

The Rainbow Reveille



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**R A I N B O W
C O N V E N T I O N
I N D I A N A P O L I S
J U L Y 1 4 - 1 5**

Complete Details
in July 1st Reveille

ON THE CHAMPAGNE BATTLE FIELD. THE VICTORIOUS DEFENSE OF CHALONS

General Gouraud has formally accepted the invitation of the Rainbow Division to attend the Convention in Indianapolis on July 14 and 15th. It is therefore fitting that we should recall the historic events that took place on the Champagne Front before and on those dates five years ago and with which General Gouraud's name will ever be gloriously associated. We therefore reprint below an article by Gustave Babin, a well known French journalist who was at General Gouraud's Headquarters in Chalons before and during the battle. The article was originally published in "L'Illustration" of July 27, 1918, and was translated and mimeographed at Rainbow Division Headquarters at Bourmont on August 18, 1918, being distributed down to Captains throughout the Division. The Division herewith pays it thanks to "L'Illustration" from whose pages it has taken the article.

"On July 15, just a week ago, the Germans launched the offensive which we had been expecting for several weeks.

It was developed with the usual fury, was meticulously prepared as always, against two of our armies, on a front of more than 80 kilometers, between Chateau-Thierry on the West and the famous Main de Massiges on the East. This time it was the Group of Armies of the Imperial Crown Prince—the armies of von Boehn, von Mudra and von Einem—which made the attack. It is then to the heir of the Hohenzollerns that this abrupt check to the fifth attack of the year must be charged.

From the first day the enemy's failure was certain. Only on his right wing did he gain any appreciable advantage; crossing the Marne at several points between Fossoy and Oeuilly, and on both sides of Dormans. However, he found himself, at the bottom of this loop in a strip of the valley between the river and a line of heights solidly held by our soldiers, in a very precarious condition as following events proved for, in the night of July 19-20, he was forced to cross back to the North bank.

At the center, in front of Rheims, the offensive was limited to a demonstration. In reality he attempted to reduce the Montagne de Rheims and capture the unhappy city.

But to the East on his left wing where the German attacked the army of General Gouraud, the affair showed for us the light of a magnificent victorious defensive, one of the most characteristic, as well as one of the most successful defensive battles—as will be seen in the future—of this formidable war.

Moreover, it was there, I think, that he intended to make a powerful effort. The stake was no less than Chalons-sur-Marne,—the Catalonic plains where Aetius had already saved the Latin world its freedom and its civilization.

July 7 General Gouraud had addressed to his troops the order of the day which follows:

"To the French and American soldiers of the 4th Army:

We may be attacked at any moment. You all know that a defensive battle was never engaged under more favorable conditions. We are awake and on our guard. We are powerfully reinforced with infantry and artillery.

You will fight on a terrain that you have transformed by your work and by your perseverance

into a redoubtable fortress. This fortress will be invincible and all its entrances are well guarded.

The bombardment will be terrible. You will support it without weakness. The assault will be fierce, in a cloud of smoke, dust and gas, but your position and your armament are formidable. In your breasts beat the brave and strong hearts of free men.

None shall glance to the rear. None shall yield a step. Each shall have but one thought; to kill many until they have had their fill.

This is why your general says to you: You will break this assault and it will be a happy day.

Signed: GOURAUD.

Today this order appears to be a prophecy in which all was foreseen: the violence of the enemy assault, the magnificent constancy of our defenders.

On what was based this tranquil serenity of the chief on the day before an attack, which was sure to prove so formidable, which had been prepared with that rigorous care of which we were already well aware and for which the most powerful means available would be used? On an absolute confidence in the valor of his soldiers and on the excellence of the plan of defense.

It would be unwise to indicate in any detail what this plan was. It consisted in leaving on the advance line, exposed to the preparatory bombardments, to the hot deluge from minenwerfer, only slight forces, small groups of lost children, under the command of resolute indefatigable officers, charged first and above all with the warning the rear of the precise moment of the attack when the assault waves would be thrown forward. The men to whom were confided these posts of honor were sacrificed beforehand and knew it. It remained for them but to die a glorious death! It shall be seen that they did not fail at any point. Some of their number, moved by a great spirit, performed prodigies of valor. On that day the Aces were numbered by hundreds. What more can I say? The blazing trail of rockets shooting to the early morning sky did not even call for help. They signalled to their brothers, to their avengers, the danger: "Here comes the enemy."

