we arrived at the hospital, he was just breathing his last—bled to death. Also, by this time I had recovered enough to be sane, and glanced at the tag which the medics had tied on me, and what do you think? It was marked 'Influenza'. Well, to get to the story, I spent several weeks in Base Hospital 83 near Toul, and was then transferred to the 41st Division Replacement Camp.

"One day we were all called into the big courtyard of the replacement camp and told to assemble in groups according to our Division designation. The Lieutenant started to call off '1st Division, 2nd Division', etc., each group answering 'here' and holding up their hands while he checked the number in the group.

'42nd Division' he bawled, and about 35 men answered 'Here'. As this was the largest number of casuals, we got the razz from the rest of the gang. But we shut them up by yelling, 'If you so forth and so on's had been near the front, you might have a big gang too.' Then we heard the Lieutenant's voice again, 'All 42nd Division will be sent as replacements to the 5th Division.' We looked at one another, but no one spoke.

"I had been assigned to the automatic rifle school for being discourteous to a second lieutenant on the drill field. In addition being a supply company man, it was my job to report the number of rations needed for this school, to the commissary sergeant This school was a separate unit. We would go out early in the morning and stay late in the evening, our meals being prepared and hauled out to us by truck. One night we were called out for night practice firing. I had to rouse the commissary sergeant, and draw some reserve rations for the jaunt.

"That is where I got my big idea. We had been talking among ourselves for several days, but no one could think of how we could keep from going to the 5th Division, and at the same time get back to the dear old Rainbow. After the night maneuver, I called several of the gang together in the barracks room, and we decided that it was improbable that our service records could be any place except at our respective companies. We reasoned, they would remain there until we had reported to some permanent station.

"When the rest of the gang came in from various duties, we got our heads together, and to a man, we all agreed. After the evening mess, we quietly rolled our packs and waited. At taps, we slipped down into the courtyard and fell in. At a signal from me, we marched in column of two's to the commissary where I proceeded to rouse the commissary sergeant.

" 'W'ot in hell do you want again,' he drawled sleepily.

" 'Sorry Sarge,' I said, 'another night maneuver that looks like it's going to last a couple of days and nights. Lieutenant told me to draw three days' reserve rations for each man.'

" 'Alright, line up,' said the sergeant, and soon each man had two cans of corn Willie, two cans of tomatoes and two boxes of hard tack which we put in our packs. In the crowd was one sergeant from our Regiment whose name was Jim Crowe. I gave him the signal and he stepped out in front.

" 'Fall in,' he said, 'Right dress, front, count off, right by squads, march.'

"Down the courtyard we marched, the two sentries at the main gate stepped aside, we marched on through, down the road till we reached the railroad. Well, so far we were free, at least we wouldn't be missed until reveille, and as long as we had the strength to go on, we would get back to the good old Rainbow Division or bust.

"On the railroad siding were a number of empty 40 and 8 box cars. So we picked one out, and pushed it out toward the main line and loaded on. Several of us wrapped up some newspapers in a tight bundle, which we lit and with which we flagged down the oncoming freight train. When we tried to tell the train crew what we wanted, they would have no part of it. But we finally convinced them that we wanted to get back to our Division. 'The Rainbow Division,' we said, which was now in the lines. At the mention of the name Rainbow, several of their faces lit up, and after a few gestures and shrugs of the shoulders, they hooked us on, and at last we were free and on our way.

"Three days passed, four days, and on the fifth day we awoke to find that we had been side tracked. Our train was gone and so were our rations. That day we foraged a little, and agreed to meet at night. We had to be careful near the larger towns, and always kept the door of the box car closed so that we would not be observed by MPs, if any. We met at dusk, and were lucky enough to catch another freight train going in the same direction with several empty cars hooked on. We were able, due to the slow speed of the train, to load on one of these cars, and we were again on our way. We didn't know where we were going, but we were trying to follow the noise of the guns.

"On the sixth day, our train pulled on a siding and stopped We looked out, and across the track was another train marked 'BEF'. We managed to slip over and open one of the cars. There were raincoats, sweaters, and plenty of cigarettes. We fixed it so that just two of the gang at a time would slip from our train, cross the track to the other train. Upon their return, two more would go over. When we all had a share of the spoils, we closed the other car door again. Luckily before they discovered it, we were again on our way. We rode all that night, it was rather chilly and we were hungry.

"The seventh day, we were again sidetracked in a fairly good sized town, the name of which, I did not notice. There were many French soldiers in the depot. One of the boys from the 165th slipped over and drummed up a conversation, in which he told the Frenchman to notify his comrades that we had a few good English raincoats which we would be willing to part with for 15 francs each. After that, there was such a commotion around the car, that several of the boys were able to sell their raincoats at least three or four times. About the time some of the 'Frogs' commenced to get sore, our train pulled out. Now we had cigarettes and money, but still no food. We hadn't eaten now for two days, and we could have easily given ourselves up for a free meal, but no, we were determined to go on until we reached the Division, food or no food. The sweaters we swiped from the British box car kept us warm, for they had the big turtle necks. In addition, I had an extra one, which I was taking back to my buddy, Willard Havlin.

"That night we sidetracked again in another good sized town. We decided to go out and see what we could find in the way of food, and meet again the next morning at dawn at the depot. A fellow from the 165th and I went down into the town. It was so dark that we almost had to feel our way along. As we came to an alley, we saw a dim light in the distance. We went down and peeped in. To our surprise, we saw a few American and French soldiers sitting around on chairs, and a couple of ladies were hurrying back and forth. We decided to go in. To our surprise, we found ourselves in a Red Cross hut where cigarettes were plentiful, and hot chocolate was in the process of making. We informed them that we were casuals on our way back to our outfit. We were invited to remain until the hot chocolate was ready. Boy, what a pleasant hour we spent, but we thought we heard a train whistle, and so we left and hastened back to the depot.

"We were just in time to grab our train pulling out. We found, much to our surprise, that all were present or accounted for, the majority being too weak and hungry to leave the train. We still had been unable to buy anything to eat, although we all had some money.

"That night we rode or rather moved, and on the morning of the eighth day, we awoke to find ourselves back in the same

town where we had sold the raincoats to the 'Frogs' the day before. We were afraid to leave the train, so two of the boys collected some money from the gang, and slipped out to buy some food. They just had time to go into a store across from the depot when the train started to pull out again. They were just able to run and catch it, bringing with them, a half dozen loaves of bread The bread lasted about two minutes, so we all laid down to sleep.

"We rode and rode, and did not leave the train or eat again until, on the morning of the twelfth day. It was just dawn, and I was laying with my face next to the car door which was open about two inches, when I heard the buzzing of voices. I awoke with a start, and peering out, I saw at least three hundred colored American troops over on the hillside, lining up for mess. The rumble of the guns was very plain by this time, so I knew that we were near the front. I nudged the fellow from the 165th. We slipped our mess kits out of our packs, and got out of the car. It was a long line, but we went clear to the end and were always glancing down toward the kitchen to see how close we were to food. Presently, we heard,

" 'Hey, are those white boys back there?' 'Yes,' we answered, fearing that we would be asked to step out of line, as by this time, there were considerable of the colored troops behind us in the line.

" 'Well, what in the hell are you doing back there, come on down to the head of the line,' the colored Mess Sergeant shouted. We went down and he said, 'Come on men, let these white boys in here, they looks hungry.'

"He filled our mess kits with the best hot corned willie and potatoes, and on the lid, a generous helping of rice and raisins, and coffee that made you feel like you could whip the world. While we were eating, we told him our story and mentioned that the rest of the gang were still sleeping over in that box car. I forgot to mention that the train had dropped our car on this siding and left us. The sergeant told us that as soon as he had fed his outfit, we could get the rest of the boys, and in the meantime he would fix them a like meal. We also learned that this was some Pioneer Infantry outfit, the designation of which, I don't remember. The rest of the gang were finally awakened, and after being well fed, we questioned the sergeant as to whether he had heard where the Rainbow Division was now located.

" 'Rainbow?' he said, 'Sure man, they done gone right up that there road not over three days ago.' We were at last in luck. We thanked the sergeant and the cooks all around, and stepped out into the road. 'Fall in' barked the sergeant, and we formed in a column of squads. At that moment a truck wanting to get by, blew his claxon for us to move aside.

" 'Hey,' we yelled, 'Where to, buddy'?

" 'Why I'm heading for Headquarters, 166th,' he replied.

" 'Boy,' we shouted, 'that's where we are heading for too.'