Behind this advance line, separated from it by an open space, was another undulating line on the plain: it was this line which was to break if not stop the German wave. Its redoubts, protected by barb wire, solidly built, were like the pebbles of the strand, around which breaks the foaming, mounting tide. Cut at first, and it was cut two or

(Continued on page 4)

WHAT OF 1918?

Still quoting from Colonel Wolf's preliminary history, we cover this month only the withdrawal from the Champagne and our move to and preparation for the Chateau Thierry attack.

"During the afternoon of the 15th, and during the 16th of July, the battle resolved itself into a vigorous artillery combat, attended by constant and daring harassing of all Allied troops and all roads by flotillas of unpunished German planes. On the evening of July 18th, the division on two hours' notice descended from the lines, and on July 21st, entrained at St. Hilaire-au-Temple, Chalons-sur-Marne, Coolus, and Vitry-la-Ville for points on the Marne in the locality of Méaux and LaFerte-sous-Jouarre, and about 20 kilometers southwest of Chateau Thierry. During the brief period between our withdrawal from the line and our entrainment, the entire complexion of the Western Front had changed, owing to the heavy defeat administered by General Gouraud's Army to the great German Army. This defeat carried larger and more decisive results than the battle itself presented. From high morale and superiority of numbers, the German had been brought to a point where the forces on his side were about equal to those of the Allies and his morale had decidedly slumped. Troops from America, who had been coming in in ever-increasing numbers during the spring were now known to be present in France in such a way, and in such size, that it was clear the balance of man power had been shifted in favor of the Allies. American and French troops had gained a new impetus, and a new inspiration of victory. From long, tedious periods of defensive, they saw before them an opportunity of picking up the offensive and holding it until the German capitulated. In the meantime, General Foch had swung all available troops into a savage and surprise attack in the locality of Soissons, which, by its success, unsteadied the lines along the Marne and put the entire salient of Tardenois in jeopardy. It was to this scene that the Rainbow proceeded.

During the few days, it was in transit, it received replacements for the 43 officers and 1,610 men it had lost in killed and wounded in Champagne, and for the 81 officers and 1,815 men that it had lost in killed and wounded in the training and Baccarat Sectors. As soon as the division was reassembled after detrainment, its foot troops proceeded by camion, and its artillery and mounted troops by road, beginning on the evening of July 25th, to the locality of Epieds and Verdilly, about five kilometers north of Chateau Thierry, as a part of the 1st American Army Corps, then commanded by

General Liggett, in the Sixth French Army, commanded by General des Gouttes. There the 84th Infantry Brigade, the first to arrive, took over the front held by our 26th Division, which was reinforced by the 56th Brigade of the 28th Division. It was about three kilometers across the entire front of the 1st American Corps at that time. The 83rd Brigade upon its arrival, came up with the 165th Infantry on the left of the 167th Infantry, a disposition that was preserved during all the subsequent battles of the division. The 165 Infantry and the 166th Infantry took over the rapid relief of the fronts of the 167th, 164th and 51st French Divisions, and later, the 52nd French Division. The actual front of the four divisions so taken over was not more in total than three kilometers, but the burden assumed by the 83rd Brigade and performed in less than 24 hours from its arrival, entailed an immense amount of movement and reconnaissances, and was a maneuver of the greatest complexity by which the front of the 1st Corps was extended about 1½ kilometers to the north. The 42nd Division found before it a battlefield bitterly fought over, and littered with the dead and the debris of combat, over which the enemy aeroplanes were playing with impunity. Immediately in front, where the lines were checked, was the bulk of the Foret de Fere in which the German had concentrated large quantities of his ammunition and stores for his now frustrated drive on Paris. And, further, at the foot of the steep hills, was the River Ourcq, with the dense Foret de Nesles starting on the crest of its north slope. The lines were deadlocked, at a standstill. The key to the position was the Croix Rouge Farm that stood in an opening of the woods, and owing to machine guns in great numbers that dominated the entire clearing, forbade an advance in any direction. This position was flanked on the edges of the woods near which it stood by long lines of German machine guns, in nests, which, from every conceivable angle, swept the open space and all the numerous roads and trails that passed or radiated from the farm itself. The German had settled for a stand there. An advance at this point would threaten the entire pocket of what was known as the Tardenois—the center portion of the area between the Marne (from Dormans to Chateau Thierry), and the Vesle (from Reims to Soissons), and throw the immense number of German troops then in that pocket in complete disorder and danger of capture."

Next month we shall quote Colonel Wolf's record of the hard fighting north of Chateau Thierry.

THE RAINBOW REVEILLE

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Due to many letters requesting information about "The Reveille," we give below in brief certain facts:

1. There is no charge at the present time for subscriptions to the Reveille, it being financed personally by the officers of the Veterans Association.

2. Every former member of the 42nd Division is intended to receive an individual copy each month, whether a member of a Chapter or not, with the hope on our part that each man will join the Rainbow Chapter nearest to him.

3. If any man does not receive "The Reveille" at his correct address, write to the Secretary of the Chapter nearest to him. This Secretary will forward the name and address to the Reveille and will also keep a file of such names as prospects for Chapter members.

4. The supply of past issues has been exhausted. The only way of being sure of receiving a copy regularly each month is to have some Chapter Secretary send in the name to "The Reveille."

5. Changes of address should similarly be made through a Chapter Secretary rather than direct to "The Reveille."

In order that all may know the active secretaries, we print below the complete list. If any corrections should need to be made in this list, communications to that effect should be addressed to the National Secretary, Mr. M. Manning Marcus, Munsey Building, Washington, D. C., who is closely co-operating with "The Reveille." Incidentally, certain of the Chapter Secretaries, who have not sent in the lists of men in their territory and to whom it has been necessary to ship in bulk for their redistribution, have refused to accept various issues from the Express Company, even though all charges were prepaid. Each Chapter should see to it in future that either the Secretary accepts and redistributes the various issues or that the Secretary sends in an accurate list of the local veterans so that "The Reveille" may mail copies direct to the individual.

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three times at some points, it accomplished its role in retarding the forward march of the enemy. It stopped the enemy three hours—three hours of bloody hecatombs for him. It was the cause of his disaster. The victory was decided there, on that line of redoubts of the advance elements, in front even of the real line of defense.

This disposition would be good only on condition that all was in its place at the moment of the commencement of the attack. It implied a rigorous surveillance at all times of the movements of the enemy. No one knew whether the German, skilled in camouflaging would be able to hide his prepara-

tions. That explains the aggressive activity shown at all times by the Gouraud army and which was still more increased during the last weeks while they waited with growing impatience each day for the great event. There was always a raid going on at some point or other. This was the triumph of astute vigilance.

Since the beginning of June an offensive on a grand scale was expected on the front of the army. As time passed many indications announced the imminence of the attack,—indications that were noted. It is known that the front opposite the 4th Army, and no doubt the whole front, was equipped for a sudden attack for several months. Little by little one saw the increase in circulation on the railroads; the munition dumps growing; the aviation fields being prepared. The front, however, remained quiet and the artillery showed little activity. But one observed, as was the case before the offensive of May 27 and that of June 9, for example, the fire by high bursts,—discreet procedure for the regulation of the artillery.

Then, suddenly, on the 13th, behind the apparent immobility of the front, one perceived a more intense movement on the narrow gauge railroads, from the Suippe toward Epoye; one scented the movement of troops. The roads North of Suippes showed a little more animation also; wagons and individuals were on the march from North to South. The morning of the 14th wagons in greater number, but moving singly and not in convoys, went back from the zone of the batteries; it could be guessed that they had been supplying ammunition during the night. But the surest information was obtained from the almost daily raids to which, above, I have made allusion. The soldiers knew the necessity of them. They took part in them with enthusiasm. Their operations were fruitful during the whole first fortnight. The communiqués made note of some of them.