"We piled on. That night, I said goodbye to the gang, as the truck driver dropped me off at the Supply Company. I busted into the orderly room. My service record was still there. Old John, the mess sergeant fixed me up with some leavings that tasted like a banquet dinner to me. I met my buddy, Willard Havlin, and we had a happy reunion. I presented him proudly with the sweater which I had been carrying all this time for him, but he complained later that the thing was full of crumbs. The war ended and we moved to Germany where we remained for five months.

"Back home, I was walking up the street in Norwood, my home town, when I stopped short. The fellow coming toward me stopped short too. It was Jim Crowe, the sergeant who had taken charge of the AWOL detail. 'What in the hell are you doing in Norwood'? I asked.

" 'I've lived here all my life', he said. Well, so had I, but this was only our second meeting."

Secret Field Orders No. 27, 30, September, 1918 relieved the Rainbow from the St. Mihiel Sector. The 89th division by extending to the left was to take it over.

Field Order No. 28 started the Rainbow on its cold, wet, muddy night hikes to the Montfaucon Woods in the Argonne. These orders and the following ones were models for the movement of a division. Once more the Staff of the Division like the brain of an expert proved its efficiency.

How often did the line officer and the enlisted men slogging through the cold penetrating liquid mud during the night and hidden during the day in muddy woods or more muddy billets in dirty villages realize the midnight oil burned by the staff and the grey hairs accumulated before their time in moving 27,000

officers and men and all their armament and equipment while supplying them with what they needed and evacuating their sick on their five days march from the St. Mihiel Salient to the Argonne.

Finally Field Order No. 32 (Secret) put the Division in the Montfaucon Woods and while leaving the infantry there in reserve sent the artillery to the support of the 3d Regular Infantry Division to the right front of Montfaucon.

Service in the Essey-Pannes Sector like the St. Mihiel Battle had cost the Rainbow but little. To the 901 killed and wounded during the St. Mihiel battle was added only 31 killed, 24 died of wounds and 259 wounded a total of but 314 or only 1215 for the whole operation on the Plain of the Woevre.

During these operations the Rainbow had lost only 5 prisoners.

CHAPTER XXII

HOW BREAKING KRIEMHILDE STELLUNG BECAME MISSION OF THE RAINBOW

Once the attack through the Argonne had been decided upon as the mission for the American army the stage was set, though none of the actors on either the German or American side knew it at the time, for the dramatic and deadly fighting which culminated when the Rainbow and Wolverine Divisions broke the Kriemhilde Stellung.

This break though made possible the final decisive act in the Argonne Battle. This was the attack of November 1st. It broke the pivot of the German line west of Verdun and as far east as the Oise River. To avoid disaster, the Germans then had to rapidly retreat to the Meuse along this whole line.

This invasion made them more than ready to sign an armistice.

It was so important to the Germans to hold the Argonne pivot that once the American surprise attack begun September 26th had progressed far enough to convince them that it was not a feint to cover a real attack somewhere else, they began rushing in divisions from other parts of the western front.

Three divisions were brought from the British front, fourteen divisions were taken from the French front, opposite Paris, nineteen divisions were taken from between the Moselle and Meuse River, and two divisions from the trench sector in Alsace.* (See Map at end of chapter 28.)

The first of these divisions arriving as the initial impulse of the American attack was dying down helped stiffen the German line and stop the further advance of the American divisions which had begun the attack. This ended the first phase of the Argonne campaign, which is what it should be called rather than

---

* In American Soldiers Also Fought, by General R. L. Bullard and Earl Reeves, Longmans, Green & Co., N. Y., page 89, the statement is made that Hindenburg put nearly a quarter of his strength into the Argonne in an effort to stop the American advance.

a battle, because it was made up of numerous battles during the period from September 26th when it began, until November 11th when the Armistice put an end to the fighting.

The reinforced German line was then well to the front of the Kriemhilde Stellung. Due to the rugged condition of the country and the many hills which made natural strongpoints because troops occupying them could use flanking fire to the front of neighboring hills and even to the rear of some of them, the German position was a very strong one.