On July 6 came the first precise information, a simple intimation that the attack was imminent on the Champagne front. On what extent of the front was still a mystery at that date.

On July 8 certain indications revealed to us aggressive plans without as yet our being able to say exactly what they were. The following day the general would give out his order: of that there was not the shadow of a doubt.

By July 10 the date of the attack was better established by our information service: it would take place July 14 or 15. The zone involved would be the zone of the 4th Army as far as Mont Teton on the East. We had at last the details of the preparations.

July 11, 12, 13 gave confirmation of everything. Finally on the 14th, a detachment led by a lieutenant, fighting like a whirlwind, carried out the best of all the raids and the one which gave the

best results obtained in several weeks. It was then learned that the attack was merely a question of hours: the artillery preparation would commence at 10 minutes past midnight. At 4:15 a. m. the infantry would leave the trenches under cover of a rolling barrage.

It seems that such precautions astonished—and even left a little bit skeptical—the staff of the fine and valiant American division which that day fought with us. A little later they declared themselves delighted that the event had proved they had been mistaken.

Whatever might happen the Army was ready. Kept informed from day to day of the situation Generals Foch and Petain had approved the dispositions taken and had given to the command of the 4th Army troops necessary to assure the execution of the same. In war it is always necessary to reckon with the unexpected, fate, luck, call it what you will, but as everything had been done to meet it they could count upon an infallible success. The order of the day of the 7th reflects this semi-certitude.

On July 14th at 11 p. m. General Gouraud gave the order to begin the counter-offensive preparation. It was launched a half hour later forestalling the German bombardment.

At the hour mentioned, at 10 minutes past midnight, this bombardment was launched with a terrible roar. It surprised no one. In this period of expectation, where every day the attack was felt to be more imminent, the commander of the army had been able to visit even the posts of the Colonels and enable them to share his firm confidence.

Everybody was in place. The "position in readiness" so minutely studied out was taken up.

The violence of our counter-offensive fire surprised the enemy. Batteries silent up to that time, and which had not been located, suddenly revealed themselves, producing the infallible effect to surprise.

At 4:15 a. m. the rockets of the vigilant look-out men of the line of observation ascended in the breaking dawn; the waves of assault rushed forward. Then our own barrage descended like a whirlwind on our first positions, where the enemy was arriving and which the German guns of all calibers and the minenwerfer had already hammered. The battle was going to be enacted according to schedule. Luck was with us. Not a hitch. In the same way that the observation detachments had done their duty, the advance elements of the first line battalions were carrying on, fulfilling the mission which had been entrusted to them, "to hold back and disintegrate the enemy." Each man remained where duty commanded him to hold.

Many of those must have fallen into the hands of the Germans. News was received from some of them however. Thus, the Army Corps which

was fighting at the left of the front proudly recorded the heroic attitude of a half section which, encircled, submerged by the wave which overwhelmed it, sent at 6:30 a. m. a carrier pigeon to announce that it was still holding. Another group resisted until 10 a. m.

On the line of redoubts, the Germans were stopped three full hours at least. Even when certain of their elements had slipped between, many little fortresses, besieged, continued furiously to resist.

For example, the garrison of Mont Sans Nom belonged to the same regiment as this half section of which I have just spoken, to the same therefore which had made the 27 prisoners some hours before—Heavens! how we should like to give more credit to these heroes, telling more clearly who they are—this garrison under the orders of the Captain remained besieged until 6 p. m., but always in liaison with the rear especially by wireless telephone, so well had the dispositions been taken. And it kept the command in touch with the course of the fight. The Battalion Commander himself was surrounded not far from there in his command post with a part of his men. All of them made the same stubborn resistance to the assaults of the enemy, and it was only when the authorization had been given for the same, and after they had exhausted all their munitions and accomplished the destructions provided for, that the Major, the Captain, and their two small garrisons retired, forcing a passage by bayonet and bringing back prisoners. A Lieutenant of the Chasseurs a Pied accomplished a similar exploit. How many others also! A regiment in the center which repulsed eleven successive attacks was cited.

But from the first minutes of the attack, so to speak, they saw clearly that it was a failure for the enemy.

The initial resistance which he was not expecting had disconcerted him. The minute clock work of this too precise machine was suddenly thrown out of gear.

While the attacking troops had arrived before the line of redoubts, all the machinery behind them was continuing to function according to the schedule based on the hypothesis of a victorious progress. The barrage rolled rhythmically far in advance of the furious waves breaking against the syke which was resisting them. And the divisions of the second line, fully convinced that the first were pursuing their regular advance, like the hands of a clock, had advanced behind them at the appointed hour; then motor convoys, supply wagons, horse-drawn batteries, in columns on the roads. . . into all that our artillery men fired with open sights, pounding, grinding, unceasingly, the men, the heavy trucks and the horses. Never has any one seen such fine hecatombs. At the source of the Ain, on that little hillock which General Marchand used to love and

which he called "Place de l'Opera," 70 corpses were lying in one heap. But it was perhaps in the region of the "Mounts" which we had just abandoned during the night in conformance with the plans of the command, that the carnage was the finest. They were seen to appear on the crests, at present denuded, where no cover masked them from view, and then to plunge down the slopes. Magnificent targets! "We were firing into the mass!" the gunners say.

At a certain moment in this region of the Monts, an artillery observer reported that the Germans were in the act of forming an artillery park under our noses. "It's a scandal" cried the Captain of the battery. And in a few shots the park was "tended to." In their case the facility with which they had crossed the line of alert, so thinly occupied, had given them the illusion of a successful advance. It is thus that a Captain in command of a Tank Section was captured on the hill of Tahure at the moment when he had just written and was preparing to send the following message:

"Tahure Hill, July 15, 7 a. m.

The five tanks have all crossed the first enemy line and are continuing to advance toward the Wardberg where the enemy possesses numerous machine gun nests. I am going to Somme-Suippes, continuing the pursuit of the enemy and will return afterwards."

They did lead him to Somme-Suippes to the command post of the General and there they said to him: "Well, you've reached it." But the jest was not to his taste.

Here was the situation at 7 a. m.: At the right our advance elements were holding well on all the line of redoubts; in the center the enemy was in contact with our intermediate position; at the left the pressure was intense between the Ferme des Marquises and the Maison du Garde; the enemy reached the Roman road and the woods southeast of Prunay.

At noon, according to the expression of one of the Army Corps Commanders, "Their legs were broken." Their offensive was smashed. Victory was ours.

"A great personage," said one of the first prisoners, "is observing this from up there." In fact the German Emperor, as formerly from the top of the Grand Couronne he watched for the moment to rush upon Nancy, was waiting on Mont Blanc, in Ludendorff's house, for the hour to enter Chalons. Thus he was able to see another of his dreams fade.

At two points only had the attack penetrated our intermediate line: to the North of Prosnes and at Perthes-le-Hurlus, carried for a moment and then retaken by us. These modest gains were only momentary for the enemy.

On the 16th, however, he resumed the charge. He had not renounced the hope of getting a foothold on our position of resistance.

Between the Vesle and the Suippe he attacked the first time at 10 a. m. and again at 1:15 p. m. He was repulsed on both occasions and left numerous bodies on the ground.

East of the Suippe he attacked three times. He was always repulsed in disorder.

In the morning, after a strong artillery preparation, he charged forward with strong forces South of the Maison Champagne. He did not succeed in gaining even the principal parallel of our intermediate position.

In the night of the 16th-17th he made a new attack in the region of Auberive but with as little success. In return, we on our side, regained some terrain in the sector of Balcon, at Beausejour and retook a redoubt which we had abandoned.

A great artillery activity reigned during the entire day of the 17th on our side. It was destructive fire on the enemy's batteries, harrassing and interdiction fire, and even fire on moving targets. Thus at the Trou-Bricot, of famous memory, groups occupied in trying to release two tanks in distress, were taken under our fire and obliged—those who could get away—to leave their task.

Our infantrymen were none the less impetuous. To the East, the days of the 17th and 18th they had reoccupied, despite a bitter resistance, all the line of the redoubts of the first position, and on the entire front reconquered certain points necessary to the security of our position of resistance.