The second phase of the Argonne was the conquest of these positions by some of the hardest and most determined fighting which took place during the war. This brought the American line up against the Kriemhilde Stellung, the last fortified position the Germans had in the Argonne. Once this was broken, they had nothing between them and the Meuse River on which to make a stand, except the natural features of the country. Between the Kriemhilde Stellung and the Meuse River the country is not nearly so rugged as from the Kriemhilde Stellung south. Thus they had no naturally strong positions on which to stand, as they had had between the entrenched position from which they were driven September 26th and 27th and the time they settled down in the Kriemhilde Stellung about the middle of October.

The German defense of the Kriemhilde Stellung and the break-through of the center of this position by the Rainbow and the Wolverine Divisions constituted the third phase of the Argonne campaign.

The fourth phase began with the exploitation of this successful break-through by the general attack of November 1st. This attack rapidly drove the Germans across the Meuse River. It finished with the Americans on the left of the Argonne on the hills dominating Sedan and everywhere else across the Meuse as the result of gallant and determined fighting during the last hours of the war.

To fully understand the part played by the Rainbow and the Wolverine Divisions, it is necessary to trace the course of the Argonne campaign and particularly in the center of the American advance from its beginning.

This was largely governed, in addition to the resistance put up by the Germans, by General Pershing's conception of the re-

lationship of the Argonne campaign to the plan he had had ever since his first report from France in July 1917, to attack towards the Moselle Valley.

The second governing feature was the topography of the country over which the fighting took place.

Marshal Foch's insistence on the attack through the Argonne had prevented General Pershing from continuing his St. Mihiel attack, which would have at least taken him to the German fortress of Metz, guarding the Moselle route into Germany.

However, it did not prevent his planning to return to this direction of attack. In fact, the plan which he executed as he advanced through the Argonne, of gradually pivoting his line around Verdun until it faced northeast, meant that at the end of this advance the American forces would occupy a continuous line facing northeast. The right half of this line was the position on which the St. Mihiel attack had halted. The left half of this line was to be the new line resulting from the Argonne campaign and extending from just east of Verdun to the neighborhood of Sedan.

Under General Pershing's orders, October 12, 1918, the troops on the right half became the Second American Army under command of Major General Robert Lee Bullard. Those in the Argonne remained in the First American Army of which General Pershing relinquished command. Major General Hunter Liggett up to then in command of the First American Army Corps was put in command of the First American Army. General Pershing then took command of the American Group of Armies made up of Liggett's First and Bullard's Second American Army.

Thus finally General Pershing succeeded in getting the mass of the American troops in France together in the same locality.

He had formed the First American Army at the time of the Second Battle of the Marne. However, in that battle he had never succeeded in getting more than the First American Army Corps together and operating in battle as a unit. It was commanded by Major General Liggett.

In preparation for the St. Mihiel battle, General Pershing was able for the first time to get several American Army Corps

together under his command and thus for the first time have an American army in the battlefield.

Therefore from the standpoint of command in the face of the enemy and strategy the St. Mihiel Battle and the Argonne Campaign were part of the same operation.

St. Mihiel was a battle in the correct sense of the word. It was the beginning of the first American campaign on a front of our own, under our own High Command, in the same way in which the British, under Marshal Haig, and the French, under Marshal Petain, were fighting campaigns on their own fronts, directly under their own High Commands.

By it, the four year old German salient, sticking more than fifteen miles into the French line, was flattened out. This salient threatened the rear of, and communications with, the historic fortress of Verdun.

The next most northerly spur terminates in the famous hill of Montfaucon, crowned by its ancient village, which, beginning in feudal days and probably even in the days of Rome and of the Gauls who preceded them, has seen so much blood shed for its possession. Our 37th Ohio Division and 79th Division from Pennsylvania, Maryland and the District of Columbia, were the last to make such a sacrifice in its capture.

The third spur of irregular hills is that of Cunel. Its ultimate conquest cost our 3d, 4th and 5th Regular Divisions and the 80th, from Pennsylvania and the Virginias, a bitter and prolonged struggle.

From the fifth crest as it curves westward across the Argonne from the Meuse to the Bourgogne Forest, which is a northern continuation of the Argonne Forest, there runs to the south a broad spur or "massif" made up of numerous irregular sharp ridges and peaks. Being largely wooded, it offers a splendid defensive position.

The Battle of Exermont—Gesnes—followed by that of Landres-St.-Georges, in which our 35th, 91st, 1st, 32d, and 42nd literally strewed the ground with their dead in more than a month's gruelling combat, showed how well the Germans took advantage of this handiwork of nature.