And that was the end of the battle. In reality the decisive phase had lasted about four hours.

The plan adopted by General Gouraud with the approval of Generals Foch and Petain, to form in front of his intermediate position, a glaciais where the enemy would strike his first and most violent blow, into empty space as it were, so as to receive him vigorously, when he was out of breath, on a line well prepared,—this plan necessitated the abandonment of a strip of terrain which at its broadest part—it can be seen on the map—hardly exceeds 4 kilometers.

Now in this scrap of territory there figured the Monts, this series of heights rendered illustrious since that time by such glorious combats as le Cornillet, le Mont Blanc, le Mont Haut, le Casque, le Teton. Sacrifices heavy for us to endure if we did not know that they were but momentary and that, moreover, in good tactics terrain does not count and that the essential is, as General Gouraud reminded in his order of the day, "to kill many of them." This result was superbly obtained.

The Gouraud Army had before it in line, at the eve of the battle, 13 divisions, some of them crack divisions, as will be recognized by their mere designation. They were from West to East, from the region of Trugny to that of Massiges, the 15th Bavarian, the 3d Guard, the 26th Division, the Ersatz Division of the Guard, the 199th Division, the 239th,

the 1st, the Dismounted Cavalry Division of the Guard, the 2d Bavarian Division, the 1st Bavarian, the 89th Infantry Division, the 7th Infantry Division, the 33d Reserve, plus nine or ten divisions in reserve, that is to say, 25 at the lowest estimate. In what state they did arrive at the line which they were occupying in the evening!... Exhausted, decimated, incapable of going further without being reorganized, an operation which is no doubt going on today. And in front of them they found an adversary weak only in numbers and well organized for the defensive. Our success cost us only negligible losses.

They, however, even if they say that they suffered relatively little from our counter-preparation fire—"even" Rabelais would have said—confess, on the other hand, that after the moment when they arrived in our first position, half deserted, furiously covered by our fire, they were mowed down like hay. It was still worse when they entered into the zone covered by the machine guns of the redoubts.

It was known for example, that some well directed shots had annihilated at 1 p. m. three platoons in a trench in front of a machine gun nest. In reckoning on an average of 100 men per company, here is one therefore which at one shot lost 60% of its strength. Another, a company of the 30th Bavarian Regiment, which on July 13 had 2 officers, 3 adjutants, 10 non-commissioned officers and 83 men, had lost on the 18th, 4 dead, 18 wounded, 7 sick and 33 disappeared, which makes 60% again.

I have several times expressed my distrust with regard to statistical generalizations, and I will refrain from concluding anything from these percentages. Nevertheless, the enemy losses were particularly heavy in the region of Perthes and East of Auberive, where entire companies were reported destroyed. Oh, yes, we killed some—to the point that on the 18th the Dismounted Cavalry Division of the Guard, reduced to half, refused to sacrifice itself completely and refused to leave its trenches. It was necessary for the officers to take the lead in order to draw the men out; all those of the 2d Chasseur a Cheval were killed or wounded in this affair.

The attacking tactics of the Germans had been those to which we were heretofore accustomed: a short but brutal artillery preparation, then the assault. The divisions occupied fronts of 2500 to 3000 meters. Each one marched echeloned in depth, 2 regiments in the front line and 1 in support. The divisions in sector had been replaced the preceding night or the same night as the attack, by entirely fresh shock divisions. The troops thus relieved returned to the support position ready to follow the attack in 2d line.

One fact will suffice to give an idea of the valor and determination of our soldiers, as well as of the will of the enemy and of the violence of his assault.

In the Army Corps which was fighting on our left wing three divisions had to face six enemy divisions, the first six of the enumeration given above. Now these admirable troops fought until the 18th. There was one battalion there which, completely surrounded, resisted three long hours on the Roman road and succeeded in disengaging itself. On the fourth day of the combat the regiment to which it belongs was charged with pinning down the enemy, holding him back, and keeping him from sending his reserves to another point. Not only did it "pin him down" but it progressed at certain points and brought back as trophies 33 machine guns and machine gun rifles.

They had in their midst, in the most perfect fraternity of arms, an American Division. It esteemed it an honor to rival them in courage and nerve. Its men went under fire as into a football game, in shirtsleeves, with their sleeves rolled up over nervous biceps. In a trench where they were operating in concert with our Chasseurs, 60 corpses were counted on a field of 250 meters. Ah! the Germans who saw them at work can no longer doubt that they are there and indeed, as our troopers say, "certainly there."

The only map which we are authorized in publishing here and which everyone has been able to draw up from the communiqués, shows a meager territorial gain by the enemy. It was evidently not for so slender a result that he has prepared so formidable an effort and that the Kaiser had mobilized himself so near to the line of fire.

His soldiers had been told that it was a supreme effort—again!—the *Friedensturm*, the offensive for peace. For the staffs it was a *Durchbruchschlacht*, a battle to break through. For us, it was the first phase of a great battle which is going on and from this success we have already seen these last days the happy consequences.

From the point of view of an attack the field of battle may be divided into 3 sectors. At the right enemy wing, the two groupments Lindquist and Gontard, each composed of 3 divisions in first line—divisions thoroughly trained in the offensives to break through—were to manoeuvre probably with a view to crossing obliquely as soon as it was possible, to the southwest, to cross the Vesle, to reach the Marne and to envelop Epernay. In liaison with the operation which was going on east of Dormans, this was to cause the fall of the Montagne de Reims. In the center, the Lauger groupment (or Isle perhaps) comprising the 12th Corps (1st Infantry and Dismounted Cavalry Division of the Guard) and the 3d Bavarian Corps (1st and 2d Divisions) was to fall straight upon Chalons from north to south.

Finally, the divisions of the left wing, 88th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division and 33d Reserve Division were, by a movement similar to that of the right wing, to cross obliquely to the

southeast in the direction of St. Menehould in order eventually to cut the railroad.

The line of the objectives of the first day, as far as it has been possible to determine it from captured documents, passed to the south of Verzy, Villers-Marmery Livry sur Vesle, Bouy, Vadenay, Cuperly, la Cheppe, Bussy le Château, la Croix on Champagne, Somme-Bionne, Hans, Dommartin.

The second day they were to have captured Reims, Epernay, Chalons. That was their principal goal. The manoeuvre of their left constituted only a cover manoeuvre on the whole.

And everything was admirably provided for the exploitation of this success and of the various stores which it might bring. Thus, the men were forbidden even to pass through towns and villages much less to occupy them. As soon as they had been reached and taken, the entrances were to be carefully guarded so as to permit officers of the Quartermaster Corps to proceed to the inventory and the distribution of the booty—no more individual pillaging. At Chalons mounted Quartermaster officers, according to an order of the 1st Army, were to go to take possession of the stores. And "Instructions regarding the utilization of the booty" indicate with a minutia worthy of these practical people the objects to be "saved" and the usage that could be made of them. It is classed by groups and materials as in an exposition catalogue.

But the 4th French Army stood in the way. May thanks be rendered to our soldiers and to their chief!

Last Saturday, during the course of a reunion of touching simplicity and cordiality General Gouraud, who had assembled with his staff the representatives of the units which took part in the battle, in order, as he said, to do homage in lifting his cup as well "to those who work as to those who fight and those who die," said: "There are here some chiefs united to soldiers and this is called an Army."

He has stated this beautiful and just thought in the order of the day which he addressed to the soldiers of the 4th Army on July 16:

"During the day of July 15, you broke the effort of 15 German Divisions supported by 10 others. They were, according to their orders, to have reached the Marne in the evening; you have stopped them short at the point where we desired to engage in and win the battle.

"You have the right to be proud, heroic infantry and machine gun men of the outposts who signalled the attack, aviators who flew over it, battalions and batteries which broke it; staffs which so minutely prepared the field of battle.

"It is a hard blow for the enemy. It is a beautiful day for France.

"I count on you that it may always be the same each time that he dares to attack you and with all my heart of a soldier I thank you."

This order is, in brief form, all the outline, all the lesson and all the consecration of the battle before Chalons."

GUSTAVE BABIN.